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Semantic Shift Day, August 31 – REMINDER! Mark your calendar!
Rejoice, the holiday that all compatibilists "love" is upon us soon! It is the day that all non-existent things can be claimed to exist, in fact the very point of Semantic Shift Day is to re-define the nonexistent! I thought I would post this in the very beginning of the month rather than right on [...]
At one point I received the below as a (unapproved) comment on a post I had written criticising Daniel Dennett's free will compatibilism. I was curious about the person who wrote the original so I copied and pasted a part of it into google, and noticed this has been copied and pasted in various locations on the [...]
Found this cartoon by Zack Weinersmith of the smbc-comics.com website and requested / was granted permission to post it here (note: always request permission before you post another person's artwork or words). See the original post here: http://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/compatibilism.
A Response to a Blog: “This Atheist Believes in Free Will”
I came across a post the other day by an atheist who seems to be a public speaker, and who runs a blog on ChicagoNow. This post was about the "free will" topic and how he holds a belief in free will. To be fair I suspect that the blogger is unfamiliar with much of [...]
Free Will Exists!! (and Happy S-S-Day)
Hi, I'm August 31st 'Trick and I proclaim that free will does indeed exist. You may find it strange that I'm saying this given that this is the "Breaking the Free WIll Illusion" website, but the reality is that posts on this website explaining why free will does not exist and what it means are not written [...]
A fresh new font. The book cover is perfect now! I want to drink the green and blue stuff!
Any news on release date yet?
I’ve only read Schopenhauer’s “The World as Will and Representation” and Barbara Hannan: “Schopenhauer on Freedom of the Will”. I’ve been active on a few non-philosophical discussion forums and talked about determinism. Initially people didn’t like the message. But you know what? People have adopted terms like motive and re-action. Less choice talk. More conversation! Important subject.
Subscribed.
Hey there mt. Zapffee …thanks for stopping by. Mmmm…blue and green stuff. 😉
Don’t have much on this site yet. No news on the release yet.
Oh yeah, there are a lot of words. The one I’m talking with to someone right now is of course that ever elusive “agency” word.
Hope all is well.
‘Trick
Recap: we communicated about our respective projects–I’m defending a dualist theory of evolution, supporting free will. I am giving a talk on it locally in April coinciding with a conference on evolutionary psychology which is what I am opposing–I support “folk” psychology.
Congratulations on your progress. I will want to see the book. I plan to use talks to sell my books.
Here, some of my art on Darwin. http://shaunjohnston.deviantart.com/gallery/46791240
Hey Shaun, I remember you and our discussion / debate. Good luck with your talk in April. 🙂
It seems possible that revenge could be a purpose of even if a perpetrator could not have done other than he or she did. After all, perhaps victims of one’s villainy derive solace in the punishment apart from those derived from deterrence or incarceration. Such a purpose couldn’t be fairly be called “retribution”, however.
I’d suggest such curbing of the irrational psychology of those individuals would be fairly called retribution (that’s what retribution is for, the individuals that take solace in it).
Thanks for stopping bye. 🙂
Thank you for your considerable contribution to the discourse on free will and determinism :-). I think your conception of retribution does not comport with its general usage; in fact, in your system, the concept of retribution only makes sense as an irrational relic of human psychology. Typically,retribution is considered punishment commensurate with the moral status of a wrongdoer regarding bad acts. Consequently, the wrongdoer, not their victims, is the one evaluated in determining proper retribution. This is why harsh treatment of someone who was insane and senselessly committed a heinous act would not serve the purposes of retribution, even if the surrounding community would gain closure or some other psychic benefit from such a punishment.
Given your beliefs, that the causally determinate nature of human action makes it insensible to morally judge wrongdoers (correct me if I’ve mischaracterized), the notion of retribution is insensible except as a relic of irrational psychology, and could not be a proper final purpose of punishment. The indulgence of this irrational psychology, or the consideration of any other psychic benefits derived from punishment, considers not the wrongdoer, but rather other parties, and consequently would not serve the purposes of retribution (an irrational concept, in your view). It would make more sense to call this purpose something else: closure, for instance.
Good thoughts. I’m suggesting retribution that is “punishment commensurate with the moral status of a wrongdoer regarding bad acts” is equally as problematic (since they could not have been, of their own accord, otherwise than immoral at that time). The only rational use of punishment (without free will) is to prevent or deter future happenings (from both the wrongdoer and others that might act similarly). If the purpose (of punishing) is for some other reason that doesn’t have to do with causally aligning future outcomes, it falls into the irrational concept line. That includes punishment for the sake of solacing the victim or family/friends of the victim (the irrational relic of human psychology).
Thank you. The point I was making was semantic: you seem to wish to salvage the word “retribution”, under a different meaning; I think it makes more sense to retain its original usage and contend that, given the empirical (indeed, perhaps metaphysical) realities, it cannot exist. Consider compatibilist and incompatibilist determinists. Both agree on a mechanistic world in which the future states of the world proceed inexorably from the present physical state of the world. The latter of these camps, counting yourself among them, believe that to continue asserting the existence of “free will”, morphs free will into a concept that lacks a crucial quality: the actual possibility of divergent choices.
The incompatibilist chooses to deny the existence of free will given our empirical circumstances rather than pervert the concept of free will into a concept that does not resemble its normal usage, which is quite sensible. There is a similarly sensible choice regarding the concept of retribution. Given the history and pervasive use of “retribution” in its irrational matter, keep its accepted definition and maintain that, like “free will”, it is a concept that cannot survive reasoned scrutiny, let alone serve as a purpose of punishment.
Regarding solace and closure: although this as a purpose of punishment addresses emotions which are upshots of irrational cognitive states (that the wrongdoer morally deserves punishment), this does not necessarily imply that the consideration of these emotions is irrational. Parents who sneak through their houses wrapping gifts in the early morning of December 25 act to preserve the illusion of Santa Claus. The joy and wonder they seek to create in their children is enabled by the childrens’ irrational beliefs, yet it seems strange to call parents’ exploitation thereof irrational. Likewise, crafting policy around promoting human psychic well-being, which might include the consideration of solace and closure for victims, is not inherently an irrational goal even though it addresses emotions or desires which might flow from irrational cognitive states. Although something seems wrong about punishing a wrongdoer purely for psychic benefits to the victim or the surrounding community, this conclusion requires additional moral premises.
I think I’m using the common usage of retribution. I’m rather suggesting that retributive punishment should never occur. I don’t want to change the semantic of retribution to something else.
“Parents who sneak through their houses wrapping gifts in the early morning of December 25 act to preserve the illusion of Santa Claus. The joy and wonder they seek to create in their children is enabled by the childrens’ irrational beliefs, yet it seems strange to call parents’ exploitation thereof irrational.”
I think a distinction needs to be made between benign irrationality (which for the “most part” is what the Santa Clause thing is – though some would contend that such lies to a child are problematic…but for the sake of this discussion we’ll suggest not) and harmful irrationality. Yes, it could be fun to stroke the imagination of a child with an imaginary tooth-fairy that gives them money, but if or some psychological reason a person thought it fun to harm another person for irrational reasons, the assessment is one that needs to be more strict in regards to displaying the irrational cognitive state that surrounds it. We don’t craft policy around promoting irrational human psychic well-being at the expense of an undeserving other (which is the problem with retribution). 😉
I do not believe in determinism or indeterminism. I believe that actions are caused not random. But not all actions can be predetermined, especially human behavior. To better understand see my web site.
Hi Wayne, thanks for stopping by. Determinism (in physics and philosophy) just means that all events have a cause, not that we can predict them. In other words it means the events are “determined” by causes, not that “we” can determine the outcome. 😉
You are absolutely correct: hard incompatibilism.
I can usually get people to agree that determinism rules out free will. Then I say that all other possibilities (indeterminism, randomness, and chaos) don’t allow for free will either because we have no way of controlling them. Even if we could control any of them, the only way we could reliably do so would be with determinism!
Hey August, I missed this comment on my site…but it’s the one I responded to on facebook. But to reiterate, you are correct. Any interactions we do for an uncaused event would be caused (and the output of such uncaused event can never be caused by us). 😉
Hi there,
I happened to find you as I was googling and I saw that you wrote a book on the illusion of free will. To give you a little background, my father made a discovery in 1959 which lies behind the door of determinism. This knowledge has the potential to revolutionize our world for the better. Unfortunately, my father was unable to bring his knowledge to light during his lifetime because he was not a member of a leading university, and held no distinguishing titles. He could not get conventionally published for that reason, so he had to resort to self-publishing which had its own set of limitations. I recently compiled 7 of his books but found out very quickly that this is an emotional issue. Most people are libertarians or compatibilists, not hard determinists.
I am sure you are busy with your own projects but I thought that you might be interested in seeing how he reconciles the issue of moral responsibility with determinism. I am trying to get some fair and balanced reviews which is why I am looking for people who are not only well versed in this subject matter but also lean toward determinism. It this piques your interest, maybe we can swap books. You can read the first chapter online or you can hear my father read and elaborate on Chapter One of his 6th book: Beyond the Framework of Modern Thought. In the 70’s he had the presence of mind to make 12 tapes which I converted to a CD and then to an mp3 which I recently uploaded. I hope we get a chance to communicate by email. It’s nice to talk to other like minded people. Thanks for listening. Sincerely, Janis Rafael
Hi Janis. Glad you stopped by. I have a backlog of reading to do, but if you have a kindle version I’d certainly do a bookswap with you (kindle for kindle). My next book will be on ethics (re: morality without free will) and I consider myself a secular moral philosopher. Do me a favor and, when you have a chance, send me an email from the contact page on my site and we’ll talk more in email. 🙂
Later,
‘Trick
Do you believe there might exist a completely causal universe, which contain agents of will?
The problem I have with discussion of free will, is the nature of absolute, mainly the term free. Do you deny the existence of free will because you are denying the existence of absolute and complete free will; like if I really had free will I could manifest more than infinite different objects right now onto my hand? Or do you admit that the general concept of free will, may speak to; that which is not determined by a singular, system with acting ability as determinator. You see, I believe it would be hard for anyone who believes in free will to suggest that, the will itself is not a determined determinator, but it is a self determinator, the nature of the self, the chooser, the actor, is not the all, it is singularly everything but the all, though it may depend on the all, increasingly the local, the idea of will, or free will, is that certain phenomenon which result in the local environment in relation to the self, or the system of potential free will we are discussing, is not determined by the all, but by that singular system, the self, the will. Which absorbs information from its surrounding environment, and from a state of near infinite potential (of course there will always be limits to everything) acts in such a way that an animate or inanimate non willful conglomerate of material cannot act.
