I came across a post the other day by an atheist who seems to be a public speaker, and who runs a blog on ChicagoNow. This post was about the “free will” topic and how he holds a belief in free will. To be fair I suspect that the blogger is unfamiliar with much of the nuance of the free will debate from our little chat we had in the comment section, and he seems like a swell guy. I thought it might be good to respond to his post as some of the things in it are those rudimentary mistakes that those new to the debate quite often make, such as the idea that if hard determinism is shown false, that opens the door for free will.
Please read James Kirk Wall‘s post in full here: “This Atheist Believes in Free Will”.
Though it will make my response much longer, I’ll quote each part just to keep his words in full context.
Wall’s post starts out in a strange way, addressing atheisms relation to free will. I suspect this is because he is an outspoken atheist with a focus on that topic.
Would the existence of free will threaten atheism? The answer is no. Life began on earth and that life evolved intelligence. The human brain is the pinnacle of that intelligence. It’s a thinking machine capable of making decisions, even, on occasion, controlled decisions. So what?
How does this threaten atheism at all? Does free will give any legitimacy to the talking snake fable? Is arguing against free will simply an attempt to attack the Abrahamic religions? We are materialists to the extent in which we understand all that we are is in the physical brain. But we shouldn’t treat materialism like a religion.
Here Wall is, of course, correct. Atheism is just the lack of belief in a god or gods. One can be a theist (believe in a god or gods) and hold a belief in free will, or they can be a theist and disbelieve in free will. One can also be an atheist and believe in free will, or be an atheist and disbelieve in free will. Now I’d argue the belief in free will in the important sense (the one that applies to just desert responsibility or what I refer to as the “strong sense of responsibility”) is an irrational belief regardless if one is a theist or an atheist, but the topic of free will is not tied to theism or atheism and both can (and should) understand why we lack it and what that means that we do.
In regards to “a thinking machine capable of making decisions, even, on occasion, controlled decisions”, most free will skeptics would not reject this ability though the idea of “controlled decisions” would fall under causally controlled by a product (we are products) that ultimately stemmed back to events that were outside of any control of that product.
Next he mentions “Abrahamic religions”. For this, arguing against free will is not simply to attack the Abrahamic religions (there are far more important reasons to reject free will), but it does put into question notions of “hellfire” being at all just, and various problems with “original sin” and other strange factors of various religions used to invoke blame. It also should be noted that the reason we lack free will does not reside on materialism being necessary. It just resides on an understanding of cause and effect (logically), and how anything that could fall outside of cause and effect cannot be “caused by us”. Even some magical, supernatural cause simply could not help the free will of importance – at least if we are to accept the constraints of being logically coherent.
After this, Wall asks a question that much of his argument for free will seems to reside on:
What’s the alternative to a worldview of free will? Hard determinism?
Though posed in question format, the author sort of suggests a false dichotomy – that if no free will, then hard determinism, and much of the arguments made suggest vice versa, that if no hard determinism, then free will. Keep in mind that this also sets him up for what I and many consider the worst account of free will, which is that of the “libertarian” variety. The word “libertarian” here is not used in the political sense, it simply means that some notion of indeterminism (lack of determinism) can grant free will. Keep in mind that free will compatibilists and free will skeptics alike (almost always) reject this libertarian variety of “free will”, and for good reason: Any indeterministic event, whether that be an event without a cause, or some more magical ontological probability, would never be “up to the chooser”. These events would just “pop into existence” or be like “throwing magical dice” in which what lands is but sheer luck (or unluckiness depending on outcome). Let’s move on.
Can your decision to read this article be traced to the beginning of the Big Bang? According to Hard Determinism the answer is yes. Every event was caused by a past event without exception.
Though it is true that hard determinism says this, most hard determinists are also hard incompatibilists, meaning they say that even IF indeterminism was the case, this could not help with free will. If you are unfamiliar with the term “hard incompatibilism” read here:
Why I’m a Hard Incompatibilist, Not a Hard Determinist.
Through reductionism everything can be traced back, or reduced down, to one singular thing.
I disagree that reductionism is required for hard determinism or for (theoretically) “tracing causal events” back to the so-called ‘beginning’ of the known universe. I think this often comes down to a misuse to the term “reductionism”. The reality is, it is also the case that a holistic or downward causal approach would be equally as deterministic, meaning parts cause “wholes” with properties that play back “down” into the part behaviour. One does not have to be a reductionist to note that non-reductionism would not equate to indeterminism. The wholes would be equally as caused as the parts, and vice versa.
As soon as the Big Bang began, and anything leading up to that moment which is unknown to us, everything was determined. Hence the word determinism. With the size, speed, and direction of celestial bodies we can trace where they were in the past and determine where they will be in the future.
Causal determinism does not suggest that we can or will be able to trace events like this. A common misconception is to suggest that determinism for the free will debate means that we can “determine” or predict events. Rather, it means that each event that takes place is determined by another (antecedent) event (or events) which is equally determined by others (so on down the line), regardless of a capacity to trace these or not. Sure, we can use a Laplace’s Demon thought experiment for the “predictability” aspect, but it is hardly needed for the tenets of causal determinism.
Here is a post I wrote about the terms used for the debate:
“Determinism” and “Indeterminism” for the Free Will Debate
Even if no “trace” could ever happen due to various technicalities regarding the limitations on knowledge – like the measurement problem at the small-scale (that in order to measure at this scale one must interact, changing what was being measured), the uncertainty principle (problems measuring both momentum and position at the small-scale), chaos theory (small changes producing complex and large differences that cannot reasonably be kept track of), or what not – it is still the case that causal determinism may be true and that all events were dictated by other events.
Our minds are made up of star stuff. They contain the same elements and therefore must contain the same determined paths. Or do they?
If every event has a cause – yes – they do. If some events do not have a cause, if we invoke indeterminism in, they do not. But indeterminism is anything but a saviour of “free will” as will be pointed out.
To provide another view of the implication of hard determinism, think about the following scenario. Take our current universe and go back 10,000 years. Freeze time and make a snap shot. Make 100 exact copies and unfreeze time. Our universe will be exactly the same as it would be akin to rewinding a movie and letting it play again. The 10,000 years already happened for our universe. But for the other 100, it was a fresh start 10,000 years ago.
First it must be denoted that the idea of “copies” bring up notions of inexact copies even if the word “exact” is used, as it suggests a separateness from the original, something perhaps, in some ways, locationally different. One cannot imagine a “copy” that is exact in every way, because a copy is not (in the logical sense) identical to what it is a copy of. This is why, rather than “make a copy”, we usually just bring back time to 10,000 years and let causality “play out again” from that point in time of the same universe.
So here’s the question, after 10,000 years are the 101 universes exactly alike? The positioning of the stars and galaxies would be exactly the same. But what about human civilization? If human events and history is different in all 100 worlds; that would mean random choices exist. Anything random destroys the concept of determinism. An action out of randomness is unpredictable and not determinable.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word “exact” means identical in every way (even though that is impossible for copies – let’s not nitpick as I think we know what Wall is alluding to) – if every event has a sufficient cause, there would be 101 universes that are exactly alike. The playout must be identical. For there to be a change, there would have to be a difference somewhere (which if identical cannot happen) or there would have to be an indeterministic event (an event without a sufficient cause).
Such an indeterministic event cannot in any way, shape, or form, be “chosen”. The word “random” used here is also one of those words that are often conflated. A truly random event is one that is not caused to be a specific state. This differs from the randomness of say a “roll of a die” in which physics dictates exactly what number that die will land on (even if we may not know all of the causal variables). A truly random event in the indeterministic sense is one that is not sufficiently caused by antecedent events. A truly random choice is a contradiction, as choosing is caused by a chooser.
Wall is correct that anything truly random in the universe means that determinism is not sustained, but the reason is because there was an event that was not determined by an antecedent cause (the reason is not because it was unpredictable and undeterminable – though it is the case that a truly random event must be those as well). And because it was not determined by an antecedent cause, it cannot be determined by a willer. This is why indeterminism simply cannot help free will. If anything, if an indeterministic event had any say over our thoughts and actions, these events would more likely be a detriment to willing. At least on a causal account there can be a causal chain of so called “causally willed” events – even if they could not have been otherwise (not free). Suggesting an otherwise possibility from indeterminism is like saying one’s decisions are made on the whim of acausal events popping into existence or the roll of quantum decision making dice. This is anything but free will
Even free will compatibilists note the problems with suggesting indeterminism helps with free will.
Why should we believe that the human mind contains the same determinism of celestial bodies? Why would we not believe that the human brain is an agent capable of making undeterminable random choices?
First, I don’t know why he separates out the human brain here. If indeterminism happens in the universe, it happens at the quantum scale regardless of being in a brain or not.
Second, any true randomness in the brain that affects our decision-making process cannot be up to the chooser any more than the causal events that our decisions ultimately stem from that are outside of us. We are products of our biology and environment, and if that environment happens to be bombarded with indeterministic events, those events not only would be out of our control entirely, but also be far more of a detriment to the coherency of our thoughts. It would be like typing this post with random letters just popping into the coherent thought.
Of couPrWQse th@t woQSuFld notT be vQSDVery heF1lp9ful. 😉
How does this relate to free will? Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded. You’re making a decision, there are at least two options. Not only are you unimpeded on what to choose, you are unimpeded in what not to choose. According to hard determinism, free will is just an illusion. Any decision we make was already determined.
Here Wall define’s what he is calling “free will”. This is appreciated as many people miss the step of defining what they are referring to. Let’s, however, go over this definition:
Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action unimpeded.
This is better than compatibilist notions as it suggests that free will requires one to be able to choose otherwise. That there is more than one possible course of action. As he already recognizes, if the universe is deterministic, then there is only one possible course of action, so he must inject in indeterminism. This makes his position strictly of the libertarian variety (requiring indeterminism).
Now let’s look at the key word he decides on for his definition: “unimpeded”. The question must be asked, unimpeded by what? Certainly an indeterministic event that a person would have absolutely no control over the outcome of, that changed the course of action, would be a huge impediment. This would impede on the choice you were going to causally make, my hitting you with some truly random event that was entirely out of your control. How could indeterministic events that bombard one’s coherent causal flow of thoughts or decision-making not be something that impeded? It seems we don’t have his definition of free will either.
Our gender, parents, genes, cognitive ability, innate talents, time, place, and economic circumstances into which we happen to be born were not our decisions to make and yet provide enormous influence on who we are and how we think.
Not just an “enormous influence”, these are the things that make up our state of being. Throwing (truly) random events into that influence is not helpful when we are not any more responsible for those random events than we are the above.
Do these factors influence our decision making? I don’t see how anyone can argue that they don’t. But do these factors not only influence, but determine every decision we make? I would argue no.
Arguing “no” here is not to argue for a coherent view of free will.
I believe that humans have free will. But let’s not think of this as an on-and-off switch. And let’s be clear on all that’s necessary to debunk determinism. Let’s suppose out of every 10,000 decisions you make, 9,999 are predetermined based on past events and one is based on choosing possible courses of action unimpeded. Hard determinism is dead, and every instance of the 100 word scenario has a different human civilization.
And here it is, the libertarian argument for free will: hard determinism is or may be untrue (as there is or may be indeterminism), therefore “free will”.
And there is that word “unimpeded” as if a truly random event affecting our decisions would not be an impediment. As if we would have some say over such an event taking place the way it does and causing what it does. First, we don’t know if such an indeterministic event can happen, that depends perhaps on which quantum interpretation one subscribes to. But even if we accept that there is real indeterminism in the universe, even if hard determinism is not the case in that a full chain of events had to all causally happen, indeterminism in any sense of that word cannot help with free will and just labeling random events that would be out of the control of willing as “free will” is the reason libertarian notions of free will are not taken seriously.
But would only a fraction of a fraction of free will make any significant difference? The answer is yes. A small decision can have an enormous rippling effect. Let’s suppose an ancestor 10,000 years ago that was female, instead of going with male A mated with male B. An entire lineage is changed. Generations expanding exponentially to other generations over 10,000 years are effected.
A fraction of an indeterministic event can theoretically have a rippling effect (though even then many would suggest that large-scale determinism would probably be an overriding factor), but such an event is not something you would have any control over, and any ripple effect it caused would be equally out of your control. To call this free will is no conception of free will that is of any worth. It would still be the case that we were not morally responsible in the just desert sense – as we simply could not be responsible for some truly random / indeterministic event that created a ripple effect.
In our own history, let’s suppose Plato dedicates himself to writing tragedies instead of being a student of Socrates. That would result in a significant change to our current history of Western Civilization.
Again, a historical change that was out of our control is not free will, it just would point out the whim of indeterminism that our future would be susceptible to. It would be a detriment to our capacities to make reliable predictions – that is about it. And if these events were pervasive, it would make even consequentialist assessments become untenable. At least sufficient causality is something we can work to understand and causally have an intentional effect on.
At this point in the post the author turns the tables in important ways that I don’t think he is aware of.
Going back to the circumstances that we’re born into, I don’t believe those factors mean we don’t have free will. The implication is that not everyone has the same level of free will. Making decisions is about having options. As a writer in the United States with a laptop, internet connection, and blogging site, I have an enormous set of options on how I want to express myself. But let’s suppose I was born into poverty in North Korea.
Perhaps he does not realize this, but now he has converted to promoting more a compatibilist notion of free will – one that is “compatible with determinism”. I find these sorts of conversions very telling, as they sort of point out a lack of the nuance when understanding this topic. Note that one could lack options that another has, for example, someone in prison lacks the option to be able to go to the movie theatre on a Saturday night with friends, but given determinism, if the person not in prison does decide to go to the movie theatre, she still could not have done otherwise than make that decision and go. The fact, however, that she had the “freedom” to do so while the prisoner did not have that freedom, is the sense of “freedom” often used by compatibilists. If someone is not restricted, coerced by another, and so on, they have “more free will” than another who has these restrictions, per many compatibilists.
This compatibilist notion is a better free-will version than what Wall has been arguing for prior. Of course I argue against compatibilist definitions of free will as they also bypass the important points of the debate and cause unnecessary and harmful confusions for laypersons who carry more problematic notions of free will abilities.
In all the discussions about free will, what should be included is freedom. If all you have to eat is rice, guess what you’re going to have for diner. Let’s suppose you have money and traveled to Chicago, New York, or Paris. You go out to eat, but haven’t decided what. You go out the door and start walking around a place you’ve never been to. Where will the journey take you?
No one can predict what you’ll wind up eating. You can’t predict what you’ll wind up eating. You pass 20 restaurants, back up five, and wind up at restaurant number fifteen. There are 100 things on the menu. You narrow it down to two choices, and you can go either way. You wind up with A instead of B, but you could have gone with B instead of A.
And now we see some strange mix of compatibilism and libertarianism. First he addresses the restrictions of having only rice, and how certain factors can have less restrictions. This is inherently compatibilistic as it does not require indeterminism.
But then Wall hits us back with:
You wind up with A instead of B, but you could have gone with B instead of A.
This is specifically indeterministic if he is saying, given the same initial conditions, that you going to B was a real possibility. For that you would need an indeterministic event somewhere down the line, one that would be entirely out of your control. If you went to B instead of A, it would be something forced upon you by indeterministic events you’d have no control over, which is not any better than you deterministically going to A instead of B (in fact I’d argue worse for willing).
Sam Harris believes that free will is an illusion, it doesn’t exist. But the premature conclusions of the Benjamin Libet experiment which he uses to base this claim in his book Free Will has since been debunked. Sam Harris cannot say that science has proven free will doesn’t exist. He wrote a book and gave lectures based on a conclusion from an inconclusive experiment. That is one heck of a blunder!
I tend to agree with Wall that the Libet experiments alone are insufficient, but Harris does not use this as his only mechanism for defending against free will. His book is not entirely about this experiment. That being said I think the neuroscientific evidence against free will is excellent supporting evidence in rejection of it:
Neuroscientific Supporting Evidence Against Free Will
But Harris only uses the Libet experiments as an example on the neuroscience front and to suggest this is the entire base for his conclusion is a strawman of his position. It is easy to call a strawman of someone else’s position a “blunder”.
In matters of randomness, Harris argues that random choices do exist but doesn’t mean free will. Why? He argues that unless you can explain why you picked one option over the other at random, like the two choices in the restaurant scenario, that’s not free will. I would argue that Sam Harris is wrong. You don’t need to explain why, you simply need to make the choice, understand the choice, and accept the consequences.
This is another strawman of Harris. First, Harris is not denoting some sort of “random” event here (especially in the indeterministic sense), he is pointing out that conscious processes stem from unconscious processes and we often don’t even know why certain thoughts come to the forefront of consciousness and not others at any given moment (not that they randomly happen). Harris tries to get people to experience a sense where there is no free will. But this is hardly his argument for why free will does not exist, rather it is an intuitive type of thought experiment he uses addressing that even the experience of free will can be adjusted if one thinks about it.
This being said, I myself do not agree with Harris on everything and I think some of the ways he words things can cause problems in the minds of others (but the bigger picture he is right on). I wrote this a while back about his talk on the experience of lacking free will:
Sam Harris on the Experience of ‘No Free Will’
I appreciate Harris for being a popularizer of free will skepticism, and for that his work is important, but other free will skeptics I think have said it better at times.
You picked from the menu. If the food is delicious, you picked wisely. If the food is terrible, you screwed up! And now you’ll have to live with regret.
Sure, regret can happen even if one understands they lack free will. One can even be frustrated that an event played out the way they did, or that they deliberated the way they did and made a poor decision. One can also be happy that they made a good decision. One can even learn from past mistakes. All of this can be part of causal processing and one does not have to inject in notions of blameworthiness to have regret or frustration over an event in hindsight. A sucky event is still a sucky event.
I found it interesting that Harris injected this “you need to understand why” into the definition of free will. Seems like an attempt to move the goal post. My statement that free will is simply an illusion rests on shaky ground, therefore I’ll attempt to redefine the term rather than admit my logic may have been a bit faulty.
That is not exactly correct. This is how Harris defines free will in his book:
- that each of us could have behaved differently in the past
- that we are the conscious source of most of our thoughts and actions in the present
Now I don’t even need #2 the way Harris defines it, I would just say that for the free will of importance:
- that we could have done otherwise (which is the same as he says in his #1), and
- the event that causes the “otherwise” difference to happen would have to be something that could be “up to us” (not something out of the control of the willer).
I compact this into “the ability to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise”. I also provide a present tense version so people don’t get hung up on tense: Free Will
The reason this (or something like this) is the definition of importance is that, without this ability, we cannot be “just desert morally responsible” or what I call “the strong sense of responsibility” in this infographic:
Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC
I really found this statement of Harris interesting as I’ve heard the exact opposite. If you understand why you made a decision it was not free will. Why? Because there were obviously pre-existing reasons that determined the choice. So people arguing that there’s no free will seem to be saying that if you know why you made the choice, it’s not free will, and if you don’t know why you made the choice, it’s not free will. How convenient.
Harris is not suggesting there are not pre-existing reasons (here Wall is making non-sequiturs), Harris is suggesting that unconscious reasons fall outside of “conscious willing”. They fall outside of “conscious decision making”. But unconscious processes are pre-existing reasons that determine the choice. The fact that free will is incoherent either way is not the fault of the free will skeptic.
When it comes to analyzing a decision and finding out why it was made, here’s the problem. No matter what decision was made, it can be analyzed and reasoning can be made. If out of 1,000 choices someone went with #937, we can examine the reasoning as to why. But if they went with choice #47, we could also examine the reasoning as to why. For a hard determinist, reasoning why a decision was made becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that it must have been made.
Again, to suggest that the deliberation process could have ended in #937 or #47 is to inject in indeterminism that would be entirely outside of the control of the willer – logically. If #937 had a sufficient cause for it and that cause had a cause, the only way to get to #47 would be an event without a sufficient cause being thrown into the mix without the willers say.
But let’s suppose hard determinism is right. Each instance in the 100 world scenario is exactly alike. Each world contains the same population, and the same history. Everything was indeed determined before the human species even existed. Well now what? What are the practical implications? Are there any?
There are tons of practical implications with understanding we don’t have free will in both a deterministic universe (hard determinism) and an indeterministic universe (hard incompatibilism).
