At one point I received the below as a (unapproved) comment on a post I had written criticising Daniel Dennett’s free will compatibilism. I was curious about the person who wrote the original so I copied and pasted a part of it into google, and noticed this has been copied and pasted in various locations on the web where Dennett has been criticized – but did not find the original author of it. Of course the entire comment is used to throw insults around like they are confetti and it is a deep misunderstanding of the actual criticisms of compatibilism and why the claim of a “semantic shift” is completely relevant. I’ve decided for this post to have some fun with this comment and break it apart inch my inch until the entire comment is shown for what it truly is: irrational diatribe. Keep in mind that I’m not doing so because I take this comment seriously (it is absurd), but rather in hopes that something can be learned from this sort of bizarre non-sense that goes on in the wild west of the Internet. Also note that if you’re a libertarian (think indeterminism helps grant free will) this does not apply to you as it is a compatibilist (someone who thinks determinism and free will are compatible) who wrote the comment so we will be addressing determinism most of the time. Please don’t send me a comment saying “but the universe is not deterministic”, that would miss the point! Before I debunk this comment, you should read the comment in full context and glory. Here it is:
I’m sorry to disappoint you but Dennett is right and people DO have free will. It is YOU who needs to stop telling people the lie that they don’t have free will. You might want to read this comment that was made to another blogger:
“Daniel Dennett is Wrong About Free Will”.
He is, is he?
This is the real problem with the field of Philosophy; the fact that laypeople, amateurs, dilettantes, fanboys, dittoheads, bloggers often feel entitled to clash their plastic horns with the actual experts and professionals of the field – people who have thought deeply about their subjects for decades- and pretend that they are philosophy experts themselves – a pretense that extends even to the area of the philosophy of the mind (one of the most recondite and obscure areas of human investigation). Not only does the fact that the large majority of the experts in the field (including one of the world’s leading and most acclaimed experts in the philosophy of the mind) hold the view that free will and determinism are quite ‘compatible’ fail to give these pretentious dilettantes any pause for consideration, but they even indulge themselves in slinging mud at these very people for daring to propose (and hold to) a theory that goes against their personal interests and flies above the capabilities of their brains to fathom. Given their failure and inability to understand the ideas that make compatibilism what it is, and their absolute refusal to budge an inch from their cherished determinist-driven dogma, such people have no cards available within their sight other than to impugn the motives of these experts and claim that they are merely “doing semantics in order to appease common folk sensibilities”. In other words, accusing the majority of academic philosophers of being dishonest or not knowing what they are talking about. This is an amazing charge given that not only is it painfully obvious that it is precisely these dilettantes and dittoheads who do not really know what they are talking about, but they are clearly the ones whose attitude and dogmatic position with regards to this topic (as some of them have occasionally confessed) is both anchored and driven by personal agenda and emotion: the desire to be free of any feeling of personal responsibility.
What is especially hilarious is the way these people impetuously paster the internet with their ‘responses’ to a written critique giving by a leading philosopher of the mind briefly explaining and outlining the philosophy of compatibilism to someone who is apparently their hero (in superficial thinking). In these ‘responses’ (usually in the form of blog-posts), they begin by pretending that they have read and understood the critique that they are responding to. They then, either deliberately or inadvertently, display/express their anger and displeasure at its author for propounding a position that happens not to sit well with them (and their champion whose misguided book they adore). They then go on to say how much they ‘disagree’ with the author of the dissertation and his points (which they obviously didn’t actually understand) and declare (rather comically) that the author is “wrong”. Why? Because they say so. This of course is usually accompanied by all the other mudslinging accusations about ‘playing semantics’, ‘changing the subject’, ‘being dishonest’ (again, because they, in their all-knowing wisdom, say so).
The first dead-giveaway that these dittoheads and dilettantes have no idea what they are talking about or any true understanding of the position they pretend to be criticizing is the very fact that they invoke the accusation of ‘semantics’ in the first place. In other words, the depth of their confusion is sharply illustrated by the fact that these people think (or at least talk as if they think) that the compatibilist position is exactly the same as the (hard) determinist position but merely expressed differently. They fail to see (or simply do not want to accept) that there is a real conceptual difference in the two ideologies that has real consequences. These people think (or at least like or pretend to think) that compatibilists do not really actually believe in the existence of free will in any way at all but merely pretend they do. Of course, one probably has no choice but to embrace such a view if one is simply unable (or unwilling) to understand how free will can still be a very real phenomenon in human nature despite the reality of a world ultimately governed by deterministic forces. Such people are simply unable (or unwilling) to perceive that the peculiar traits of the human mind that distinguish it from most other living organisms – such as self awareness and subjective consciousness, the ability to reason, introspect, plan and make judgments and informed decisions – have given humans the ability to supersede blind deterministic forces in important ways and to act essentially as free agents (in the same way they’ve being able to overcome many other laws of nature). They insist on continuing to see people as merely robots (largely because that is how they like to think of themselves and partly because of their conceptual difficulty in understanding compatibilism). Of course, in a trivial sense, humans still operate under the laws of determinism given that they are part of nature, and thus one could, in principle, predict everything people would do if one had omniscient information. The conceptual difficulty that these ‘hard determinists’ have is understanding that an entity can still act as a free agent (in a way that is relevant both to itself and to all other entities) even though the course of its life could theoretically be predicted by an omniscient being.
These people are doggedly fixated on using nonsensical strawman definitions and notions of ‘free will’ which they pretentiously project unto the ‘common folk’ and which enables them to assert triumphantly that “free will doesn’t exist” and to serve whatever internal satisfactions they derive from making that assertion. In doing so, they fail to see that ‘free will’ is simply a complex human trait like many others which are neither time independent or consistent and are not possessed by everyone to the same degree. Yet, when it all comes down to it, when you strip away all the fluff and feathers, the entire position of these “no free will” enthusiasts rests upon a single red-herring that they regularly invoke as a ‘trump card’: “Where does a person’s will (at any time) come from?” [The word often used is “desires”, but it would allow much more clarity if it were expressed more generally as “will”.] In other words, the entire argument of these people is predicated upon the single notion that a person’s ‘will’(at any time) is ultimately due to factors beyond his/her control or choosing. Of course, they will typically cement this argumentative trick with another sleight of hand in the form of some kind of infinite regression: “where did the will that led to that will come from; and the will that led to that one; and the one that led to that one…” and so on and so on. Thus, according to these not very bright but obnoxiously pretentious dormroom philosophers, the luxury of being able to act in accordance with one’s ‘will’ and sense of self interests is not enough to qualify as ‘freedom of will’; one also has to be able to snap one’s fingers and conjure into the driver’s seat of one’s psyche an arbitrary will straight out of thin air, one that they had no prior inclination whatsoever to conjure (otherwise it wouldn’t be ‘free’). And it mustn’t be a random event either, or it still wouldn’t be ‘free’. Therefore, this arbitrary will must be both willed and unwilled at the same time. Only then can someone have ‘free will’. Only then can someone ever have any responsibility for any of their actions. This is the kind of tomfoolery that occupies the base of these people’s minds when dabbling in this subject.
Of course, they can always fall back on the very notion of ‘determinism’ itself (if the ‘trump card’ doesn’t work) and what it seems to them to mean: that human beings are simply robotic automatons of nature whose thoughts and actions are determined by a domino effect of causes and who merely labor under the illusion that they enjoy what they call ‘free will’ when they really don’t. It is the sort of conclusion that makes the chests of dormroom (and beer parlor) philosophers swell with pride and pat themselves on the back for ‘seeing’ something so ‘insightful’. Human beings, thus, are merely (at least when they enjoy this ‘illusion’) puppets that like their strings. (Incidentally, is a puppet that likes its strings essentially ‘free’, or isn’t it?) Meanwhile, these self-congratulating retards fail to see that their position is every bit as obtuse as saying that a canvas is not really a beautiful painting featuring a lovely scenery with humans and various objects…Why?…Because if you look very closely at it, it is made up of tiny little dots.
Typically, ‘hard determinists’, especially these dilettante types, are usually people who have come to some personal realization and knowledge about a basic fact about the world and biological life (particularly human beings) that has long been trivial and obvious to other people and feel as though they have discovered something revolutionary (and personally exhilarating). This, for some reason, gives these amateurs a tendency to feel entitled to browbeat the works of much more thoughtful minds that have explored the subject long before they even knew that such a subject existed. This tendency may be attributable to the sensation of ‘discovery’ and conclusiveness that such people tend to feel about the concept of ‘determinism’ as it swims around in their heads, and a naïve and presumptuous belief that they have reached some kind of plateau of knowledge about the nature of the human mind – rather than just the foot of a long steep.
That is the end of the comment. Breaking this apart inch by inch is going to be long, but that is what happens when trying to address irrational bloat from the Internet. So here we go!
“Daniel Dennett is Wrong About Free Will”.
He is, is he?
Yes, he is.
This is the real problem with the field of Philosophy; the fact that laypeople, amateurs, dilettantes, fanboys, dittoheads, bloggers often feel entitled to clash their plastic horns with the actual experts and professionals of the field – people who have thought deeply about their subjects for decades- and pretend that they are philosophy experts themselves – a pretense that extends even to the area of the philosophy of the mind (one of the most recondite and obscure areas of human investigation).
It is never a sign of a rational person when they start with the insults and then lead from that into a big, whopping, argument from authority fallacy. An argument from authority fallacy goes something like this:
- X is an authority on a particular topic
- X says something about that topic
- X is probably correct
The reality is that arguments either stand or fall on their own merits regardless of who says them. Just because someone is a so called “professional or expert” in a field such as philosophy does not mean they necessarily have a sound argument. If they did, there would be no disagreements between professionals in the same field. Also, even if many professionals did agree with each other on a topic, the fact that more people agree is an argument from popularity fallacy. And last, just because one is a professional philosopher does not imply that someone who in not a “professional” in the academic sense has not thought deeply and educated themself about a subject for decades. Even Dennett, who this person is defending, describes himself as an autodidact. While he holds a PhD in philosophy, he says he has been a “beneficiary of hundreds of hours of informal tutorials on all the fields that interest [him], …” meaning even he understands the importance of informal self-study and how academia is not the end-all-be-all when it comes to knowledge. Many people who “clash their horns” with so-called “experts” are just as knowledgeable if not more knowledgeable on a specific topic. There are also many people who are academic professionals who disagree with Dennett on many topics, including free will. The status of being an “authority” is a fallacy, and anyone doing philosophy should know better than to invoke this fallacy anywhere – let alone the first few sentences of a critical comment.