If there are 10 different options in your refrigerator that you may eat for lunch which you enjoy equally, and it has been an equal time since you last had each dish, it is possible for there to exist no factors severe as the logical, illogical, reasonable, unreasonable, invented, clumsy, accurate, purposeful, pointless, random, eyes closed, planned, calculated, outside of that persons mechanisms of thought, that may determine which choice they will choose. How can you deny that there is an awareness that is responsible, that is confronted with options, and has the complete freedom to make a choice?
Hi Daniel,
Thanks for stopping by the site. 🙂
I agree with you that the problem with free will lies within the realm of such “freedom” rather than “willfulness”. That is why “free will” is distinct from “will” alone…or “causal will”. Or “free agent” is distinct from “agency”. Or “free choice” is distinct from “choice”.
What I’m saying is, if we were to “rewind time” to before a decision was made, such a decision couldn’t have been, of one’s own accord, otherwise. The weighing of 10 different options and the election of one of those options, if causal, would come out identically. You couldn’t choose the strawberries instead of the piece of pie, if initially you chose the piece of pie. You’d weigh those options the same and make the same decision.
And if everything is causal, such a decision was dictated before a person was even born. In a way you can say such a decision was “self-determined” in that a number of causal factors leading up to thought and conscious decision happen within the body of a person (if we wan’t to call that body the “self”)…but they extend outward to causal factors that were prior to and many that were outside of such a body (e.g. the environment).
A person who has a brain tumor which causes them to run down the street naked, might have made that causal decision based on the brain tumors effect on the person’s brain, and the brain tumor might have happened due to numerous genetic and environmental conditions, but we wouldn’t say such a person made a freely willed decision to strip and run naked. The brain tumor might have actually caused the person to think of various options but align with the strip and run option…so they were a “self-determinator” in the regard you mention – just with different causal factors that created less of a coherency of thought than a brain without a tumor.
So yes, I agree with you that someone makes a “choice” between “perceived options”. They just don’t make a “free choice” between options that are all viable. Their very configuration (and the configuration that surrounds them) will output how they weigh those options and come to the only option that was ever “possible” for them to “choose”. 😉
“I agree with you that the problem with free will lies within the realm of such “freedom” rather than “willfulness”. That is why “free will” is distinct from “will” alone…or “causal will”. Or “free agent” is distinct from “agency”. Or “free choice” is distinct from “choice”.”\
Well I hope people that argue against free will are not arguing against it thinking that it means ‘complete absolute freedom or free will’, this is obviously eternally impossible, as even a hypothetically infinitely free willed being would still be infinitely limited every unit of temporal measurement it exists. The argument or discussion as I have always thought of it and about it, I thought was the concern with whether or not there is ‘actually a ‘thingness’, self, will, which ‘can’ ‘choose”, and that was the free will, as in there was no external pressure potentially to make a certain choice, that their will, was free to choose between multiple choices, is I always thought the general and basic essence of the concept of free will.
“What I’m saying is, if we were to “rewind time” to before a decision was made, such a decision couldn’t have been, of one’s own accord, otherwise.”
What I am saying, is the fact that ‘there is a one’, whose accord it can potentially be of or not, is the will.
“The weighing of 10 different options and the election of one of those options, if causal, would come out identically. You couldn’t choose the strawberries instead of the piece of pie, if initially you chose the piece of pie. You’d weigh those options the same and make the same decision.”
There is no evidence or proof of this, and the reason is, you are expecting ‘the probability wave function to definitely become collapsed’, so looking at it from before a choice is made, you are saying ‘a choice Must be made’, therefore there can be only 1 future state, with one choice, because it is purely causal events which result in the making of this 1 choice, that must be the choice that must be made. And ‘one’ is not responsible for the weighing? Your example, I would say just isent true, because you are limited to this definite 1 choice, 1 specific event, where there can only be 1 outcome, and then you say, because there was only one outcome, that must have been the one outcome, that must have been. There is just no logical evidence or idea, or it is more logical to assume, that there really are different potentials, before a moment occurs, that deal with a will, and that the will really does have power to for near infinite reasons or lack there of, choose to act.
The problem is, I believe in complete determinism, obviously, that is to say, all things are determined, because all things occur, and all things that occur determine all things that occur. But where we differ, and where the concept of free will differs, is that the will, has the power to determine, what it wants to determine. It has freedom to express its potential. An asteroid, or the sun, or a rock, cannot change its momentum, or cut itself open, or stop in its tracks (yes we cannot in a sense ‘stop’, I am not arguing for beyond god like freedom, as I mentioned initially in the opening of my response, I am arguing for even the tiniest bit of personal determination, which would be and act separate and independent of the totality of all other determinations), we are self determinators. I open the fridge, because in any conceivable or inconceivable reality, by the nature of ‘something’ existing at all, that something must exist with limits, and therefore laws, I open the fridge, lets imagine we understand there may be even an abstract most minimal unit of time that passes from the time I open the fridge to the time I sit in front of it, and you and I as ghosts are above observing this action, so I can stand in front of the fridge for maybe 5 minutes maybe 10 minutes, doing absolutely nothing, while you and I are as ghosts, having this conversation.
We can say to each other, we have set this experiment up, I as the refrigerator opener, was told, as law, as limitation, that I must choose 1 of 10 foods to eat for lunch. This is a determination, generally, in that, we know something exactly will occur, as something exactly always occurs.
Hm, well I suppose I might believe the mind is capable of indeterminism, in the way of randomness and taking advantage of non causal or illogical statements, and so a ying yang of a spectrum of these opposing extremes might be the threshold where the will waivers.
So I think what I mean by that, is that, it is possible I at the refrigerator can choose something for literally no reason, though you will argue there is always a reason, mainly in this case, it was lunch time, I was hungry, so the reason must be that as we said, it is determined something must happen.
What if I like all these foods equally, this example really would have been easier to express with numbers, but I am making it the same thing, by saying I like all the foods equally, and I dont really have any emotional or logical memories or attachments to them, my body demands that I eat, there are limits, as I cannot eat the fridge (though I can try to, and that would also be determined…rolls eyes, as of yet since I am still a believer), and you told me to choose 1 of 10, therefore I am expressing it is completely meaningless, I could choose any, I could choose none, I could bang my head into the door, there are many potentials, but I, whatever I am, however I exists or works, this is the ultimate mystery as we dont understand consciousness/awareness/mind how it exists and functions and that is what we are discussion, it is only up to this awareness, this conciseness, this self, this me, this knower of potentials, this knower of the need to choose one of the potentials, I need to pull the trigger, I have the power, I am a self controlled force, I am a self referential self determining self determinator, who acknowledgingly must work within many limits, you cannot deny that at least some of the power comes from within the mechanics of the ‘controllable mind’, (what is doing the controlling, what is the controller. how is it controlled, how is it able to be controlled?) which forces itself to turn probability, to turn a problem, into a fixed future, a solution. Eliminating the existence of this controller, this self, this seeer, this thinker, this feeler, this mind, this chooser, this determiner, is death.
“And if everything is causal, such a decision was dictated before a person was even born. In a way you can say such a decision was “self-determined” in that a number of causal factors leading up to thought and conscious decision happen within the body of a person (if we wan’t to call that body the “self”)…but they extend outward to causal factors that were prior to and many that were outside of such a body (e.g. the environment).”
It doesnt matter, as I think you will see from my response, I am not arguing for ultimate pure free will, as I dont think anyone of intelligence ever has tried to do, I am only arguing that I believe at least the tiniest percentage of some mysterious phenomenon is possible, and that is this self determined aspect of the human body, and that is the will of the body, and that I feel is what you are denying completely exists. If you admit there is a power within the human body, that makes choices, you are admitting free will (not absolute free will, I wont stress this again, but free will at all, that is to say, more free will than a rock).
Just because there are internal pressures doesn’t mean there are no external pressures. One’s very structure is a product of external pressures.
I agree with you here. Willing causally happens. Consciousness causally happens. Thinking causally happens. Decision making causally happens. And the decision we make causally happens.
I’m not sure what you are getting at with the “wave function collapse”, but if (such collapse) aligns with such a decision, such decision would simply an output that is not due to a wave-function collapse (some other causal or acausal factor). Wave function collapse (or decoherence depending on interpretation, etc.) has to do with quantum particles. If those particles have an effect on our decisions, then so may whether collapse happens or not for them.
To be clear, I’m saying that if everything is causal (no acausal events take place – determinism)…then logically there can only be 1 future state.
I’m saying any “weighing” had to happen the way it does (in a deterministic universe).
It follows (if all events are causal) that such “must have been” the one outcome. In other words, an event cannot both be the cause of an effect and not the cause of such effect, as such would make the event self-contradictary. This stems to any and all causal events.
The only way it can logically follow for different “potentials” (that are all “possible”)…is if acausal events (events without a cause) happen. And any acausal event simply cannot be a “willed” event (only causal events can be willed). In other words, they are just as incompatible with free will, and also incompatible with “willing” (where as causality isn’t problematic for willing).
Determinism means all events are causal. I’m agnostic on such a position (though I suspect such determinism is the case – I don’t demand it)
I don’t think we differ much in this regard. There is a distinct difference between determinism and fatalism. Determinism means that our conscious actions are part of the causal chains of events.
The distinction between these types of events is that one is of conscious and thinking events, the other is not. That’s why I chose the guy with the brain tumor causing him to “want” to strip and run down the street naked. The only difference between him and a person with a properly functioning brain is cohesiveness in thought.
You standing in front of the fridge for 5 minutes happens causally. You couldn’t have, for example, opened the fridge in 1 minute.
Determinism doesn’t mean we can know what will happen, only that causes “determine” the outcome. The food you choose is the one dictated by an entire line of causality. A line that stems “beyond” what you cann a “you”.
Any acausal event can never be a “willed event”. Such has no temporal or spatial determinacy. It would be totally out of one’s control.
I won’t argue that there is always a reason, only if all events are causal is there always a reason. I’m a hard incompatibilist, not a hard determinist. Free will is incompatible in both a deterministic universe as well as an indeterministic universe.
For your food analogy I decided such is worthy of a post. I changed it to two food items to simplify the analogy (but same holds for 10) 😉
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/buridans-ass-and-food/
The definition of free will that I’m against, and that I think most people intuitively feel they possess, and that is the definition of philosophical importance for so many other topics…is here:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/terms/free-will/
Catch ya later good sir.
I responded to this with the web browser open but no internet, so I couldnt check your link, which I just read now, but I think I still have the right to respond with my responses and see what you can say to them.
“Just because there are internal pressures doesn’t mean there are no external pressures. One’s very structure is a product of external pressures.”
I admit, easily and obviously, that there are external pressures, the only argument is whether the internal pressures have any freedom at all. That is to say if according to a human, objectively an subjectively, the universe surrounding them, and even to a large extent within them may be 99.99999999999999% hard determined, I am only interested in the discussion and philosophizing, to reach an idea, of whether or not, there is a minimum >0 degree of freedom that a human has.