Here are just 10 of the benefits of not believing in free will:
10 Benefits of Not Believing in Free Will
A big criticism of hard determinism is that if people aren’t free to choose their options, nobody can be accountable for them. Criminals were going to do bad things, it’s not like they had any control. We should feel sorry for them. Why should we punish people that couldn’t help what they were doing?
So shouldn’t we change our justice system if we have determined free will doesn’t exist? The answer is no. Not that we should never make changes to our system, but not based on determinism.
The lack of free will has huge implication for the way we run our criminal system. Free will skeptics such as Pereboom and Caruso address these at length. We need to move away from retributive models that only reinforce undesirable behaviors, and focus on more rehabilitative and quarantine models:
Quarantine Analogy and Free Will Skepticism
I’m sure you’ve heard the expression, “there’s a new sheriff in town.” Where did this expression come from? When European settlers in the U.S. headed west, remote towns were established. Without organized law enforcement, these towns were lawless. People didn’t feel safe walking the streets.
So some tough son-of-a-gun comes into town, takes the badge, and makes their presence known. I’m the new sheriff in these parts and everyone will obey the law. If they don’t I will hunt them down and string them up. Not wanting any part of that, people who were causing problems are now walking the straight and narrow. Crime goes down significantly and people now feel safe to walk the streets.
This is the very archaic, even barbaric mentality free will skeptics are looking to change. We don’t live in the “wild west” any longer and the idea is to progress, not to regress. The lack of free will does not equal just letting all criminals run free, it doesn’t even equate to no crime deterrence. What it does equate to is a compassion for the variables of people who, if you were in their shoes atom for atom, you would have acted just like. We also need to account for victims who do not deserve being victimized by causally unfortunate mentalities. The criminal system, however, needs to remove retributive justice and just focus on the most compassionate consequentialist justice possible.
What if the sheriff came in and said, “All your actions are determined, and since everyone is going to do what they’re going to do anyway, no one can be blamed for anything.” What would happen? Crime would continue.
The actions of the sheriff establishing law and order immediately became a past action that directly impacted future actions. Even if these actions were determined, they still made a positive and significant impact.
No, not holding people “to blame” does not equate to not preventing criminals from harmful acts – any more than not holding people who accidentally contract a contagious disease “to blame” would prevent us from quarantining that person, or not holding a mentally ill person “to blame” would prevent us from stopping that person from harmful acts. In fact we can still have great concern and compassion for the person in quarantine or the mentally ill person, yet still prevent them – even against their wishes. Same with the criminal who is a product of circumstances.
Fatalism is the belief that none of our actions mean anything. That doesn’t make any sense at all.
Wall has that right, but whatever you do, don’t conflate determinism (or hard incompatibilism) with fatalism. They are not the same thing:
Determinism vs. Fatalism – InfoGraphic (a comparison)
Our thoughts and actions play a causal role in the future output, even if those thoughts and actions stem from events that were ultimately out of our control – our biology, and our environment (and any acausal events we are bombarded in per the indeterminist).
The bottom line is that a society must establish law and order. Good arms and good laws as Machiavelli would say. This means people need to be made accountable for their actions in order to guide others in making constructive decisions. Actions to help determine future actions.
Yes, we need to have “law and order”, but you know where the crime rates are less? Where criminals are treated with compassion rather than hatred and disdain. Take Norway’s prison system as an example. We also need to understand that people are not truly blameworthy in the “just desert” sense (in the sense that they deserve it). This leads to far greater compassion over the causal variables of another, and leads to lesser harsh punishments that they are not truly deserving of.
Hard determinists will often throw out extreme examples where people didn’t have free will. A brain tumor or schizophrenia caused someone to be violent. How can you punish people in those instances? But our justice system already has ways to address those uncommon scenarios. Reasons of insanity or temporary insanity, if proven to the court, receive a different sentence than those determined to have control, meaning free will.
Here Wall misses the point of these so-called “extreme examples”. There are a few points:
- Someone who is not considered mentally ill or who does not have a brain tumor is not any more “blameworthy” for the causal variables that have led up to their particular “sound mind” brain state at any given moment that processed a bad decision.
- We still prevent people with brain tumors or mental illnesses from harmful acts, even though they obviously are not blameworthy. They are just the product of unlucky circumstances, yet we don’t just “let ’em loose on the streets” as free will advocates like to suggest we would need to do with criminals if we understand they are not blameworthy.
Yes, the way we rehabilitate someone of supposed “sound mind” may differ from one of a mental illness, just as someone with a brain tumor differs as well. But the free will skeptic would hold that all three are equally as unblameworthy in the sense that they do not deserve punishment for their wrongdoing (even if we had to for consequentialist reasons). It just happens that the “sound mind” person was influenced by causal factors that stem from events that are out of their control (or if one inject in indeterminism, then uncaused or probabilistic factors that were out of their control as well).
What about someone under the influence of drugs or alcohol? They are made accountable for taking the drugs or alcohol. We don’t let off drunk drivers because their judgement was impaired.
If all Wall means by “accountable” is that “we prevent drunk drivers from injuring and killing others” then that is no different than quarantining people with contagious diseases. They are “accountable” in the same sense that they had the unlucky variables to contract the disease. Likewise, the drunk driver had the unlucky variables for the psychological disposition to drive in that condition.
Mentioning half-baked experiments, and stating the obvious that past events have impact on our thinking and decision making, simply doesn’t add up to a good argument for hard determinism.
These are not “half-baked” experiments and have been reproduced, but again, this is not the argument for hard determinism and hard incompatibilism. Those arguments are logical arguments, and that is all that is needed to show that the free will of importance simply does not exist. The experiments are only supporting evidence from the neuroscientific front, they are not the end-all-be-all for why free will does not exist by any stretch of the imagination.
The arguments that our justice system should somehow reflect an understanding that we don’t have free will, even though that claim is uncertain, don’t appear to offer any intelligent reasoning as to why.
The claim that the free will of importance does not exist is not any more “uncertain” than the idea that invisible non-monkey monkeys who live in the core of uranus and who knit ontological square-circles do not exist is “uncertain”. Free will is logically incoherent in both a deterministic and indeterministic universe.
But even if free will was not logically ruled out, the burden of proof would still be on the person who claims it exists, and until proven, one should still “lack a belief in free will”. Wall is a self-proclaimed “atheist”, and should understand the distinction between weak atheism (lack of belief in a god or gods) and strong atheism (the belief that god does not exist). For free will, if there is no evidence of it (which there is not) and evidence against it (which there is), at the very least he should lack the belief in it until (good) evidence shows up. And for that matter the justice system should do the same. I’m fairly sure Wall doesn’t think the notion of “god” should affect our justice system until such time as “god is disproven”.
That being said, free will skeptics take on an extra burden to “prove a negative” which they successfully do by showing how free will is logically incoherent. Though that is as sufficient as showing that square-circles don’t exist, there is even scientific evidence piling up against free will. On top of all of that is the understanding that the belief in free will is a positive claim (like the belief in a god) that holds it’s own burden of proof. Due to this, if Wall wants to promote critical thinking, he should be an a-free-will-ist. 😉
Sam Harris seems to argue that when people hurt people, we should feel the same way as if the damage was done by a lower animal or weather event. We shouldn’t hate the people that hurt people and we shouldn’t want vengeance upon them. To me, that ideology is naïve, incoherent, and self-destructive.
There is an irony when Wall calls free will skepticism and the rejection of hatred and retributivism as “naïve, incoherent, and self-destructive”. Not only is the free will of importance incoherent, but free will belief has caused way too many harms.
The idea of determinism may belong in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, but outside of academia, it doesn’t appear to have practical applications. So keep doing what you’re doing, even if you don’t have a choice.
This idea that free will skepticism (which again is entailed in both determinism and indeterminism) does not appear to have practical applications probably stems from insufficient education on the topic. Here is a post I wrote on this some time back. Though it focuses on the problem with compatibilism for the importance of free will, it also details out the very practical importance to the free will debate:
On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
The free will topic also affects individual mindsets in various important ways. Here are some infographics to give just a few ideas:
Imagining Yourself in Someone Else’s Shoes – Infographic
How Free Will Belief Justifies Wealth Inequality – INFOGRAPHIC
All of this being said, this post is not to demean Wall in any way, like I said, he seems like a great guy and if we lived near each other he’d be the type of person I would have a coffee with to discuss this topic further. Perhaps he will read this and disagree with my criticisms – in fact often criticisms like these are met with defensiveness (I hope this is not the case with him). Perhaps I’m even mistaken on his real position or have missed something important. But from my read of his post, it seems that he might have just started with the topic and what he has expressed in his blog is just a causal starting point to a transition to a more rational position of free will skepticism or at the very least a non-strong responsibility compatibilist (NSRC).
'Trick Slattery
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337 Responses to “A Response to a Blog: “This Atheist Believes in Free Will””
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Wrote a 10,500 character response, before being told of the 500 character limit.
Anyone interested can read it at https://tedhowardnz.wordpress.com/2017/12/01/free-will-again/
Heh, sorry about that Ted. I do mention the 500 character limit in the yellow section above the comment box (and the reason for it).
In regards to whether determinism or indeterminism is the actual case, that depends on which interpretation of QM is being postulated. There are deterministic interpretations. Also chaos theory is deterministic. 🙂
Free will meaning “being able to develop degrees of influence” sounds like you might be a sort of compatibilist?
I don’t know how anyone can make a “Deterministic” interpretation of QM, it is probabilities and can instantiate stuff from nothing.
Hard to make that “Deterministic”.
With uncertainty in boundary conditions then degrees of influence between systems can vary substantially with context.
Once one realises that, then one can manage levels of context (to the degree such is possible).
One is always subject to degrees of influence, and one can develop degrees of freedom.
Delicate balance.
You have to already be assuming an indeterministic interpretation of QM (such as Copenhagen) in order to assert “can instantiate stuff from nothing”. Probabilities for a completely causally deterministic interpretation are epistemic only. One example of a deterministic interpretation is Pilot WaveTheory.
I assume little.
I observe.
I understand the systemic underpinnings of evolution.
I understand many of our tendencies to simplify and our attachment to being “right”.
Evolution only needs to be “close enough”.
Reality seems like it is very probably similar.
QM seems to support that proposition.
It allows for observed degrees of freedom.
Why let deterministic presuppositions rule?
Why not look at the data and see what assumptions fit best – rather than letting dogma rule?
I’d suggest the less dogmatic position would be one that is *agnostic* on determinism or indeterminism – considering we don’t know which interpretation actually applies “to the data”.
Sounds like a reasonable idea – how does it apply to “breaking the free will illusion” ? 😉
Both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with the free will that is of practical importance for “just desert moral responsibility” or what I call “strong responsibility” here: Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC 😀
It is difficult to call a claim like “Reality seems like it is very probably similar” dogmatic 😉
To be honest I don’t really parse that particular sentence. Similar denotes a comparison, but it is not clear what reality is being compared to for the sentence. 🙂
Hi Trick, Reliable cause and effect is neither coercive nor undue, so it poses no threat to free will. Our choices are reliably caused by our purpose and our reasons, so our free will poses no threat to determinism. The illusion of conflict is created by a logic error called the “reification fallacy”. We mistakenly treat the concept of “reliable cause and effect” as if it were an external force controlling our choices (choices which we supposedly would have made differently without it).
Hey Marvin, LTNS. Hope all is well. I’m sure we have gone over this in the far past. If you define free will as being “free from coercion, etc.”…you are just (re)defining free will different than the traditional usage. You are a compatibilist. At that point we revert to:
The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
and perhaps:
A Compatibilism / Incompatibilism Transformation
Indeed, it is about definitions. The question is why you would continue to use a definition that we both agree is irrational rather than the one that makes sense and which everyone understands and uses correctly.
Hadn’t seen a tweet from you in a long time, so thought I should stop by and say Hello. Happy Holidays!
Because:
1) People believe they and others have the abilities in that “irrational” definition, regardless if they also think they have your version of free will abilities as well.
2) People believe they and others are “just desert responsible” in the strong sense here: Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC
3) That “irrational” definition is the one of importance for the question about “just desert responsibility”. If we do not have it, we cannot BE responsible in this sense.
Happy Holidays. 🙂
1) People correctly believe that their choices are caused by their own purpose and their own reasons. No magic required.
2) People correctly believe that most criminal behavior is due to deliberate choices.
3) People correctly believe that rehabilitation can enable making better choices.
4) People correctly believe that prison is necessary for incorrigible offenders.
5) People correctly believe that they are the final responsible cause of their choices.
^Some, ….HOWEVER MOST:
1) People incorrectly believe that they and others could have done otherwise given a scenario where that is impossible
2) People incorrectly assign blameworthiness to people.
3) People incorrectly support retributive punishment, especially if they believe in free will.
See studies: “Free to Punish: A Motivated Account of Free Will Belief” and “Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution”…as well as others.
What penalty does a criminal offender “justly deserve”?
A. Repair the harm to the victim if possible.
B. Separation from others until the behavior is corrected.
C. An opportunity to change through rehabilitation.
D. No harm beyond what is reasonably needed to accomplish A, B, and C.
Correlation is not causation. Retribution is not about free will, but one’s philosophy of justice. I believe you’ll find that most of those who are actively involved in prison reform believe in free will.
It (A, B, or C) should not be about notion of “deserve” AT ALL, just as someone who contracts a contagious disease does not “deserve quarantine” even if we must quarantine them anyway so they cannot harm others. You (just like most compatibilists) conflate the important distinction between consequentialism or pragmatism with “just desert moral responsibility”–> these are very different things. And you are ignoring the evidence that the more people believe in free will the more they justify retributive positions: Again, see “Free to Punish: A Motivated Account of Free Will Belief” and “Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution”.
Trick, in the “Free to punish” paper, please note in the abstract the DIRECTION of influence. The subjects were given scenarios of immoral behavior, and their desire to prevent such behavior motivated their wish to punish the offender. The need to punish influenced the degree of culpability assigned. And that in turn led them to assign greater free will. It was NOT free will that motivated the desire to punish. It was the nature of the crime. The authors’ conclusions are bogus.
Yes, the desire to punish motivated their free will belief (which is not any better than the reverse) “Across 5 studies using experimental, survey, and archival data and multiple measures of free will belief, we tested the hypothesis that a key factor promoting belief in free will is a fundamental desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors.”
Also in “Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution” (I’ll just go outside of the 500 character limit to display the abstract):
You seem to have confirmation bias. By the way, it is also very obvious that most people hold retributive tendencies (not simply your A, B, and C as you like to claim, as most do not hold your D), to deny this is to reject the world we live in.
There is “a fundamental desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors”. Holding responsible is another deterministic tool for modifying behavior. The role of free will is to distinguish between a deliberately chosen act versus an act forced upon you against your will. After the Marathon bombing, the Tsarnaev brothers hijacked a car and forced the driver to assist their escape. The driver should not be held responsible because he was not acting of his own free will.
“Just desert moral responsibility” is a wrongheaded deterministic tool. Just because something is “deliberately chosen” does not mean that the very deliberation wasn’t caused ultimately by events outside of a person’s control. We need to prevent “bombing psychologies” from bombing just as we need to prevent someone with a brain tumor that causes them to go on a shooting spree from continuing to do so. If you were the bombers atom for atom, biology for biology, and environment for environment – you would do the exact same thing.
Maybe this video will help you understand: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-GkUHI2888
The pragmatic question is how to correct the behavior. If it is due to the deliberate choice of a normal mind, then we must provide an opportunity for rehabilitation. Part of that rehabilitation is holding them responsible for their past choices so that they will know they will be held responsible for their future choices. Rehabilitation presumes free will and it is impossible without it.
Annnnd… this is where you go off the deep end.
Again you conflate pragmatism with moral responsibility. These are not the same thing. It is due to the BRAIN of the person that we must rehabilitate, the choice just reflects the problem with the brain.
We don’t rehabilitate those with a mental illness because they are ‘just desert responsible”, and yet no one assumes they have free will…. therefore, per your reasoning, the rehabilitation of mentally ill people is impossible.
Annyyywayyy…this is where we always butt heads. Time to call it quits rather than fall down this rabbit-hole once again. 😉
The brain is the person. There is no dualism. If the problem is physical abnormality, we treat it physically. If the problem is habits of thinking, we treat it psychologically with counseling, education, etc. Note that when you eliminate free will, you conflate the two. We cannot legally treat a sane person as if they were insane. Those are the pragmatics. Rehab presumes a normal brain with freedom to choose between the legal and the illegal option.
The fact that we need to “treat” different physical configurations differently has no relevance for the free will of practical importance, only for your version of free will.
The person with the “problem in habits of thinking” is not “more deserving” or “more blameworthy” than the person with the the physical abnormality. The conflation is you not understanding the distinction between being “deserving” and a difference in pragmatic or consequentialist actions. Also, this notion of normal is contrived, as there is no need to rehab a “normal brain”. We rehab because there is an abnormal (or rather harmful) psychological configuration, regardless if it needs to be treated through a psychological mechanism.
We can never blame people for who they are, we can only blame them for what they do. Blame, which identifies the responsible cause of the criminal harm, is the first logical step in correction. Even Christians profess this distinction when they suggest we should “hate the sin, but love the sinner”. They believe in free will, of course. But that does not blind them to the circumstances in which a person is raised.
Someone is not “blameworthy” for what they do, if what they do is caused by who they are at any given moment in time (which per you we cannot blame them for). Your usage of the term “blame” is disconnected from the notion of “blameworthiness” in the “just desert” sense that is important. In your usage, since the person with the mental illness is the responsible cause of the criminal harm, then they are equally “to blame” as the person who does not have a diagnosed illness. Same with a broken machine going on a rampage. You cannot have your cake and eat it too.
I do not accept Caruso using the term “just deserts” for a penalty that is morally wrong. The meaning of the phrase is literally, “the justice that one deserves”, and that justice is to repair the harm to the victim, correct the offender through rehabilitation, protect the public from the offender until corrected, and nothing more. That is “just deserts”. And, pragmatically, blame is the first step in the correction process. It identifies the wrongful act and who did it.
JUST DESERT: (idiomatic) A punishment or reward that is considered to be what the recipient deserved.
It may appear that they’re getting ahead by cheating, but they’ll get their just deserts in the end.
Synonyms: payback, poetic justice, comeuppance
DESERVE: to merit, be qualified for, or have a claim to (reward, assistance, punishment, etc.) because of actions, qualities, or situation.
——-[ >500 just to copy definitions above – now on to comment…]———–
None of this “just desert” is qualified via rehabilitation, repair, protection, pragmatism, or consequentialism. It is about an action or quality that grants the person a deserving status, just because of that action or quality happens ALONE! If taking an action on a person could never rehabilitate them or repair or protect others, a wrongdoer would still deserve punishment per “just desert”.
This is the problem with compatibilist semantic shifters. You don’t care about how words are really used.
Caruso’s complaint, then, is about a specific “brand of justice”. We correct this by addressing it directly, as I’ve demonstrated for you, without attacking personal responsibility, and without attacking free will. Even Christians advocate rejecting revenge and seeking to redeem the sinner. Caruso introduces confusion by conflating these issues, and by using an irrational and false definition of free will. Free will is not “freedom from reliable cause and effect”.
The attack by free will skeptics is the attack on just desert moral responsibility (also see “moral responsibility” in philosophy)…and the FACT that the more free will belief people hold, the more people justify this TYPE of moral responsibility – so attacking this TYPE of free will is important. Showing this type of free will does not exist reduces retributive tendencies (people deserving an eye for an eye) and reduces gross inequality justifications (placing people on high pedestals as being “more deserving” of their well-being than others).
People are aware of the social causes of criminal behavior. If not, they can be taught, without attacking moral responsibility or free will. Free will means freedom from coercion or undue influence. Everyone understands and correctly uses this definition. If you doubt this, see http://www.brown.uk.com/brownlibrary/nahmias.pdf . To say that free will means “freedom from reliable cause and effect” is irrational, no matter how many philosophers or scientists repeat it.