Not only does the fact that the large majority of the experts in the field (including one of the world’s leading and most acclaimed experts in the philosophy of the mind) hold the view that free will and determinism are quite ‘compatible’ fail to give these pretentious dilettantes any pause for consideration, but they even indulge themselves in slinging mud at these very people for daring to propose (and hold to) a theory that goes against their personal interests and flies above the capabilities of their brains to fathom.
Again, a popularity fallacy and authority fallacy is not a rational response. Yes, a little over 50% of so called “experts” surveyed in a philpapers survey are compatibilists, but that means the rest are not compatibilist. This is not some question like “does gravity exist” and many experts have explained the problems with compatibilist definitions of free will. All of this is, however, irrelevant. If one wants to start throwing around authority and popularity fallacies, the majority of experts in that study also support the B-theory of time, something that makes compatibilist “free will” just a stagnant playout of already existing events – meaning for the B-theory of time, the future already exists and cannot be changed. We just experience what is already in place. There is no real causality, only correlation. Of course people like this won’t address these types of inconsistencies, they will use their popularity and authority fallacies only when the data suits them. It is also good to point out that there are more insults thrown in such as “pretentious dilettantes” that are irrational propaganda to demote a position. This will be seen throughout and I won’t point out every single insult and ad-hom thrown in.
Given their failure and inability to understand the ideas that make compatibilism what it is, and their absolute refusal to budge an inch from their cherished determinist-driven dogma, such people have no cards available within their sight other than to impugn the motives of these experts and claim that they are merely “doing semantics in order to appease common folk sensibilities”. In other words, accusing the majority of academic philosophers of being dishonest or not knowing what they are talking about.
There it is again, the invoking in of a so called “majority”. Need I repeat the fallacies this makes? Also “determinist-driven dogma” is a silly claim considering that compatibilists ARE determinists. When the motives of compatibilists are impugned by free will skeptics, it quite often is in response to something the compatibilist has said that proves the motive. Take Dennett for example, he has said more times than not that he thinks that telling people they don’t have free will is dangerous. As just one example out of many: click here. So yes, this incorrect adverse consequences fallacy is a motivation that Dennett and many compatibilist have – as borne out by the evidence of what they have publicly asserted! It is also important to note that I, as a free will skeptic, also think there could be some adverse consequences if people are not taught about the (lack of) free will topic correctly (at least initially) and they conflate determinism with fatalism. It, however, is a huge mistake for compatibilists to conflate the education of these two things as one and the same. Also, to try to subvert the truth of the matter or to change around semantics is to be dishonest. It just is.
This is an amazing charge given that not only is it painfully obvious that it is precisely these dilettantes and dittoheads who do not really know what they are talking about, but they are clearly the ones whose attitude and dogmatic position with regards to this topic (as some of them have occasionally confessed) is both anchored and driven by personal agenda and emotion: the desire to be free of any feeling of personal responsibility.
It is important to note when an assertion is made and when an argument is made. This comment has a lot of assertions and little arguments. The assertion that us “dilettantes and dittoheads” do not really know what we are talking about is a non-argument. It does not point into an actual argument made by a free will skeptic (in which there are plenty). This idea that free will skepticism is anchored and driven by personal agenda and emotion about the “desire to feel free of any feeling of personal responsibility” is just made up psychobabble. First, the majority of free will skeptics actually care about the truth and want to understand what is true regardless of consequences. They also understand that the truth is that lacking the free will of importance (the kind that is not semantic shifted) has important consequences – and if people understand the facts here they will minimize blame, retributivism, and gross inequality justifications based on incorrect ideas about ‘just desert’ responsibility, and they understand that people will likely have more compassion over the variables of others and ‘put themself in their causal shoes’ more often. This leads to a far more compassionate and ultimately better world. And since this also is the truth of the matter, then yes, free will skeptics feel personally responsible for dispelling the illusion of free will. This person has not shown one case of someone who has claimed a lack of free will just so they can avoid feelings of personal responsibility. That is a profound misunderstanding of the topic.
What is especially hilarious is the way these people impetuously paster the internet with their ‘responses’ to a written critique giving by a leading philosopher of the mind briefly explaining and outlining the philosophy of compatibilism to someone who is apparently their hero (in superficial thinking). In these ‘responses’ (usually in the form of blog-posts), they begin by pretending that they have read and understood the critique that they are responding to.
This person is addressing Daniel Dennett’s response to philosopher and neuroscientist Sam Harris who is a free will skeptic. Let’s keep in mind that Dennett’s “philosophy of mind”, as a qualia eliminativist, doesn’t really sit all that well with his own compatibilist position so it is funny that this person brought that up as if it is pertinent. There are many things I disagree with Harris on, but Harris is correct in his response to Dennett (though I would have worded things differently). That, however, is another story and if you want to read the back and forth between the two you can do so here: The Marionette’s Lament
Also, it is quite obvious that Dennett is a hero of this person, so the irony is yet again thick.
They then, either deliberately or inadvertently, display/express their anger and displeasure at its author for propounding a position that happens not to sit well with them (and their champion whose misguided book they adore). They then go on to say how much they ‘disagree’ with the author of the dissertation and his points (which they obviously didn’t actually understand) and declare (rather comically) that the author is “wrong”. Why? Because they say so. This of course is usually accompanied by all the other mudslinging accusations about ‘playing semantics’, ‘changing the subject’, ‘being dishonest’ (again, because they, in their all-knowing wisdom, say so).
Does anyone else see the irony of complaining that someone is saying they disagree (without giving an argument as to why) and making mudslinging accusations…when this entire commentary that I’m now addressing is one big assertion of disagreement that makes no argument against any real case any free will skeptic has ever claimed or their criticisms with compatibilism, and is filled with mudslinging insults galore? The declaration of ‘playing semantics’ and ‘changing the subject’ is not a simple assertion without evidence. It is not ‘mud-slinging’, it is true, and it is proven by the fact that compatibilists like Dennett self-ascribe to being a revisionist of the term free will from the traditional view of it. The reason that it is ‘playing semantics’ and ‘changing the subject’ is because it bypasses the free will of practical importance – as denoted by other professional philosophers, …the version of “free will” that addresses whether or not he have ‘just desert’ moral responsibility (which we don’t BTW and this differs from “feeling” personally responsible, having a sense of duty, etc. – something often conflated by compatibilists). Please read this post on the version of free will that is important:
On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
The first dead-giveaway that these dittoheads and dilettantes have no idea what they are talking about or any true understanding of the position they pretend to be criticizing is the very fact that they invoke the accusation of ‘semantics’ in the first place. In other words, the depth of their confusion is sharply illustrated by the fact that these people think (or at least talk as if they think) that the compatibilist position is exactly the same as the (hard) determinist position but merely expressed differently. They fail to see (or simply do not want to accept) that there is a real conceptual difference in the two ideologies that has real consequences. These people think (or at least like or pretend to think) that compatibilists do not really actually believe in the existence of free will in any way at all but merely pretend they do.
If free will skeptics believe we have the abilities that compatibilists say we do, and compatibilists do not believe we have the free will abilities that incompatibilists (hard determinists and hard incompatibilists) say we lack, then it is a semantic quibble. This does not mean the semantic quibble is not important, it is in regards to the consequences of how we educate people on this matter and what compatibilism dangerously side-steps. That being said, compatibilists often inject in things that do not follow from their “version” of free will – namely that of ‘just desert’ responsibility. When they do this, not only is there a conceptual difference, but the compatibilist position hold logical inconsistencies as well. Some compatibilists do not do this, but rather they skirt the entire ‘just desert’ responsibility topic altogether, which is a reason that compatibilism is quite often so problematic. Every now and again you will get a compatibilist like Parfit who redefines free will (is a compatibilist) but also thinks that ‘just desert’ responsibility is incompatible and makes that clear! When you have this, then there is often an alignment of ideas between this type of compatibilist and the incompatibilist (who is not a fatalist). For this, a transformation can be made between concepts:
A Compatibilism / Incompatibilism Transformation
Even though this is the case, the semantic debate is still important due to the confusions that redefining free will away from the abilities layperson’s actually think they possess causes. But yes, depending on the compatibilist, it could be about semantics only, or it could be about both concepts and semantics. Most free will skeptics do not “fails to see this” in any way, shape, or form.
Of course, one probably has no choice but to embrace such a view if one is simply unable (or unwilling) to understand how free will can still be a very real phenomenon in human nature despite the reality of a world ultimately governed by deterministic forces. Such people are simply unable (or unwilling) to perceive that the peculiar traits of the human mind that distinguish it from most other living organisms – such as self awareness and subjective consciousness, the ability to reason, introspect, plan and make judgments and informed decisions – have given humans the ability to supersede blind deterministic forces in important ways and to act essentially as free agents (in the same way they’ve being able to overcome many other laws of nature).
Let me be clear here, the majority of free will skeptics would say that humans do have “self awareness and subjective consciousness, the ability to reason, introspect, plan and make judgments and informed decisions”, that is all part of the way causality processes. No-one said deterministic processes were entirely blind, or reductionistic, just that they could not have processed otherwise regardless. They are essentially causal agents, not “free agents”. Now this part is funny:
“(in the same way they’ve being able to overcome many other laws of nature).”
The majority of compatibilists, such as Dennett, would be against this idea that anyone in the history of the universe has been able to “overcome laws of nature”. If this person thinks compatibilist notions of free will are about overcoming laws of nature, they are the one that needs education on what compatibilism is and is not.
They insist on continuing to see people as merely robots (largely because that is how they like to think of themselves and partly because of their conceptual difficulty in understanding compatibilism). Of course, in a trivial sense, humans still operate under the laws of determinism given that they are part of nature, and thus one could, in principle, predict everything people would do if one had omniscient information. The conceptual difficulty that these ‘hard determinists’ have is understanding that an entity can still act as a free agent (in a way that is relevant both to itself and to all other entities) even though the course of its life could theoretically be predicted by an omniscient being.
This is a little better and makes up for that last sentence, as it explains that humans are a part of nature. It even addresses the point of determinism (if assumed), that being that how causality will play out is dictated by past causal events and a creature such as Laplace’s Demon, if it could have all of the variables (note we are not addressing indeterministic interpretations of QM here which are not relevant as we are addressing compatibilism not libertarian free will) could predict everything a person will ever do or decide. This is not a “trivial sense” and it has nothing to do with personal wants (how they like to think of themselves) or any difficulty understanding compatibilism. We are, biological robots. Even compatibilists agree with this.
These people are doggedly fixated on using nonsensical strawman definitions and notions of ‘free will’ which they pretentiously project unto the ‘common folk’ and which enables them to assert triumphantly that “free will doesn’t exist” and to serve whatever internal satisfactions they derive from making that assertion.