The biggest problem is we do not know a lot about the mind, we cannot I dont think, even conceptually, hypothetically comprehend how the mind functions. Consider that ‘you’ ‘are always ‘looking’ in ‘your mind”. What is seeing the information that comes through your eyes? What sees your memories and how? What can choose a memory to see? How do you see images in your mind? How am I, in my mind, viewing, or ‘speaking’ letters in my head, to then type? It is almost as if the mind, or operator of the mind exists in a state of timelessness, and that is the nature of freedom, that allows choice, to this operator of mind, this viewer of the external and internal, the experiencer of the body. I can say, ‘red car’, and close my eyes or keep them open, and ‘see’, a red car, I am really ‘seeing’ something, ‘I’ must really be ‘something’, that I that sees, in order to see something, even if the mind and memory and imagination is some type of symbolic/digital/sofware/hologram, that is to say, I am obviously not seeing a real car, just as a photograph of a real car is not a real car, but I am, in my mind, seeing, some physical apparatus that displays information in such ways.
“I agree with you here. Willing causally happens. Consciousness causally happens. Thinking causally happens. Decision making causally happens. And the decision we make causally happens.”
Well, I discovered you page, after discovering Sam Harris’ ideas on free will, and I thought you were in pretty coinciding belief with his, so I figured to try and better understand, as I disagreed with him, at least I think, that I could argue against you as a substitute. But now, if you agree with this, I probably should read your whole response first, but instead I am going quote by quote and answering, but if you agree with this, I dont know what we have to ague about, because if you agree consciousness exists and decision making exists, by the very nature of those things exiting, then the concept of relative free will exists.
“I’m not sure what you are getting at with the “wave function collapse”, but if (such collapse) aligns with such a decision, such decision would simply an output that is not due to a wave-function collapse (some other causal or acausal factor). Wave function collapse (or decoherence depending on interpretation, etc.) has to do with quantum particles. If those particles have an effect on our decisions, then so may whether collapse happens or not for them.”
Yes, sorry, I meant to use it as an analogy. I meant it to talk about the paraphrased argument; ‘to prove that free will does not exist, I will ask you to make a decision. Ok, you have decided. Free will does not exist, because ‘you had to make the decision you made’, because if you could have made otherwise you would’.
How I tried to relate that, what I think is a weak argument, and the general nature I am arguing against, to wave function/probability and collapse, is by stating; because you know that the collapse will occur, before hand, because you have asked me to make a decision, prior to making the decision, there does exist a probability of options, though you would argue from the future, there was only ever 1 option, because only one decision ever occurs per decision. So the collapse of probability is determined, into 1 choice, when you ask someone to out of multiple choices choose one, but then you use this to suggest that ‘see, you couldnt have chosen differently, the exact choice you made was determined, and you really have no choice’, I am arguing really the only reason he had one choice, was because he was forced to only have one choice, I am suggesting, that before he made the choice, he had the free will, to choose which of the multiple choices he would choose, and this is at the very least, an expression of at the very least a will that is free to choose 1 choice out of multiple.
“To be clear, I’m saying that if everything is causal (no acausal events take place – determinism)…then logically there can only be 1 future state.”
Yes, and what I am saying, just because there is always 1 exact successive future state, does not mean for some mysterious, odd, hard to understand reason, systems can exist within larger systems within larger systems etc. which somehow have the power to ‘freely’ (to at least a degree >0) effect the future state they find themselves a part of.
“I’m saying any “weighing” had to happen the way it does (in a deterministic universe).”
I am saying, the only ‘evidence’ you have for believing this, is the argument I attempted to highlight 2 quotes up, which I tried to prove as being an illogical argument.
“It follows (if all events are causal) that such “must have been” the one outcome. In other words, an event cannot both be the cause of an effect and not the cause of such effect, as such would make the event self-contradictary. This stems to any and all causal events.”
You are ignoring the entire reason we think free will exists, or we can even think at all, which is because somehow, we do have the power to ‘be caused to cause’. Between us being forced to force, exists somehow, the ability to ‘choose’ in what way what is being forced to force ‘wants’ to force.
“The only way it can logically follow for different “potentials” (that are all “possible”)…is if acausal events (events without a cause) happen. And any acausal event simply cannot be a “willed” event (only causal events can be willed). In other words, they are just as incompatible with free will, and also incompatible with “willing” (where as causality isn’t problematic for willing).”
I dont see why you say this. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
If I asked myself to pick one of those numbers above. I can pick any of them, and for no reason. I dont care about them, they are meaningless. I suppose this gets into the nature of random. But I have the power to be random. Which is similar to being acausal. I am caused to pick 1 by the proposition, or external determinism. But I exist in a state where it is possible for me to choose any of them, for equally no reason, or equally any reason. There is no reason why I couldnt pick any of those numbers, if asked to pick just one. This is the probability collapse I am talking about. Because you ask me to pick just one, in the future we know, it is determined my probability must be collapsed to just one pick. But this does not mean reality is determining that I pick any one over the other.
Thinking about this problem of freewill, in general, I have been trying to rationalize, as in how free will might be possible at all, and I keep thinking something about the nature, of thoughts, language, our human programming, being capable of producing functions which ‘are not logical’, as in we have freedom over our bodies. Everything is logical, foundationally, as in, utilizes unbreakable laws. Everything that exists, exists as it does, and is changing, and obeys the laws of that which is everything that exists is changing as it is changing because it cannot do any otherwise because it is obeying laws. This is the existence of causality, and that reality is destined to be literally physical logic (though reality is…idk, so enigmatic, like physical laws and the ‘existence’ of physical quanta and/or energy at all as it exists in the way and how it interacts, is bizarre, but one must suppose any possible way reality manifests must be bizarre, because why would one suppose there is 1 absolute normalcy, especially with such a complex and vast undertaking that is reality. I think the foundational standpoint for any philosophy must be starting from the perspective and agreement that reality is really marvelous, what we know of it, is, incredible). You are of the belief that is impossible for a relatively small system (composed of many many relatively small and smaller systems) to have even a tiny bit of ‘its own effect’ on the surrounding systems, and some of the systems its composed of, to greater and lesser degrees?
And you are saying, for anything like the smallest degree of free will to exist, determinism, meaning all events are causal, cannot be true?
The thing is, it appears that the human mind, is a system/network of mechanisms, which allows the potential of a number of causes to be known, and accessible (yes causally), but somehow, causes act upon the human system, (but the point I am trying to make is that something about the human system, some singularity region that is ‘the consciousness’, what is aware of the information that enters, and is stored in the mind, that can be accessed and played with a number of ways (imagination) is able to ’cause itself to cause’, so yes, it exists because of entire causal and determined factors, but as time progresses, it accumulates more and more material for its body, energy for its body, and the more subtle material and energy of the brain and mind, in the term of solidifying networks in the brain, memories, symbolic representations of the external causal natures of the external causal natures that exist outside the mind, the gaining of language, which is the relation of symbols (words) with objects and events of objects, and comparative feelings about objects and events, all of this gaining, of information, is a gaining of possibility and potential. I believe I could have been born, and covered my eyes my whole life until I died, I believe that was technically possible, but because I didnt, I gained information in my mind, which was a necessary aspect to unleash the potential that was my existence beyond sitting without allowing information to enter my mind and soon after dyeing. I believe because it is the same mechanism (me, I, self, consciousness, cursor, observer, willer, driver) that has sequentially/linearly chronologically (thought with the ability to because of knowledge of causality, and the determination of time, can escape the immediacy of the moment or linear time, and ‘plan ahead’) been observing the information, the external environment, how it related to me, how it stored in my mind, how I liked or did not like it, how I could use or not use it, how I could know more or even more about it, by using language/thoughts, to question more if I wanted to, it is that ‘me, I, self, consciousness, cursor, observer, willer, driver’ which is gaining in potential. The gaining of this potential, is the gaining of freedom, as it might be said, ignorance might be bliss, knowledge might be power.) in such a way that the human system has the causal power to act upon itself and become an agent of cause upon the causal powers surrounding it. When you ask me to pick one number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
And that is all you say. Where/how does the cause start, in me, to actually pick a number. Right now I am just sitting blankly, you have given me a demand, I know what numbers are, I know what is meant when it is said, choose one, so that information strikes my ‘information understander’ somehow someway somewhere, but where does the cause begin to pick one? is the causal logical link, if we were being as detailed as possible, “pick a number” and that is the Only cause, immediately next to the forceful action, which that demand, that determination of ‘pick a number’ forces me to pick a number? Is there any stage or activity or action in between that? Is there an ‘I’? Do ‘I’ have a choice to register what you say or not, ignore you or not? Is your demand all that is forcing, or determining the number I will choose to be chosen? Do you get what I am getting at, like…for me to register what you are asking of me, and exist in a state of almost thoughtlessness, maybe I take a deep breath, maybe I think, thats a weird question, why are you asking, should I answer etc. and you would rightfully say me asking those questions would not have existed, if you did not cause me to ask them, but are you really saying ‘i’ have no responsibility in causing them? And that is the very essence of what I am trying to get at, that I, how do I have any existence at all, have any awareness, have any knowledge of being caused, have any power to cause in another? I am caused to pick a number, but I am causing myself to pick a number. You can ask me to pick a number and I can say, no. You can ask me to pick a number, and I can say ANYTHING I can say. You can ask me to pick a number and I can right a 300,000 word book that has nothing to do with what you asked of me, and give it to you. The activity of which, I would argue, is motivated internally, to some degree above 0%. You say pick a number, and that is not good enough alone, to cause a number to come out of my mouth. So you stating that is one cause, that if we now agree fairly, is a cause near the causal relation of me producing a number. But if we rewind back from the point of me stating a number, step by step observing all the details involved, to the point of you asking, I think the mystery, of free will, is how ‘the system/mechanism’ of my head that understands what is meant by your demand, ‘works’, willfully, listens to the command, but not in a determined way by anything outside that mechanism and system. Yes, there are some determinisms, as I say, maybe 99% of that activity that occurs with the mechanism of mind is determined, I am talking about the self determination, which is the concept of at least minimal free will. I would argue this is possible, because the human mind can invent its own means of programming, or pseudo logic, as I said all things foundationally are logic, because they depend on laws, but a human can think and state symbolic language illogically, and I think this might be some kind of representation of causality, or unpredictability, to outside agents.
My argument is that you are claiming, everything about my mind is determined, maybe. Or you are claiming there is nothing about my mind that has free will. But the thing is, yes everything is determined, but ‘if I have power to determine’, then that is the idea of free will. You would say, I cannot have power to determine, because?