Ironically, it is that very study you linked that actually says the exact opposite of what you suggest. That study shows that even when people are given entirely deterministic scenarios (even 100% predicting machines) where an “otherwise” is impossible, they still irrationally denote that someone could have done otherwise – especially when that person did a wrongdoing! So when you say “free will means freedom from coercion…”, you really mean that YOU define free will in a way that disregards other abilities that people think they and others possess.
People can read it for themselves. It is not “irrational” to say that “someone could have done otherwise”. (1) If today I can say, “I can choose either A or B”, then tomorrow it will always be the case that I can say “Yesterday, I could have chosen either A or B”. It’s English. (2) It is also true that if rewind time to that prior point you “will” make the same choice. But your intuition that this implies you “couldn’t” have made a different choice is false.
It is entirely IRRATIONAL to say that, assuming a 100% perfect predicting machine that exists in the year 2150 (before Jeremy is born) that predicts (with certainty) that Jeremy will choose A on January 26th, 2195 at 6PM, that Jeremy can choose either A or B (he obviously cannot). It is also irrational to say that, once Jeremy has chosen A as the machine predicted, that Jeremy could have chosen B instead given the prediction in 2150 that he would choose A.
Going over the 500 limit to display what is in it for people to “read it for themselves”, because the context is important.
*Also keep in mind the inconsistency for the wrongdoing scenario vs. the helpful and benign scenarios (which were worded identically except a change in what was done).
If the machine predicts with 100% accuracy that he will choose A, then the following must inevitably happen:
1. Jeremy will face a decision where he can either choose A or choose B.
2. Jeremy will consider both options, and for his own reasons, he will choose A.
No matter how many times you replay this tape, he will always have two choices at step 1. And it will always be the case that tomorrow he can truthfully say, “I could have chosen B instead, but A seemed best to me”.
1. FALSE – Jeremy will face a decision where he can ONLY choose A and never choose B (even if he deliberates between both)!
2. TRUE – Jeremy will consider both options, and for his own reasons **that causally come about the one and ONLY way they can**, he will (and **MUST**) choose A.
No matter how many times you replay this tape, your 1 will always be FALSE. And it will always be the case that tomorrow he can FALSELY say “I could have chosen B instead, but A seemed best to me”.
Once the CONTEXT of the 100% predicting machine is given –> colloquial, counterfactual, and epistemic usages of “can do” and “could have done” are completely out of the picture (and irrational)!
At the outset “he has two choices” which logically means “he can choose either one”. We know in advance that he will choose A and not B. But this fact does not contradict the fact that Jeremy has two choices, and that it will be up to Jeremy to choose either A or B. That’s the empirical and inevitable reality. There is nothing other than Jeremy that will make the choice. “To predict” does not mean “to control”.
A man sits down in a restaurant and asks the waiter, “What are my options for dinner tonight?” The waiter, a free will skeptic, replies, “There is only one possibility”. The man, disappointed says, “Okay. So what is that?” The waiter replies, “I have no way of knowing until you tell me.” Moral: It is irrational to break the process.
No, he deliberates between two options, but that DOES NOT logically mean he can choose either option! One can never be actualized. Given the 100% prediction of B not happening (and of A happening), there is not even an infinitesimal percentage chance that B could happen. Assuming the prediction, it will always (100%) lead up to Jeremy choosing A and NOT choosing B. Always, every single time – no exceptions. He simply could not choose B, because if he did, the 100% prediction would be wrong (which would be outside of the scenario and not 100%).
Regarding your restaurant scenario, that is a contrivance – you need to stick to the actual scenario given rather than bring that bad example up as you have done in the past. The people in the study are given exactly which option will be chosen, so there is no epistemic uncertainty (you cannot use epistemic uncertainty of a future event for the scenario – because the participants should have NO epistemic uncertainty about what Jeremy MUST do at that point in time). Jeremy will certainly choose A and NOT B – and to suggest otherwise based on a different context where there is epistemic uncertainty is irrational. You also conflate “multiple options” that a deliberation process assesses with “all options being possible“. These are not the same thing.
———————————————————-
* Note – As you see I consolidated your two comments together, but let’s stick with one comment at a time – as I had to address multiple problems with your reasoning. This is why I have the limit – so we can focus on each point made at a time and my responses don’t have to be lengthy like above. Let’s also stick to one single scenario at a time, in this case the Jeremy scenario. 😉
I am very confident that 100% prediction is not an option.
A degree of reliability – that I can accept.
100% – nope – that seem extremely improbable.
Ted – I tend to agree with you, but that is irrelevant to the study (and the problems in the thinking of the participants). For the study, the 100% prediction is to be accepted on its face for the questions – regardless if one actually believes it is probable or not:
Hi Trick,
If such a computer were possible, then free will (of any sort) is pure illusion, of that I am confident beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt.
I am almost as confident that such a computer is not possible, and that the question is one of argument from absurd premises (classical premises). It is in violation of quantum mechanical principles.
Hi Ted, if you think free will is impossible given such a computer (as do I), you need to adjust your definition of free will, as it is compatible even if this type of computer exists (e.g. “degrees of influence” does not suggest an otherwise ability is needed). You need to mention that if someone could not have done otherwise (due to absolute determinism), there is no free will – somewhere in your definition. This would also make your position of the libertarian free will variety (indeterminism / probabilism allows for free will), which is far easier to address the problems of. 😉
Hi Trick,
Nope.
By the definition I have consistently used, if a computer is able to make a fully deterministic prediction, then the sort of free will that seems to me to exist cannot exist – it is a logically impossible proposition.
The sort of free will that seems to me to exist requires two different sets of conditions, degrees of indeterminism, and degrees of influence. That is what quantum mechanics seems to indicate is the sort of reality we live in.
Hi Ted, might I suggest that you explicitly add in “requires two different sets of conditions, degrees of indeterminism” into your definition, as “something one can create, in terms of degrees of influence, not anything absolute”, does not sufficiently denote your requirement of indeterminism and two (or more) different set of “truly possible” (I’d add in these words) conditions. This, indeed, makes your position libertarian, and the discussion then refers to how such indeterminism can ever be “up to the person”.
Ted, I DO presume the “theoretical possibility” of 100% accurate prediction when ALL three levels of causation are included: physical, biological, and rational. In a perfectly deterministic world, free will can still mean “a decision we make for ourselves, free of coercion or other undue influence”. The final responsible cause of the decision is empirically us. This is the definition of free will that I presume (and I’m demonstrating) the subjects in the study are intuitively using.
Even though the study shows they believe in an irrational notion of “could have done otherwise” abilities (with perfect predicting machine / causal determinism) that your definition does not have or account for.
I claim that their notion is precisely the free will (free of coercion and undue influence) that I’ve described. I don’t know what other notions they may hold, but they are using the correct definition and the correct language for the mental process of choosing to take place.
Then you are ignoring the important part of the study in which their INCORRECT notions that “Jeremy could have decided not to rob the bank” (just because it was a wrongdoing BTW) tracks with their free will belief. Also note that for the benign and good-doing cases (worded identically) they said Jeremy could NOT have done otherwise! This just further denotes the inconsistency of layperson thoughts for the topic, and how incorrect you are about layperson intuitions (which tend to be contextually circumstantial – as other studies such as “Folk Intuitions on Free Will – Shaun Nichols, 2006” show).
But Jeremy could have decided not to rob the bank. We want to know why he did decide to rob it, because we want to fix those things, both in his social environment and in his way of thinking about crime. This is what “could have” is all about, to review a mistake and discover better ways to deal with the issues he was trying to solve. You cannot outlaw “could have done otherwise” without breaking the fracking process.
No, really, really, …Jeremy could NOT have decided not to rob the bank. The reasons why he did rob the bank could not have happened otherwise, hence neither could Jeremy’s decision to rob the bank. You cannot “fix” the circumstances that led up to him deciding to rob the bank, and any fixing AFTER THE FACT so it is not repeated could not have happened otherwise either (given determinism). “Could have” means the action (“not robbing bank”) was ontologically possible (Jeremy physically not going into the bank and robbing it). It was not ontologically possible. Also you just ignored the other part of what I said as well. You seem to have a large confirmation bias here.
Let’s put it this way, I’ve demonstrated several times now that it is not “irrational” to say “I could have done otherwise”. It is always a true statement if I had more than one option to choose from at the time. And it is always the case that when I make a choice that I will have at least two real possibilities to choose from. And I believe that is the case in all the Jeremy scenarios. Therefore the subjects in the study were NOT presuming any special abilities.
You have not “demonstrated” this, you have asserted it and then you gave an epistemic example of a “can do” modality (which differs greatly from an ontological “could have done” reality) that is not analogous to the Jeremy scenario that was given. And it is NOT the case that when I make a choice that I will have at least two real possibilities to choose from….given determinism only one is *ever* a real possibility, the other is not (even if I do not know which). The Jeremy study makes it perfectly clear that only “choosing to rob the bank / robbing the bank” could ever have happened (we know this).
Nobody can change the past. When considering what we “could have done” we are imagining “How might things have turned out IF I had made a different choice?” THAT is the rational context of “I could have done otherwise”. And it is always true that today I can imagine what I could have done differently yesterday. And you continue to prove over and over that they could not have possibly meant anything else.
SCENARIO: Given the 100% perfect prediction that Babe the pig will not have wings or fly on Jan 22nd, 2034 at 10AM EST, in which case the prediction comes true, (given that scenario) could have Babe the pig had wings and could have Babe the pig flown on Jan 22nd, 2034 at 10AM EST?
PER YOUR COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING: Yes, Babe the pig could of had wings and could have flown (at that time) IF Babe the pig had wings and flown (at that time).
*** Begging the question fallacy, entirely against the 100% perfect prediction, poor counterfactual reasoning, and entirely irrational response.
If Babe the pig had functional wings, then of course she could fly any time she chose to. If we have the power to predict (but not control) when she chooses to fly, then we know for certain what she “will” do. However, it remains the case that if she had two viable options (fly or not fly) then she “can” choose either one today. And tomorrow it will be true that she “could have” made either choice yesterday. The possibilities exist in her imagination, but not ours.
According to the 100% prediction Babe will not have those wings, so your “IF” is outside of the scenario (and hence irrational to invoke in!). Also even if Babe had the wings she would still only have one specific brain structure that allows for one viable chosen option – not two brain structure that allow for two different chosen options. Likewise, according to the 100% prediction Jeremy will not have the brain structure that decides to not rob the bank, so your IF is outside of the scenario (and hence irrational to invoke in!).
It IS a single deterministic brain process:
1) Shall I fly today? After step 1 Babe “can” choose to fly and “can” choose to not fly.
2) Consider flying.
3) Consider not flying.
4) Choose the one that seems best. Babe’s choice in step 4 is the final responsible prior cause of the inevitable and predicted outcome.
Tomorrow, she “could have” made either choice after step 1.
No, tomorrow Babe’s brain STRUCTURE for step 4 could not have been the DIFFERENT structure needed to select a DIFFERENT option. Just as Babe couldn’t have “wings” given the scenario, Babe could NOT have a different brain structure either! This also makes your second sentence in step 1 false. After step 1 Babe “can” choose to only do that dictated by the brain config in step 4 that could not be otherwise. The weighing of 2 and 3 can only lead to that one brain structure (and never the other).
Trick, (A) thinking changes the brain.
(B)
1) A problem/issue is encountered.
2) Possibilities arise (“I can’s”).
3) Options are tested (values arise).
4) A choice is made (“I will” appears and “I can’s” vanish).
Tomorrow, the “I could have’s” replace yesterday’s “I can’s”. We have both perfectly reliable cause and effect AND a list of “I could have’s”, because we are resetting the clock to the beginning of step 2 to redo step 3 (reconsider our choice).
(A) All thinking must be the same as well.
(B)
1) A problem/issue is encountered.
2) EPISTEMIC (fictional) possibilities arise IN THOUGHT ONLY (Colloquial “I can’s”).
3) Options are tested (values arise) – the only way they can.
4) A choice is made – the only way it can (the real and ONLY ONTOLOGICAL possibility)
Tomorrow (assuming determinism), “I could have’s” DO NOT replace yesterday’s “colloquial I can’s” – as there is no longer an epistemic lack of knowledge over the action that causally arose. Step 2 will happen identically, as well as 3 and 4 – because the BRAIN STATES cannot be otherwise at any given moment!
Anyway- we are just repeating now so I might end this convo unless I see something new. Peace.
Yes, all “can’s”, “possibilities”, “options” exist in the context of the imagination. You are correct to say they are like fiction, because they are stories we create to answer, “What might happen if I choose this?” In precisely the same fashion, our “could have’s” address the same question in a different tense: “What might HAVE HAPPENED if I HAD CHOSEN that instead?”
Ontology is about what “will” happen. There are no “could’s” involved.
I wasn’t going to let this in because it is repeating the same type misunderstandings of language (in a really bad way)…but let me ask you this question (answer with a yes or no please):
Is there anything that “could not have happened” in your view? Yes or no?
(if “yes” please provide a quick example of something that could not have happened)
Babe the pig could not grow wings. That is a possibility that could never be actualized (at least as far as this pig goes, a future pig, with genetic engineering, who knows). But both of Jeremy’s options, to rob or to not rob the bank, could have been chosen, even though only one of them was inevitable. Sounds counter-intuitive, I know, but that appears to be how things work.
According to your previous comment all “coulds” are based on imaginary “IF” question begging contingency “stories”, …so babe could have grown wings IF babe had the configuration to grow wings. This is no different than your “Jeremy could have robbed the bank IF he chose to (IF he had the brain configuration to choose to)”.
This means that there is no “could not have happened” on your account, as we can make up any “IF” scenario that allows anything to happen in our imaginations. It’s more than counter-intuitive, it is counter-reason.
A possibility that cannot be actualized is an impossibility. (Fact 1:) In the case of Jeremy, since he has already robbed the bank he cannot (present) have not robbed the bank (past). (Fact 2:) However, he could have chosen not to rob the bank, because that was a possibility that he could have actualized if he had chosen to do so. (Fact 3:) But it was inevitable that he would choose to rob the bank. None of these 3 facts contradicts the others. All 3 are equally true.
Your Fact 2 is false. You are basically saying that Jeremy could have the DIFFERENT brain state that allowed him to actualized the DIFFERENT choice – and that is no different than Babe the pig having wings (a different physical state) that allowed her to fly.
What you are not recognizing is the physical state change (brain change) required for the “OTHER” actualization – a physical change that is impossible given the scenario.
I’m saying that (a) IF he had decided NOT to rob the bank, then (b) that is what the machine WOULD HAVE predicted with 100% accuracy, because (c) that choice WOULD HAVE BEEN inevitable. COULD HAVE logically implies all three assumptions. COULD HAVE also logically implies (d) it DID NOT happen (that’s why you keep using the term “counter-factual”). Thus COULD HAVE applies to all of the real possibilities that DID NOT happen (but not to any impossibilities).
Which is no different than saying (a) IF Babe the pig had wings, then (b) that is what the machine WOULD HAVE predicted with 100% accuracy, because (c) the wings WOULD HAVE BEEN inevitable.
SO when the participants are asked to accept the 100% prediction of Jeremy robbing the bank, you are basically saying “IF the prediction did not say that, even though you just asked me to accept that.” This is 100% irrational, bad thinking. Period.
Also, there can be no “impossibilities” per this bad reasoning, because we can simply say “BUT IF X impossibility was possible, then…”
Perhaps the imagination is “irrational” in some sense. But every scientist uses it to generate possibilities, estimate the outcome of different approaches, and choose the one that seems most promising. If the experiment fails, she’ll say, “I could have done this instead of that. Let’s try doing this next time.” The sequence is always: 1) multiple possibilities, 2) evaluation, 3) single inevitable choice. This process is rational because it works. Moving step 3 to step 1 breaks the process.
We use it when there is epistemic uncertainty of future events or as a colloquialism depending on CONTEXT, but when given a scenario like in the study, there is only one CONTEXT that makes any rational sense, and to move outside of it would be to go against the scenario given. It is problematic thinking.
“Could have done otherwise” does not mean, “can do otherwise next time”. “Have DONE” means the “doing” could be actualized “back then”. It simply cannot given the scenario.
1) The colloquial use of “could have” is “literally” the literal use!
2) Counter-factual does not mean “false”, it means “hypothetical”. It refers to an event that did not happen, but might have happened under different conditions. That’s why the “if” is always logically implied in the “could have”.
3) Everyone assumes a deterministic universe in which they have causal agency.
4) Paradoxes arise when “philosophers” invalidly pit these two facts against each other.
1) The colloquial use of “could have” does not equal “literal” at all – as I explained here.
2) Counter-factual means COUNTER to the FACTS (WHAT IF’s counter to WHAT IS). That is what false means. I can give a counterfactual of two different non-existing universes and compare them. {IMAGE}
3) It is a blatantly false statement to say that “everyone assumes a deterministic universe…”
4) LOL – it they pitted two FACTS where there is a paradox- then reality is full of FACTUAL paradoxes.
If all control is external to us, then what hope does anyone have to make anything better?
Because we often DO make things better as part of the causally interactive process – and when we do, we could not have done, of our own accord, other than the action that makes things better. Keep in mind that a programmed robot could also “make things better (or worse depending on programming)” – all without free will. We are just programmed by our genes and historical environment we had no say over (to do better or worse, etc.).
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Have you stopped beating your grandmother yet Trick? Simple yes or no answer please!
Sometimes the assumption sets of one paradigm have no simple translation to another paradigm.
All language is pointers to complex structures.
Common culture can mean common structures, but not always, in this case not much.
QM seems to be telling us that some things are not allowed, and everything else is a matter of probability (many of those so small as to be unlikely to occur in this universe, ever).
Ted – My “yes/no” question to Marvin was not a malformed or loaded question (and ultimately answerable in his own context), so the “beating” question is a bad analogy. My question makes the point about Marvin’s confused language – unless he wants to accept that “could not have happened” is impossible in his usage (which he does not).
Also, you keep bringing up QM indeterminism into a picture that removes it for a reason. Also, we could haggle over your ideas about QM, because they are not solid like you believe.
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Regardless of the prediction, Jeremy WILL always choose A and WILL never choose B. However, before he makes up his mind, Jeremy CAN choose A and he CAN choose B. There is never any uncertainty in OUR mind as to what he WILL do. Nor is there any uncertainty in JEREMY’S mind as to what he CAN do. Nor will there be any uncertainty in HIS mind tomorrow as to what he COULD HAVE done yesterday. He COULD HAVE chosen either A or B. His claim is not irrational.
Before Jeremy makes up his mind, he can ONLY choose A and NEVER choose B (he just doesn’t know this – which plays into his decision). If before, Jeremy thought he can choose B, he is simply wrong on the matter (which plays into his decision). If afterward, Jeremy thought he could have chosen B, he is simply wrong on the matter. He could not have chosen A or B, he could only have chosen A and NEVER B (given the deterministic world that the predicting machine is in). The fact that he might think, in hindsight, that he could have chosen B simply points to why your definition of free will misses the boat.
There is actually only one definition of free will. The hard determinist claims that reliable cause and effect is an external force compelling our choices, so they reject it. But reliable cause and effect IS US DECIDING WHAT WE WILL DO. It is not an external force coercing us against our will. It is how our will is formed. The language in Jeremy’s case is precisely as I described. The words “can”, “could”, “possibility” refer to an imagined future.
No, there are many definitions of free will. To suggest there is “only one” is absurd (just look at Ted’s for example). Now which definition is the important definition is what the semantic debate is about, and your definition is not it. ALSO external cause and effect exactly causes our very decision making process and “what we will do”. In the Jeremy scenario, Jeremy cannot choose B, could not have chosen B, nor was B ever possible…and that should be understood by the participants of the study as soon as they accept the scenario.
1. Give me any alternative definition that does not reduce to “a decision free of coercion or other undue influence”.
2. Scenario: I am alone in the room with a bowl of apples. I feel hungry. Should I wait or eat one now? I’ll eat one now.
Challenge: Name the “external” cause that forced me to eat the apple.