Let’s be clear that we don’t just “project” the free will abilities most laypersons intuitively feel they possess, there are also multiple studies that back this up. Mind you, some of these studies themself are not the best, but let’s go over a few key points:
- Most people, when given an entirely deterministic scenario to accept, feel that others (still) could have done otherwise, especially if the person in the scenario did a wrongdoing (less when it’s not a wrongdoing).
- Depending on questions asked, most lay-people have libertarian views at some times, compatibilist views at other times, and often have a mish-mash of both in incoherent ways.
- The more free will belief lay-persons hold the more retributive punishment tendencies they have.
These are facts of the matter as born by the evidence, and any version of “free will” that avoid these facts (which compatibilism most often does) is using a “nonsensical strawman version” of free will that avoids these crucial facts.
In doing so, they fail to see that ‘free will’ is simply a complex human trait like many others which are neither time independent or consistent and are not possessed by everyone to the same degree.
Oh no, we see that you can define free will that way if you want to, you can also define the word fairy as the little white floating dandelion florets and seeds that the wind carries away and tell everyone that fairies exist. You can even assert that people “fail to see that fairies simply are these florets”. The reality, however, is very different.
Yet, when it all comes down to it, when you strip away all the fluff and feathers, the entire position of these “no free will” enthusiasts rests upon a single red-herring that they regularly invoke as a ‘trump card’: “Where does a person’s will (at any time) come from?” [The word often used is “desires”, but it would allow much more clarity if it were expressed more generally as “will”.] In other words, the entire argument of these people is predicated upon the single notion that a person’s ‘will’(at any time) is ultimately due to factors beyond his/her control or choosing. Of course, they will typically cement this argumentative trick with another sleight of hand in the form of some kind of infinite regression: “where did the will that led to that will come from; and the will that led to that one; and the one that led to that one…” and so on and so on. Thus, according to these not very bright but obnoxiously pretentious dormroom philosophers, the luxury of being able to act in accordance with one’s ‘will’ and sense of self interests is not enough to qualify as ‘freedom of will’; one also has to be able to snap one’s fingers and conjure into the driver’s seat of one’s psyche an arbitrary will straight out of thin air, one that they had no prior inclination whatsoever to conjure (otherwise it wouldn’t be ‘free’).
It isn’t the problem of the free will skeptic that the free will belief that people feel they possess is one that is logically incoherent. The fact that the will is ultimately caused by events that stem outside of a person is a very important point: if the programming of us “robots” is not really in our control but stems externally, we cannot have the free will that is of concern regarding blameworthiness, deservingness, etc. These are just facts that “acting in accord to one’s ‘will’ and self interests” does not account for. If you were Hitler atom for atom, environment for environment, you would have his “will and self interests” and do exactly as Hitler did. These facts matter and are why ‘just desert’ responsibility is out which just leaves consequentialism in its wake (we would still need to stop Hitler and the Nazi party from harming others even though they don’t have free will – just as we would a rabid dog).
And it mustn’t be a random event either, or it still wouldn’t be ‘free’. Therefore, this arbitrary will must be both willed and unwilled at the same time. Only then can someone have ‘free will’. Only then can someone ever have any responsibility for any of their actions. This is the kind of tomfoolery that occupies the base of these people’s minds when dabbling in this subject.
Again, I’ll repeat, it is not the free will skeptics fault that free will is logically incoherent regardless if the universe is deterministic or there is indeterminism (true random events that would be outside of our control). We are actually saying the concept of “free will” is incoherent in both situations, so people cannot have it at all – any more than they can have ontological square-circles in their ears. In regards to “responsibility” there are different types. The type that the lack of free will holds (as well as some more rational versions of compatibilism) is that we lack ‘just desert’ responsibility or what I label as strong responsibility. If you are unfamiliar with the distinctions, here is an infographic I created a while back:
Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC
Note that we lack the strong type that invokes in things like “just deserts”, retributivism, etc. but we still have the weak varieties which are just about how we act and what we impose for the sake of consequences. If you scroll down on the infographic there is also a section that explains that we also can have a sense of duty (responsibility in this sense) without free will. Of course compatibilists often like to stroke this with a broad brush, which makes their account un-nuanced (even though they tend to falsely claim being more nuanced). So when you say “Only then can someone ever have any responsibility for any of their actions” that is a complete strawman fallacy. It should also be noted that whenever Dennett gives an example of “responsibility” he always shifts to some consequentialist assessment while avoiding the “deserve” question.
Of course, they can always fall back on the very notion of ‘determinism’ itself (if the ‘trump card’ doesn’t work) and what it seems to them to mean: that human beings are simply robotic automatons of nature whose thoughts and actions are determined by a domino effect of causes and who merely labor under the illusion that they enjoy what they call ‘free will’ when they really don’t. It is the sort of conclusion that makes the chests of dormroom (and beer parlor) philosophers swell with pride and pat themselves on the back for ‘seeing’ something so ‘insightful’. Human beings, thus, are merely (at least when they enjoy this ‘illusion’) puppets that like their strings. (Incidentally, is a puppet that likes its strings essentially ‘free’, or isn’t it?)
Yes, free will defined properly (given determinism) does mean this. You calling people who think this “dormroom (and beer parlor) philosophers” is just another ad-hom fallacy. Do I really need to display the list of philosophers and scientists who are either hard incompatibilists or hard determinists? BTW, the fact that “dormroom philosophers” keep getting invoked means that this commenter is likely a dormroom philosopher (not that a dormroom philosopher should be invalidated – again, it is about the merits of an argument, never about the person – there are probably many dormroom philosophers that are more rational than this person). No professional philosopher would create this ad-hom, insulting, uninformed diatribe of a comment.
Meanwhile, these self-congratulating retards fail to see that their position is every bit as obtuse as saying that a canvas is not really a beautiful painting featuring a lovely scenery with humans and various objects…Why?…Because if you look very closely at it, it is made up of tiny little dots.
This is yet another strawman. If hard-determinists were consciousness eliminativists (ehem…Dennett? at least regarding qualia referring to “beautiful paintings”) or extreme reductionists (reducing everything down to quantum particles and suggesting that large scale does not exist), this analogy might apply (at least a little), but hard-determinism and hard incompatibilism do not imply this kind of reductionism. We can say that we have conscious thoughts and actions, just as we can say that the painting exists, that does not imply “free will” in the sense of practical importance and in the sense that addresses layperson beliefs and feelings. We lack free will regardless if reductionism applies, or if emergentism, downward causation, or holism applies. Also, the “retard” jab means that this person is extremely immature. Seriously, who says that except 5th graders?
Typically, ‘hard determinists’, especially these dilettante types, are usually people who have come to some personal realization and knowledge about a basic fact about the world and biological life (particularly human beings) that has long been trivial and obvious to other people and feel as though they have discovered something revolutionary (and personally exhilarating).
First, this is not a “trivial” realization at all. It has vast implications on future progress as already pointed out. Regarding how “obvious” it is, the majority of people on planet earth think we have free will, and when I use that term I mean the incoherent variety (as I also pointed out). It is not a new “discovery” but it is a very important realization that hopefully, as humans progress, more start to understand it and (just as important) what it means and does not. Obviously this person does not understand it and compatibilism just buries it under scare-tactics and irrelevant definitions of free will that actually are trivial.
This, for some reason, gives these amateurs a tendency to feel entitled to browbeat the works of much more thoughtful minds that have explored the subject long before they even knew that such a subject existed. This tendency may be attributable to the sensation of ‘discovery’ and conclusiveness that such people tend to feel about the concept of ‘determinism’ as it swims around in their heads, and a naïve and presumptuous belief that they have reached some kind of plateau of knowledge about the nature of the human mind – rather than just the foot of a long steep.
More ad-homs! Obviously these so called “amateurs” can seemingly make a far more logical case than the fallacious reasoning embedded within this person’s text. This last section is just more psychobabble BS (when a person tries to claim that X is incorrect because, or so they assert without evidence, it just driven by some psychology that they seem to think they have magical knowledge about).
Again, I have no clue who the author of this diatribe is, but it was fun debunking the nonsense in it. The fact that another person latched on to it and copy/pasted it into my comment section means it needed a good ‘ol debunking. There was probably some part I missed that I should have debunked but didn’t. Let me know.
Besides my own site – here few links where this exact diatribe has been pasted in:
http://rationallyspeakingpodcast.org/show/rs-163-gregg-caruso-on-free-will-and-moral-responsibility.html
Daniel Dennett is Wrong About Free Will (Daniel Miessler) from philosophy
'Trick Slattery
Latest posts by 'Trick Slattery (see all)
- Semantic Shift Day, August 31 – REMINDER! Mark your calendar! - August 1, 2020
- Debunking Dennettian Diatribe - May 2, 2018
- Compatibilism: A Parable (comic) - December 7, 2017
172 Responses to “Debunking Dennettian Diatribe”
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You have more stamina than I Trick.
Part of me likes Dennett, another makes me think he talks down to us through his nose in a pedagogic manner. Linked below is a quote from Dennett from, From Bacteria to Bach and Back. Touches on free will.
http://www.agnosticsinternational.org/forum/viewtopic.php?p=34179#p34179
please delete if not allowed
I actually like Dennett on a variety of topics – for free will he’s terrible. This sentence says it all to me (from the link you provided): “This is not an illusion we should dismantle or erase; it’s where we live, and we couldn’t live the way we do without it.” In other words we should keep people in their illusions rather than disillusion them: Free Will Illusionism vs. Disillusionism
The interesting thing in the quote, Dennett recognizes the traditional (commonly) accepted definition of free will.
I am OK with say doing something of my own free will, in the sense there isn’t a gun at my head; but in any deeper or philosophical sense compatibilism is unnecessary.
Exactly, I think free will is an UMBRELLA TERM which hosts both coherent abilities (She was not coerced by a gun) as well as incoherent abilities (She could have done, of one’s own accord otherwise – and is therefore blameworthy for not). The problem with compatibilism is that it ignores the latter.
OK fair enough … what about illusions (not what it seems) … like love, colour, dollars, opportunities that Dennett cites?
I personally can be pragmatic about these as well … my kitchen chair is red …. despite every bit of physics says it isn’t. We can reduce dollars and opportunity in similar ways.
“Illusions” exist as illusions (specific brain states). The free will illusion exists, free will does not. “Love” refers to an emotional brain state (a type of emotion). “Colour” either refers to a wavelength of light reflected or a mental state / brain model (a type of qualia). “Dollars” is a useful concept for passing around fictitious value. I’m not sure in what sense “opportunity” is an illusion unless one does not take it (then the opportunity was a counterfactual rather than factual).