Because I, in my mind, can make determinations, that dont depend on anything that can be inferred or assumed, or predicted outside of my mind, so I as my mind, has the freedom of determination. My mind, I as it, can has access to maybe lets say at least 20,000 quanta of information, which is mixed up, and stretched, and connected and has networks, and repetitions to itself, all different ways, for example a car, and then I know all sorts of kinds of cars, or an animal, houses, names, etc. I have access to all this quanta of information, the point is, multiple quantas of information, from a state of, not accessing any. When you ask me to pick a number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
There is no argument you can make (I think the sam harris, your neurons know before you do, argument is silly but I guess it is probably all you have) that says that ultimately, I, do not have the power to determine which of those numbers I will choose. That is an expression of freedom, by my will.
“I don’t think we differ much in this regard. There is a distinct difference between determinism and fatalism. Determinism means that our conscious actions are part of the causal chains of events.”
Then when you say, there is no such thing as free will, as your blog appears to parade, what are you saying? And sorry, the only reason I got into this topic, is because I feel Sam Harris is arguing for fatalism, as being synonymous with determinism, or them both extinguishing free will. How do you think consciousness can possibly exist, exchanging terms consciousness for free will, how can a system choose which cause it wants to employ?
“Determinism doesn’t mean we can know what will happen, only that causes “determine” the outcome. The food you choose is the one dictated by an entire line of causality. A line that stems “beyond” what you can a “you”.”
The idea of free will is that, because one of the causes that determine the outcome, is a ‘self’, all the causes that self employs, are expressions of that self choosing to employ causes, it can, and ‘wants’, and chooses to. I understand the argument slightly, because the self is limited, it is as if the self is not really choosing, because it cannot choose beyond its limits, it can only occupy the perspective of determined causal relationships between parts or all of its limits, so it is as if that self does not even really exist at all, only causal relationships and limits caused to cause to cause to cause be cause etc.
You are looking about the line that stems beyond. We already agree there are things beyond what I call ‘me’ that determine things about me. So you can stop bring that up each time, because when you do you miss my point, I eternally and infinitely agree, with that. What you are ignoring is, there is something that can be called ‘me’, that ‘me can call me me’. That I can dictate. When I dictate, I dont exist and am not dictating, but the line that stems beyond me is dictating completely? This is not true, I am dictating. I know the line that stems beyond me, if it dictated, I would sit down and wait to die, and thats what it would the stem beyond me would dictate, because one must will themselves to will, in order to not sit down and wait to die, something beyond the line that stems beyond me, must dictate, that something is the self, the will, the me, I am dictating, I am choosing, I have choice.
“Any acausal event can never be a “willed event”. Such has no temporal or spatial determinacy. It would be totally out of one’s control.”
A fish was walking down the road and then turned into cotton candy and flew to the moon which was a spaceship that ate a child, the child was a grown man who played with a yo yo that was made of water which boiled to a rainbow made of gold, the yo yo was completely in the mans control, the man willed the yo yo to drop towards the ground, when the yo yo dropped towards the ground the mans hair shot off his head completely unwilled and acausally.
I dont believe acausal events can occur, only in a simulation/fakely in the imagination, but this can have effect on the real world, which is my point. So illogic, acausal statements, can play a role in purely determined, purely logical, purely causal reality.
“For your food analogy I decided such is worthy of a post. I changed it to two food items to simplify the analogy (but same holds for 10) “ https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/buridans-ass-and-food/
Of course I would have preferred you use 10, as it gives my point more credence, as the very nature of greater freedom becomes visibly greater when dealing with larger quantities of potential 😉
“The definition of free will that I’m against, and that I think most people intuitively feel they possess, and that is the definition of philosophical importance for so many other topics…is here: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/terms/free-will/
Catch ya later good sir.”
because in the waking state, there is something of a ‘real time release’ continuous supply of electricity or energy to the mind apparatus, which also has access to the past states of its being, according to its memories, to piece back its general or detailed causal history, and project forward in this state, of mind being fed energy to its appartusi which allow for the continuous stream of access to its information that may allow it to draw probabilities and conclusions about the potential causal history to come, it is as if, as long as the apparatus (is alive) is being fed this continuous stream of energy, it is as if the apparatus experiences a pseudo eternity of sorts, a pseudo timeless and spaceless state, yet it very much depends on material,energy, time and space, because the system has stores of energy to feed it, it is as a stable system unto itself. Because this, it itself, can as a contained system, control itself, from this awareness of internal information (brought/given/found to it by external information, and internal information, to a large degree). As long as it has stores of energy, to feed the mind this continual stream of ‘being on’, or being conscious, it has the power of free will, as this being on, or consciousness, is the will itself, or the most distilled singular related concept to the term will, it has the power of free will because from this state of being on, and having the on-ness maintained by the mechanistic system of energy supply, the will, the consciousness, the experiencer of on-ness, itself exists in a potentially action less state, it has the freedom to be actionless until its energy supply runs out, or do what it thinks will most insure its resupplying of energy. Besides the opposite extremes of waiting till off, and doing whatever is most immediately and projected long term logical to remain on, exists a realm of near infinite freedom, in which the consciousness, the will, utilizes limits as it see it can and sees it wants. The reason my 10 option lunch example is perfect, is because it is determined that the will must resupply its energy, but nothing outside of the will determines what exactly the will wants to or decides to resupply its energy with, when given multiple viable options.
Hi Daniel,
Thanks for the response. Rather than go through each item line by line, which could take forever and create a gigantic, unreadable comment, I’d rather focus on a few key points if that’s okay with you. 🙂
First, where we agree. We both agree, I think, that “willing” happens causally (e.g. that we have a “causal will”). We both agree that consciousness exists and is part of determinism (part of the causal process). We both agree that internal processes happen that lead to decisions.
Where we disagree is that you seem to be suggesting that you could have, of your own accord, done otherwise than what you did. For example, you say ” I believe I could have been born, and covered my eyes my whole life until I died, I believe that was technically possible”, which, regardless of the plausibility of “covering eyes since birth”, you have not done so but you think such “was a possibility” in a deterministic universe (e.g. if we could go back in time, that something could have been different).
It’s this “possibility” where we disagree. If the universe is entirely causal, as you suggest it is with “I don’t believe acausal events can occur”…then such options never were, and never are “possibilities” (as I mention in this post). They could never be (or have been) “actualized”. We can assess between different “imagined epistemological possibilities”, but only one is and can ever be an “ontological possibility”.
If (A) is the cause of (B), it cannot also not be cause of (B) – for example, the cause of (C) instead. Such would be the assertion of self-contradictory causes. The variables that make up (A), are the variables that cause (B). Likewise, the variables that cause (A) aren’t the variables that do not cause (A).
No matter how many epistemological possibilities our brain fathoms (whether we perceive two foods or ten foods or a hundred foods in the refrigerator)…the option that is ultimately decided on is and could have only ever been the option chosen. None of the others had any “real” possibility. There was no “real” freedom to choose these options.
You mentioned Sam Harris, who primarily makes his case via the Libet and nature neuroscience studies (though mentions the incoherence of free will as well). In my book I mention these studies as evidence against free will – but only briefly. I don’t think they are needed, however, to make the case against free will (nor do I think they are the strongest case available against free will – only that they are “supporting evidence”). Rather, what makes the case against freedom of the will is the fact that such is logically incoherent – which stems into understanding the nature of causality (and if someone postulates acausality – why such is logically incompatible with that as well). Also, Sam does mention the distinct difference between fatalism and determinism in his book, and the fact that he’s written the moral landscape means that he certainly does not take a fatalistic or defeatist approach.
But before we go on, it may be that we are perhaps having some semantic arguments. Do you accept the definition of free will I propose in:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/terms/free-will/
If so, do you agree we don’t have such an ability? If you don’t, this is where our disagreement primarily is (and where we should focus our efforts). If you do agree we don’t have this ability, then again, we are perhaps talking past semantically.
If such is the case, what is your definition of free will so that we can analyze it? For example, would a person in which a brain tumor causes them to want something and act on that something fall under your definition of having free will? How about a microchip that changes the brain state to make the person want and choose X? If the tumor or chip causes “who they are” at a given time…and that “who they are” outputs the decision they make…would that be a “freely willed decision” per such semantic? If the “supply of energy” comes from the chip to adjust the “will’s energy”?
Just some food for thought.
Hi Daniel,
“Thanks for the response. Rather than go through each item line by line, which could take forever and create a gigantic, unreadable comment, I’d rather focus on a few key points if that’s okay with you. ”
Well you dont really have a choice, so how could I blame you 😉
“First, where we agree. We both agree, I think, that “willing” happens causally (e.g. that we have a “causal will”). We both agree that consciousness exists and is part of determinism (part of the causal process). We both agree that internal processes happen that lead to decisions.”
Yes. I think we also must admit that the nature of consciousness is baffling, in that, humans have progressed in knowledge and ability exponentially, and we are so smart and wise and intelligent, yet consciousness, the most fundamental aspect, I would argue in even simpler life forms, still in a large and significant way, escapes us.
But yes, we agree, would I could I should I say, in the logical train of thought of some sort of ‘materialist’ philosophy. My axiomatic principles of my own philosophic thought stem from the idea that ‘at least something exists’. That is to say, that pure eternal nothingness, is not all that exists. What follows then is that, this totality of somethingness that exists must have always existed, and must always exist, as it cannot turn into pure and absolute nothing (energy cannot be created or destroyed), it only transforms (time)(also need space for transformation to take place). From this perspective, it would follow that reality can only, quite obviously, only ever be tautological, at all times, continuously, it equals itself. So yes, I would claim that even without the natural and obvious nature of any possible nature, would be that the parts of the totality would interact, and only interact and only be interacted with by interacting. That is to say, physical logic, cause and effect, causality, action A determines action B determines action C, etc.
I would loosely posit that the only time this can be escaped, can only be with ‘trickery, or illusion’, computer simulations, video games, digital programming, projections etc, basically, generating a pseudo reality. Just for example, a video game, if a video game character was an AI, and was not aware of the world outside their experience of the game realm, they could write all sorts of appropriate level laws and figure out their relative physics of that realm, but you and I would agree that the laws they would create would not be the laws of physics, but laws of relative programming code, that utilize the real laws of physics. But that might be a whole nother path of discussion.
“Where we disagree is that you seem to be suggesting that you could have, of your own accord, done otherwise than what you did. For example, you say ” I believe I could have been born, and covered my eyes my whole life until I died, I believe that was technically possible”, which, regardless of the plausibility of “covering eyes since birth”, you have not done so but you think such “was a possibility” in a deterministic universe (e.g. if we could go back in time, that something could have been different).
It’s this “possibility” where we disagree. If the universe is entirely causal, as you suggest it is with “I don’t believe acausal events can occur”…then such options never were, and never are “possibilities” (as I mention in this post). They could never be (or have been) “actualized”. We can assess between different “imagined epistemological possibilities”, but only one is and can ever be an “ontological possibility”.”