1. The ability to have, of one’s own accord, chosen otherwise (mine) – for one (or my present tense version as well).
2. You were born with a mechanism of a stomach, other organs, and brain that becomes hungry – that you had no control over. Each moment in environments you ultimately had no control over since birth led up to you not having sufficient food in your stomach to feel “full” at X moment, which caused your brain to say “I’m hungry”, in turn causing your weighing of “eating the apple” to push toward you actually deciding to eat it. Not to mention numerous other causally bombarding factors out of your control such as the visual stimulus (of the apple), etc.
2. So, which of these items that you listed is “external” to me: my stomach? my other organs? my brain? my sense of hunger? my deciding?
So far, the only external item you’ve listed is the apple. Are you suggesting the apple hypnotized me and convinced me to eat it against my will?
1. My own accord is what my own hunger and my own choosing causally determined. Empirical fact: “that which is me” is “that which made the choice”.
Still looking for that external cause.
2. Your stomach, organs, brain, etc…are PRODUCTS of events outside of you – from your parents providing those genetics, environmental epigenetics, to the external enviromnental conditions that change your brain structure. None of these are things you had control over. The apple was just one environmental factor out of billions you had no control over, and you are not the dictator of your biology OR brain state at any given moment.
1. “You” made the choice based on your exact “you-ness” that “you” had no say over….and “you” could not have “been” or “done” otherwise (assuming determinism). Imagine a rube goldberg machine that halfway through formed playdough into a ball, which then (due to now being round) rolled and hit a bell causing a ring. The playdough caused the bell to ring, but the outside factors that formed the playdough were just as responsible for the bell ring as the playdough itself. “You” are the playdough.
No, I did not create myself. But neither did any prior cause to which you are attempting to shift responsibility for my choice. If your logic shifts responsibility from me to them, then it also shifts it from them to … well, what?! The requirement is impossible, thus irrational.
My “self” and a bowl of apples are all that are in the room. One of us made the choice freely, without external coercion or undue influence, to eat the other. 🙂
EXACTLY!!!!! (Hence the problem with responsibility in the important sense)
UNTRUE – you were influenced by everything that lead up to your state of being and decision at the time, as was the apple.
Normal influences, that every one of us routinely experiences, are duly expected. Reliable cause and effect, for example, is not an “undue influence”, because we all rely upon it for our freedom to do everything that we do. Since these influences are neither coercive nor undue, they do not compromise free will. Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, free of coercion or other undue influences. Determinism (reliable cause and effect) poses no threat to free will.
Reliable cause and effect (which the “reliable” word is redundant, is there unreliable cause and effect?) that stems to outside of us is that which we have no control over which influences us. The word “undue” is “undue”. Even cause and effect that coerces us (e.g. at gunpoint) is “reliable” and not any more “undue” than any other cause and effect. Your qualifiers are contrived for your own purposes – not anything real. 😉
Trick, whether there is “unreliable” cause and effect is what you and Ted have been discussing. I believe he’s counting on quantum indeterminism to provide free will. I don’t. I prefer perfectly reliable cause and effect.
The qualifiers of due and undue distinguish how people actually interpret free will. For example, a suggestion from your friend is rather ordinary (due), but a suggestion from a hypnotist actually removes your control (undue). Same with brain tumor, etc.
Indeterminism isn’t cause and effect. Also, something seeming ordinary or unordinary (to us) does not mean “cause and effect” are these things, nor is it relevant. Cause and effect are consistent, regardless of some extraordinary event that happens due to it. If a spaceship comes down and the alien asks you whether you want to go to his planet or stay on earth, according to your reasoning (due to this being undue), you can’t have even your version of free will for the decision. You rather just mean “uncoerced” (by others)…not “undue”.
The point is that your version of free will, which is actually “freedom from causation”, is an irrational concept. And no one uses such a definition in any pragmatic scenario. You keep claiming that “freedom from causation” is what they mean. I keep demonstrating that what they mean is simply freedom from coercion or other undue influence. My problem is that when you attack one, you are also attacking the other, which unravels evolved moral concepts, like responsibility.
The point is, my version of free will: A) most people believe they possess this ability (as shown) and B) is the important definition for the topic of just desert moral responsibility (and it is also shown that people hold this type of responsibility).
I am not “claiming”… I am showing you that the abilities people think they possess ARE the irrational abilities, not simply your compatibilist definition of “freedom from coercion” (or other poor qualifiers) which just falls under the larger UMBRELLA of the abilities people think they possess.
Anyway- we are just repeating now so I might end this convo unless I see something new.
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In most contexts, I don’t think retributive morality is appropriate, as the sort of free will involved probably doesn’t justify it, and other more effective alternatives exist, and in an evolutionary context, I can understand its emergence.
And to me, that has little to do with free will.
For me, free will is something one can create, in terms of degrees of influence, not anything absolute.
And in anything other than extremis of passion, there is little excuse for intentional murder.
Ted – I think what you label as “free will” differs radically from my / the traditional version. This is fine that you define it as “something one can create, in terms of degrees of influence, not anything absolute”, and I’d agree that we may have those abilities (just as I agree we have the abilities most compatibilist purport as “free will”). Since you agree that retributive morality is out, etc…our disagreement is probably more of semantics for the term, and the problems with labeling “free will” in ways that bypass the main issue for the debate. 🙂
It’s hard to haggle in 500 Chars.
The thing that really gets me about QM, is that the arrangement of electrons around atoms, and all the chemical properties that follow, can be derived from an information principle, which says that it is not allowed to know both position and momentum beyond certain limits.
When you spend a few thousand hours contemplating that from a systems perspective, it can fundamentally alter one’s relation to ideas like classical causality.
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (HUP), which is what you are referring to when you mention position/momentum measurements, does not suggest that the universe is not causally deterministic. Depending on which quantum interpretation is being postulated, how HUP is interpreted changes. Some interpretations of QM are deterministic (causal), others indeterministic (true randomness), and others are agnostic on determinism/indeterminism. I have spent countless hours on QM too. 🙂
(500 char keeps things conversational, one point at a time, rather than allowing large blocks of unreadable texts and unwieldy tangents – this is better in the long run (trust me) unless one is looking to obfuscate).
In 500 characters I cannot constantly restate, on every occasion, that all of my understandings are probabilistic.
Hard to back up a claim like HUP is causally deterministic in a short space. That seems a very hard position.
Hard to make a soft argument when the other person rejects anything that is not hard – it becomes somewhat tautological.
The strongest claim I will make is one based on balance of probabilities – given my experience set.
The word “probabilistic” can mean A) “epistemic probabilistic” (probability due to a lack of knowledge) or B) “ontic probabilistic” (the probability is embedded in what exists). These are very different things and (A) is compatible with causal determinism (e.g. a roll of a die can be entirely causal even if we could never know all of the causal variables or outcome and need to assess a probability). The point I make about QM is that we do not KNOW if a deterministic interpretation is the case (e.g. non-local hidden variable) or an indeterministic interpretation is the case. I also make a logical case against ontic probability.
Hi Trick,
Your proposition fails.
Consider sequence:
total chaos;
filter;
Outcome.
A mix of the ontic random and the causal.
Twin slit – fourier transform of square filter delivers outcome.
Real randomness, plus a filter, can give the outcome.
Ontic randomness can exist.
Asserting it cannot is a failure of imagination, not a logical necessity.
I assert that it seems very probable that this universe is based upon such mix.
It does allow for real degrees of freedom.
1) You strawman my position. It is NOT that real (or ontic) randomness (in the sense of acausality) cannot occur, it is against this event having an “ontic probability distribution” (other than “at some point in time at some location, or never”).
2) Chaos theory is entirely deterministic (filtered or not).
3) Again, my position is not against indeterminism (in the strong sense) being possible (I’m agnostic on that).
4)To assert the universe is probably “based on such a mix” is to assert the likelihood of an indeterministic interpretation of QM unwarrantedly. A deterministic interpretation is just as “likely”.
5) Indeterminism is not any “freedom” we would have any say over. It isn’t free “to us”.
Ted, Are you saying that we have some freedom in how we filter the chaos to produce an outcome we desire? (Generally, Trick and I are in agreement that as “randomness” increases our freedom to control/direct what happens decreases).
Marvin – the interesting part is that you and Ted have diametrically opposed “free will” positions. You are a compatibilist and determinist, he is a libertarian and indeterminist. You think (and I agree with you) that indeterminism cannot help with free will (if anything it would be a detriment to willing). He thinks (and I agree with him) that an entirely causally deterministic universe is incompatible with free will (no otherwise). It is interesting to have the two opposite ends of the “free will belief” spectrum commenting at the same time. 🙂
Trick, LOL, indeed! Now all I need do is convince you both that reliable cause and effect is not an external force that threatens free will. Most ordinary people believe in reliable causation as well as their own causal agency. It is only when determinism is reified into an external force that removes our control of our own choices that people start running for a place to hide, either in the supernatural or in quantum indeterminism.
Marvin – That depends on how you define “free will” – and I think your definition is insufficient to denote ALL of the abilities people think they possess in this regards. Also, other studies show that whether people side with causation or not depends on the questions being asked as well – so even that in very inconsistent for the layperson. Where I agree with you is that people think they are agents and that coercion removes free will, but that is not all that is important to the term “free will” which is an umbrella term that carries all of the incoherent baggage along with it (unfortunately).
Trick, it depends on how you look at it. I can defend the position that free will ALWAYS means “deciding for ourselves what we will do, free of coercion or other undue influence”. For example, “freedom from causal inevitability” is espoused by those who view causal necessity as a coercive influence, rather than simply as us going about our normal business of choosing and causing. As to the “baggage”, that can be (and is) dealt with by critical thinking.
You (re)define at the expense of bypassing what it means that we “could not have done, of our own accord, otherwise”. That our brain, thoughts, and decisions are dictated ultimately by events out of our control (whether causal or acausal). That if you were X person atom for atom, environment for environment, variable for variable – you would do as X did. This leads people to a greater compassion over the unlucky variables that others were born into that lead up to their state of mind and decisions, it reduces retributive blame, and it prevents people from justifying gross inequalities of being more deserving of their causal luckiness than others (or others less deserving). Understanding we lack that “baggage” makes all of the difference in the world, and is what the tradition definition of free will is about.
Christians are already say things like, “you don’t really understand someone else until you walk a mile in their shoes”, or “put yourself in his place”. The same people who preach free will also preach compassion and understanding. And if you want the reverse, retribution and punishment, then you can easily justify that with determinism, as in “let the punishment fit the crime” and “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” where the punishment is literally determined by the crime.
Marvin – Christians also do a whole lot of blaming, support unfettered capitalism (gross inequalities), and believe in an “eye for an eye” and “just deserts”. Also, as already shown, the more people believe in free will, the more retributive their responses are. This is a fact that you cannot just hand-wave away. If people believe that someone could have done, of their own accord, otherwise,… it is a lot easier not to put themself in the other person’s shoes and just blame them for not doing otherwise. It is a lot easier to point the “blame” finger.
Hi Marvin,
Almost yes.
I agree that beyond a certain limit, ontic indeterminism degrades complex systems.
I am also saying that to deliver real freedom, there must exist ontic indeterminism to some degree. And it is all about the degree, and the context.
Yes it does seem that what we can do is alter the filters in some contexts, and over time accumulate degrees of independence.
And it isn’t clean, it is messy. Very different from Dennett’s hidden lottery.
An indeterministic even is just a new “starting point” that we have no control over the outcome of (regardless if acausal or some more magical ontological probability) – which simply leads to a new causal set. Any filters we make that an indeterministic event finds its way into also came about through a causal line that ultimately stems outside of us.
Wow what a monster thread
A couple of quick comments.
Random … truly random? Generally not a well understood topic. Random.org I think has a good as any layman’s definition of “random”
Conscious decisions in the “now”. I recall reading this “now” is an agglomeration of the last two to three seconds and in sports extends back a few tens of milliseconds.
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Hawking and Mlodinow on QM and Determinism (The Grand Design)
Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case. Instead it leads us to accept a new form of determinism: Given the state of a system at some time, the laws of nature determine the probabilities of various futures and pasts rather than determining the future and past with certainty.
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and from the same source
… the molecular basis of biology shows that biological processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets…so it seems that we are no more than biological machines and that free will is just an illusion
Hi Rom
To me, QM seems to be pointing to the fundamental aspects of reality being a mix of the lawful and the random (order and chaos).
That pattern seems to repeat at every level of life.
At the level of replicating molecules, too much order, then not enough variation for evolution to progress in the time available; too much chaos and complex patterns cannot survive. Always a balance, always sensitive to the specifics of the context.
And how does chaotic or random molecular replication give us free will?
Hi Ted 🙂
Hi rom,
It all comes down to the nature of the freedom involved.
I acknowledge that form requires boundaries.
I acknowledge that communication and degrees of influence must exist.
It all comes down to how hard is the connection in causal terms.
Can degrees of randomness give us sufficient isolation from the hard stream of causal influence to give us some useful approximation to freedom?
It seems to me that the answer is yes.
“Can degrees of randomness give us sufficient isolation from the hard stream of causal influence to give us some useful approximation to freedom?”
You did not answer my question Ted. How does a some sort of cosmic dice shaker make my will free of that cosmic dice shaker?
In what sense free?
By definition, will must have a form, so in that sense, it must have boundaries, and must in a sense have a strong degree of predictability if all of its elements were known.
So freedom in this sense cannot be freedom from all constraint, and it can mean sufficiently isolated that it is not connected to the external stream of existence in a way that is predictable by an agent within that external stream.
So in this sense,randomness does seem to create such freedom.
In the sense of independent of cause.
And if you are claiming that are wills are formed by prior cause(s) then in what sense is our will free?
Ultimately you must be pointing to some compatibilistic defintion of free will and ignoring the fact we cannot do otherwise, in that all our deliberations, logic, expreiences, evaluations etc are determined.
There are at least two senses of “free” present here.
One sense is free in the sense of not being able to predict ahead of time what the outcome is – free of strict causal determinism.
The other is free from all prior influence.
The second sense we both reject of necessity.
Complex systems require high levels of reliance on prior influence to maintain the boundary conditions necessary for such complexity with sufficient fidelity.
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The sense that seems real, is that in which degrees of randomness can be inserted into systems to give sufficient degrees of freedom that the outputs are not entirely predictable by any external agent.
An agent within such boundaries may develop directional control over the various levels of randomness, and thus attain levels of directionality of internal development that may not be predictable to any external agent.
In this sense, one can be “free of the influence of external agents”.
“… it can mean sufficiently isolated that it is not connected to the external stream of existence in a way that is predictable by an agent within that external stream.
So in this sense, randomness does seem to create such freedom.”
Randomness [should it exist] essentially results in unpredictability.
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Why does “will” have to have boundaries? Ultimately any boundary we draw around a human being is at best temporary and perhaps historical. In that a human being’s ‘present’ is actually in the past, albeit very recent past.
Any boundary we draw around the will is arbitrary.
So we draw an arbitrary boundary around sufficient isolation?
I view reality from the lens of an evolutionary systems geek.
In a very real sense, it seems that a good definition of life is “that which can replicate reliably on the boundary between order and chaos”.
That boundary is very context sensitive.
Seeing all life as recursive levels of complex adaptive systems, and we humans as instantiations of some 20 levels of such systems, the boundary definition seems to work at every level I have investigated.
“In a very real sense, it seems that a good definition of life is “that which can replicate reliably on the boundary between order and chaos”.”
Order and chaos are not mutually exclusive … evolution requires a chaotic aspect. Not being able to predict has nothing ultimately to do with free will. Just because we can’t predict which potassium 40 atom will decay next mean potassium 40 has free will. No matter how complex a system we insert into.
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This 500 character limit is painful!
…
All this is very interesting but chaotic/random output does not provide “free will”. Being free from cause is what the debate has been all about. In the last two three hundred years compatibilism has muddied the waters.
Perhaps…but trust me, it will be far more painful if I let people respond in a wall of essay sized text that would be impossible to address each part and completely unwieldy. Technically, I shouldn’t even be allowing in multiple posts from one person at the same time – that is the bigger problem. I may move up the limit to 700 characters in the future. 😉
And of course you are right that chaotic/random output does not provide free will, hope you can convince Ted. 🙂
What I suggest is it is not so much the character count as limit to the box size.
Also remember you as the admin are not limited to 500 characters.
Ted and random? I think he will be determined to maintain his stance 😉
Naw, that just creates copy/paste syndrome of essay sized posts (essay wars are unproductive). Just look at the walls of text in Ted’s own blogs comment section (scroll down his convo with John) and you will see how unconversational and unwieldy it is. Feel free to interact with him on his own turf for unfettered comment lengths. I try to keep my own comment sizes on par with others and if I make an exception I usually explain why (usually to correct misinformation). 😉
Rom and I agree on this.
It may be “unconversational” for you Trick, and it is the sort of conversation I most enjoy.
I love it when someone is willing to explore an idea in depth, and speak for several minutes, then listen while others respond for a similar time. One can start to explore the depths of an issue, rather than staying with surface simplicity.
Some of the best conversations I have had have gone on in such manner for many hours (start at 8pm finish at 5am sort of thing).
It isn’t just unconversational but unproductive. The problem is that the lack of focus on a specific point at a time allows you to contrive just about anything in a wall of text (hence, I suspect, one reason you may like it). There is a difference between text essay convos that are unwieldy and allow people to disregard one sentence and not another (selective reading), and verbal convo where one can interject in on a point to address it. It is a sneaky way to play the unfocus game.
While that is a possible strategy, it is one I consciously do my best to avoid.
The problem is, that when things are really complex, and do actually involve many levels of many sets of complex adaptive systems all of which influence each other, that one cannot begin to seriously address the levels of relationship present in the space available.
That does pose deep difficulty for individuals who are not capable of holding many complex ideas simultaneously and building the linkages.
The problem is when one adds complexity that does not address the actual question. There is nothing that cannot be broken down unless one is trying to obfuscate a conversation with bloat that is actually disconnected from the topic. Even in the discourse I linked with you and John, John says this “I meant that you write a lot of mostly irrelevant stuff instead of clearly analysing the origin of cognitive processes to demonstrate how ‘free will’ can be possible“…and I agree with him. He explained his frustration with your process to me as well and it is the reason he quit the discourse (it was too unproductive).
I get that it appears that way to both you and John.
Just imagine for a moment how it might appear from my side.
The complexity present is such that it would take me a very long time to make every linkage as explicit as many people seem to require – and I simply don’t have that sort of time and energy right now – so I leave such trails as I reasonably can.
In my understanding, the linkages are sufficiently obvious that I didn’t think I needed to be explicit.
Keep in mind that from where I (and others) sit, not only is there not an obvious connection, but we don’t think there is a connection at all from the complexity you grant to the free will topic of importance – and my position does not stem from not understanding the complexity involved. The problem, however, is that the only way to show that there is not a connection is to force very tight and focused, incremental discussions about each aspect (to point out nonsequiturs, problematic semantics, etc.), something impossible with the “looser” type of communication you prefer. This isn’t necessarily a criticism of how you do things on your own blog (that is your prerogative), but an explanation of why I have the bloat avoiding limits I do on my own.
When I started reading Einstein, I couldn’t follow the math, so I went to Hilbert. I couldn’t follow Hilbert, so I went to Riemann. Finally, I had enough math to follow him, then worked back to Einstein (books – not sentences).
Similarly in economics, logic, philosophy, history, systems, AI, QM. Lots of books. Finding lots of errors. Building lots of relationships.
What you ask is logically impossible. It is like trying to understand plate tectonics by looking at a pebble.
Yes, we have both read a lot of books, but in regards to philosophy and science clarity of thought does not come about through a mess. Analytic logic, for example, tries to formalize language and see if there are mistakes in premises or if conclusions actually follow. This takes having clear, concise, incremental, and focused arguments. One can even break them out into multiple 3 step syllogisms. It doesn’t come about through willy-nilly tangents that do not address the question at hand and a lot of bloat about complexity without ever explaining what the complexity has to do with the topic. What I ask is not impossible, it is required.
“If you can’t explain it simply, you don’t understand it well enough.” – Albert Einstein
OK.
Try this.
Mathematics and logic give us the best tools we have for building complex models, but those models do not necessarily relate to reality exactly, and they are the best heuristics we can have.
Do not mistake the map for the territory.