Your chair reflects the longest wavelength (red), and your brain models the photon/retina/brain interaction as what we label “red”.
Yes I understand (as much as I need, the science). But the dollar (loonie in our case) remains an illusion. Calling it a useful concept (and no doubt a brain state), while I think, is accurate; it is also missing the point.
I think the bigger point is that illusion exist “as illusions” (real states that are informationally confused), what they are referring to is what does not really exist. For the “dollar”, that is more of a fiction than an illusion, a fiction made for a specific purpose. Similar to unicorns, most don’t experience an illusion of unicorns, they are fictions that we can build an image of create imagery in pictures, statues, mentally, etc.
“(we would still need to stop Hitler and the Nazi party from harming others even though they don’t have free will – just as we would a rabid dog).” Why is viewing criminals as rabid dogs morally superior to viewing criminal behaviour as the result of a rational choice (which most criminal behaviour is)?
Because rabid dogs are not “blameworthy” for being rabid and we should not punish them retributively for trying to bite but rather try to cure them or quarantine them. Read here: On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
Trick, Dennett asks would you rather be punished or “treated” (drugged up, locked in a cage and experimented on)? Since according to incompatibilism determinism means all criminals have a diseased Brain (“tumours all the way down” as Harris says).
Yeah – Dennett is kind of silly that way. Being good consequentialists means actually doing what is consequentially best for both the criminal and potential victims. This doesn’t usually entail “being drugged up and experimented on”. Incarceration should resemble the quarantine model. In places like Norway where they have less retributive models of justice we see the lowest recidivism rates in the world.
We would still need to stop Hitler? Surely that depends if we are in that particular bit of the unfolding universe that has that particular need?
This bit of discussion reminds me of Walden Two … I “should” read it one day.
Of course, that part of the universe concerned with such things as wellbeing of conscious creatures (colloquially “we”) would still have the need, those parts unconcerned with this would have no need. I’m only referring to the former and not the latter.
Dennetts justification for punishment is simple. 1) criminal acts are rational decisions made in the persons self interest 2) The purpose of the law is to constrain the self interest of individuals therefore punishment (taking away something that a person values) is a necessary part of criminal law and justice.
Nor do criminals need to be “rehabilitated” because criminal acts by definition are rational decisions not acts committed by a diseased (insane) mind.
“Simple” is the key word here. They are “rational” based on the very specific brain construct caused by circumstances out of their control. If you were born them atom for atom, environment for environment, you would have the same “self interests”, the same “rational capacities”, and think and do exactly as they do. “Constrain” should never be “in order to punish”, just as a quarantine “constrains” those infected, but is never meant as a punishment, even if the person values their freedom. A “rational act” does not mean they could have, of their own accord, thought or done otherwise.
“but is never meant as a punishment, even if the person values their freedom” Without punishment why is anyone going to respect the law or take it into account when making a cost-benefit evaluation? Those people who aren’t punishable are criminally insane or “wired wrong” as DD says and they are the people who are sent to secure mental hospitals for their own protection and the protection of society.
If you are referring to deterrent, sure, we can still do that without blame – however, it should be noted that harsh punishments as a deterrent is ineffective as many studies show. Even the death penalty shows no evidence of deterring homicide, and in some areas has a reverse deterrent effect. Deterrent works best with small fines such as speeding tickets. Also, harsher incarceration leads to re-enforcing of bad behaviors and repeat offense, as I mentioned before. It doesn’t work.
The more important point is that no person deserves punishment if they could not have done, of their own accord, otherwise (which they could not have). Free will skeptics such as Pereboom and Caruso look to change the justice system to a non-retributive quarantine model of justice, because it is shown to be more effective AND because ‘just desert’ notions of justice are illogical and unprogressive.
“The more important point is that no person deserves punishment” It doesn’t matter whether they “deserve” it or not punishment is a integral part of criminal law and justice.
“change the justice system to a non-retributive quarantine model of justice, “ Unless these people are arguing lack of CCFW means everyone is insane then punishment is going to stay an integral part of the criminal justice system.
Only someone like Dennett would produce a strawman that no CCFW means all criminals are “insane”. It does, however, mean that they are no more “to blame” than an insane person is, and they are no more “to blame” than a person with a brain tumor causing the behaviour. This is about blameworthiness, which differs from treatment – we don’t treat the brain tumor person like they are insane, we try to remove the tumor – different methods for different circumstances.
Faulty rationale does not need to “rehabilitated”? OK.
Agreed! I tend to think John is conflating “rational” with “rationale” too. Most criminal acts are not “rational” in the sense of being “reasonable” or “logical” – especially if the act harms others. Rather they have, as you say, a “faulty rationale” that a specific “pre-programmed” brain outputs.
Criminals are sane that means their brain is cognitively healthy and their behaviour was the result of a cost-benefit evaluation – not the result of a diseased (insane) mind.
“Sane” and “rational” are two very different things. Most “sane” people belief in some sort of creator deity. Most “sane” people allows billions of animals (annually) to exist in horrible conditions until slaughtered. Many “sane” people think 1% owning more wealth than 50% of the population is justified. Most “sane” people believe in incoherent notions of free will. Almost 50% of “sane” people in the US don’t believe in evolution.
Again, if you were the “sane” criminal since birth, you would process the same (usually irrational) “cost-benefit” analysis and do as they do.
Does not mean that criminals have adopted reasoned cost-benefit models for their analysis. Does not mean they have sound axioms either.
Trick
They are the same thing sane means your mind is in touch with reality.
A criminal who commits a crime in order to benefit himself is not insane.
Also people who lack empathy for others are not insane.
No, being “irrational” is not the same thing as being “clinically insane”. Also sociopathy/psychopathy (or ASPD) which entail a lack of empathy is a mental disorder that is often not diagnosed as being “insane”. Also the line between sanity and insanity has to do with psychological norms and degrees of abnormal behaviour, delusions, etc…it isn’t about a capacity to reason or not.
Rom
Well “career” criminals do exactly that. They make rational decisions that will increase the chances of profiting from their criminal activities (and decrease the risk of being caught). These people are not insane.
It is you John that is flitting between insane and rational.
Lets leave insane aside for the moment as I think we are all agree insanity is irrelevant to the people that are actually considered criminal. These career criminals may well be rational. But that does not mean the models and axioms for their rationality are coherent or even accurate.
Trick the Oxford dictionary agrees with me.
Sanity
11 The ability to think and behave in a normal and rational manner; sound mental health.
1.1 Reasonable and rational behaviour.
People who dispose of bombs and those who work in the special forces and law enforcement also have low fear and anxiety but they are not mentally disordered and certainly not insane
This is what the oxford dictionary says:
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sane
1.”(of a person) of sound mind; not mad or mentally ill.”
1.1″ Reasonable or sensible.”
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/insane
What you are doing is conflating ambiguous definitions (1 vs 1.1), one being a clinical diagnoses “clinical insanity”, and one being a colloquialism “it was an insane discussion”. If you want to call any irrationality “insanity” then everyone is insane to various degrees (as everyone is irrational to various degrees). You cannot have your cake and eat it too here, either use definition properly or be consistent on your misuse of terms.
Also “low fear” is not the same as “lacking empathy”.
Trick said
“different methods for different circumstances.” The method for treating someone with a cognitively healthy brain is punishment.
Rom
“But that does not mean the models and axioms for their rationality are coherent or even accurate” Nothing incoherent about profiting from prostition, security fraud, smuggling drugs and making and selling guns and bombs to be used in illegal wars.
No, studies show that punitive measures are inefficient to rehabilitate and only work in very specific conditions that almost never apply for inmates. In fact the harsher the sentence (such as in supermax), the more it reinforces negative behaviours. Non-punitive and comfortable environments that allow inmates to learn, not fear for their own existence, have various educational programs, etc. work best and this is borne out by a hundred years of evidence.
Super max is for the most dangerous criminals – those who are high risk for killing other inmates and guards.
The purpose of punishment is so you will make better future choices and live a normal life when you leave.
As I mentioned, it has the reverse effect, and places where punishment is reduced such as Norway have far fewer repeat offenses: “It looks nothing like most prisons in the US. That’s because Norway’s prison system is designed with three core values in mind: normality, humanity and rehabilitation.”
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/08/us/prison-reform-north-dakota-norway/index.html
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-norways-prison-system-is-so-successful-2014-12
What kind of punishment are you talking about? The kind of punishment DD talks about is one which encourages offenders to make better choices in the future. If offenders choose to engage in educational programs and skills training etc then they are rewarded and get time knocked off their sentence you disagree with that?
If they get time knocked off their sentence because they are less of a danger to society earlier, then it has to do with that fact. More time should not be thought of as punishment, but just for the sake of others. People who are not a danger should not be in prison.
Similar to the quarantine, someone who participates in curing themself may be cured and able to leave quarantine earlier, but forcing those who do not and hence are not cured earlier to stay in quarantine, is just a matter about not harming others – not meant as a punishment to the individual.
“then everyone is insane to various degrees” Yes that’s probably my view. The delusions of religious people for instance are practically indistinguishable from what is classically called insanity.
“Also “low fear” is not the same as “lacking empathy”. Studies show psychopaths can choose to empathise or not – and this is true of normal people as well.
Then you should take no issue treating criminals as “insane” – hence the part about having your cake and eating it too.
The thing about psychopathy and a lack of empathy is that it is ACTUALLY linked to structural abnormalities in the brain, and “Most violent crimes are committed by a small group of persistent male offenders with ASPD.”:
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/ioppn/news/records/2012/May/The-antisocial-brain.aspx
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/09/130924174331.htm
https://academic.oup.com/scan/article/11/8/1326/2413915
“However, this study featured a fascinating twist: in a second condition, both criminals and control subjects were instructed to explicitly try to empathize with the people in the videos they watched. Under this condition, individuals with psychopathy engaged these regions more than they had without instructions, and almost as much as control subjects. These data, again, suggest that oftentimes deficits in empathy can be reduced through the right motivational “triggers.””
———-
Show that a criminal whose behaviour is the result of a rational decision and cost-benefit analysis is delusional.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/moral-universe/empathy-as-a-choice-part-2-autism-and-psychopathy/
Even if some empathy can be triggered given the right circumstances (e.g. being asked to explicitely focus on empathizing in a study), the fact that it is not triggered without these circumstances (when it is for non-psychopaths) is a brain abnormality. There is no magical “free will” that can produce the “empathy trigger” when we want it – and punishment certainly is not the way to trigger it! Psychopath’s do not “rationally” decide to be unempathetic given such a circumstance, and they certainly could not have done, of their own accord, otherwise given that specific circumstance (which is more important).