The last sentence, is what I kept trying to get you to see my argument against, with my mentioning of…Ok. I am saying there is only one possibility because what is being determined is that there can only be one possibility. The nature of time, is such that you can not be in china and new york at the same time. So the option to go to either exists, but what is determined, is that you will only go to one, if asked or demanded to choose. So if I say pick a number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
I am determining that you will pick a number. Dont you see this, so of course there is only 1 possibility, because that is the rule we are operating under in this assignment. Under those conditions it is no physically possible to choose anything other than one choice, because that is determined by the assignment or demand. What is not determined by the assignment or demand is which number will be chosen. Like with the food example, I will express that to me, I will choose a number, and all of those choices are equal, to me, they equally are meaningless, no intellectual or emotional attachments or significances, they may as well each be an equal platonic sphere, nothing will come of my choice and I know this, I have no stake, it just doesnt matter, its completely meaningless task and process, (but as I made in that reply to you, my point of the ‘being on’, because we are in a state of alive, or on, we can ‘chill’ in a mode of non terror and hell, but just exist in a state where we can discuss such things), from my perspective before I choose a number right now, I can equally choose any one. That is freedom! That is the freedom my will has. What is determined, is that, due to the nature of the demand, I am forced to only choose 1 number. You are saying, which is a very interesting thing, and maybe the entire thing we need to focus on, “No matter what you do ever at all! you are forced to do it!”. That is a very interesting idea, but I suppose my attempt of a counter argument is, if I have an equal opportunity to choose any of the 9 numbers, you are not forcing which number I will pick by asking me to choose one, ‘I have to force myself’ to use my mind and body to speak and number choice I choose.
So from this perspective of prior to me choosing one number over the others, knowing that there are no reasons or personal relations to any of the numbers, let me ask you; What reason do I have to pick one number over another? What exactly! will force me to choose the exact number I do? Do you see the crux of our opposition, is I am saying the only reason I pick one number, and its the number i pick, is because I am forced by the proposition to pick one number. Whereas you are saying, I pick one number, and it is the number I pick, because I ‘could not possibly!’ have chosen a different one. I do not think you can use hindsight is 20/20 as evidence to validate your argument. Because hindsight is 20/20 is what I am saying = “you must choose one number”. From a point in time now, by stating “you must choose one number” or “you cant eat everything in the world for lunch”, you are making a statement about the limited nature of a state of the future. So making the proposition at a point in time now, you already know, that in the future I will pick only one number, because you have told me too. My argument is that it is physically, logically, realistic for me to equally choose any of the numbers, and the process from comprehending your proposition, to forcing myself to move my mouth to say a number, is the process of the will at work, and the fact that the will has multiple numbers to choose from, is an example of the existence of the will grappling with a freedom.
It is the very existence of the ability to think that has such a relation to the concept of free will. Can we agree that the ‘computations’, thoughts, imagination, accessing of memory which occur in a humans brain, are not occurring outside of the humans brain? That is vague and tricky wording so let me be clear, what is occurring in the human brain/mind may reflect and may be of what is occurring outside of it, but materially, when you think of a car, when you see a car, when you imagine a flying car, if any of those things exist outside of your mind, when those things exist in your mind, it is not the identical material object existing in your mind. This is the key. Obviously it is the key, as the very existence of thought, or willed mind computation, or consciousness, the very minimal awareness of being on and forced to act, is what separates life from non life, etc. So, the reason the will has the ability to freely choose between options, is because it can think about ‘all things it can think of’ (yea but thats determined!) surrounding those options, and choose any of them, in the number example. I am aware that I can pick any number, and I am right in stating so, this is truth, you have no evidence or proof, that it is not possible for me to pick any of the numbers, only your “yea but I know you will only pick one”, which as I have been saying, is not proper evidence or logical proof or argument. So, when the proposition is asked, I can take as much time as I want, in my mind, to not act physically in the world outside of my mind, meaning cause my chosen number to come out of my mouth. I can compute in my mind that it is possible for my to equally choose any of the numbers, I am aware of this fact, I know that I can pick any of the numbers, I know I must pick one as the rule of the proposition demands it, my awareness of this, is my awareness of my freedom, my freedom exists and my awareness of my freedom exists, it does nothing to aide my decision, but it is the awareness that I actually have the power to make a decision. If not “I” will ultimately make the decision, what do you suggest is making the decision? What will pick the number, when you ask me to pick a number? Given the conditions of you now knowing from me telling you the truth, that each number is equally meaningless to me, in terms of my relation to whether I would pick it or not, what is a reasonable, logical, causal, reason for me to pick one number over another? If you had to rewind the tape, and look at all causal elements, from my speaking the number, viewing all parts of my brain etc. what do you think would be even a hypothetical causal reason for me picking one number over another?
“You mentioned Sam Harris, who primarily makes his case via the Libet and nature neuroscience studies (though mentions the incoherence of free will as well). In my book I mention these studies as evidence against free will – but only briefly. I don’t think they are needed, however, to make the case against free will (nor do I think they are the strongest case available against free will – only that they are “supporting evidence”). Rather, what makes the case against freedom of the will is the fact that such is logically incoherent – which stems into understanding the nature of causality (and if someone postulates acausality – why such is logically incompatible with that as well). Also, Sam does mention the distinct difference between fatalism and determinism in his book, and the fact that he’s written the moral landscape means that he certainly does not take a fatalistic or defeatist approach.
But before we go on, it may be that we are perhaps having some semantic arguments. Do you accept the definition of free will I propose in: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/terms/free-will/
If so, do you agree we don’t have such an ability? If you don’t, this is where our disagreement primarily is (and where we should focus our efforts). If you do agree we don’t have this ability, then again, we are perhaps talking past semantically.”
Yes, I agree with that definition. And all of my attempts since starting talking to you, have been to prove to you why my belief in the validity of that definition is correct. So, now that you know that, I mean, I stated everything I think, attempingly thorough above, so, I can only suggest to really try to pick apart my questions and answer them, so then I can do the same to you, until we reach mutual understanding of ourselves and the world. I am constantly questioning myself, but I believed since coming across this subject (and having a general interest in all things philosophical) I am more confident than ever that my stance is correct.
“If such is the case, what is your definition of free will so that we can analyze it? For example, would a person in which a brain tumor causes them to want something and act on that something fall under your definition of having free will?”
Thank you for these very interesting questions. I suppose the brain tumor would depend. I am never arguing for absolute free will, so if the brain tumor causes them to want something and act on something, that would be just another natural determination like how all beings that have >0% of free will grapple with. I am only arguing that for example a human being able to move their arm at all, is an expression of free will. Now the reactionary argument, is what if certain somethings are always causing a specific person to always move their arm in a certain way, or brain tumor that causes a certain behavior, or I thought of the way some people train dogs to obey a command, if every time I clap my hands, my dog comes to me and sits at my feet, is this dog acting with free will? If after learning my command, it disobeyed it, would that be free will? Does the dog itself, have any power over the dog itself? You are arguing that there is no internal environment, there is only pure objectivity, that is always to itself, mechanistic and we are just observers stuck watching ourselves and the worlds like we are trapped in an already written movie, is that what you are arguing? If that is not what you arguing then you believe that the will has at least a greater then nil degree of freedom. But I sense that movie analogy is the nature of fatalism. I dont know how much free will a person in a coma has, if you asked them to use their free will to move their arm, and they did not respond, I dont know, how much free will a person who has a brain tumor that forces them to do something has, but you do understand I am not arguing that there are not an overwhelming amount of determining factors that we cannot control, I am only arguing that the existence of control is real. To exert ones will over their bodies and the environment surrounding, is a real phenomenon, and because the will from a place of inactivity can do this in an near infinite number of ways, the will has this degree of freedom, when the system of human, amasses a ‘critical’ amount of information, with which to then make real time projections about the world that exists beyond their mind, they are aware that there are a near infinite number of possible actions they may choose to utilize if they want, they have this power, they have this freedom, they have this potential.
It is like a 1st person video game, the programming is written, the games universe is established, maybe even story line, there is a limited amount of things, MANY, from the pixels resolution, to all the colors, everything about it is full of limitations, there are even though a baffling large number, a finite amount of potential actions given a span of linear time, infinite patterns in infinte time, like the character can potential just move back and forth 100 times, then forward once, and then back and forth 101 times, and forward once. This sort of abstract thinking, is related to the nature of decimals, and the fact there are technically infinite numbers between any 2 real numbers, that given infinite abstract time, there is no reason to suggest a ‘number writer’ cannot write out 1 and then 0’s forever. So, the video game character, there is a world map, there is a story line, talk to this person, go this way etc. but then you approach a field, and it is a relative size, relative large size compared to the character. The rules and laws and environment of that game universe is determined and limited, to be such that the character can only move in so many ways, but nothing in that game, is determining which way the character will move when, and why, totally, I say totally because obviously, once you move 100ft to the left, the following action is predicated, or determined, on that action, but the decision to stop, and move another way, or spin in circles, is not predicated on the games universe, but the will of the character, who is an internal universe unto itself (that is a shitty thing to say, admittedly, I prefer to say as I have said before, systems within systems) it grapples with all the determinations and limits, and its own ability to grapple, is itself determined and limited to a large degree, my only arguement, or the only place I am arguing from, is that it is not completely determined, there is something mysterious, unknown, but I would argue true, about the fact that there is if even the smallest amount of choosing, determination, causing, done by the system itself, as if it had the freedom, to decide what cause it would like to be. A snowflake falling from the sky, this is determined, the snowflake has no power, no choice, it was caused to be created, and it is being caused to fall, and it will cause something to happen continuously, as it lands somewhere, and melts, etc. a human is caused to exist, it eats, and processes information, ‘gaining in physical ability and mental processing ability’, so that unlike the snowflake, the system itself, as a snowflake can be called a system, which has no personal power over its environment or itself, no choice, the human as a system, has power over itself and its environment. I cannot explain how, I can only say, that it does, because all the arguments I have been saying, suggest that a human is aware of its power over itself and its environment, and proves this, by being a force, a causer of causes, unto itself and its environment.
“How about a microchip that changes the brain state to make the person want and choose X? If the tumor or chip causes “who they are” at a given time…and that “who they are” outputs the decision they make…would that be a “freely willed decision” per such semantic? If the “supply of energy” comes from the chip to adjust the “will’s energy”?”
instead of a microchip how about an advertisement, advertisements ‘work on people’, people live, people like to own things, people want things, people need things, capitalism is such that there are multiple places to get things, the places that have things to be gotten, want the people to get their things, so they try to cause the people to want to get their things. If an advertisement works on a person, does that person really want what the ad is selling, or are they uncontrollably forced to get it? I know vague question, but this may be a whole nother topic with lots of minutia. Maybe start with my other answers above and we can get back to this.