Pi is an irrational number – it may not be computed exactly, ever.
No perfect circle may be instantiated in a quantised reality.
QM – the best tool we have, is profoundly counter intuitive for most.
Even within 500 characters you manage to go off on 4 different irrelevant tangents (map vs. territory, pi, perfect circles, QM counterintuitiveness) in regards to what we are talking about right now which is about the best way to converse ideas back and forth with others (and for the free will topic we need to focus in one at a time here). Imagine how convoluted things get with an unlimited amount of characters and 20 other tangents per comment. Right now I’m just stressing why I have a limit and why that helps prevent (at least some) unwieldy tangents and stay focused. Your response furthers my point here. 🙂
But those ideas are not irrelevant – they are central.
They are all different sorts of indeterminism.
It seems beyond all reasonable doubt that our experiential reality is not the external reality, but a subconsciously created model of it. We all (each and every one of us) live in our own personal version of reality, and every one of them is a map (at some level of accuracy) of the thing being modeled.
Freedom (that which is other than hard causal predictability) does seem to exist.
1 – They are not central to the topic
2 – They are not different sorts of indeterminism without a complete semantic shifts of that term
3 – The fact that we model reality through perceptual input rather than magically know external reality itself is irrelevant to the topic
4 – “Freedom” and “unpredictability” differs from “freedom OF the will” and should not be conflated for this topic
Hi Trick
1/ They are precisely on topic.
2/ They are very different, systemically.
3/ We don’t model reality through perceptual input, we entrain our models to reality via perceptual input. That distinction is fundamental. Our perceptual reality is model – always.
4/ Freedom of the will can be “unpredictability” in respect of agent relationships. What else could it possibly be? My will is free to the degree that it has internal consistency and another cannot control it.
1 – They really are not.
2 – I’m saying they do not all fall under the umbrella of the term “indeterminism” how it is normally used regardless of their systemic differences.
3 – That distinction is also unimportant unless you are leaning toward epistemic solipsism about the external world.
4 – Unpredictability, internal consistency, and others not controlling it… can ALL happen in a completely deterministic universe scenario in which you couldn’t have done otherwise. No free will.
You are being tautological Trick.
I already agreed with you that if the universe is deterministic, then necessarily free will is illusion.
Never have argued about that!
Hold that thought.
What I am arguing is that the evidence we have does not seem (on balance of probabilities) to support that hypothesis.
In a universe which is a balance between order and chaos, then free will can exist as described above.
That does seem to be the sort of world we live in.
You are missing why I bring up the deterministic universe in which you could not have done otherwise. It is not to say such a universe is necessarily the case, it is to say that what you are saying qualifies as “free will” exists in just as much in that deterministic universe – which contradicts your position that free will does not exist in that deterministic universe. Chaos theory, for example…IS entirely deterministic. Probabilities exist in a deterministic universe. Epistemic uncertainty exists in a deterministic universe as does “consistency”…etc. This is why those are irrelevant qualifiers.
Sorry Trick,
You can be right and wrong at the same time.
I can see how what you write is true from your perspective, but it entirely ignores the point I have been consistently trying to make clear.
There is deterministic chaos, and there is non-deterministic chaos.
My statements apply only to the ontologically non-deterministic sort – as I have explicitly stated – many times.
You haven’t seen that yet.
Probability of that happening any time soon seems low.
If you are referring to an indeterministic event (e.g. quantum indeterminacy assuming an indeterministic interpretation), the words chaos, unpredictability, probability, etc….add nothing new to the free will discussion. They do not add any explanatory power in how that indeterministic event – an event that you have absolutely no say over the outcome – an event that you cannot “will” – an event that you have no say how it ultimately interacts with other existing events once it happens – helps at all with free will. It may cause an “otherwise”, but not one that is a willed otherwise.
If you start from a presumption of necessary causality, then there is only one conclusion possible.
We must all start from simple beginnings.
If one examines evidence, and goes where the evidence leads, then for me, the balance of evidence is clearly that order and chaos are both necessary components of reality, and both need be in balance for life such as ourselves to exist.
Such freedom as exists, exists in that boundary.
And what does this have to do with free will? ie the ability to do otherwise?
Sure I can deliberate and conceive alternative paths, pick and choose from them. But all this thought is also caused by classical or probabilistic events.
On top of this all, the concept of free will is totally unnecessary to go about one’s life.
The idea that one has choice, at some level, is fundamental to social organisation.
The idea that one can refrain from an impulse to cause harm, and can choose something else, is important in how we act in reality.
The idea that we can be creative, that choice (morality) matters – is real.
The experience of choice – is real.
Few people have explored the some 20 levels of complex systems present in an embodied human, from both evolutionary and systems perspectives.
We are complex!
So we are complex! So what? Does not mean we are free.
Refraining from impulses to cause harm? In what way is this free?
Morality I would think is a figment of our collective imaginations that has been spurred by evolution giving us emotions like shame and pride.
Because we are complex and the access to the underlying mechanisms to our choices etc is limited, results in the illusion for freedom.
Hi Rom,
It seems that we are free to the degree that we accept all the many levels of necessary boundaries and constraints that are required to maintain the existence of complex social apes such as ourselves, and no more than that.
The levels of uncertainty and complexity present deliver many levels of uncertainty, particularly in changing and novel contexts.
The classical notion of causality seems to be a simple heuristic approximation to something profoundly more complex.
We are going around in circles here Ted.
The many levels of necessary boundaries that we are free to accept – No we are caused by something profoundly more complex to imagine these boundaries. These same [necessary] boundaries are an anathema to the profoundly more complex you point to.
And to be clear when I refer to causality, I am not solely referring to the Newtonian approximation. But something similar to the Hawking and Mlodinow quote on 21st March
Please provide a link to the quote, and I will look closely at it.
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/atheist-believes-in-freewill/#comment-7482
Thank you.
Probabilities – yes – those I can work with.
Hard determinism – no – that doesn’t work.
The thing most people don’t get about probabilities is that small differences in the median can make big differences in the tails of distributions.
The longer the tail, the more pronounced the effect.
We cannot say precisely where the planets were even a few hundred years ago, though we can get close enough to compare to the historical accuracy of any historical documents we have.
I don’t disagree with what you say. What about hard indeterminism? How does indeterminism give us free will? Indeterminism (ie no such thing as cause) absolves form responsibility. We are not responsible for indeterminism. We might think we take on that responsibility, no matter how erroneously.
If you are saying the universe is at some level fundamentally unpredictable, I don’t think anyone would argue against this. But how does this unpredictability give us a will then in any philosophical sense free.
Thank you rom – that is the question.
The answer seems to be deeply recursive (about 20 levels in each individual).
It seems that reality is not simply unpredictable, but is at every level a balance between order and chaos (between predictability and unpredictability).
Within sets of constraints, order and pattern can exist.
What does free mean?
Free cannot be an absence of pattern.
That is chaos.
Free must mean pattern that has degrees of isolation.
It cannot be absolute.
Free? Independent of cause.
Recursion does not give freedom … just blinds us to cause.
Chaos nor patterns are free. An example a Mandelbrot set.
No freedom does not have patterns with degrees of isolation.
Not only is freedom not absolute, but it is an llusion or an arbitrarily applied boundary.
No rom
This time you missed the point.
In a deterministic world we use pseudo random algorithms to approximate randomness – like the sequence of irrational numbers, or other such things. These are not really random, just useful approximations in some contexts.
Freedom does seem to be a mix of the truly random, with complex pattern, with that balance at the boundary delivering degrees of freedom.
Recursing that system, is what increases the degrees of freedom (isolation).
If I am missing your point it is because your semantics are strange. You seem to be confounding chaotic and random. They are not the same thing!
Your last post referred determinism … my post referred to cause irrespective of whether the cause is deterministic or indeterministic.
Regardless of the degree of recursion/iteration there is a mechanism. A mechanism for free will is an oxymoron.
OK
I was not using chaos in the mathematical sense, just in the ordinary sense of meaning “elements without order or connexion” (OED), so can understand the mis-interpretation.
In ordinary language, random and chaotic are synonyms.
A mechanism for free will is an oxymoron only if all aspects of the mechanism are deterministic – which is quite explicitly not the case in this instance.
So if the mechanism is indeterministic … in that I am not, in any sensible interpretation, responsible for cause; how is that relatable to free will?
Also in this long discussion Trick has made it clear that chaos is deterministic.
Random is a poorly understood term. A series of numbers might pass statistical tests for randomness and not actually be rando … eg a high end pRNG. Randomness essentially boils down to not being able to predict a next step in a sequence of events.
Chaos can be deterministic.
It has both forms – in normal human speech.
In the strictly mathematical sense, then yes, it is deterministic.
I can’t see this going anywhere.
From my perspective, you are both looping, inside a closed system.
I guess it feels safe in there.
And it is, really, very complex.
At 500 chars per message, 3 messages per day, could take years to get anywhere near alignment (seems like too many local attractors keeping you within boundaries).
The reality Ted, is that you are avoiding rom’s main question “So if the mechanism is indeterministic … in that I am not, in any sensible interpretation, responsible for cause; how is that relatable to free will?” Asserting something as “really, very complex” allows one to make any erroneous claim. How square-circle producing invisible undetectable self-contradictory fairies exist is “really very complex”. No, for the free will topic it is not that complex at all and many have debunked libertarian free will entirely.
As per Trick’s point we are not moving ahead, because you are not answering the question repeatedly.
The argument from complexity/recursion … does a family have more free will, than an individual? A community? A city. A nation? The Earth? At each level there are orders of magnitude increases in recursion. Does this provide more free will?
And yes I would be interested to know how indeterminism (a cosmic dice shaker) provides free will. Are you looping and not answering our questions?
1 We are complex, multi level, systemic entities – approximately 20 levels of complex adaptive systems in each of us;
2 At every boundary, between every system, both within and between levels, exist levels of uncertainty, of isolation (not in total, but in degree);
3 When you look at individual will, it must have many levels of systemic influence on its development (physical, biological, cultural, etc), and it will also have degrees of separation present (from boundary uncertainties);
——–
4 At the level of will, all influences will be present, as will degrees of separation;
5 To the degree that one is conscious of influences, and to the degree that one consciously develops and filters internal systemic novelty (creativity, randomness, creating from nothing, call it what you will), then one develops degrees of freedom from any predictable chain of cause and effect;
6 Real novelty (real randomness) must be part of the system for this systemic separation to occur.
——–
7 I have been very consistent in saying this.
8 I am very familiar with complex systems, I have written vary larger and complex computer systems, and have lead teams developing legal systems, I have worked in law enforcement and as judiciary. I undersstand something of both the power and the limits of stricty causal rule based systems.
9 If your conceptual system does not allow of the random, then none of this can possibly make sense.
Since you used 3 comments I will go over 500 characters to address each unnecessary term used:
1 – 4 and 6 (if we accepted those all as premises) do not follow to the free will of concern for anyone in the history of this topic. What you are calling “degrees of freedom” in 5 is an interaction of causal events that you have no ultimate say over (no matter how complex, multi level, or systemic) with indeterministic events (and “separation”) that you have no say over, in a way that the interaction is forced from both ends of “complex, multi level, systemic” processes with “separation” that you ultimately have no say over. 7 – 9 are not a part of your argument (and are irrelevant to the soundness of it which fails – perhaps trying to invoke an authority fallacy for 8, etc. 9 is irrelevant because both rom and I are willing to accept an indeterministic universe). The indeterministic interaction of “unbounded uncertainties” doesn’t grant the free will of concern any more than not having a single indeterministic interaction, it is just the addition of a “dice rolling” bombardment into the causal interaction that you had no control over….again, no matter a) how complex, b) how many levels, c) how systemic, d) how much uncertainty, e) how much indeterminism/real randomness/real novelty, f) how many degrees of separation, and g) how much influence. Every aspect will be dictated by 1) causal events that ultimately stem outside of you, 2) indeterministic events that you have no say over, and 3) the exact interaction between 1 and 2 that must come about based on how 1 and 2 come about.
In other words, your “terms” (no matter how many you throw in) do not logically lead to “free will”. Your conclusion is a non-sequitur. What you label “degrees of freedom” also are not freedom of the will.
rom – your turn. 😉
Why are you engaged in this conversation?
Because you both invoked my name in the convo. I would have let you two haggle over your positions but not when I’m invoked. You said “From my perspective, you are both looping, inside a closed system” but the reality is that we are both granting you a universe with indeterminism (for the sake of argument) and pointing out it is equally incompatible with free will as a deterministic universe. We are granting an “open system”. 😉
To respond to the challenges of existence in real time we have many levels of heuristics and oracles.
Heuristics are quick ways of solving complex problems that are near enough in practice most of the time to allow survival.
Oracles are essentially black boxes that deliver a random output within a range that is survivable.
Why use oracles rather than heuristics?
Because we often face halting problems while involved in tournaments at various levels, and predictability means losing.
—–
So we come to awareness as extremely complex entities, but with extremely simple models of ourselves.
We are (or ought to be) deeply mysterious to ourselves, but the needs of survival mean we usually adopt simple heuristics in our models of ourselves (of the sort you keep repeating).
To will is to show some disposition, some preference, at some level.
Will is a very complex thing.
It has many levels of components in each of us.
—–
Every level of that complexity has certain sets of boundary conditions, and certain sets of rules, that give it the form and functionality that it has.
There must exist some degree of predictability in those relationships, or else they have no survival value.
And sometimes, in some tournament situations, the survival value exists in some randomness.
So not simple.
So given this reality, what might freedom mean?
It cannot mean an absense of rules, for that is an end to pattern.
—–
It can mean a level of self determination that includes levels unpredictability from the perspective of external agents.
We may be able to have random generated sets of heuristics and oracles that we test (internally or externally) and accept or reject on the basis of those tests.
As we explore our own systemic depths, we can modify or replace many of complex componentry of “Will”.
We can choose.
—–
Thus our “Will” can develop a freedom from any causally predictable stream to any external agent, or conversly, may develop in ways that are at variance with externally imposed probability functions.
In both of these fashions, our will can be said to have degrees of freedom, even as aspects of it remain deeply mysterious even unto ourselves. The systems do in fact appear to be that complex.
In this fashion, freedom of will does in fact seem to be reality, and is essential to survival.
This type of unfocus is exactly why I have the character limit. Adding in terms such as “heuristics” and “oracles” adds in nothing new to the point about how those are freely willed, even though you make the non-sequitur to that. You do this with the term “predictability” as well, but the free will debate is not about whether something is predictable or not (or to whom it is not predictable for, etc.) – that seems to be your misunderstanding of the topic. Same with complexity, more complexity (with sets of boundary conditions) does not equate to free will.
So to focus down on where you make the non-sequitur leap:
None of this is freely willed “self-determination”. These “heuristics”, “oracles”, “predictability”, “unpredictability/randomness”, “complexity”, “boundary conditions”, “rules”, etc…ALWAYS stem to events that the person has no say over…whether that be a causal lines that ultimately stem outside of the person (and hence is not “self-determined” but driven by antecedent variables), or causal lines that stem to indeterministic/truly random events that the person has no say over (and hence is not “self-determined” but driven by non-willed truly-random variables)…and any interactions between the two can never lead to a system that has freely willed “self-determination” because the very interaction is dictated by the EXACT product of these lines.
The point is, that “will” could not have been, of the person’s own accord, otherwise (the free will of concern). Any otherwise that comes from indeterminism would be entirely out of the control of the willer. This is the same for ANY of those complex processes that you use to obfuscate this point.
Whether or not something is predictable to an external agent is entirely irrelevant to the topic of free will.
***********************
Instead of keep reiterating what you had in multiple comments, I’d like to focus down on a “yes/no” question if answerable to you:
Given the “complex” system you propose, could the “willer” (the person willing) have willed, thought, or done otherwise – of the willer’s own accord (meaning the otherwise output would have been ultimately “up to willer” and not due to some event out of the willer’s control)? Yes or No?
Have you stopped beating your grandmother yet Trick? A simple yes or no answer – please!
Implicit in your question is an acceptance of the very system I am questioning.
In my world, which is a world defined by probability functions, neither yes nor no are accurate.
The answer is always – to some degree, and the degree depends upon the context, and both the context and the degree are important, and uncertainty is always a big part of every context.
No, my question was NOT a loaded question. This is the 2nd time you’ve incorrectly used that “grandma” analogy which is used for a specific purpose – not just because you don’t like yes/no questions.
Some questions are indeed binary, for example: Do you have any type of brain in your head at any point in your existence? Yes or No? It’s not a loaded question. If you say “to some degree I do”…the answer is “yes”….PERIOD!
Same with my question which contains the FULL context (which is important). If you say “to some degree you could have done, of your own accord, otherwise”…the answer is “yes”. So I ask again?
The question is loaded Trick – but you cannot see that, which is a big part of why communication is not working.
All questions are loaded, in a very real sense.
Communication happens when the loadings are accepted on both sides, in our case they are not.
I am not operating on the same set of assumptions you are.
For me, their use in this context is outside of their domain of utility.
You will not allow discussion of the substantive issue as you have not distinguished it as such.
Then you don’t understand what a loaded question is. There is nothing presupposed in the question I asked.
You are basically suggesting that questioning your position cannot take place because “all questions are loaded”. This is a convenient way to suggest that your position cannot be questioned.
—————————————-
Reminder: Please don’t waste your time writing a 2nd and 3rd comment that will not be approved. One comment at a time. Once the person you are talking with has responded, it is your turn to respond to that. Also, I don't consider these necessary reminders or addressing rules (that fall outside of the discussion topic) as breaking my own rules, but I'll place them in this font type so you can understand the distinction. Also note that if these rules prolong the discussion, I'd rather have that and have certain points addressed (even basic ones like the correct use of a fallacy claim) than none at all.No Trick.
False on every count.
Good, that gives us focus. Let’s start here:
Q: Given the “complex” system you propose, could the “willer” (the person willing) have willed, thought, or done otherwise – of the willer’s own accord (meaning the otherwise output would have been ultimately “up to willer” and not due to some event out of the willer’s control)? Yes or No?
You claim this is a loaded question, which means no matter how you answer Q, it presupposes that you X.
Please fill in X.
The use of the term “ultimately” is what makes the question difficult.
Will in this sense isn’t ultimate, it is instantaneous.
A system complex enough to exhibit “will” must of course have many necessary components present that allow it to have the form that it does.
So if you are in search of an “ultimate”, then everything in existence ultimately traces back to big bang.
“Will” of the sort I contend, can only exist if the causal chain is soft (probabilistic) rather than hard.
Great, progress! I’m always happy to revise language for clarity (but it is a clarity issue – we should not jump to claims of fallacies). How about this:
Given the “complex” system you propose, could the “willer” (the person willing) have willed, thought, or done otherwise – of the willer’s own accord (meaning the otherwise output would have been not due to some event(s) out of the willer’s control)? Yes or No?
I cannot answer that question from my perspective, because the terms “control” and “own accord” are too hard.
In my understanding, none of us have strict control of anything, the best we have is degrees of influence, and in some cases those may closely approximate (but never equate to) strict control.
In my understanding the willer could have altered the likelihood of that particular outcome in that particular instant, and that was the outcome that occurred.
Let’s start with indeterministic events first: Do you have ANY degree of influence over the outcome of any indeterministic event (e.g. whether a particle in the system collapses or decoheres to a 30% chance area over a 15% chance area, etc.)? Y or N
Can you be a little (lot) more specific?
I can push a graphite control rod in or out of a nuclear pile and alter the output of the system, without knowing how or if it affects the probability of any specific atom decaying.
I cannot tell when any specific atom will decay, and I can predict within quite useful limits the response of the system as a whole.
It is analogous to that, but several levels more complex.
Let me be very Quantum specific (which also applies to atom decay start):
Regardless of what preceding events cause a specific superpositioned state – once a superpositioned state exists, does a “willer willing” EVER have ANY “degree of influence” over how the wave function of the superpositioned state will collapse – meaning which position it collapses to (which is where all of the indeterminism resides for an indeterministic interpretation of QM)?
I do not accept the assertion that all quantum indeterminism is in “over how the wave function of the superpositioned state will collapse”, though that is an important idea.