(1)
If you want to participate in a civilised society you have to obey the rules. Just like if you play a sport you have to obey the rules of that game. If you break a rule you are punished- if you don’t agree with that don’t play the game.
Likewise if you don’t want to participate in society then you get put in an institution and appointed a guardian by the state – since you can’t be relied upon to obey the rules and manage your own affairs.
But if you prefer that didn’t happen and want to continue having a politically free life then take your punishment.
————-
(2)
“the fact that it is not triggered without these circumstances (when it is for non-psychopaths) is a brain abnormality.”
The study shows empathy is not simply an automatic reflex but often requires a choice – to engage with others emotions – a choice which even “normals” often refuse – because it is challenging painful or costly to the individual.
“Psychopath’s do not “rationally” decide to be unempathetic given such a circumstance, “ They certainly do and even non psychopaths do.
(1) Except you miss the important facts:
First – if a person could not have done, of their own accord, otherwise (which they could not have) – they do not DESERVE punishment.
Second – punishment (even a death sentence) is INEPT as a deterrent. These “if you don’t want X don’t do Y” are not even practically relevant for the criminal cases of concern.
Third – people are forced into the game of life, their biology, and their environment.
(2)
No, the study does not show that empathy is not an automatic reflex (or that it is a rational decision to empathize by non-psychopathic people) – it shows that it IS an automatic reflex for non-psychopaths and not for psychopaths. All the study shows is that deficits in empathy that psychopaths HAVE can be reduced through the right motivational “triggers”. You are wrong about what the study shows:
https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/136/8/2550/432196
From the study: “Brain regions involved in experiencing these interactions were not SPONTANEOUSLY activated as strongly in the patient group while viewing the video clips. However, this group difference was markedly reduced when we specifically instructed participants to feel with the actors in the videos.”
(meaning it is a more automatic or instinctual response in non-psychopaths – hence the issue)
Also, you are missing the point that they could not have thought or acted, at that time, otherwise. This is the part you aren’t comprehending.
*Let's go back down to one comment at a time please. Please stay within the rules as these are getting bloated.John
If this were true, you would be advocating that we all should do this.
Trick … the Captcha question did not work just now 15 – 15 = 0 did not work …. tried three times!
Thanks rom, it seems even systems we expect to logically work are sometimes “insane”. Let me know if the insanity in the system continues.
Why on earth would a person need the ability to choose an option to act against all their desires in any given circumstance in order to be deserving of punishment?
Law and punishment is a necessity of any civilised society without punishment no one will have respect for the law.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/moral-universe/empathy-as-a-choice/
———
Trick here is a little story which shows that the fact of inevitability is practically useless “It’s my fate to steal,” pleaded the man who had been caught red-handed by Diogenes.
“Then it is also your fate to be beaten,” said Diogenes, hitting him across the head with his staff.” (I will try to keep it to 1 comment from now on).
Those “desires” could not have been otherwise either. I’m saying that the notion of ‘just deserts’ (e.g. being deserving of punishment) is as incoherent as the ability to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise (the free will of concern). Also – cute story that conflates fatalism with determinism…and has nothing at all to do with being “deserving of punishment” which “inevitability” certainly has something to say about even when someone is inevitably punished undeservingly.
Appreciated. 🙂
Trick
“Inevitability” is not an argument against punishment. If you say it was inevitable for a thief to steal from me then I can say it’s inevitable that I will beat him. You can’t claim he doesn’t deserve it – while at the same time claiming that the whole notion of “deserve” is incoherent.
Yes- it is. The fact that you inevitably beat the thief does not in any way, shape, or form, imply that the thief deserved the beating. Only that it was inevitable that you acted irrationally. He does not deserve it BECAUSE the whole notion of deserve is (rationally/logically) incoherent (due to a lack of coherency with free will). One cannot deserve X if deserve notions are incoherent. Saying they deserve it is like saying they possess the attribute of being a square-circle.
If the concept of deserve is incoherent then the justice system doesn’t even need to get into reasoning about “deserve” then when giving a criminal a punishment. For example somebody who commits a capital offence will simply (and “inevitably”) be handed a death sentence by the state.
That is what would happen if society “inevitably” doesn’t care about a rational justice system that mitigates “non-deserved” (meaning all) harms, but people like me “inevitably” do care and hopes that society “inevitably” does as well. What rationally justifies retributive punishment is the very notion of deserve. If that was ruled out, then the only thing to rationally fall back on is consequentialist assessments – such as preventing “non-deserved” harms. The death sentence does not do this, nor do a large majority of punishments….in fact they often make things worse. Also, being “incoherent” just means it is not logical to invoke “deservingness”, not that a lack of deserve cannot be addressed (just like a lack of free will).
Rom
This would be like saying to a vegetarian who points out farmers profit from slaughtering animals “if that was true you would be advocating that everyone should make money from slaughtering animals”. Completely ridiculous.
Yes it is not coherent … yet you claimed it was a coherent position, whether it be slaughtering animals or smuggling drugs.
Unless you are claiming the circular argument that it is completely coherent for criminals to carry out criminal acts.
Rom
Criminals act in their self interest. What’s incoherent about that? We also have laws for this reason and enforcement of those laws. Is having a state and laws incoherent in your opinion or can we just expect that everyone will have empathy for each other and just give out of the kindness of their hearts like anarchists believe?
It’s coherent to risk getting caught and going to jail? It is in their self interest?
Again I will restate … the axioms they have adopted and possibly the reasoning the find they have are probably a bit wonky.
“consequentialist assessments” The criminals have violated the social contract therefore society is justified in taking from them what it can to restore the harm they have caused. In the case of someone who commits a capital offence they have given up their right to live in a civilised society and they have a debt to society – a debt which they are never going to be able to pay back.
Your entire comment presupposes that they could have, of their own accord, not have violated the social contract. Punishment is not a restoration of harm, it just tacks on more harm. Again, if you were unlucky enough to be born in their shoes (their biology, environment, and causal variables), you would have done the exact same thing and “violated the social contract”. The sooner you get this the sooner you will have compassion over someone elses causal variables.
Trick
If you think all criminals have a diseased brain then why keep the most hardened criminals alive? There’s no cure for them, no magic pill, no therapy and these are not people that society needs.
That has more to do with my consequentialist assessment of the death penalty: 1) They don’t *deserve* to die or the threat of death and psychological harms of that threat, 2) the death penalty has no deterrent effect, 3) the death penalty causes harm to interconnected relations (e.g. family), 4) some are put to death when they would have been exonerated, 5) the death penalty costs 18 times more than life incarceration, 6) sometimes the procedure goes horribly wrong.
That beings said, there could be a very rare (consequentialist) exception, but this is the case for most things.
1) If they are in prison for life that means they will die in prison. Presumably that also causes psychological harm. 2) If it deters no one then no loss but if deters anyone that is has saved at least some lives. 3) See point 1 also this person destroyed someone else’s life. 4) The risk of killing an innocent is minuscule. 5) Where does 18 times come from? 5) Lethal injection is generally safe, quick and painless. (It’s what we use to euthanise our pets).
1) To die is not to be killed. Knowing you are being put to death is a huge existential harm. 2) It doesn’t deter anyone and in some places there are more homicides where there is the death penalty. 3) That doesn’t mean they deserve to die themself. 4) 4.1% is not miniscule here. 5) The california study for example. 6) There have been many cases where this is not the case. See the links in my last comment.
* To keep comment length on par let's focus on these one at a time starting with (1).“It’s coherent to risk getting caught and going to jail? It is in their self interest?” Certainly its a risk versus reward evaluation. A robbery can take place in literally seconds and the robber takes that risk because the probability of him being caught is low and if successful will make hundreds or thousands of dollars from a few seconds or minutes “work”.
Trick if we found a mass murderer committed his murders because of a tumour in his brain and we could not remove the tumour, its very easy to justify killing (euthanising) him. You think viewing criminals as (essential) wild animals instead of rational agents will make society treat them more humanely. That’s far from guaranteed and if anything is easier to justify experimenting on people and killing them. (like the Soviet Union and the nazis did).
I’m saying it would not be justified killing him (if he wants to live). The fact that you think it is is the very problem. Let me ask this:
X person, who is in quarantine, is a carrier of Y contagious disease. X, as just a carrier of Y, will not die from Y, however, others will die if we ever let X out of quarantine. We cannot cure Y and X will never be helpful for the cure. X does not want to die, but X also doesn’t want to live in quarantine for the rest of X’s life (though would rather that than be put to death). Should we put X to death (force death on to X)? Y or N?
If we Abandon free will in the justice system and instead base sentencing on that persons risk to society then yes. Not only would it much be easier and cheaper to kill the most hardened criminals under this system but the mentally ill and retarded as well.
I disagree (it’s also not even easier or cheaper as already mentioned), but please answer my question about the quarantine scenario of the person who has contracted a contagious disease. Should we put person X who is in quarantine (in my specific scenario) to death under your position? Y or N
Sam Harris’s moral theory is that the action which produces the most benefit is the morally good action. So from that viewpoint it seems we would be morally obligated to kill this person.
That is a very simplistic view of The Moral Landscape. I didn’t, however, ask about Harris (which you are incorrect about). Is it YOUR position that we should kill the quarantined person? Y or N?
Hi Trick,
I didn’t realise how bad Dennett is on this. I read the Harris response and then Dennett’s review. I wondered if Dennett had pinned his colours to the mast and wasn’t prepared to change his mind or if he’s just stupider than I thought. He misses the point of the “could have done otherwise” thought experiment, and defines free will as having the ability to do things differently when circumstance are different.
Exactly! 🙂
I don’t believe the mentally ill and retarded should receive a death sentence (and the justice system agrees with me). So the answer is no. Now you need to prove all criminals are sick and should be excused from the death penalty.
Why are you mentioning the “mentally ill and retarded” for this question (though I agree they should not get the death penalty even if a danger if let “free” to roam about on their own), the person in quarantine is neither mentally ill or retarded. They just had the unlucky circumstances of contracting and being a carrier of a dangerous disease but are of clinically sound mind (and not mentally deficient). Should the person in quarantine, who is NOT ill (but a carrier of a dangerous disease), get the death penalty according to YOU? Please answer the proper question.
“get the death penalty according to YOU? “ The person in your hypothetical case hasn’t committed a crime so obviously no. (Whether they should be euthanised for purely utilitarian reasons and not as a punishment is a different question.)
Great and (in the scenario) is the main reason for keeping person X in quarantine the negative consequences to others if we let the person out of quarantine? Y or N?
“Great and (in the scenario) is the main reason for keeping person X in quarantine the negative consequences to others if we let the person out of quarantine” Yes.