To clarify, I’m not only saying that there is one possibility, but rather that the one possibility is specific, based on prior events. In other words, prior events can only output one “specific” possibility.
Again, I’m saying that only one is viable ‘based on what the past events output’. This distinction is important It isn’t that you can’t be in China because you are in New York, but rather that New Yourk was the only actual possibility that the causality could have ever produced.
This is where we seem to disagree. I’m saying the number that will be chosen was the only VIABLE option. None of the other numbers were ever a “real possibility”. If we were to rewind time to an hour before the number option, and let the same causality roll, it can never be that a different number is chosen.
I’m saying this is a logical impossibility. The way your brain (and everything else) is structured will output the specific number dictated by what caused such a number. It seems to me that you are attempting to derive an acausal event here in that somehow equalling the desire for each number will output a random choice between the set. If causal, this simply is not the case, as the cause (the configuration that precedes the decision) will output the “specific” number chosen. If you are suggesting that such a configuration could “cause” either 1, or 2, or 3 (etc) to be chosen equally, you have created a self-contradictory cause. A cause (configuration) that is both the cause of 2 and the NOT the cause of 2 (e.g. of 8 instead).
I’m saying the way you use your body to “speak a number” and the number that “comes to the forefront of your consciousness” all come about causally and could not have been otherwise.
Every environmental and genetic causal structure that has forced that exact number (which could have never been a different number).
Correct, that is exactly what I’m saying. I’m saying that, if all events are causal, to suggest that you could possibly have chosen a different one leads to contradiction. It’s logically incoherent. It leads to A being both the cause of B and not the cause of B.
That is not what I used. I’m not saying that because you picked one you couldn’t have picked another, but rather that the one you did pick was the only viable option you could have given logic (at least without injecting in acausal events – which have their own problems for free will).
Before we move on to anything else you said which much seem to be based on you thinking I’m saying that the reason you could not choose another option is that you already chose one (and the two can’t happen simultaneously – e.g. china/ny)…we need to clarify that this is not the argument I’m making.
Do you agree that A cannot be both the cause of B and not the cause of B? That the configuration of A cannot hold two contradictory causal outputs. A and B can represent specific events, or even the entire state of the universe at one moment and the next moment. Whatever comprises A either outputs B or it does not. To say it has the capacity to do both suggests A is a different configuration. If A is a different configuration, what caused A needs to be a different configuration as well (and so on down the line). In an entirely causal universe, such differences are impossible without a self-contradictory cause…or an acausal even “popping” in to change the causal trajectory.
To get into the details of the logic I’ve written an entire book on this topic. Since you have interesting thoughts and obviously an interest in this topic (even if for the other side) I’d like to email you a free electronic copy if you want (kindle). You can then read it and see if you can better understand the argument I’m making (if the book clarifies what I’m arguing). Only if you are interested of course.
And I’m not saying you need to read an entire book, but rather than work in circles, it may be best if you at least read the chapters on causality to get the argument I’m making on that front first. I’m enjoying our discussion and do appreciate your perceptive, just don’t want to have to recreate the wheel if we don’t have to. 😉
Catcha’ later friend.
“Again, I’m saying that only one is viable ‘based on what the past events output’. This distinction is important It isn’t that you can’t be in China because you are in New York, but rather that New Yourk was the only actual possibility that the causality could have ever produced.”
Sorry for vagueness, I only meant that example as a very generality, to express the laws of physics, that one cannot physically be both in china and new york, so this fact, this physical rule or law of reality, forces only one law to be made, whereas we both know, in a span of time, it is physically possible for a person to both visit new york and china. My entire argument, which you are not really offering any counter arguments too, is that it is not that, all choices or decisions must have been exactly as they were, more so that, as in the nature of physicality and time, like in the new york and china example, it is not physically possible (all the time, maybe there are multi task examples) to make multiple decisions in the same ‘moment of time’ when it is demanded that you only make one. This is my entire argument, you are not talking about it. I am picking a number, and you are saying “you had to pick that number”, “why?”, “because you did, if you could have picked another number, you would have picked it, and then you would have had to pick that”, I am saying, “no, this is not perfect logic, on your part, you are stating with confidence that you know this for certain, but the only evidence you have, is our inability to travel back in time to past states of the universe, the only evidence you have is the inability for when one is demanded to make one decision, they cannot by rule of the demand, make 100 decisions at once, I am saying, this is not evidence that a person has no choice moment to moment”. I think, from my observations and thoughts on existence and reality, without suggesting any clue as to how it works, I believe that everything about reality may be 99.99999999999999999999999999999999999% determined, but that there exists in reality, systems, known as humans, that ‘escape’ the pure determinism of the reality which surrounds them and which they are made of, in which they become a universe that determines itself, and this is called will. I would suggest that some of the greater mass achievements of humans, and a single human, the major freedoms of humans, are composed of many tiny freedoms. So just because the humans is slightly less then 100% determined, over time, this builds up, and they can add together, and there are different percentages, that fluctuate by the microsecond, which build and build over time, and can be maintained, and this is how humans have small moments of choice, which can also effect and cascade into large movements of effective decision making.
“This is where we seem to disagree. I’m saying the number that will be chosen was the only VIABLE option. None of the other numbers were ever a “real possibility”. If we were to rewind time to an hour before the number option, and let the same causality roll, it can never be that a different number is chosen.”
Ok, I understand this, but before I choose a number, I am aware I can choose any number, I can even say, “this time I will choose one number, but if we were to rewind the tape after I choose, I promise I would choose another number”, and I would believe this to be true, because I believe I have the power, to choose any number, at any time, because I am aware that all numbers exist, and that it is equally pointless for me to pick any of them. Of course there would be probabilities gradient that I would more likely choose a number <99999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 , but there is the possibility I would choose greater. And now the argument goes to the nature of random, I suppose. For, one supposes I have no argument for free will if I am attempting to prove the existence of free will that hinges upon an act of mindlessness right? Meaning, it was a 'thoughtless feeling' that 'forced' me to let go of that 9 button above at the certain moment I did, not a 9 longer or shorter. I just dont get how you can argue that, it is impossible for me to write from now till the moment I died, if I wrote non stop, to write every variation of 9, 99, 999, 9999, 99999, 999999. Would that prove that I have the power, to have written a 9 greater or less, I am free to write 1 or more 9's if I want? This is the freedom I am talking about, how can you deny that statement; "Barring the physical limitations (of not being able to write infinite 9's) I can write x amount of 9's". That is the free will, knowing it is free, to write x amount of 9's. How am I not free to choose how many 9's to write? What is choosing for me?
"I’m saying this is a logical impossibility. The way your brain (and everything else) is structured will output the specific number dictated by what caused such a number. It seems to me that you are attempting to derive an acausal event here in that somehow equalling the desire for each number will output a random choice between the set. If causal, this simply is not the case, as the cause (the configuration that precedes the decision) will output the “specific” number chosen. If you are suggesting that such a configuration could “cause” either 1, or 2, or 3 (etc) to be chosen equally, you have created a self-contradictory cause. A cause (configuration) that is both the cause of 2 and the NOT the cause of 2 (e.g. of 8 instead)."
I am saying before I choose, it is clear that there is multiple choices to choose from: "1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 : Choose one"
Is not: "2" : Choose one
I am saying, looking at the choices, I am aware, that I must pick one, so I may as well pick any, so it truly is random (perhaps we could do this experiment, by asking 100 or 1000 people to pick a number: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9. Of course I would want to make sure the experiment was flawless, even the way the numbers are presented, I would suggest on a screen like this, would be ideal, instead of spoken, and to stressly make it clear and believed honestly, to the person that there is truly no significance to this experiment, as of course mystery and intrigue and even saying that would cause reactions of thoughts "are they lying to me", "hmmm I wonder what the experiment could be, should I and other people mess with it by just choosing 1", also asking all the people after why they choose the number they did, if there was any significance to it, if they have a favorite number, etc.
I am saying, the process to the result, because there is nothing at stake, may be a truly random process, you are forced to pick any, so you pick any, I can equally pick 2, because I must pick one, as I can pick 8 because I must pick one, as I can pick all of them, because I must pick one. The one I end up picking, in this regard, is just one that was able to be picked, because it is just another one that was able to be picked, I utilized my freedom, to pick exactly that. The freedom is in, the conscious awareness, utilizing its physical existence, to narrow down this activity of choosing, to picking one, that is the will freely choosing.
Your argument becomes interesting and more serious, when we discuss things like, work and foods and such. Or, I dont know, I was thinking about ants, I was thinking about the nature of logic, or rational; in the way of, is there an objectively (abstract, but possible) most rational, logical way for each person to exist, and then what would follow is the most rational and logical society, and this would have nothing to do with our preconceived notions or anything, or are you suggesting, everything that has ever occurred and ever will occur and can occur, is the most rational and logical thing that can be possible to occur, because all that exists is physical logic and reason? Is there no absolute logic, like "living the longest most healthiest life is the most rational and logical thing a human can do, and then there is the most rational and logical way of achieving that", or is logic and rational entirely subjective, that is to say, someone's highest form of logic may be to impinge their health and longevity, and this may be true, because they are pure physical logic, and doing exactly what they are doing, and can do nothing else, so they are perfect? Everything is only ever perfect because it can not be anything else, is your argument. Reality equals reality, truth equals truth, that is all, there is no control. Everything, a thing, is controlled by the totality of all things that is not that thing, is your argument (but also controlled by only the material exactity of what that thing is, a rock dropped in water and a ping pong ball dropped in water are controlled by all things that is not the rock and ping pong ball, but also controlled by being nothing but a rock and ping pong ball, you would say all humans are controlled by all things that are not humans, and humans that are not them, and controlled by the fact they themselves are humans, but they are not controlled by themself, because there is no such thing as a self, because how can a self exist, what would a self be, where would it get its power from, how can a self control a self if we dont know how a self can be and what it could be and how it could control if it itself is controlled by not only all things that is not itself but also it self, so the self is completely controlled and doesnt even exist, and so it cannot possible control itself at all, this is your argument?)
So where I was going with that, is, a human who believes that the longest most healthy life is the most logical and rational thing for a human to strive for, and focus on at all times, do they have any free will, or are they on auto pilot? Did they have any free will to make this conclusion, do they ever waiver in their thoughts? if there is no absolute logic and rational path for a human and its entirely subjective, we are back to, whatever a person does it perfect because they cannot do anything else because they are always doing exactly what they are doing and you cannot both do exactly what you are doing and everything else exactly what you are not doing. And hey, I am just thinking about these things, I am not so settled, but as sure as you have noticed I am leaning towards the existence of the will, and I hope you also would agree I am trying to be as thorough, and objective as possible, I hope we both must agree at the end of it, and the beginning of it, we only truly care for what is true, I am attempting to abandon, and I believe I can do this successfully, my knee jerk feelings, and intuitions, and strive for a comprehension of truth as fully and accurately as is possible, and hopefully beyond.