Heisenberg uncertainty (related) seems to be important also.
The very idea that mathematical models can capture what is going on accurately seems to be at issue.
Degrees of approximation seem to be allowed, nothing more.
The mathematical technique “sum over life histories” seems to point to deep influence.
The HUP (uncertainty principle) has nothing to do with indeterminism in ANY “true-randomness” sense. Not being able to mathematically measure both the momentum and position in a clear way simultaneously is a product of how the wave function itself works. It does not itself, for example, allow an “otherwise” occurrence. Only the “collapse” for an indeterministic interpretation does, which, for a deterministic interpretation there are hidden variables for (a causal variable) whereas for indeterministic interpretation there are none. The HUP is irrelevant and applies to both deterministic and indeterministic interpretations of QM.
Here is a 1 minute vid that can help you out: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vc-Uvp3vwg
That 1 minute video does not do the topic justice.
Heisenberg himself said “The law of causality is no longer applied in quantum theory and the law of conservation of matter is no longer true for the elementary particles” (Physics and Philosophy (1958)).
HUP has fundamental uncertainty within it.
Yes the video is sufficient for the point.
Heisenberg supported the Copenhagen interpretation and your quote-mine is absolutely true under that interpretation, but the quote is about wave-function collapse and no variable for it… NOT HUP!! For HUP it is entirely about what we can and cannot measure only, and Heisenberg understands this.
Do you agree that the “uncertainty” in HUP is NOT the same thing as true randomness / no cause? Y or N
Still not that simple.
At least two aspects present in HUP.
1/ HUP gives indeterminancy to all measurement – regardless of if underlying mechanism is deterministic or has random aspects. So from the perspective of the knowability of the universe – HUP introduces indeterminance.
2/ Is the conjecture that any mathematical model accurately models reality, rather than simply giving us the best heuristic approximation. Irrational numbers point to mathematical models being heuristic.
1)That type of “unknowability” or “unpredictability” is irrelevant to the topic and when we address “indeterminacy” for the free will debate we are referring to “true randomness” meaning not being ‘determined by causality’. Again, you even said that a CAUSALLY deterministic universe cannot grant free will – this is regardless of HUP. 2 is also irrelevant.
Are you going to answer the question?
Do you agree that the “uncertainty” in HUP is NOT the same thing as true randomness / no cause? Y or N
If consciousness is an information system, then indeterminancy of information is every bit as random, from the perspective of that information system.
So giving a simple yes or no answer to the question seems to be off topic, if the topic is the freedom of an information system rather than the freedom of any level of substrate upon which that information system is operating.
From an information perspective – HUP delivers indeterminant measurements – Random, within limits.
Let’s avoid the terms “determinism” and “indeterminism” from here on out as you have a different (and irrelevant) definition than the norm for the topic that is epistemic rather than ontic. Also let’s exclude “random” as you are using an epistemic version there too. Rather, answer this:
Imagine a universe where EVERY event (ontologically) has a cause (there is no event that is not the specific product of antecedent causes), HOWEVER there are aspects that make it so we cannot assess the specifics about certain causes or effects (there is uncertainty, meaning a lack of knowledge about a cause or potential effect). In that universe, could you have done otherwise? Y or N
That universe cannot logically exist.
As soon as uncertainty becomes translated to information then it delivers randomness to some degree.
That lack of predictability, then introduces a degree of freedom to the system.
If a system is of sufficient complexity that it can condition that (bias it in some way), then the internal state of that system can become separated from hard causal predictability of the whole.
Any level of “noise” in a system can do that.
This requires complex systems.
It certainly can “logically exist” (as in the case of any deterministic interpretations of QM). This idea that “uncertainty” translates to “randomness” in the non-causal (could have been otherwise) sense of that word is, frankly, nonsense for both logic and science. Seemingly, there is not a question you are willing to answer (and no, none of the questions are at all loaded), but the good thing with the 500 character count is that we can decipher that quickly and without all of the unnecessary bloat.
This is the point where the good ol’ “agree to disagree” mantra comes in. It causally happens. 😉
Can you prove your claim that a lawful computational system whose state is determined by its consistent rule set applied to inputs according to its program, can have outcomes that are predictable when one or more of the inputs are not predictable?
HUP gives fundamental limits to predictability.
No amount of repeated measurement can get past HUP.
Strawman – I never made that claim. Let me make this clear: Your position is epistemological, not ontological. The questions being asked are ontological questions. You invoking epistemological unpredictability is irrelevant to whether an event is determined by an antecedent cause or not. None of my questions asked about “predictability”. If every event has antecedent causes that derive the event, I can prove that the output could not have been otherwise – logically (regardless of unpredictability).
No Trick
My position is both epistemological and ontological (repeatedly stated as such).
I do not accept your assertion that the position of a photon is deterministic. The twin slit cannot work if it is. It must have a plank degree of indeterminism.
The math says it is probabilistic.
Can we prove absolutely ontological indeterminism?
No – no more so than we can prove determinism.
HUP is non deterministic on that issue.
Ted, I granted you your Indeterministic Interpretation of QM (IIQM) for the sake of argument multiple times and explained that it is (entirely) about wave function collapse in the ontological sense – which is what the double slit is about for this. My questions (that you refused to answer) were entirely about this aspect! HUP, however, should not be conflated with this! The “uncertainty” for HUP is not about the probability distribution of “collapse” (and applies to both IIQMs and DIQMs).
Also, you are simply incorrect about your assertion that the double slit cannot work without an IIQM as there are DIQM’s that work just as well (but that is irrelevant as, again, I’m granting you an IIQM for the sake of argument).
I agree with you in the sense that it is possible to construct a deterministic model of anything that works within the margins of error present in a system.
And having had both the physical and intellectual experiences I have, it seems probable to me that the universe within which we exist is at every level a balance between the lawful and the stochastic.
In that universe, free will can exist.
In yours it cannot.
And by definition, there is no reliable way to distinguish between them.
I’m agnostic on whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic. I’m trying to show you that free will, in any important sense of the term for this topic, cannot exist in either a causally deterministic model (meaning ontologically deterministic) OR an indeterministic model (meaning ontological indeterminism in the non-caused sense), regardless of epistemic limitations, uncertainty, unpredictability, and so on (that apply to both). I cannot do that if you refuse to answer legit questions. Also, the term “stochastic” is as ambiguous as the term “random”.
Are you familiar with the idea of an “Oracle” in computational systems?
A system that delivers a workable heuristic by having a random output within a set of constraints that have a reasonable probability of surviving in that context.
With the insertion of an unpredictable output from an oracle, a system can become decoupled to a degree from the necessary relationship to the external causal stream, in as much as such causality exists.
And this will need many sets of 500 characters.
Unless it is a quantum computer or uses QM (and we accept an IIQM), randomness on a computer is not ontologically random in the sense of not-caused. A random oracle is either an epistemic “black box” that uses (caused) “noise” or (caused) pseudorandomness, or it uses (uncaused – if we accept an IIQM) QM wavefunction collapse. But again, unpredictability is irrelevant to whether or not an event has a cause. You are mistaken on the “decoupling from causality” claim unless it is a quantum computer or uses QM and the probability distribution comes from wave-function collapse in an IIQM.
No Trick
You are making an assumption of ontological causation.
That is your bias, your belief.
It is not actually supported by evidence.
Evidence sets we have all contains uncertainty.
The best evidence we have indicates quantum mechanics gives the best approximation to reality, which is uncertainty within limits, that over large collections delivers a close approximation to a regular distribution.
And that distinction is important.
It seems to be as Heisenberg said.
Ted – stop. Everytime the word “causation” comes up you mention “uncertainty”. Why can you not understand that “uncertainty” (of knowledge about something) does not necessarily equate to “uncaused event”? This is your bias. I am not making an assumption of ontological causation, I’m saying that the only evidence of an uncaused event is in quantum wave function collapse IF we accept an IIQM. This is just a fact about physics – borne out by the fact that HUP (uncertainty) also applies to entirely causal interpretations of QM (DIQM). HUP is irrelevant here.
I can say something exactly equivalent Trick.
To me, the evidence is clear, that all knowledge is approximation, that the very idea of Truth – of absolute causation, is illusion.
Look at the evidence of recent centuries.
We started with the idea that absolute knowledge was possible.
Newton was certain of Truth.
He was wrong.
His mathematics was later proven to be nothing more than a useful approximation to reality in some contexts.
Why do you hold onto a disproved idea?
Ted – when you speak of “knowledge” you are specifically in the realm of epistemology, which should never be conflated with ontology. The fact that we lack knowledge about something does not imply that you can make a conclusion such as “no cause exists”…that is a complete argument from ignorance fallacy. If you want to invoke in quantum mechanics, which you do, then it is an IIQM that you are referring to which postulates that there is an actual lack of a causal variable for wave-function collapse. Period. There is no other quantum theory for an ontological lack of causation in QM.
I get that in your reality, your statement:
…”lack of a causal variable for wave-function collapse. Period. There is no other theory for an ontological lack of causation.”
does make sense.
I can see how that appears to be so, from within the paradigm set you seem to be using.
And yes – in a sense.
You do not yet seem to appreciate how my statements might be valid in a different paradigm set.
And that is the issue.
I can point to any number of ladders.
I cannot make you climb them.
My set is science and logic here, your set is an argument from ignorance fallacy and nonsequitur. If we are going to talk about how uncaused events cannot be willed events and why they cannot help free will, it makes no sense for you to bring up uncertainty in this context. Even if I accept there are other uncaused events besides wave-function collapse in an IIQM, the more important part is that “uncertainty” does NOT address those uncaused events – both logically and scientifically (it is not a replacement word). It just doesn’t and to keep saying “there is uncertainty” is to avoid context about ontology. Your “ladders” are (tangential) non-sequiturs, conflations of epistemology and ontology, and avoidance mechanisms. For that REASON I refuse to climb and we require thee “agree to disagree” mantra.
NO Trick
It really is far deeper than that.
It really does go deeply to the nature of interaction, the ability of systems to influence, rather than to be seen as hard cause.
Hard causality can only exist where there is hard time.
Relativity destroys the notion of hard time, and makes time local.
That blurs the distinction cause.
QM takes that blurring a step further.
Complexity does not require hard boundaries, it can work with sufficient regularity.
It does seem to do so.
Even here you don’t understand the philosophical implications of your assertion. You seem to just blurt out aspects of physics that you don’t fully understand when that misunderstanding suits you. For example, if you are suggesting there is no neo-lorentzian absolute frame (another argument from ignorance btw) in relativity/the universe (no real local frame), then a block conception of time logically follows and the future and everything you will ever (watch yourself) do already exists in the block. Absolutely no free will there either – and certainly no “otherwise” possibilities.
I was suggesting Trick only what I said – that time is local. That the sequencing of events depends upon the reference frame being considered – that there is no absolute sequencing of things – it is all relative.
That was not in any way intended to be any direct inference about a mechanism for free will.
It was an attempt to show that classical notions have changed.
It was an argument by analogy.
Rather than make the effort to look for the substantive argument you insult from error.
You are bringing up a time conception that is completely incompatible with your own position. This isn’t an insult Ted, you are DISPLAYING a lack of understanding. This doesn’t mean that you cannot educate yourself, or that you are not intelligent, it is just that you seem uneducated here due to the display of misunderstanding you continue to provide (even now). And it is the very sequencing of events and reference frames that I’m referring to – if there is no real ontological frame with absolute simultaneity (A-series) – the block universe (B-series) is the case and everything everyone “will do” is already in the block. Please understand this.
No Trick
That is not what I am pointing to.
What I am pointing to is the change of perspectives – Universal time, to frame relative time.
A sequence from fixed eternal heavenly perfection, to Newton’s eternal clockwork, to something probabilistic.
A shifting of paradigms.
A series of better approximations to something.
Hard truth, to probabilistic approximation to something.
In a systems sense, it is a journey from simple binary approximations to Bayesian approaches to infinities.
First, relativity theory is NOT probabilistic, there is a Lorentz transformation that happens between frames of reference. Second, you are missing the more important point that your invocation of relative frames, if each frame is considered ontic, leads to a B-series of block-time which actually is eternally fixed. You have this all exactly backward.
No Trick
Once again you misinterpret me.
The paradigm shift on time – was from universal to relative (though any particular measurement will have probabilistic margins of error on it, that wasn’t the point – the point was paradigm shift).
The spatial aspect really does come down to quantum probabilities – both in HUP and in “wave function”.
And the point was the nature of paradigm change.
It is not trivial, not easy, and you haven’t got it yet.
No Ted,
I know why you THINK you are invoking this in, but it is wrong on a number of fronts (and another attempt to muddy the waters). We have more accurate time measurements today than ever before DUE to relative assessments (not less…and that is not trivial)…AND you invoking in relative frames as ontic features still goes against your very position (and that is not trivial). You don’t even appreciate that we have huge issues aligning relativity with your version of QM. Since you feel you can just invoke in misunderstood ideas about time to muddy the waters about causality, let me ask you this: Is your preferred system an A-series of time or B-series of time?
It is another – yes and no.
Yes – we can make more accurate time measurements, and not exact – ever.
It seems very probable to me that you do not have much idea at all of how or what I think, if you did, then you would not be making false assertions with the frequency that you seem most likely to be doing.
This approach is clearly not a productive use of time.
Can I suggest exploring a couple of definitions:
Freedom; and
Knowledge.
Start with freedom.
You first.
Another question goes unanswered: I asked if your “system” had an A-series or B-series of time? You brought up time and I really want to know. If you don’t know, just say “I don’t know”. If you do know, please answer.
“Not exact” has nothing to do with relativity, as relativity allows for exact mathematical transitions between reference frames.
Perhaps I don’t know what you think because you refuse to answer a single relevant question. That is unproductive.
The term “freedom” is ambiguous and context dependent, but here is how I define “free will” and the reason why: CLICK HERE.
Please answer the question about time.
My understanding of time is a mix of relativity and QM.
Time seems to me a local phenomenon mediate by the exchange of photons (and the information they carry).
As such time also seems to be part of quantum mechanics, and subject to uncertainties at the Plank level.
Thus I am closer to Hericlitus, and significantly different in detail.
It seems to me every particle only has the eternal present, which is constantly evolving as conditioned by influences and uncertainties.
Please select one:
1) My view falls under an A-series of time…such as presentism (only the present exists and constantly changes) or evolving block (the present changes like in presentism but leaves an existing past – the future does not exist)
or
2) My view falls under a B-series of time, such as eternalism (the past – present – future all eternally exist)
*I need more clarity due to the “eternal” word you used – as eternalism is B-series…but you said only a present that is evolving which leads me to think A-series. Please specify if your view falls under 1 or 2 (it must be one or the other) for clarity sake (in other words answer the question I asked directly).
This is our problem in every dimension – our paradigms of understanding are so different, they do not easily map one to another.
I was explicit.
It seems clear to me that the notion of any sort of universal time is illusory, though a useful approximation in many common contexts.
It seems that time is a local phenomenon to each “particle” of matter, and it is given by the exchange of information embodied in “photons”.
This understanding seems to work for both relativity and QM.
I’m suggesting that if you cannot categorize your theory of time (e.g. A / B series), you don’t understand the topic (and how it relates to “particle” relativity). To get to the heart of the matter, in YOUR VIEW, is the relativity of simultaneity:
1) An ontological fact (two events can *exist* together in the same reference frame and for another reference frame the same two events can *exist* one after another)
or
2) NOT an ontological fact about event order but rather about a lack of knowledge over whether two events are ontologically simultaneous (*exist* at the same time absolutely or not)
or
3) Neither 1 nor 2
or
4) I don’t know
I will continue to ask questions to see if I can get an actual answer at some point, though it seems futile, almost comically so.Most closely approximates 1 in most contexts, and contains aspects of 2, and aspects of 3; and because it is explicitly heuristic knowledge (as all knowledge is in my paradigm of understanding), probably has aspects of 4 embedded and undistinguished.
If all one wants to do is build a house, and a road to the next village, then “flat earth works”.
Understanding the range of cosmology to intelligence, and all that seems to embody, seems to demand one accept evolutionary epistemology.
Then your view is actually agnostic on whether there is an absolute reference frame or not, correct? (Meaning you do not know if ontic simultaneity is absolute or if it is relative)
No.
The idea “agnostic” doesn’t apply well to me.
All my understandings have both contextual confidence and essential uncertainty.
I am very confident that the very idea of “Ontic simultaneity” seems to be a simplification of something profoundly more complex and fundamentally uncertain at the margin. It is a low resolution model of something very different at the next level. Different in ways that are fundamentally important to the nature of freedom.
If by “freedom” you mean the freedom to have been or done otherwise, do you agree that ontic simultaneity (if it did exist – and regardless of complexity) being ontologically relative (e.g. to a particle’s frame of reference) is incompatible with that freedom?
Note: You are the one that brought up relativity, so I want to make sure you know just how uncomfortable your claims about relativity are with your version of QM.
If by “ontic simultaneity” you mean that reality is a “hard” causal system, with no uncertainty at the margins, then yes.
But that does not seem to be the sort of reality we live in.
So – No.
It does seem to be the sort of thing people like to model – which is not at all the same thing.
The sort of reality we live in seems to have ontic uncertainty at the margins, always.
That marginal uncertainty allows for systems to operate in ways that are free from hard “causality” in degrees.
I’m referring to the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity where-as:
* From the POV of reference frame 1, event A happens first and event B afterward.
* From the POV of reference frame 2, event B happens first and event A happens afterward.
* From the POV of reference frame 3, events A and B happen at the same time (are simultaneous).
I’m asking, in your view, if it is ONTIC-LY the case for events A and B that the order is ontologically relative?
That is relativity. Space-Time is relative.
Basic stuff.
That is not the issue.
(And keep the idea that it seems probable that all models are useful approximations at some level.)
The issue is much deeper.
It is the quantum uncertainty at the margins (be it the “time like” or the “space like” margins) that seems to be real, and it is fundamental to the ideas that there may be uncertainty in outcomes, and systems may be conditioned over time as to how they employ such uncertainty.
It is an issue. If you think the relativity of simultaneity is ontologically the case, then the future ALREADY EXISTS in a block conception of time (both events A and B already exist in the block). This leaves you no room for your indeterministic interpretation of QM where an “otherwise possibility” is actually viable. I’m explaining to you that you are being inconsistent with the “physics” you expel in order to promote “uncertainty” (an irrelevant word for the onticity).
No Trick.
You do not allow of the possibility of ontic uncertainty.
You deny it, ignore it, repeatedly, at every level.
Of course, if you do that, then free will must, by definition, appear as illusion.
That is simple logic.
I am making the strong claim that the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that such a model is not how reality is.
I make the strong claim that ontic uncertainty seems very likely to exist, and is fundamental to freedom.
No Ted, it is your very position on time and relativity that does not allow it. I’m denying nothing, I’m showing your own inconsistency by using your own responses. You are promoting two incompatible theories… you just do not realize it. Your view of relativity (e.g.relativity of simultaneity) requires a block conception (of space-time) where the future already exists, but that is incompatible with your idea of ontic “uncertainty” in a sense that allows an otherwise possibility.
No Trick
You keep making assumptions about what I am saying, that are strictly at variance with my explicit statements – but fit with your model.
I see no indication of your having comprehended what I wrote.
You seem to deny the possibility of uncertainty.
You seem to deny the possibility of time as a local phenomenon, given by photon interaction, which always has quantum uncertainty.
I said: “I’m asking, in your view, if it is ONTIC-LY the case for events A and B that the order is ontologically relative?”
You said in response: “That is relativity. Space-Time is relative. Basic stuff.”
To me that is a “yes”. If it is not, then maybe try being clear with your communication and actually answer a question using appropriate words (like “yes” or “no”) rather than side-step it – so try again (and re-answer that question).
Also, I’m not denying anything – I’m pointing to your own inconsistencies.
What you do not seem to acknowledge Trick, is that we have fundamentally different ontic (and epistemic) paradigms.
I have tried many times to make mine available to you, but it remains hidden.
I understand the grief and frustration as I keep saying things that make no sense in your paradigm.
I get that.
I have explicitly stated many times, I am not using that paradigm.