Great – last one: Should we treat person X in quarantine poorly, punishing them for accidentally contracting the dangerous disease? Y or N
“Should we treat person X in quarantine poorly, punishing them for accidentally contracting the dangerous disease?” No.
Great – most free will skeptic suggest that we should (most often) treat dangerous criminals similar to dangerous person X who is in the quarantine. As you denote – that would not necessitate: A) killing the person, or B) letting the person free (as doing so is harmful to others), or C) treating the person poorly / punishing (as they do not deserve it). It does not imply we need give them the same diagnoses as those with a mental disorder, or a brain tumor (just as we don’t need to for those in quarantine) –> they just are equally not as ‘just desert’ responsible for their conditions as those with a mental disorder or brain tumor (and that is what is being compared for the analogy, not cure methods). Hope this clarifies.
“‘just desert’ responsible” Nobody is *ultimately* responsibly but that doesn’t mean they are not pragmatically responsible.
As pragmatically responsible as person X who is in quarantine (we need to keep them in quarantine for pragmatic reasons). No more and no less.
“No more and no less.” No there are different degrees of responsibility. a child is not responsible while an adult with a cognitively healthy brain whose criminal behaviour was the result of a rational choice in an attempt to benefit themselves is held to be responsible for their choices and the behaviour which resulted from that choice.
Are you talking (as you say) “pragmatic responsibility”? If so, pragmatically, it is more of a danger to let the person in quarantine out (that would cause a death epidemic) than it is the psychopathic serial killer (that would kill many)….so sure, in that sense (and ONLY that sense) there are different degrees of “pragmatic responsibility” (if you can even call that responsibility) depending on consequences (it seems the quarantined person has MORE here – so sure – it seems I misspoke with the “no less” statement technically in this case). You are missing the point that if the person who committed the crime could not have, of their own accord, made a different “rational choice”, then it is ONLY about pragmatics (re: consequences). They are NO MORE blameworthy or responsible than person X (who is a bigger danger) in quarantine is. Correct?
No a person whose criminal behaviour was the result of a rational choice is responsible and blameworthy a person infected with a virus or whose behaviour was the result of an accident or illness etc is not.
Your position here displays the very reason free will skepticism is so important and why compatibilists contriving free will is a problem. Your position isn’t about “pragmatic responsibility” at all (the fall-back of compatibilists) but the more irrational type of responsibility. If it was about pragmatism you would have to say person X in quarantine is “more responsible”. Glad we cleared this up.
For the sake of argument, I will give you that a choice was “rational” (even though that isn’t the case for most criminals).
Could the “rational” criminal have, of their own accord, made a different choice at the time? Y or N
If a person was put back in the same circumstance they would always make the same choice. Now should we treat people differently based on their capacities? Should somebody who cheats on their tax return be treated the same as a person with Down syndrome? Should tax evaders be excused from paying a fine or serving a prison sentence? If no then you agree with DD and our justice system. If not then in your system all law breakers should be declared incompetent to manage their own affairs and put in an institution.
It means we should not treat people retributively. Should person X who is in quarantine be treated the same as a person with Down syndrome? Should person X be let out of quarantine? If no, then we are simply back to matters of being pragmatic.
Sidenote: I do think that for some acts fines may have useful deterrent effect (as I mentioned earlier)….but that is also entirely about pragmatics (and I don’t agree with ownership rights here anyway). Prison (a quarantine) should be only for those who are a danger to others – not used as punishment. It all comes down to what is pragmatic (the consequences).
“If no, then we are simply back to matters of being pragmatic.” The whole idea of responsibility and moral competency is ultimately pragmatic.
“ Prison (a quarantine) should be only for those who are a danger to others – not used as punishment.” Why? Like Dennett says if you don’t want to punished then don’t play the game. If you don’t want to honour a contract then don’t sign it.
Great, then I’ll ask again: Person X in quarantine (that would cause an epidemic if let out) is more pragmatically responsible than the criminal in jail. Correct?
Because prison is an ineffective deterrent.
It’s pragmatic to hold people with a cognitively healthy brain criminally responsible for their choices. It’s not pragmatic to do so for a person who contracted a virus through no fault of their own.
“Because prison is an ineffective deterrent.” People value their freedom so it makes sense that taking it away will deter them. That doesn’t mean prison should be used first maybe cheaper alternatives like fines and community service should be used first. (For more minor offences).
What is the distinction between “criminally responsible” and “pragmatically responsible” that you are making? If there is none (as you suggested before), then isn’t it the case that it is MORE pragmatic to keep person X in quarantine than the criminal in jail? Y or N
I understand why you intuitively think this, but this is not borne out by the evidence. The deterrent effect is very minimal, there are far better ways to deter. Also, (once imprisoned) harsher prison environments have far larger recidivism rates (which makes them anti-pragmatic).
Those who are criminally responsible are those who have the capacity for reason and whose criminal behaviour was intentional.
(link removed)So you think if a police car is visible to drivers it won’t deter people from speeding? CCTV, locks, alarms, vaults and security guards all a waste of money in your opinion?
Answer the question and stop avoiding: isn’t it the case that it is MORE pragmatic to keep person X in quarantine than the criminal in jail? Y or N – You should be able to answer this question – it’s easy.
Actually no, those are where deterrence actually DO have an effect – when there are visible features AT THE TIME of considering a crime. Don’t strawman.
No, I'm not going to debunk an entire (compatibilist) PDF file in comments - link removed.t’s just as pragmatic to punish people whose behaviour was the result of a rational choice as it is to quarantine a person with a deadly virus.
“DO have an effect” Deterrence and punishment does have an effect then?
“AT THE TIME” So all criminals commit their crime on the spur of the moment? They can only make a cost benefit decision just seconds before but not hours, days, weeks or months in advance?
You are question avoiding, so I will rephrase another way: If we HAD TO let A) a serial killer out of prison, or B) person X out of quarantine that will cause an epidemic, who would be the more pragmatic one to let out? A or B?
I said in the very beginning (click here) that there were some lesser punishments, such as fines, that did work as a deterrent for smaller infractions – and are pragmatic even if someone does not have free will. And no, I said that is when (statistically) deterrent works best – if there is something in their view at the time that leads to caution (e.g. a police, etc.). Harsher punishments (even death sentences) and incarceration are not good deterrents…for example, for homicide (as I mentioned many times now). This is a fact.
Actually, the death sentence is a great deterrent; recidivism goes way down. There’s not a lot it won’t pragmatically solve, come to think of it.
Hah…good one JF…it would also prevent future speeding, especially if it can be enacted right when someone is pulled over. 😉
A death penalty for speeding? Very extreme no? But if all criminals are dangerous wild animals on the other hand….
JN -The death penalty when pulled over for speeding is a joke (but if we are using it for recidivism? 😉 ). If we shouldn’t kill the quarantined person – we shouldn’t the criminal (as neither are deserving of it) – rather life sentence/quarantine is better as you denote yourself John re: quarantine person X (and not killing them). Also, over 4% of those put to death would have been exonerated (and it costs 18X more than life incarceration) – there is that.
Come to think of it JF – if we start killing people who have not committed any crime at all it would start to lower crime rates. Statistically the more dead, the less chance for them to commit a crime. 😉
“If we HAD TO” Is such a scenario realistic?
If criminals do not choose to commit a crime if they see a police officer etc then that means they are deterred and that they are punishable.
Does it matter if it is realistic or not – it points out that the quarantined person X is MORE pragmatically responsible….and to denote otherwise is to move away from pragmatics…which you so desperately want to do for the criminal. This shows your leaning toward retributivism – which is irrational.
It just means that they are deterred by the threat of being caught. If that threat seems less (no police or cameras around), the deterrent effect loses value statistically. Again there is no rate change of homicides in areas with the death penalty (some have higher homicides) – so it isn’t the punishment itself that deters, it is the visual cue of a higher chance of being caught.
I am talking of moral responsibility. It’s pragmatic to praise and blame the Actions of a moral agent don’t you agree? The only way that a offender with a sound mind can change their behaviour is by taking responsibility for their actions and by making better future choices.(since in reality we don’t have any magic pills), don’t you agree?
You are confusing pragmatic responsibility in the consequentialist sense with moral responsibility in the just desert sense. If what we do is for the sake of pragmatics only, then the REASON we do it has nothing to do with moral responsibility – it is just the pragmatic thing to do. We quarantine person X not because they are morally responsible, but because it is pragmatic. Likewise, the criminal. We should only do what we do because it is pragmatic, not because they are morally responsible for something they couldn’t have not done.
How else are we to influence the future behaviour of rational (and moral) agents if not by praising and blaming their good and bad choices? (Holding them responsible basically)? Do you have a superior alternative?
Doing so through ‘pretending someone is blameWORTHY’ is archaic and unprogressive. We can look to see if a method is pragmatically effective (like the quarantine) ONLY – if not and it causes harm to the person who does not deserve the harm (which they never deserve it any more than person X in quarantine) – don’t do it (such as harsh prison sentences and harsh punishments). We should treat people as well as we consequentially can, which also is more effective at rehabilitation than harsh punishments / prison sentences are. We should change behavior through education and changing causal conditions, and avoid doing it through hitting them with a stick whenever possible.
Pragmatic incentive is another topic but we should stick to the problem of ‘blame when someone is not actually blameWORTHY’ for now.
“blame when someone is not actually blameWORTHY’ for now.” The law blames people who fail to exercise their capacities. For example if a police car asks you to pull over and you choose not to do so you will be held responsible. That’s because you are an agent with the capacity to reason. Only if you lack that capacity will you be excused by the law.
What we do and what we should do are very different things. We can change behaviours without (irrational) backward blaming for things that could not have been otherwise (they did lack the CAPACITY to do otherwise at the time!). We can focus entirely on future output. The mental capacity to adjust behaviour can be a consideration for future adjustments that are pragmatic ONLY BUT should not be a consideration for blaming for the past event. This is important for the attitudes we have about criminals, etc….which plays into how they are treated.
Understanding one’s role in causing something is the basis for “taking on” responsibility. The Sun is responsible for much of today’s life that exists on Earth. Is the Sun morally responsible?
Personally I would drop the word moral; though it is a good way of manipulating people to do what we might want.
Understanding we are proximate or perhaps immediate causes is a more accurate way of looking at things.
John Nutt, you said, “if a police car asks you to pull over and you choose not to do so you will be held responsible”, but are you arguing from a position of accepting the premise that there’s no free will? I thought you were. If so, that person was caused not to pull over (even including their decision not to) by prior causes, hence the law is an ass. If not, maybe catch up with the argument. Cheers.