Ok, so where my thought leads me with that, is if there is an objective most rational and logical thing for all humans to do at all times, then free will might exist as the act of being illogical, or sacrificing momentary perfection and completeness for future degrees of freedom, something that sets us apart from the simpler animals, whereas ants, and even much simpler organisms are pretty much have obviously less degrees of freedom and potential, a microbe is not going to paint the mona lisa or build a skyscraper or fly a plane (though perhaps I have a pet theory that simpler life did have maybe intelligent part in building more complex life and plants, this is to say nature did build the plane, in creatures that can fly, this is undeniably remarkable to me, as I dont know why its not more likely that reality is eternally rocks and mud, the fact that more complex then the bare minimum simplicity of 'stuff that exists', I mean there is no reason why it is possible other then, it was possible, the way things are are the way things are because the way things are are the way things are.
So ants, have a simple program, or simpler organisms: Eat, move, Eat, move, reproduce, eat, sleep, sleep, eat, move, move, reproduce. I would imagine using 'weighing mechanisms' and their sensory devices; scan an area, detect a scent of potential food, do they have to choose, using their past memory, whether to go toward the food, or maybe there could be more food to the are with no signal, but just slightly outside their sensing reach, so its a gamble, a risk, but a choice must be made, because their programming is: Live live live live food food food now now now now live live food food food go go choose choose or die, live live food food success yes yes pleasure pleasure food food yum yum more more more go go go left right up down a b a b select start stop wait, sense sense predatory run run run run run safe safe hungry hungry food food food sense etc.
So does the most logical decision for every creature to make come from above, in an objective way, this insect or microbe, starts with 100% logic, perfect score, and each less then perfect move it makes, its score diminishes slightly? Or there is no score, the insect is born, and it is up to it, whether or not is succeeds based on its utilization of itself? It is determined that if the insect 'wants?' to live it will play the game to the best of its ability, you are saying the insect cannot make a mistake, it cannot choose poorly, it can only choose what it can only choose because it can only choose what it can only choose. And that means! it cant choose. Hm, my argument depends on the existence of more time, whereas you are looking at it in a very point like particle way, because we have minds that are capable of abstractions, considering the future and past, simulating events to determine whether they would be more preferable and or beneficial and or suited to our moods etc. gives us the freedom to choose what we will choose because we want to choose what we will choose, you dont believe there is such thing as want.
“That is a very interesting idea, but I suppose my attempt of a counter argument is, if I have an equal opportunity to choose any of the 9 numbers, you are not forcing which number I will pick by asking me to choose one, ‘I have to force myself’ to use my mind and body to speak and number choice I choose.”
"I’m saying the way you use your body to “speak a number” and the number that “comes to the forefront of your consciousness” all come about causally and could not have been otherwise."
Why couldnt the number have been otherwise, before hand we agree that there are multiple numbers to choose from, before hand we agree that due to the nature of the challenge, I am forced to choose one number, this is proof that I can choose otherwise, if the nature of the challenge permitted it. If you say choose any of the numbers you want, the nature of the challenge permits there being more than one number chosen, now the amount of numbers chosen, and the numbers them self, are not determined by the nature of the challenge, but by the nature of my mind, which I would argue I have the power to determine its nature to some degree. This is the crux of the argument, the power the mind has to interact with itself, and if we, when we say I or we, are that mind, or a part of it, and can view it, and view ourselves. If I some how develop a tick, where I cannot help but say over and over " 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ", in my head a continuous loop non stop, but then at some point I say "enough of this, this is annoying me, I am going to stop", why could that have been anoying me, what can be annoying about it, what is the nature of annoying, why and how could anything be annoying, what does that mean? if I did stop it, how could I stop it, how could I decide that, what could make me decide that, where would I get the power, where would I get the force, how could I succeed in doing something I say I want to do, what is causing me to want to do it, I cannot cause myself to do something, I do not exist?
“Do you see the crux of our opposition, is I am saying the only reason I pick one number, and its the number i pick, is because I am forced by the proposition to pick one number. Whereas you are saying, I pick one number, and it is the number I pick, because I ‘could not possibly!’ have chosen a different one.”
"Correct, that is exactly what I’m saying. I’m saying that, if all events are causal, to suggest that you could possibly have chosen a different one leads to contradiction. It’s logically incoherent. It leads to A being both the cause of B and not the cause of B."
But one of the causal links is imagine for crude pictorial example "-" represents a causal event – – – – – – – – those are causal events one leading to another; – – – – – – – – – – – – O – – – – – – – – – …. imagine the O has – sticking out around all its sides, (imagine the real human mind/imagination is much more complex then a circle with tiny lines sticking off it), you see my argument is, because of the nature of the mind, it can escape a purely determined causal chain of thick material, and exist in a state of 'time out' from the external world, and compute all causal events before and after the moment, by simulating all these causes and potentials and probabilities, it is escaping the physical world for a moment, and still existing in the physical world of cause and effect, but kind of cheating it, because it is simulating the external world, in the internal world of mind, the mind has this quality of simulation, or thought, and this causes a kink in the chain of 'all things that are not minds', that do not have this quality of simulating and knowing a multitude of different causal relationships, this gives the subject extra degrees of freedom, in navigating the purely determined purely causal world, by escaping the regular dimensions and time patterns, and making a choice, each moment, the human is constantly making choices, unless they are locked in a groove, but it is possible for a human to make choices each moment, it is possible for a human to make no choices their entire life, a human knowing that there are multiple possibilities or routes it can take in any moment, is the freedom. Me knowing that I can pick any number, is my freedom. You telling me after I pick a number, I was not free to pick it, is your freedom, me telling you you are wrong in saying that, is my freedom.
“That is not what I used. I’m not saying that because you picked one you couldn’t have picked another, but rather that the one you did pick was the only viable option you could have given logic (at least without injecting in acausal events – which have their own problems for free will)."
I think its not so black and white, it wasnt that it was the only viable option, its that I was forced to pick one, so any one is a viable option. I think the freedom of inventing ones own scales of logic and reason and meaning and casual relations and the ability to change these things to whatever degree one can and chooses to, all make up the very complex and intricate thing that is the potential of human free will. I am aware that I can pick any number, I weigh the options maybe, this is the causal logic you speak of, lets use fruit now in stead of numbers, there are 9 apples in front of me, I pick up each one and examine them, I am looking for out of these options the ideal fruit right? Boom, I have no free will, when I find the best fruit according to obvious objective and eternal standards, least amount of blemishes, maybe the biggest, I am a slave to predictability, to events and accordances thrusted upon me, I must pick the most ideal apple because I dont want gross apple bruises in my mouth, I want to minimize the risk of getting sick, I want to maximize the probability of getting nutrients, well, I dont want this, I need this, I am forced to want this, so I am not forcing myself, is your argument. But if I see the 9 apples, and say, yes I am aware that life demands I eat, I am aware I may get sick if I eat a less then ideal apple, but I want to live, so I want to eat the best apple available, so you can say I am not free to choose, but I am choosing life, so I accept the auto pilot of seeking the ideal, because I am giving up the freedom to potentially get sick, which is a free choice. But wait, I want to live, but I also have a fetish for eating bad fruit, so I take the worst apple of them, which to me is the best, and I eat it, and get sick and am miserable, but I didnt, because I lied, I took the best apple, but it had a blemish inside I couldnt see, so I got sick, and miserable, but I have a fetish for being sick and miserable, so It made me happy, but I am not choosing any of this, because I do not exist, and I have never moved because I have no power to move or choice, I can raise my right arm right now, but I cant, because I didnt.
"Do you agree that A cannot be both the cause of B and not the cause of B? That the configuration of A cannot hold two contradictory causal outputs. A and B can represent specific events, or even the entire state of the universe at one moment and the next moment. Whatever comprises A either outputs B or it does not. To say it has the capacity to do both suggests A is a different configuration. If A is a different configuration, what caused A needs to be a different configuration as well (and so on down the line). In an entirely causal universe, such differences are impossible without a self-contradictory cause…or an acausal even “popping” in to change the causal trajectory."
Ok, I agree so far, but believe the main problem, is A an observer, and does A as an observer have the power to observe options, and physically select one of them, if so, A is like nothing else we know of to exist in reality, and its main distinction is that it has a greater degree of ability selection over itself as A and over the causal environment that surrounds A.
This is going to be long. 😉
I don’t understand your argument. I agree with you that it is physically impossible to make multiple decisions in the same ‘moment in time’ when it is demanded that you only make one. It seems to me that this is not a counter to my argument … which doesn’t have to do with this.
This, however, is not the argument I’m making for why you couldn’t have picked another number. The argument I’m making is that the configuration that has led to you picking a very specific number couldn’t have been otherwise, and the configuration that lead to that configuration couldn’t have been otherwise. If the universe is entirely causal, self-contradictory causes logically follow from such “otherwise possibilities”.
If you look at the definition I provide here, I display it in both present tense and past tense. Perhaps it’s the past tense that is leading you to the thinking that I’m using a “because you already did X” argument. To be perfectly clear, I am not.
I’m saying the decision you make is the only possible decision that ever could have been made, based on the causality that precedes it. None of the other options that you might think about were ever VIABLE options.
Determinism simply means that all events are causes. If you are saying there is a .00000000000000000000000000000001% that isn’t determined, you are talking about acausal events (indeterminism). Such events would have no spatial or temporal determinacy. They could never be “willed” events.
A buildup of acausal events are are buildup of unwilled events. They not only couldn’t grant free will, they would be more detrimental to any causal willing.
If we rewind time you wouldn’t be aware we rewound time. We would simply be playing causality from the same point in time, in which case (logically) it could not play out differently (unless we inject in acausal events).
The very specific configuration of your brain state, environment, chemistry, etc. can only bring about a specific 9X to the forefront of your consciousness.
I understand this, and those other options are part of what leads to the illusion. You thinking another number other than 2 could ACTUALLY come to the forefront is an illusion. The reality is, causality will lead you to think about 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 which will be part of the process that MUST lead to the decision of 2 (for example).
If something doesn’t cause you to pick one number over the other, you are talking about an acausal event (“truly random”). Such events would be entirely detrimental to willing. The is why “up to the chooser “ and “of one’s own accord” is part of the definition. To address the problem is such events aren’t “up to the chooser”.