I do not require you to adopt my paradigm ongoingly, but acknowledging it as a possibility is a start.
If you are invoking in physics such as QM and relativity, then you do not have different paradigms, but let’s start here: what methodologies do you use as “epistemic standards of evidence” regarding what is ontological or not?
For me it is the scientific method and analytic logic. You?
Scientific method for me means a recursive process of:
Examine evidence;
Generate hypotheses to explain evidence;
Design experiments to discriminate between hypotheses;
Perform experiments;
Use best available tools to examine results;
Repeat.
It has been an exploration of domains of enquiry and understanding.
It started with True and False;
Then came probabilistic tools for deciding True or False;
Then came non-binary Truth values, starting with T/F/Undetermined…
Good, so we BOTH incorporate the scientific method in our epistemological standard (and hence we will get back to the relativity of simultaneity later). Now you also happen to believe free will exists (a metaphysical topic). Is that based on the scientific method alone, or do you have other epistemological standards you use as well (e.g. like analytic logic)? What other method (if any) do you use to conclude “free will exists”?
Note: I’m not asking for your argument for free will, I’m asking what methodology other than science do you use to argue for its existence?
I have used the scientific method, recursively, across many domains.
That has lead me to an interpretive meta-schema where seems that all interpretive schema are very probably, at best, some sort of useful approximation to reality in some set of contexts.
It seems very probable that reality has ontic uncertainty at all levels.
It is logical that uncertainty at the boundaries of systems can lead to uncertainty in the relations between sets of systems that meets the definition “freedom”.
What epistemological method do you use for your “interpretive meta-schema”? Does it, for example, take a scientific finding (such as uncertainty), and other findings or axioms as other premises, and use those premises in order logically deduce a conclusion from them? If so then we are on the same page with the use of logic as well. If not, what method other than logic or the scientific method do you use here?
Here is where it starts to get uncertain again.
What do you mean by logic?
Do you mean using the tools of probability to determine which of the infinite sets of possible logics best meets Ockham’s Razor in that specific context, which can itself lead to a recursive process with higher order logics becoming involved if the context gets really complex (as biology often does)?
If you mean that – yes.
If you mean simple Boolean logic in all contexts, then no.
So (to be clear) you don’t use DEDUCTIVE logic (which differs from mathematical Boolean logic) to conclude that free will exists? Meaning premises follow to the conclusion that it exists. It is just a scientific fact that we can assess from an observed (empirical) probability distribution?
One can only reliably use deductive logic within defined domains. It is great within mathematical and logical domains.
Goedel is one of the few thinkers who’s work I have closely investigated in whom I found no significant errors, largely because he stayed in the domain of logic and made no claims about reality.
When it comes to reality, one can use deductive logic to refine conjectures (hypotheses), and one must always test those hypotheses in reality.
Reality has uncertainties.
Yes, there are different domains when induction is used, deduction, etc. Do you use any deductive logic for your conjecture (hypothesis) about free will existing?
Note: We may get into Gödel later, especially his conjecture on time in which real change is impossible… which contradicts your free will position as well (but I doubt we will get that far). The idea that he makes no claims about reality is misinformed.
Yes certainly.
And in doing so I use all the logics I have gathered from QM, relativity, biochemistry, evolution, games theory, systems, cybernetics, history, psychology, economics, politics, complexity theory, logic, computational theory, information theory, neuro-anatomy and physiology, artificial intelligence, probability, mediation, martial arts, religious and cultural evolution, etc; and all the abstractions I have made from my 50+ years of study and experience across these domains.
Great, so you use both the scientific method and logical deduction for your epistemological standard of evidence to conclude what ‘exists’. So rather than we have “fundamentally different ontic (and epistemic) paradigms” as you suggest…. there seems to be more of a communication problem, and I’d argue the problem has everything to do with a lack of clarity on your end. For example, it was like pulling teeth in over four comments to get you to just say that you used the “scientific method and deductive logic”. I didn’t ask about your (irrelevant) resume, just your epistemic standards.
So shall we go back to your ontic position on the relativity of simultaneity and what it means?
Everything depends on how each of those terms is interpreted.
I use simple binary logic forms when writing computer code.
I rarely use them in relation to anything in reality that isn’t trivially simple.
The differences in ontic and epistemic paradigms doesn’t relate to the use of logic and models, but to the forms of models and logic being used.
I’m still not confident that you have that distinction.
I only care about what forms you use for the free will conclusion you make, which (if I have it correct) is obtaining information from science, placing that info into premises, and having a deductive conclusion that follows logically from the premises (whether done formally or informally). I could care less about binary logic in computer code, we are addressing a philosophical topic in relation to an ontological claim you are making regarding something IN REALITY.
Before we move on, let me ask you this: If there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? If it is not, should you accept the conjecture?
What does the word logic mean to you?
Is it restricted to classical binary logic forms, containing on binary truth value (True and False), or does it allow for any of the infinite class of possible non-binary logics eg the simplest trinary form (True, False, Undecided).
If open, then you immediately have uncertainty deciding how to search the space of possible logics for appropriate hypotheses, and how to test competing claims, in respect of any particular physical system.
It contains both classical AND modal/multivalued logic, and whether you use one over the other depends on the information you have (or lack) and context. Modal and multi-valued logic are an EXTENSION of classical logic depending on the conditions, they are not a replacement as you seem to suggest. But no matter what you use here, one thing is the case in all of these – if ontological identity is contradicted – it is unsound and hence illogical. So I ask again:
According to your usage of logic (whatever that may be), if there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? If it is not, should you accept the conjecture?
Ontological contradictions, if supported by evidence, indicate that the logic in use is not appropriate to the task.
The meta schema seems logically sound.
It seems to be a useful approximation to reality, which is all any evolved entity has any right to expect.
Logic gives us the best models we have of reality.
There is no demand that reality follow any form of logic exactly, though whatever reality is must approximate the forms of logic at some level for them to work as they do.
If your epistemological standard of evidence allows in ontological contradictions (something that exists that does not need to be identical with itself) and, hence, the principle of explosion (which applies to all ontological contradictions), it is neither scientific evidence, nor empirical evidence, nor logical evidence about something ontic, (all which depend on identity) but something else (what I’m unsure of). So it seems you are right about one thing after-all, our epistemological paradigms are fundamentally different, and communication about what exists or does not becomes impossible. Knowing this makes things very easy, as convo on philosophical topics end full-stop. It also should be noted that without identity as a fundamental standard, you cannot know anything at all about what exists as it could, at the very same time, also not exist….so any free will claim becomes rather absurd (as free will need not be identical to itself per such a standard). All knowledge goes out the window.
Once again – you misinterpet what I wrote.
For me:
Evidence is king.
Systems of logic must fit the evidence.
If the evidence points to ontological contradiction, then it means the logic is not appropriate to the evidence.
So we are saying something very similar, in different ways.
The difference, is that you seem to attach primacy to the particular logical form that you happen to be using, rather than to the evidence sets available.
You said “Ontological contradictions, if supported by evidence, …” (and you repeat that idea again above).
To suggest that there could be evidence of an ontological contradiction is cart-before the horse and proves that your standard of evidence does not depend on identity / non-contradiction – which is a requirement of A) any deductive reasoning regarding an ontological claim, B) any inductive reasoning regarding an ontological claim, C) any abductive reasoning regarding an ontological claim, and D) falsification / any science regarding an ontological claim. They all depend on identity holding. You are basically saying no matter how many contradictions I show in your reasoning, you can just hand-wave them away by magical evidence that does not require identity.
I cannot use logic to convince you of the merits of logic, so we are at an impasse.
Not quite there.
You seem to subscribe to the notion that reality must fit the particular logic that you subscribe to.
The abstract space of all possible logics seems to be infinite.
I have gotten to the idea that all knowledge seems to be heuristic approximation to whatever reality is (in as much as reality may be approximated by any system). At all levels that seems to be what evolution does, as a system.
It seems clear that all evidence sets come with levels of uncertainty.
No Ted, I’m addressing epistemological standards that address ontology that there is currently no replacement for. If you have an epistemological standard (for ontological claims) that does not have identity at its very base, you have some standard of evidence that is not known to humans yet. Perhaps you are an alien with your own form of reasoning in regards to “reality”, I don’t know. If so, you should write a book on this new epistemological standard that does not require that A is identical to A and teach us humans a better system. Right now, all standards of rational evidence (from physics to syllogisms, etc.) for ontological claims rely on the tautology of identity and without it the principle of explosion kicks in and we can’t know anything.
But that is precisely the point.
A = A is simple tautology.
It says nothing, whatsoever, about the nature of reality.
A is a symbol, that in an abstract space equals itself.
Tautology.
So what!!!
If you make any logical inference between that and any aspect of reality, that is a category error of logic.
A tautology says everything about the nature of reality. It is true in every possible interpretation. It isn’t a category error in logic when it is the very basis of logic itself when addressing ontological claims. My point is that there is no evidence for any ontological claim that you can point to that breaks identity. If there is, it is no TYPE OF EVIDENCE any human knows of. To suggest there is “evidence” that is outside of this means you do not understand the term “evidence”.
Wrong Trick.
Tautology is a non entity.
It is valid only in its domain of logic.
Correspondence of any logic domain to reality requires evidence.
Evolutionary epistemology is different.
Evolutionary epistemology requires only that something has a greater than random probability of utility.
Evolution will select for that, and for any subsequent variant that delivers greater divergence from randomness in that specific set of contexts.
Thus systems successively approximate.
No Ted, what you are calling “evidence” requires the tautology that A is identical to A. You have this all backward. To have evidence for A, it cannot also be NOT A. If your evidence for A is X, X cannot also be NOT X.
Your fundamental error is in assuming that any percerpt or concept you have of reality is directly related to reality.
The evidence is overwhelming that our experiential reality is a low resolution subconsciously generated model of reality that is strongly conditioned by our many levels of highly evolved systems.
It is a fundamental error of logic to think that anything you experience as reality is actually the thing it represents.
Back to evolutionary epistemology.
Right, you are then an epistemological solipsist who should not be making the claim you have evidence for free will. There can be no knowledge about reality OR ANYTHING under your epistemological position. You cannot talk about evidence being overwhelming for anything when you have no standard of evidence. You cannot have your cake and eat it too here.
Wrong.
Saying that all information we have is some sort of probabilistic approximation is nothing at all like saying we have no confidence about anything.
Stop trying to make a binary out of an infinite spectrum.
Your claim is the exact opposite of the initial proposition.
You seem to have lost all contact with reality in your pursuit of being right.
You said, and I quote:
If you are suggesting that there is no precept or concept that is related to reality, that is epistemological solipsism. If, however, you just mean that all relations to reality are “indirect” (whatever that would mean), that is a meaningless distinction and any indirect relation / evidence still requires identity at base.
If you see a car you have the impression you do of car.
What you perceive, is what is presented by subconscious processes.
That perception is not identical to the car it represents.
The car is vastly more complex than any perception you may have of it.
Yes there is a relationship, but it is not one of identity, but one of degree.
Same appears to be true of all aspects of reality.
Bacon’s great contribution to science was the use of experiment over logic to resolve such claims.
Whatever conception of “car” you have, if being used as evidence of something, must be identical with itself. If the conception holds a contradiction, it is an illogical conception. For example, your conception of car X cannot be that which both has wheels and an engine and does not have wheels and an engine. Identity is primary. No one is suggesting that a concept or precept is identical to an object, only that each are identical to themselves – ALWAYS! No contradictions.
Sorry Trick – but that is simple tautology, and utterly irrelevant.
Of course a thing is the thing it is, when it is.
But that does not tell you anything.
The thing you do not acknowledge, is that nothing in reality has to be as we conceive it to be.
Our conceptions are pointers, models, not the thing itself.
One cannot make any necessary binding statements about reality.
One can only make probabilistic assessments based upon evidence.
That is science.
You said:
Now you are saying:
So which is it, because (2) contradicts (1) (which makes it very relevant).
*** Also the fact that we only ever model reality through precepts that come through senses and internal conceptualizations (which I never claimed otherwise – we could theoretically be a brain in a jar probed by scientists – the problem of hard solipsism) is entirely irrelevant to my original question: if there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? If it is not, should you accept the conjecture?
It is all definitional Trick – what does is mean? Give examples.
To me, saying A = A says nothing about reality.
Science is about examining the evidence.
If A is real we can never know what A is, we can only ever approximate what it was.
Sure, if there seems to be a logical contradiction in the evidence, then one will suspect a fault in the evidence, and examine it carefully.
If having done that, and the evidence remains strong, then one must look at the logic being used to model A.
The whole point is that you don’t seem to have a standard OF evidence if you allow in any ontological contradictions (which always is in opposition to identity), so for you to say “examining the evidence” and “[if] the evidence remains strong”, I have no idea what you mean by “evidence” here.
To suggest that the evidence can remain strong in light of a contradiction is completely cart before the horse. If there is a contradiction, the evidence fails….because ALL evidence requires consistency with identity. An ontological contradiction within the argument for A is always evidence that the argument fails and hence is not evidence for A.
No Trick.
Here is where you have the cart before the horse.
The only method we have to determine what reality is, is to test it with experiment and see what it does.
Saying something has identity implies that some list of attributes are present that one can test.
The only way we have of determining what that set of attributes might be, and what the values of any attribute was, is by experiment.
Evolution seems to have given us this ability by successive approximation.
You simply cannot “test X with experiment” (empiricism) if X (which can either be the internal model or the reality) need not be identical to itself. All empirical evidence relies on identity at base level. Saying X has identity does not say anything specific about the attributes other than they cannot be in contradiction whatever they happen to be (and regardless if we can know the specifics or not). When you say that evidence can remain strong in light of an ontological contradiction, your standard of evidence fails as the principle of explosion kicks in and all so called “evidence” is lost. This is why your position is cart before the horse, identity precedes evidence (any type).
No Trick,
1/ Recall how many times I have said that this is really complex – more than 16 levels of recursive process.
2/ Models or processes do not need to be identical or perfectly aligned with reality to survive, they only need be closer approximations than the alternatives.
3/ The idea of identity you champion is true only in the most trivial of senses. Evidence is clear – we don’t get to experience reality directly, ever. All we have is a historically near enough model.
1) Complexity is irrelevant as I said even more times. Recursive process (whether a million levels) grant no allowance of contradiction.
2) STOP saying that I’m suggesting that “our models need to be identical to reality” – you are just displaying your own intellectual dishonesty or incapacity to read when you do.
3) Again, us not experiencing reality directly is irrelevant to whether the reality (which we cannot perfectly know)can hold a contradiction OR (more importantly) our imperfect models OF reality (what we call evidence) can be in contradiction and still be evidence. Neither one can!
We are at a stand-still because your epistemological standard of evidence is decrepit and needs a complete overhaul that I cannot help you with. This is why for philosophy the “agree to disagree” mantra is sometimes required.
When you write “be in contradiction” what precisely do you mean?
Do not use a symbol “A”.
Give an example.
Symbols exist in an abstract realm of logic where the rules of identity are trivially true.
There is no necessity for reality to be constrained by any rule set in all instances.
We find out what rules (if any) apply in reality via evidence.
You appear to be mixing logical realms – something Rand did often.
You don’t know what a contradiction is? The always entirely furless bunny that never doesn’t have fur has eyes and has no eyes at the same time. Given that “fur” and “eye” is defined the same in both usages, that bunny is in contradiction (has properties that contradict each other).
Then something (whatever that thing may be, the symbol “A” just represents whatever you want to insert) in reality does not have to be identical to itself per you – correct?
And don’t compare my epistemology with Rand, that is an ad-hom and insult. The reality is that you do not understand logical realms and why identity / non-contradiction is a requirement for all logical realms that are addressing ontological assessments.
No Trick.
It is not that I don’t understand the concept of identity.
What I fail to see is any place that it has anything to do with the argument we are having.
You just keep raising it without explicit connection.
I have made no arguments about bunnies.
I have made the explicit claim that human freedom of choice, to the degree that it exists, exists in a system that is 16 or more levels of complex adaptive systems, each level with a necessary balance between order and disorder.
Ted, we have moved the discussion from free will to epistemological standards of evidence (e.g. for an ontological claim like “free will exists to some degree”) per your request (and I’m glad we did now). Whether or not you allow ontological contradictions into your framework has EVERYTHING to do with the topic. Once back addressing “free will” – I need to know that once I show a contradiction in your “meta-schema / position”, that you will no longer think that your position is “evidence” for anything (that identity needs to be fundamental to anything postulated in it). If not, your epistemological standard of evidence allows in any claim at all (via the principle of explosion), and any discussion we have is moot. I don’t care about your arbitrary and meaningless “16 level / complexity” assertion right now – just whether or not you allow in contradictions.
In any non trivial discussion one has to make assumptions.
Any argument in logic has to be free of contradictions if it is to be coherent. If one cannot assume that, one cannot do anything, so I was looking for much deeper meaning than the obvious in your questions. Unfortunately – it seems such meaning was absent.
And in a very real sense, that is almost irrelevant to the conversation, as the conversation is dealing with realty, with uncertainties at every level, with approximations.
I’m not going to let you spin doctor your way out here, you said:
and in a different comment:
…there is no way to spin your way out of that by suggesting some deeper meaning or that what I asked is trivial (it is anything but), but since you seem to be backtracking (which is fine but be honest about it)….I will ask you again: (1) if there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? (2) If it is not, should you accept the conjecture?
(what you should say here is (1) “no” and (2) “no”)
I am not trying to spin doctor my way out of anything.
I stated plainly – what I am trying to communicate is very complex.
I accepted that you are intelligent – I would not be attempting to communicate with you otherwise.
I expected that the basics would be given, and we would not need to start from grade school all over again.
I was, therefore, looking for depths of meaning, involving at least three levels of abstraction, in what you were writing.
Basic rules apply at meta level.
Ted, the problem is that there is no other way of interpreting what you wrote other than something that goes against the basics of any evidence, this is why the basics are our top priority right now. But I’m willing to let the past be past and to move on by saying this: YES!… let’s address the very basics of epistemological standards of evidence, and applying those basics, please answer my question:
(1) If there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? Y or N or Maybe
(2) If it is not, should you accept the conjecture? Y or N or Maybe
I also now want this answered too:
(3) Can the basics of identity/non-contradiction be trumped via complexity? Y or N or Maybe
The the best of my ability to test and evaluate, there are no logical contradictions in the meta schema.
And many of the conjectures present will seem orders of magnitude more alien than those of general relativity do to someone living in a flat earth model of reality.
Einstein got to relativity by the conjecture:
We observe C as constant.
What happens to the equations if I make C constant?
Coherence must be preserved, and almost everything one once accepted might vanish in the process.
I recognize that you don’t see any contradictions, but there are. Right now we are not addressing whether your argument does or does not have a contradiction, but rather epistemological standards of evidence. So please answer my three questions or I will take it that you are not really interested in communication but rather proselytization. If we find out in the future that C is not a constant, then that contradicts it being a constant, and we should reject theory that is based on it being a constant.
So please, next comment place the numbers 1, 2, and 3 and answer each with either a “Yes”, “No”, Maybe”, “I don’t know”, or “Other”. Appreciated.
1N2N3N
Now take a simple case, the uncertainty principle.
s(x).s(p)>=h|/2
The standard deviation of position, multiplied by the standard deviation of momentum must exceed this version of Planck’s constant (hbar divided by 2).
h|/2 is a constant, so let us just call it k for now.
Now assume we can define p with absolute precision.
What happens.
The uncertainty of p is now zero.
s(x) >= k/0
Whatever we have so defined can no longer exist in observable space, so it must vanish.
Thank you! It seems we are back on track with epistemological standard of evidence agreement here for the basics. What a relief. 🙂
I think we would measure p, but otherwise, sure. If we are taking an IIQM the wave function would collapse to p (a collapse to a position we would have no say over). But let’s get back to relativity since we are now on the same page regarding no ontological contradictions.
Does the relativity of simultaneity exist at event source in your view? Y, N, Maybe, I don’t know, I don’t understand the Q, etc. Let’s try to be clear with our answers.
In my understanding, relativity means that space-time is relative to every “particle” of matter.