Trick
“We can change behaviours without (irrational) backward blaming” How can we influence a persons future choices if we don’t hold them responsible for past choices?
“(they did lack the CAPACITY to do otherwise at the time!). “ If they lacked that capacity they would have been unable to make a choice
We can influence their causal choices through education and assistance (influencing brain states) all without backward blame.
Aren’t you a compatibilist? If you are you should understand that a capacity to have done otherwise given the causal variables at the time is nonsensical.
* My request is that, if you insist on compatibilism, be a more consistent NSRC Compatibilist: click here
“understand that a capacity to have done otherwise given the causal variables at the time is nonsensical” If their behaviour was the result of a decision making process then at the start of that process they would have started with multiple options from which to choose from. So they did have the ability to choose any of those viable options. Saying I “could have done otherwise” is correct (even with determinism) but in the same circumstance I WOULD always choose the same option.
No, only one of the options was ever “viable” the others were part of the thought process that MUST causally play to the only one possible selection (given determinism that is). You would always choose the same option because the other options were not really possible in the sense that they could have been actualized, they were just unviable thoughts that were weighed the only way they could have been causally weighed.
If we rewind the tape till just before the person starts to deliberate then it’s true at that moment that they are faced with 2 or more viable options which they could have (at that time) chosen. But given who they was at that moment they will always choose the same option.
Who they are at the moment in time is a part of causality that ALSO could not have been otherwise…so no, only one option was causally viable (unless you are reverting to indeterminism and libertarian free will, not compatibilism….then we can address how those indeterministic events are also out of the control of the willer. Right now we are addressing compatibilism/determinism).
Rom
“Is the Sun morally responsible?” The sun is not a moral agent. The only way to change the behaviour of a Criminals with a sound mind (since we don’t have magic pills in reality) is to give him better options from which to choose.
“Understanding we are proximate or perhaps immediate causes is a more accurate way of looking at things.” Such as the persons choice being the immediate cause of their behaviour? And the only way for them to improve their behaviour is to deliberately choose a better way to live.
So you are saying people are moral agents? If so this begging the question! The question is how we change a criminal’s mind.
Yes the choice might be the proximate cause … is the choice free? Do judges intentionally tend to give stiffer sentences just before lunch?
Trick
When a person is faced with an issue they imagine multiple possibilities (can do’s) and then they implement one of those options (what the person “inevitably” WILL choose). So it’s correct to say they had the capacity to do otherwise.
Just because one THINKS that they can take a {counterfactual} action (due to epistemic uncertainty), does not mean they actually CAN take (“can do”) a {counterfactual) action. That is to conflate the epistemic with the ontic. Rather, that thought plays a part into the one and only option they can take/do. Also, once it is done, there is no more epistemic uncertainty about the factual. It is entirely incorrect to say they had a capacity to do otherwise (to do a counterfactual) – given determinism.
You have the capacity to select one option out of multiple options. At that moment in time you had a choice and then by exercising your will or “free will” you determined which option would be implemented in reality.
You had the capacity to select the one and ONLY option you could select at the time. You did not have a free choice or free will, but rather a constrained causal choice and will. You had zero capacity to select a different option at that time. You had no more capacity to select a different option than you had the capacity to flap your arms and fly to the moon at the time.
What is free will to choose the inevitable?
Trick
I did not not say we have the ability to select multiple options but the ability to imagine multiple (feasible) options. Obviously we can only choose or select one of those options and implement it.
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JF
“What is free will to choose the inevitable?” Because you actually have to deliberate over multiple options and exercise your free will to choose anything – because the universe or “inevitability” isn’t going to do it for you.
JN
Some have the ability to “imagine” they can jump off a cliff and fly (and think it “feasible”). It is whether or not they can “DO” that (it actually being “feasible”) that matters to whether we find them splatted on the ground below or not. We could not have DONE otherwise, and DOING so is not any more “feasible” than jumping off a cliff and flying just by flapping our arms (regardless of what one imagines they can do).
* Only one option was ever ontologically feasible – those other imagined options are just part of the causality (that could not have been otherwise) that will lead to the one and only option that could have been selected.
JN: ‘Because you actually have to deliberate over multiple options and exercise your free will to choose anything.’
Whether you deliberate or not and every detail of how you do are subject to the same causative law, also inevitable. Deciding to be conscientious or laisez faire, outside influences – everything is caused precisely, inevitably, just the way it happens. So you are defining the illusion of free will as “free will”.
Feasible means I can physically and realistically do it. For example I can (its physical possible for me) to walk to the supermarket but it’s not possible that I can fly there so that option is not feasible.
“Only one option was ever ontologically feasible” So tell me what it is then so I don’t have to bother making a choice? It doesn’t matter if determinism is true – since we still have to make choices to determine what the future is.
The fact that you don’t know the only feasible option does not make the others feasible. You could never have physically done otherwise. You could never have realistically done otherwise. Doing otherwise was physically impossible. Saying you could have done otherwise is unrealistic. You still have to choose the only way you can (physically) choose and the only option you can choose, based on the only brain configuration you could have had at the time.
JK
“So you are defining the illusion of free will as “free will” Free will definition (from the free will dictionary) “The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will” Where’s the illusion? Even with determinism the word choice has meaning and saying all our choices are “inevitable” adds nothing of value and therefore should be of no concern to anyone.
JN: ‘Where’s the illusion?’
1. You appear to be making a decision between several options.
2. There can only be one possible outcome.
3. Therefore your apparent freedom to choose is an illusion.
4. Dictionaries say many things that don’t always apply.
“does not make the others feasible.” It’s feasible that I can make a cup of coffee or a cup of tea this is a correct use of language.
“You still have to choose the only way you can (physically) choose“ So you agree we still have to go through a decision making process? And being faced with multiple feasible options (“can do’s”) is a necessary part of that process? And determinism does NOTHING to change that fact?
You are conflating epistemic for ontic. Saying something is epistemically feasible/possible just means you lack the knowledge over which is really ontically feasible/possible. After the fact that epistemic uncertainty is no more: and under determinism if you made coffee and not tea, you never could have made the tea (it was not feasible for you to have). We process decisions the only way we can, and only one of the options we factor in was actually (in reality) feasible/ possible. “Can do” suggests ontic, not simply epistemic. That is wrong under determinism, you could not have “done” otherwise.
“just means you lack the knowledge over which is really ontically feasible/possible.” I can make tea (I have the ability to do so) and IF I do choose the tea then that is what I WILL do.
““Can do” suggests ontic, not simply epistemic.” The “can do’s” only exist in our imagination.
“That is wrong under determinism, you could not have “done” otherwise.” With determinism we WOULD NOT have chosen otherwise.
You had no ability to make tea AT THAT TIME! To suggest you did goes against causality and the laws of physics (given a deterministic account). Your ability was constrained to processing the only decision you could – coffee.
If “can do’s” only exist in your imagination, they are no different that someone imagining you “can fly”. It does not mean you actually can fly but that you are just imagining it (indeed, you might even believe it).
You BOTH would not have done otherwise AND could not have done otherwise.
“You had no ability to make tea AT THAT TIME!” You have the ability to make tea and if you choose it you will make it.
“Your ability was constrained to processing the only decision you could – coffee.” In other words the only constraint was my own will – and why would a person want the ability to act against their own will?
No I can (feasible) walk to the supermarket but I cannot fly there.
You had no ability to choose tea at that time, hence no ability to make tea at that time.
You could not have chosen another will. Your will was not free to be otherwise.
You could not have feasibly A) had a different will, B) deliberated otherwise, or C) done otherwise, anymore than you could have feasibly flown to the supermarket.
JF
1. We actually do evaluate the multiple options and then we select the “best” option.
2. Yes that’s the option we end up choosing to implement.
3. Where’s the illusion?
JN: There’s no illusion at all. Trouble is, you just re-wrote the scenario without determinism.
1. You’ve no idea it’s the best option. It could be the worst. Never made a bad decision? What we know about it is that it is the inevitable decision.
2. It’s the only one we could have made.
3. The deluded prisoner decides to stay in today.
1. We actually do evaluate the multiple options and then we select the “best” option.
2. Yes that’s the option we end up choosing to implement.
3. Where’s the illusion?
JF
1. We select the “best” option based on the information available to us at the time. Obviously since we are not omniscient it could turn out terrible.
2. It’s the only one we would have chosen. Why would we want to choose something different to the option that we thought was best suited to our purposes (at that time.)?
3. The deluded prisoner is not responsive to reasons so it cannot be said he is exercising his free will.
Where is determinism missing?
JN: ‘ Why would we want to choose something different to the option that we thought was best suited to our purposes?’
The argument does not rest on whether we would want something other than what we choose. But to be postulating such a condition shows that you understand the difference. If you could choose a different option, you’d have free will. And if you deliberately choose a bad option to spite determinism, that was just as caused, so that’s no escape from determinism.
JF
“If you could choose a different option, you’d have free will.” No if I choose a less attractive option I would be acting against my own will. So such an “ability” even if it existed would have nothing to do with “free will”.
Without causality/determinism you wouldn’t have coherent thoughts and you wouldn’t have the ability to make rational choices and implement those choices. So “escaping” from determinism is just as nonsensical as being “free” from yourself.
JN: ‘No if I choose a less attractive option I would be acting against my own will.’
So you define free will as choosing what you cannot help but choose, and choosing something else “acting against” FW?
‘Without causality/determinism you wouldn’t have coherent thoughts and you wouldn’t have the ability to make rational choices and implement those choices.’
That may be true, but is irrelevant to whether your choices are freely made, whereas determinism itself precludes that.
So “escaping” from determinism is just as nonsensical as being “free” from yourself.’
True, but for the wrong reason. Are you saying determinism GIVES us free will?
Rom
“the option we chose has been determined” Yes it’s determined by us – we are the ones doing the choosing – not anything else and this is NOT an illusion.
“That we chose independently or freely” When you choose a meal at a restaurant the only thing (or being rather) in existence interested in what you want for dinner is you. It’s a free and independent choice made entirely by you.
JN
When you say determined by us you mean … chemical and physical processes chose a result? Or are you pointing to some magical property of the brain? Why is it the chemistry and physics of only humans and perhaps a few other animals that chose freely? In what way is the chemistry and physics free and independent?
Your menu example is an argument form ignorance … sorry. We are completely unaware of these processes and therefore free of them?
JF
We select the option that best suits our purposes. Why WOULD we choose something else (even if we “could”) if we was ever put back in the exact same circumstance?
“but is irrelevant to whether your choices are freely made, whereas determinism itself precludes that.” You’re making choices freely and independently of anyone else. Determinism doesn’t change this fact.
