Debunking Dennettian Diatribe

 compatibilism, determinism, free will, moral responsibility  172 Responses »
May 022018
 

debunking-dennnet-ian-diatribeAt one point I received the below as a (unapproved) comment on a post I had written criticising Daniel Dennett’s free will compatibilism. I was curious about the person who wrote the original so I copied and pasted a part of it into google, and noticed this has been copied and pasted in various locations on the web where Dennett has been criticized – but did not find the original author of it.  Of course the entire comment is used to throw insults around like they are confetti and it is a deep misunderstanding of the actual criticisms of compatibilism and why the claim of a “semantic shift” is completely relevant. I’ve decided for this post to have some fun with this comment and break it apart inch my inch until the entire comment is shown for what it truly is: irrational diatribe. Continue reading »

A Compatibilism / Incompatibilism Transformation

 compatibilism, free will, incompatibiism  21 Responses »
Apr 012017
 

Compatibilist-Incompatibilist-Transformation
If you frequent this blog you know that I pick on compatibilism a lot, and I do so as a point of contention about definitions, focus, and problems inherent when one uses a term in a way that causes a bypass of some serious issues of concern. And though I’m very critical of compatibilism, especially when the compatibilist is not blatantly clear to the reader about what their position is in regards to “just desert moral responsibility” or what I’ll refer to as “strong responsibility” (and does a sort of “bypass” over that issue), I do sometimes like to bring things back to where agreements can be had between the compatibilist and hard incompatibilist. Continue reading »

On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate

 compatibilism  28 Responses »
Nov 072016
 

practical-importance-of-free-willCompatibilists and incompatibilists disagree on how the term “free will” should be defined. Rather than focus on specific compatibilist or incompatibilist definitions, Gregg Caruso and Stephen Morris wrote a paper on what is of philosophical and practical importance for the free will debate. That paper is titled:

Their analysis is spot on.  The abstract sums up their position fairly well: Continue reading »

The Important Context of “Could Have Done Otherwise” (for the Free Will Debate)

 compatibilism, free will, incompatibiism, possibility  Comments Off on The Important Context of “Could Have Done Otherwise” (for the Free Will Debate)
Aug 222016
 

context-could-have-done-otherwizeSome compatibilists (people who define free will so that it is compatible with determinism), when asked the question of whether people “could have done otherwise” given a causally deterministic scenario (note that this discussion does not address indeterminism such as acausal or “probabilistic” events, etc. – which are equally incompatible with the free will of importance), say that “could have” or “could have done otherwise” can be used in different ways. They often address a few different contexts in order to push the important context off of the table of discourse. This post is going to address  those contexts/usages and explain why there is only one context/usage that applies to the important points for the free will debate that the free will skeptic wants to make sure isn’t neglected. Continue reading »

The Neglect of the Traditional View of Free Will

 compatibilism, free will  Comments Off on The Neglect of the Traditional View of Free Will
Aug 012016
 

NEGLECT-TRADITIONAL-FREE-WILLIn the post titled  “Extending a Hand to Philosophical Compatibilists (by a Free Will Skeptic)” I addressed the point that free will compatibilists and free will skeptics often talk past each other and actually quite often agree with each other in some fundamental ways. I point out that the debate between them is, much of the time, mostly if not entirely semantic, that they each define free will differently.

Today I want to address the philosophical traditional view of free will and why the free will skeptic such as myself thinks that many compatibilist definitions of free will, though those definitions are indeed “compatible with determinism” (and that definition of “free will” exists), more often than not neglect the traditional view. I also want to address why that traditional view is important today and why it should not be neglected. Continue reading »

Extending a Hand to Philosophical Compatibilists (by a Free Will Skeptic)

 compatibilism  7 Responses »
Jul 042016
 

p-compatibilist
Philosophical (p) compatibilists believe that free will and causal determinism are “compatible” with each other. They do this by defining the term “free will” in a way that is indeed compatible with determinism. If you have read my blog you will see that I have criticized compatibilism, but that it is always a semantic criticism about the problems with defining “free will” in the way that (p) compatibilists do. I’ve even vehemently opposed certain compatibilist thoughts and attitudes.

With that said, it is extremely important to point out that outside of the semantic disagreement (the words we use to explain things) there is quite often a whole lot of agreement over what is and is not the case between the (p) compatibilist and the hard incompatibilist. Continue reading »

“Free Will” is an Umbrella Term

 compatibilism, free will  2 Responses »
May 162016
 

free-will-umbrellaThe term “free will” is an umbrella term that has a whole lot of added abilities under it that cannot be easily partitioned away from the minds of the majority. It is a term that is simply too baggage laden. This means that it can be used in a narrow way, but those narrow ways do not remove the excess metaphysical abilities that are often inherent in the term. Continue reading »

The Problem with Compatibilist Qualifiers

 compatibilism  No Responses »
Mar 212016
 

compatibilist-qualifiersIt is interesting the hoops compatibilists will jump through in order to qualify their definition of free will in an attempt to make it coherent given any number of counter-points. These qualifiers almost always miss the point entirely.

If you are unfamiliar with the term compatibilist, it’s just someone who thinks “free will” is compatible with determinism. In other words, regardless if the universe is entirely deterministic, or has some indeterminism, free will is something that is entirely compatible with causal processes. Compatibilists build this compatibility by a semantic shift, meaning they change the definition of free will to something that is actually compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists might argue that they have the “true” version of free will, but when they do this, it is done ignoring the abilities the common layperson actually thinks they and others have. Continue reading »