In this view, our experience of time as a universal is an illusion created because most of the time we are dealing with things that are going at about the same speed in about the same place, so it usually works within the errors of measurement.
So a simple yes no doesn’t clarify a lot, because either answer could be interpreted to reinforce the illusion of time as some sort of universal.
We are getting there, but I will rephrase the question in hopes for a clearer answer:
Under your view, can there be two space-like particles which have events that EXIST *ABSOLUTELY* simultaneous with each other – or is whether the events EXIST simultaneously always relative to a specific ontological worldline slice (frame) in which there are other ontological worldline slices that the events do not exist simultaneously for as well?
Note: I know this can be confusing, so let me know if this wasn’t clear to you and I can re-word.
You’re right, hard to resolve.
The term “worldline” has history and I acknowledge the heuristic utility of such a view in most normal contexts and I use it in those.
To me, it seems probable that at the most fundamental level we have yet explored (without making any claim of absolute), the most powerful interpretive schema is that space-time is relative to each and every “space like” entity.
The uncertainty principle seems to demand uncertainty in those relationships at this level.
Still getting there, but let’s put this in the context of two position measurements of two different space-like particles (at the expense of momentum measurements being uncertain). Let’s imagine that someone in location L1 measures particle P1 location causing collapse to a specific observable collapse location of C1X ….and another person in location L2 measures particle P2 location, causing collapse to a specific observable collapse location of C2Y.
P1 and P2 both collapse to their specific collapse locations simultaneously (e.g.C1X/C2Y) per one reference frame, but one before the other for all others (e.g. C1X first C2X next).
Is (per you) the “more powerful interpretive schema” for the collapse event order:
A) the idea that all reference frames are equally correct ontologically speaking about event order (relative order), or
B) that only one is ontologically correct about event order (absolute order) but there is a lack of knowledge over which one is the absolute frame
A is the more useful approximation of the two.
And in my schema, both A and B miss essential aspects. Both imply a sense of localisation that is a reasonable approximation at human scale, but doesn’t work at all well at the quantum scale. At this scale, rather than “things” being localised by some simple set of integers across some set of dimensions, it seems that the arrays that best describe identity are complex functions that deliver probability distributions over multiple dimensions.
I have a lot to say about your comment and I will get to why A is incompatible with your position on “otherwise” possibilities, but before I do, I want to inquire about what “dimensions” you are referring to if you don’t mind? What “dimensions” are you talking about here (I assume you are referring to dimensions within a sect of theoretical physics with the term but if not let me know that as well)?
The 4 dimensions of space-time are the prime set of interest.
It does seem likely that there are more present, last time I had a serious look, seemed like 7 more was most likely to be the next set.
I suspect that deeper exploration may find more. That has been the general trend over the last few centuries.
I suspected that by answering as I did you might ignore most of what I wrote, and we’ll see where this goes.
I just wanted to be clear, because to add in extra dimensions beyond the fourth dimension of time (e.g. 10 dimensions for superstring theory, or 11 for m-theory, etc. – speculative theories with no empirical evidence for them BTW), one must invoke in the fourth dimension being real (for all minkowski space-time) and A below applies fully. So back to A… before I explain why, are you aware that this position denotes an eternal block conception of time where the past, present, and future are all equally ontologically real? If not we will go over why, but let me know if you are aware of this aspect, because if so it would save a ton of time.
Hi Trick,
No.
It does not require that, and that is a possible explanatory framework.
Continue as to why you think it is the only possible one.
IF the relativity of simultaneity addresses ontic events (btw – that is not my position, but that is not relevant since it is yours), then what makes two events simultaneous for one frame, and in different orders (unsimultaneous) for other frames, is the fact that you can slice space-time into different “now slices” from “past” to “future” or vice versa (different angles slicing space-time).
(If you have 30 min) Watch this first and we will get into this deeper if you are still unclear:
Everything hinges on the definition of Ontic.
I was explicit – that time is relative to each entity.
Simultaneity is not a concept that has a lot of meaning in that context.
In that context, ontic is relative. Time itself, as a measure, is relative.
Not only does it seem to be relative, it seems to be fundamentally uncertain at the level of quanta.
And I get that is not a concept that seems to sit happily with you.
——————————————————————–
Watched the video – and fine with it up to about 23 minutes in, when both Brian and Max seem to drop back to a Newtonian conception, of slicing a loaf, rather than a relativistic conception where time is local to particles, and ontology only makes sense in respect of interaction.
So to me, they really haven’t accepted relativity, they are treating it as something universal, which does lead to that weird conception.
To me, it is what happens when one accepts invalid assumptions.
From my perspective you don’t seem to understand what “relative” means in the context of special and general relativity. Saying “time is local to particles” is meaningless in the context of relativity – it is about wordlines and “relative slicing” (frames). What you are not getting is the incompatibility between the (assumed ontic) relativity of Einstein and your conception of quantum mechanics. This is why there are so many problems trying to fuse the two. Are you familiar with Minkowski space-time diagrams? If so we can address actual special relativity and ontic relativity of simultaneity of source events (and why the block follows if we suggest that).
Hi Trick,
I am clear about Minkowski diagrams, and Lorentz transformations, and that those equations are useful approximations to reality, at least to the limits of our experimental methods to date.
I understand that “world lines” and “relative slicing” tend to give the impression that they do, and your using that framework explains why you have come to the conclusion that free will is illusion.
To me, coming to such a conclusion ignores too much data; alternative model required.
Then you need to change your position on relativity and suggest that the relativity of simultaneity is not ontic and that there is an absolute frame that we just do not know about. BTW, I don’t support a block conception, but A requires it (you need to switch to B if you want to avoid it). In other words, these cannot be ontic-ly relative:
Note: My (lack of) free will position is based on an A-series of time with an absolute frame, though a B-series also has no free will either and my point is it is incompatible with your position.
Communication is poor.
Many concepts are not being communicated. Only a few are getting through.
Consider a possibility:
Anything traveling at the speed of light, experiences no time. Interacting with such things gives time. The exchange of information about the state of the emitter is what we call time. And it is connected to space.
In this view, all space like entities exchange information via time like entities (eg photons).
The equations are the same, the picture different.
You are talking a language that seems to be far removed from the physics of relativity. For example, space-like / time-like almost always pertain to separation of events – not whether it is a photon or not. Space-like denotes two events that are not in the same light cone, and time-like are events within the same light-cone.
How relativity measures time is via light traveling to an event and back in a specific frame.
I get that is the schema you are using.
It was the one I was using 40 years ago.
It is not the schema I am using now.
It really is difficult communicating ideas for which no agreed terminology exist.
Yet you invoked relativity when addressing how time has changed, however, your very theory of time seems to have nothing to do with relativity. So let’s address schemas and start at the beginning, do (non-photon) events happen, in your view, at a spatial and temporal location (space and time)?
(Regarding terms, if using a physics term other than the way it is used in physics, we should specify that when using, otherwise it will be assumed the common usage)
Space and time are useful approximations to what seems to be present at our scale of being.
At the scale of the very small, the ideas of space and time seem to be much more related.
The equations of both relativity and quantum mechanics seem to work within the errors of measurement of our existing technologies.
The history of Flat Earth, to Newtonian Mechanics, to Relativity and QM supports a series (perhaps infinite) of successive approximations.
Ontic and epistemic uncertainty.
For our discussion, I want you to assume one thing AT ALL TIMES during it: Anything we address about external reality is never a discussion about epistemic certainty in some absolute sense, just the evidence we have today and what we infer from it. Neither of us believe in absolute knowledge about much if anything, it is always about what is “beyond any reasonable doubt” or “most likely” given the evidence we have.
So when you say “useful approximations of what seems to be present”, is there an example of science that is not this given we only ever model perceptions about external reality?
Great – epistemic alignment is close.
Consider:
Flat earth works at the scale of building houses. It is a useful approximation at that scale.
Similarly Newtonian.
Similarly GPS requires both relativity and QM.
In each case, the domain of utility is defined by the scale of interest.
Each contains uncertainty.
Evolution is heuristic.
You and I appear to embody 18+ levels of complex adaptive heuristic systems; all biased by evolved priors.
Science exists in this milieu.
Flat earth is (beyond any reasonable doubt) proven incorrect, are you also suggesting that space and time for the macro-scale addressed in relativity is similarly proven incorrect (but is still a useful approximation for some things like GPS)?
Let’s also keep in mind that flat-earth ideas have no real utility for building houses, rather it is benign to it. It is not useful.
Perhaps we need to overcome the heuristic level that made you believe in free will. 😉
I am suggesting that thinking our current best available knowledge is anything more than the best approximation available at present is probably unwarranted.
Is it the case that your position on “free will” is based on your assessment of your “current best available knowledge”?
If so, then if I show an inconsistency between two positions you hold regarding what you deem as “current best available knowledge”, isn’t it the case that you should re-think your position about one or both of them?
I reassess my “position” whenever I have evidence of sufficient quality, or imperatives of sufficient strength, to warrant it.
For me, over 50 years of enquiry, evidence, experience and contemplation indicate beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt that free will exists.
And the nature of that free will is not at all what most think.
Evolution seems to have selected a much more complex and constrained form, that is still capable of independent, creative, responsible action.
We will eventually get to how indeterminism (in the could have been otherwise sense) does not allow or assist with “independent, creative, responsible action”, but for now let’s keep to the time discussion: Do you agree that true indeterminism in the “could have been otherwise” sense requires an A-series of time for our known universe or those (indeterministic) events (that the B-series in the video you watched is incompatible)?
If you are unfamiliar with an A-series, it basically means there is a state of the universe that becomes or evolves to the next state that does not exist prior (which requires an absolute frame that changes or evolves).
I agree that the “B” series in the video is incompatible.
The requirement for an absolute frame is questionable. It is the simplest way of resolving, but not the only one.
It does seem possible that existence itself is distributed. But that is a very difficult notion to get to terms with, and for the sake of the free will debate is not required, so the “A” series is a sufficiently useful approximation for the purposes of this debate.
Whenever you say “useful approximation” you make me think it is not your actual current position given the evidence you have.
Is an A-series with an absolute frame your current position on time given the evidence? Y or N
* If it is not (only answer 1 and 2 below if you say “N” to the above):
(1) How can you have an A-series of time or lack a B-series of time without an absolute reference frame ontologically?
(2) What do you mean by “existence itself is distributed”? Do you mean distributed through time?
I have said all along this is deeply complex.
I have stated repeatedly that it seems very likely that all of our models are at best “useful approximations” at some scale to whatever reality actually is.
Our understanding of anything and everything seems to be deeply conditioned by evolution. Some ideas “come naturally”, and others are much more difficult.
What if the very ideas of time and space are heuristic interpretational biases?
What if existence is actually quite different?
You said:
…and then this:
Your very idea of free will is likely a heuristic interpretational bias. Regardless, you seem to have a framework you are using to make assertions about “beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt” assessments for some things in reality that are not even empirical (and rather illogical), yet when questioned about any part that ties to your positive claim your answer is always “reality is too complex”. Do you not see how convenient this is for you? If you are going to be an epistemological solipsist, you need to consistently do so for all beliefs (including free will).
No Trick.
As has been so often the case you have misinterpreted what I wrote. Understandably so in a real sense.
Yes, in a sense, of course I have looked at the possibility of bias in my schema, it is only by distinguishing them as such that one gains the opportunity to mitigate those effects.
And I do not deny the logic of your statement that on the surface an A series does seem to imply an absolute frame. Part of my brain brings that up every time I approach this question.
You are very misinterpretable…almost by design it appears. 😉
So you are saying that biases can be mitigated – great, we agree. Right now I’m trying to mitigate some potential biases you have by pointing out that an A-series of time does not align with an ontological relativity of simultaneity (and you should tentatively abandon the idea that both can exist together given the current evidence that they cannot). We should be able to assess this incompatibility “beyond any reasonable doubt”. If A happens before B within frame 1 …and A happens simultaneously with B within frame 2, then for frame 1 the future (B) already exists before it happens. This is incompatible with an A-series of time – beyond any reasonable doubt. Agreed?
No Trick.
I have been explicitly clear on many occasions, and I will repeat, I am using a different interpretive schema.
If you take relativity seriously, then time and space are local to the existence of each particle, and there is no universal frame.
Because we live in a place where everything is essentially in the same place, moving at the same speed (within the errors of measurement available), then we get the illusion of space and time as universals.
The illusion works.
We already went over that we have fairly close epistemological standards, we are just addressing communication issues where you are inconsistent. Regardless, this last response was more clear even though you don’t say if YOU take relativity sufficiently seriously and I need to assume that is what you are saying. I don’t agree with your “if” statement above but since you do:
I’m saying that the interpretation of relativity you have (of no universal frame) is incompatible with your other position that something “could have been otherwise”. Under your ontological position, the relativity of simultaneity kicks in for source events themself, and the future already exists in a block conception of time. This is logically unavoidable under that interpretation of relativity.
No Trick
That is true only if you demand a universal frame of time.
The alternative is really hard to even conceive of, being the total absence of any universal frame. Relativity meets QM.
It is the very ideas of space and time originating as the existence “fields” of the particles present, via the interaction with the existence of other particles, as mediated by the “fundmental” forces.
Think – little bundles of time and space potential – it may help initiate something.
———————————-
The thing to get it is – block conception of time is a universal frame.
———————————
The “block conception” of time is the meta equivalent of flat earth.
Yes it is how it seems, naively, from our default universal frame perspective, but we do not exist in a universal frame, our universe is not “flat” (at least such seems most likely to be the case – on balance of probabilities).
No Ted,
You do not seem to understand A) what a frame is, and B) what a universal frame is. The block universe has no universal/absolute frame. What you are saying makes absolutely no sense for relativity, quantum physics, any other physics, or the philosophy of space and time. If there is more than one particle, either those particles must be in the same frame (absolute/universal), or frames can be sliced differently where they are not in the same frame or are in the same frame depending (relativity). If the latter, the frames are relative rather than universal, and a block conception of time follows. The same can be said about “fields”, “interactions”, etc.
And no, from our common-sense perspective we have an A-series / absolute frame – NOT a block conception (which is a B-series). You are confusing the two.
But let’s clear up semantics: What do you think a “frame” is in relativity?
I think a frame in relativity is a mathematical tool that Einstein found that allowed him to hold on to the idea of time as some sort of universal relationship in some construct.
He wasn’t able to let go of that notion completely.
He got close, but didn’t quite make it.
I cannot make this jump for you Neo – you have to make it for yourself.
——————————————————-
This may help.
Consider mathematical induction.
Consider flat earth n=1
Consider Newtonian world n=2
Consider Einstein/QM n=3
Having now established a sequence of 3, and you are engaged with a guy saying take a look at n=4, why would anyone consider the sequence has an end?
I noticed you are avoiding answering the question (“mathematical tool” says nothing). What do you think a “frame” is in relativity?
After I get that response we will address the absurdity of you suggesting that frames themself are not a requirement of relativity or a requirement of all time notions for all of physics. And yes, relativity is about relationships.
And WOW on n=4, you need to write a scientific journal, get it peer reviewed, and win the nobel prize!
My workload just went ballistic – likely to be 3-4 weeks before I have significant time to put into this conversation.
Totally understand! Unfortunately starting July 3rd I’ll likely (it isn’t set in stone yet) be starting a new project that will take me outside of my home for a whopping four months and it is likely I won’t have time for these convos when you come back. I may even disable commenting for that 4 month period – haven’t decided yet. We would probably just have to do the “agree to disagree” thing ultimately anyway. Hope everything goes well with you and your work. Later good sir.
Ted here is my perspective I have asked repeatedly how indeterminism (a cosmic dice shaker) provides free will. You assume indeterminism exists. I might not as there are deterministic interpretations of quantum phenomena. eg Sabine’s Superdeterminism. Never heard of superdeterminism? How does complexity and recursion make it free?
Hi rom
I don’t assume anything, other than existence (whatever it is – cogito ergo sum).
Everything in my world is some function of evolution in the first instance, and some function of a balance of probabilities derived from the examination of sets of observations and conjectures.
Mathematics and logic seem to be the best modeling tools we have, and there does not seem to be any requirement for reality to exactly align with any model we may make of it.
This is false Ted. We might apply boundary conditions to simply the complexity. Boundary conditions are useful approximations nothing more.
Which of the four fundamental forces don’t extend to infinity? We ignore the contribution at some arbitrary distance to simply the calculation and get a reasonable prediction.
A gradient can be an effective boundary, if at some region of that gradient a threshold of action is effectively crossed.
And boundaries can be much more complex that simple gradients.
All that is necessary for evolution is for something to be sufficiently boundary like to alter survival probabilities with sufficient reliability to influence the frequency if variations present in the population. And the definition of population is also similarly probabilistic.
Seriously not simple.
Ted seems to have redefined freedom as indeterminism (should it exist). Possibly in conjunction with determined recursion at different levels. Ted does not seem to distinguish between unpredictability derived from chaotic behaviour [mathematical] and indeterminism.
He simply asserts that freedom is present at some arbitrary boundary.
Oh well.
Exactly rom….the “freedom” to be truly-random and entirely out of the control of the willer…interacting with causality that he recognizes does not grant free will – until some “free” truly-random event comes in to manipulate that causality in a way that the willer also has no control over. Oh…and it’s really very very complex…so there is that. 😉
Yep.
But to be fair reality is extremely complex. As Ted points out likely many levels of recursion. But where he goes wrong badly is with boundaries.
There is a lot of hullabaloo about nature versus nurture. In reality the separation between the two is in our minds. Every single bit of me is a product of my environment.
No doubt it’s extremely complex, but let’s keep in mind that while we are simpletons who cannot understand complexity fully, Ted is very familiar with complex systems and has written vary larger and complex computer systems, and has lead teams developing legal systems and has worked in law enforcement and as judiciary. He knows complex – and complexity + indeterminism allows for free will! We are just looping in a closed system – obviously. 😉
In that case Ted should be able to state his position clearly and coherently, that is he has the will to do so and it is free to do so.
I wonder what the judiciary make of witnesses that don’t answer direct questions?
============IMPORTANT NOTICE - PLEASE READ=============Sorry guys, I need to start buckling down on the one comment at a time rule. I was allowing multiples in but this last round there are 7 comments pending from Ted - and for the ones to me - each comment (even with the 500 character limit each) contained multiple pieces of misinformation that would need to be addressed separately. As examples, there is a false claim of a loaded question when there is none and an abuse of a wrongheaded analogy for this, there is a misuse and misunderstanding of when multivalent logic is used vs bivalent logic (what he calls "binary space") and a conflation of that with indeterminism and complexity, there is an appeal to consequences fallacy, there is a (dangerous) misunderstanding of those consequences for the topic, there is a false claim of "over-simplification", there is a straw man fallacy, etc. It is just loaded with too many fallacies and misinformation to approve all comments, each deserving of their own attention and debunking. I’d be more than happy to go through these one at a time (and one comment at a time) in a back and forth convo that does not allow more tangent fallacies in, but the reason I have a comment limitation is to prevent illogical and unreasoned bloat from being too much to address and misinformation sitting on my site unaddressed that can confuse laypersons who read it.
If you two would like to continue your own convo without the limited one comment rule, you should navigate to a post on Ted’s platform where this type of misinformation can run "free" to get as bulky as it wants and as convoluted as it wants. My comment section I reserve for back and forth focused discussions only....which means addressing one fallacy or misinformed claim at a time (think of it like a call in show where the host is going to stop you to clear up what you said before you move on and not let you just proselytize the whole show away). For the sake of fairness I'm only approving the first comment to each person (first comment to me and rom). If either of you want the other comments I can email them to you and you can copy/paste them on Ted's site or some unlimited forum. All responses on my site from here on out must abide by the one comment per addressing one person rule so focused conversations can actually happen and convolutions cannot. I won’t approve multiples. Thank you for your understanding.
rom, since your comments are unmoderated (I put you on the whitelist when we first met as I trust you not to spread misinformation and you seemed to limit responses), I ask that you only respond with one comment at a time (I'd prefer not to moderate your comments).
We’ll see how the universe unfolds Trick … 😉
All I ask from sections of the unfolding universe. 😉