JN: ‘Why WOULD we choose something else (even if we “could”)’
So you now agree we could not? (Please have the courtesy to answer questions.)
Not being able to identify a motivation to do otherwise doesn’t make your action freely willed. Determinism doesn’t impose terrible hardship, just inevitability.
JF
“So you now agree we could not?” More precisely would not. You are putting the “could not” at the start of the decision making process – which is mistaken. As a choice always starts with what we “can” do and finishes with what we WILL do.
“Determinism doesn’t impose terrible hardship, just inevitability” Yes and the fact of *inevitability* has no practical value and therefore shouldn’t be a concern to anybody.
JN, you accept the fact of inevitability. This means that, at the start of the decision-making process, the outcome is already determined. It can only be one thing. This is what inevitability means. It applies to future conditions. So it is right to put “could not” at the beginning regarding all other outcomes. Saying you have free will, or avoiding “could not” implies that other outcomes are possible, which is not the case. You know it is not the case, because only one is inevitable. You are simply abusing English.
We select the option which is completely dictated by the specific deliberation that takes place which is completely dictated by the very specific brain configuration we have at the time that is ultimately dictated by events that stem outside of us, none of which could have been, of the our own accord, otherwise. We wouldn’t choose something else, because the very “programming” we have dictates the exact way we deliberate and assess at the time.
*** It is the will itself that is not free.***
If one is going to denote an unfree, entirely causally dictated choice as “free will”, they might as well say that a selection a computer chess program makes out of a database of options that it processes through via checks and balances was a “free choice”.
JF
“So it is right to put “could not” at the beginning regarding all other outcomes.” No it is not. A choice starts with what we “can do” and then ends with what we will do. If you put “could not” at the start of the choosing process then no choosing would have happened – and that is factually wrong.
Why was the chosen option inevitable? Because that option most fitted our purposes at the time- inevitability is not some mysterious external force which forces us to choose against our will.
JN
No, I agree, not a mysterious force, or all external. Inevitability is the fact that only one outcome is possible. That fact pertains at the start of the choosing process. It must pertain at all moments prior. Therefore, before we choose, we cannot choose anything other than the one inevitable outcome. These facts follow from determinism.
Trick
We act with “free will” when we are free from coercion and undue influence. It’s the “I am signing this of my own free will” variety – not the contra casual variety that most religious people believe in.
I do understand that you are a compatibilist who re-defines free will to be “lacking a disqualifier [of free will]“, that is common for compatibilists. When you, however, suggest that someone could have done otherwise or that they are responsible in the strong ‘just desert’ sense you are falling victim to libertarian notions or not being a “good compatibilist”. Believe it or not, I don’t insist on necessarily converting you to a full-blown free will skeptic (defining free will in the proper, important sense), I’d be okay if you redefined free will the way you want – but don’t inject in irrational metaphysical beliefs in. I’m asking that you, at the very least, become a NSRC Compatibilist that I denote in this article:
A Compatibilism / Incompatibilism Transformation
If that is doable, we’ve made progress.
Why are you so desperate not to be responsible for your actions?
Hi Andrew, thanks for stopping by.
It isn’t about me. Rather, I’d argue, that the notion of “just desert” responsibility (or “strong” responsibility denoted here: Moral Responsibility Infographic) is causing way too many problems in the world – from retributivism to justifying gross inequalities, and for humanity to progress we need to move away from these faulty, irrational, and ultimately harmful notions. 🙂
It’s more about the nature of that responsibility rather than whether or not we are responsible.
Trick
Okay let’s for now leave aside “free will” and talk about moral responsibility.
As defined on wiki “Moral agency is an individual’s ability to make moral judgments based on some notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions.A moral agent is “a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong.”
Is moral responsibility compatible with determinism in your opinion?
Why did you say “let’s talk about moral responsibility” and then give the wiki definition of “moral agency”? They are not the same thing. The wiki definition of moral responsibility is:
And no, moral responsibility in this sense is not compatible with determinism, as this denotes the STRONG ‘just desert’ sense that I show here: Moral Responsibility Infographic
The article on moral responsibility also says “Philosophers refer to people who have moral responsibility for an action as moral agents.”
It seems you are simply arguing against Retributive notions of justice and in favour of rehabilitation. While that might be fine humanism it is poor philosophy. ( To make the point what ethical system is NOT compatible with determinism – as determinism is a metaphysical claim and not a ethical system – anymore than indeterminsm is.)
The wiki article on “moral agents” is based off of one article and is missing a whole lot. One can be a causal moral agent and NOT have after-the-fact moral responsibility in the sense that wiki explains (being “deserving” of X).
No John, both physical and metaphysical facts play a huge part in any rational ethical system. To suggest otherwise is “poor philosophy”. If someone could not have done otherwise due to the metaphysical position of causal determinism being true, that fact ties to the notion of ethical responsibility (same with indeterminism that one would have no say over).
“being “deserving” of X” The concept of deserve doesn’t contradict determinism. It simply means a person has earned something or should be given something because of their actions or qualities (dictionary definition). How is this a metaphysical claim?
Causal determinism doesn’t tell us how to behave it doesn’t tell us to distribute wealth for example – anymore than the scientific method tells us we should not use it to build nuclear weapons.
Causal determinism (the metaphysical claim) tells us that one could not have done otherwise and what they do is based on causal variables they ultimately had no say over. It is that understanding that informs us that suggesting someone is more or less deserving over one’s lucky or unlucky (privileged or unprivileged) causal variables is an irrational, baseless position. Someone could not have had different actions, nor could they have had different qualities or privileges.
Causal determinism tells us that one is not more or less deserving of wealth than another, and that justifications of someone owning more of the world at the expense of others because they deserve more (or the other deserves less) are irrational justifications that have no basis in reality.
1) “suggesting someone is more or less deserving over one’s lucky or unlucky (privileged or unprivileged) causal variables is an irrational, baseless position.” Which is not what people are suggesting when the say x deserves y for doing z. Dictionary definition again “a person has earned something or be given something because of their actions or qualities”. This definition has nothing to do with metaphysics.
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2) Causal determinism doesn’t say anything about “deserve” because it is not a ethical theory .
There may be justification for someone receiving certain benefits that others don’t or them not receiving extra (or less) benefits than others but those reasons have nothing to do with causal determinism per se.
1) No, it is not just about “earning” but whether they deserve what they earned (earning itself does not suggest deserving what is earned). Also, if you are going to point to a dictionary definition, link it as well, because a quick google search shows many different definitions, for example “do something or have or show qualities worthy of (reward or punishment)”.
The point is that they have not “deserved” or “merited” a reward or punishment that should be granted to them due to the action or quality itself that could not have been otherwise (even if there may be other reasons for granting it that apply to future consequences that do not suggest “being deserving”). And yes, being “deserving of X” when others do not have X or at the expense of others who lack X means that they are deserving X OVER another – and this is a big part of the problem of faulty “deserve” notions. Metaphysics of determinism just explain that the notion of “deserve” itself is as silly as suggesting that anyone who wins the lotto “deserved winning” and anyone who gets cancer “deserved cancer”.
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2) Causal determinism doesn’t have to, itself, be an ethical theory …in order to play into an ethical theory (namely the parts about ethical responsibility), just as any other fact that plays into ANY theory do not by themself have to BE the theory (if you want to use that reasoning you cannot make any claims about anything). If there are justifications, those justifications cannot (rationally) be that the person is more deserving (or the other is less deserving), because that very idea of “deserve” is nonsense given causal determinism.
Let's go back to one comment at a time please.Trick
“but whether they deserve what they earned” That’s what it means to be deserving – that you earned the reward through you own actions or qualities.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/deserve
“And yes, being “deserving of X” when others do not have X or at the expense of others who lack X means that they are deserving X OVER another” Why should incompetent people receive the same benefits as competent and productive people?
That is a horrible (and uncommon/obsolete) dictionary definition of “deserve”. If one can say “Did person X deserve what they earned?”, and that sentence makes sense (which it does), then obviously they do not mean the same thing in normal usage. Some of the examples the dictionary gives are more suited than the way they define it. How that dictionary defines “EARN”:
“(1) to receive money as payment for work that you do, OR (2) to get something that you deserve because of your abilities or actions”
(1) is NOT the same as (2)!
Receiving money as payment for work does not imply one deserves it. It is (2) that is completely irrational (If one uses the term “earn” in that way – that uncommon definition of “earn” is just as irrational as “deserve”)
Because whether one is competent or not has to do with causal luck or causal unluckiness and having causal luckiness does not mean one deserves more of the earth than another.
Trick
“Receiving money as payment for work does not imply one deserves it.” Not necessarily no. We usually say criminals despite “earning” their money do not deserve to profit from their crimes.
If no one deserves anything then why should the fortunate spend their resources on the unfortunate?
Then a definition that equates “deserve” with “earning” (as the one you suggest does) is a poor definition. Glad you agree.
The fortunate don’t spend their resources on the unfortunate today (8 men own more wealth than 3.6 billion people). The bigger point is in regards to justifications for calling resources “their resources” to begin with when they are not more deserving of such a larger chunk of resources. Mindset shifts regarding “ownership rights” need to take place, as when one is not more or less deserving, that lends to less justification for the gross inequalities we see with today’s “deserving” psychologies.
“Ownership rights” also come with responsibilities to the community and wealth generated by private citizens and businesses is redistributed through taxation. But if the whole concept of moral responsibility is nonsense then nobody need worry about these concerns – if a billionaire decides to hoard his wealth instead of putting it back into society we should just regard that as the same as if the termites eat it.
We don’t sufficiently “redistribute” via taxation – at least not yet. No doubt that if people hoard money they were causally determined to do so and are not blameworthy – but that does not imply there is no need to worry about these concerns (anymore than we should not worry about the dangerous psychopath even though they are not blameworthy – or non-blameworthy termites that eat important resources for that matter). The question we are asking is if it is rationally justified in society … if there is a rational justification for society to accept that “the billionaire should have ownership rights to that degree of wealth and resources at the expense of others” given that the billionaire is not any more deserving of it and that people in poverty are not deserving of that, etc.
“given that the billionaire is not any more deserving of it and that people in poverty are not deserving of that, etc.” But if we dispense with the notion of deserve then how could we convince a billionaire to show compassion to the unfortunate?
If we are able to convince a billionaire, hopefully it would be by explaining to them that the unfortunate are not blameworthy in regards to their circumstances and hence not deserving of their negative circumstances, and that the billionaire is not more deserving than the unfortunate of what they do own. More importantly, regardless if we can convince billionaires or not, perhaps a mindset shift needs to happen in regards to what we (society) allow for unjustified extreme ownership rights at the expense of many.