Speaking of experiments, are you aware of the Libet and newer Nature Neuroscience experiments? The newer ones shows we can predict a button someone will press (given left or right hand) 7 to 10 seconds before they are consciously aware of the decision to press one over the other, by looking at brain scans. This at least shows a causal mechanism that takes place even prior to one’s own conscious awareness of a decision (though in itself isn’t the case against free will – the logical case is)
Again, acausal events can never be willed, and causal ones can never have multiple contradictory effects (B and ~B).
Logic is simply our most consistent and reliable methodology (in the forms of deductive logic and inductive logic). At the base of logic is certain tautologies such as identity and non-contradiction. Whether or not a person uses such methodologies comes about causally, and depends on a number of factors (e.g. what they have learned, there propensity to be concerned over what is rational, etc)
I certainly don’t think everything is perfect (I don’t even like the word “prefect” to be honest).
To be clear, I’m saying what we think, say, and do is part of what is caused. Humans are a complex mechanism. A computer can have multiple processes working, and those processes are “controlled” by the hardware of the computer…but such could not process differently. A computer isn’t “free” to process otherwise, even if it has millions of numbers in a database that is opts one from. And don’t take this to mean I see people as computers, as computers (currently) aren’t consciousness. But consciousness isn’t outside of identity and non-contradiction. It’s still restricted by what causality means.
I’d definitely argue against that person’s conclusion, and if they heard me, such might causally change their position …depending on the factors in place that would allow such a change.
If they do waiver, they couldn’t have not waivered. 😉
I’m still not sure what you mean by “if there is no absolute logic”. For example, in deduction, either something is logically “sound” or it’s not, meaning either its premises are true and the conclusion follows from those premises – or such is not the case.
This is good, I am glad for this (and see you are a truth seeker). If I thought otherwise I wouldn’t take the time to respond. Also, I too believe in the existence of the “will”, I just don’t believe in freedom of the will (FREE will)
People act on illogical understandings of reality all the time. Again, logic is a methodology used to parse truth.
I agree with this.
No, it can only choose what it can only choose, because that choice is determined by what causes it to choose. It’s (specific) configuration that leads to what it “chooses”…a configuration that could not be otherwise.
I’m saying that all abstract thought, considering the future and past, simulating events to determine whether they would be more preferable and or beneficial, etc…can only come out the way they due based on the structure of the universe that precede those thoughts and actions. And likewise, the structure of the universe that produces that comes about from the structure that precedes it.
There being multiple numbers to choose from does not mean that all of those numbers are VIABLE…only one is. And more importantly, the one that is is dictated by the causality that brings such number to the forefront of your conscious thought.
The logical fact is, in an entirely causal universe, something does cause you to say “enough of this, this is annoying me” at the specific time you do say it. If something doesn’t cause it, then such is coming about acausally….something you equally would have no control over (acausal events can’t be willed).
The only thing that can “escape a purely determined causal chain”…is an acausal event. I go over both of these possibilities thoroughly to great extent in my book. I also explain why it isn’t just the “physical world” that free will is logically impossible / incoherent in…but anything we postulate as existing outside of the material universe as well. I also explain how complexity does not help. These are all things I’ve written chapters upon chapters about and simply can’t recreate this wheel in these comments. Like I said, I’d be willing to email you a (entirely free) electronic copy…just say the word. 😉
I think we are repeating a lot here. 😉 It’s a logical impossibility (in a deterministic universe) for it not to be the “only viable option”.
I’m saying it doesn’t matter if A is an observer, the logic still follows. The power to observe options, or have consciousness, or to think, etc…all come about causally and specifically based on that causality. Otherwise what you are saying is that consciousness allows logically incoherent things to happen (contradictions). It would be like saying “invisible colorless pink square circles exist due to complexity”.
To be clear, the case I’m making against free will is a logical case. If you are suggesting that because consciousness is “like nothing else we know of in reality” that it moves outside of identity, non-contradiction, etc…and allows for contradictions…then I can’t argue against such. I’d only question the very epistemological foundation that allows one to conclude such. If, however, we keep within the confines of inductive evidence and sound deductive arguments, I’m saying that no matter how complex, or how unique, our conscious decision making is…the free will ability defined here is logically impossible. 🙂
Have a great day. 🙂
I added <<Me and <<You when I left the quotes you responded to in your last reply, so, "Blah blah"<<Me "I have no free will"<<You… then my quote less response follows.
“My entire argument, which you are not really offering any counter arguments too, is that it is not that, all choices or decisions must have been exactly as they were, more so that, as in the nature of physicality and time, like in the new york and china example, it is not physically possible (all the time, maybe there are multi task examples) to make multiple decisions in the same ‘moment of time’ when it is demanded that you only make one. This is my entire argument, you are not talking about it.” <<Me
"I don’t understand your argument. I agree with you that it is physically impossible to make multiple decisions in the same ‘moment in time’ when it is demanded that you only make one. It seems to me that this is not a counter to my argument … which doesn’t have to do with this." <<You
You are saying: all actions, which are in some way physical (I am not saying all actions, and then referring to only the actions which are in some way physical, but, expressing that all actions and all 'things' are physical), occur causally (I understand you are not saying this explicitly, as your argumentative focus is more on the incompatible nature of the concept of 'free' will and any conceivable reality) therefore all 'effects' are also 'causes', in this sense all 'things' can be looked at as causes that cause causes to cause causes to cause causes etc, by the nature of 'how that thing exists' in that momentary context. You are saying, the effect of 'choice' exists only by being caused by 'exact things' leading up to the exact event of that choice coming into existence as a new cause which was caused by causes and which will be a cause that will cause causes to cause as this is all that ever has happened, ever can happen, and ever will. You are saying, because exact things/causes occurred prior to the cause/effect of choice coming into existence in that moment, that the exact choice which came into existence, could not have been any other one. I think this is a very simple view on your part, I am not saying because it is simple it is wrong, but perhaps reality escapes your simple constrictions by being so much more complex.
The freedom comes from the knowledge of the freedom. Once, the cause occurs that suggest I make a choice, where there are multiple choices, and I am aware I have a choice, then there is real freedom to make a choice.
What you didnt understand about what I was trying to say above, is I am saying, the only reason you have your argument, or the only evidence for your arguments accuracy, is that one choice must occur. If I am told 'pick a number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9', I can think to myself 'I can pick any of those numbers', and that is true! True, true true true. That is the truth, there is the freedom. My will, my knowledge, knows, for a fact, that I have the freedom to pick any number. The only reason I cannot pick every number, is because the stipulation or condition of the demand, which is to only pick one, this is what I am talking about the physical impossibility, of saying 'pick one number', and then me responding by picking all of them, I cant pick more than one, only because that is the demand. I know my will has the freedom to pick any one. I see nine numbers right there above, what is your argument that I dont have the power to pick one or another? I see all nine number equally, they are all equal, I can pick any one equally, the only reason I will pick one over another is because I have to pick one over another, not a specific one, its a grey mixture of randomness, freedom, and limit. Could you give me any reason why I would pick one number over another? If I picked one number, and said, I dont know why I picked it, I just did, could you explain the causality as to why I picked the number I did? Keep in mind I am only asking hypothetically and theoretically explain, if you had all possible information of the universe, from quarks and electrons to neurons to memories to subjective data and experience, could you express why I choose one number over another? And if you think you can, can you tell me what a reason might be? I can pick 1, I can pick 2, I can pick 3 , I can pick 4, I can pick 5, I can pick 6, I can pick 7, I can pick 8 , I can pick 9, this knowledge is the freedom, this is the pressing pause on causality, this is the existence of the willed thought, this is the existence of choice, of free choice, I am aware I have free choice between those numbers, the only thing that is a controlling factor is the demand that I choose one number, I have the freedom to choose which one, and I have the freedom to equally choose any one, if this exact test with exact particles of everywhere rewound I would equally have the power to pick any number any time.
“I am picking a number, and you are saying “you had to pick that number”, “why?”, “because you did, if you could have picked another number, you would have picked it, and then you would have had to pick that”, I am saying, “no, this is not perfect logic, on your part, you are stating with confidence that you know this for certain, but the only evidence you have, is our inability to travel back in time to past states of the universe, the only evidence you have is the inability for when one is demanded to make one decision, they cannot by rule of the demand, make 100 decisions at once, I am saying, this is not evidence that a person has no choice moment to moment”.”<<Me
"This, however, is not the argument I’m making for why you couldn’t have picked another number. The argument I’m making is that the configuration that has led to you picking a very specific number couldn’t have been otherwise, and the configuration that lead to that configuration couldn’t have been otherwise. If the universe is entirely causal, self-contradictory causes logically follow from such “otherwise possibilities”."<<You
But once I am aware that (in the number example) I can only choose one, then the nature of the causality is entirely changed, and 'broken', the probability is broken, and forced to then boil down into one choice. When I just approach 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 with no demands, I have the freedom to do many things with them, once you demand to choose one, then I start to have to act (based on the totality of my past experience and all those determinicies etc.), however I believe by me stating with awareness, and belief in that awareness, of my power to before I choose or think about choosing, that there are nine numbers there, there are not only eight number or seven, but nine candidates to choose from, I am aware of freedom, I am aware that if I close my eyes and fail to act, and not choose a number, that a number will not be chosen for me, I have to force myself to act, and this act of forcing myself and knowing and knowing what I know and knowing why I know and trying to know more, is not automatic, its not a program that runs itself, I must participate, I must, I, I must interact. A person asked this questions, favorite number (for whatever reason) might be 3, for them it might be automatic when confronted with this demand, to choose the number 3, which is why I expressed having no prior relation to the choice. Similar to the lunch problem/situation, we can agree that we didnt invent the need to eat, this is forced on us, just as the demand to choose a number is forced, the demand to choose a meal is forced, I believe without a doubt I am correct and true, when I state that: when confronted with multiple options of equal value and/or uselessness/meaninglessness multiple choices that are exactly in every way the same and would result in absolutely no difference, that this is a proof and expression of the existence of in the purest sense, if even the smallest amount, of freedom the will has, as its very nature of existing.
"I’m saying the decision you make is the only possible decision that ever could have been made, based on the causality that precedes it. None of the other options that you might think about were ever VIABLE options."
In the number example all options are viable, this is the problem you must confront. Lets say I narrow it down to picking either 2 or 3, I dont know which one 2 or 3, 2 or 3, 2 or 3, hmmm, which do I want, I can say something like, I want to pick them both equally, "you cant, you must pick one", well then it doesnt matter to me, I like them both equally" "you have to pick one", "I really dont want to, it doesnt matter to me" "you must pick one", "Ok, so is there a most perfectly random system to pick either one or the other?", "Im not sure, I suppose any type of random system would be equally random when the odds are so small?", "maybe, sure I cant pick them both, or neither?" "yes the main determining factor of which one you will pick is introduced by the fact that I am forcing you to pick one", "hmm, yea…. you know I could equally pick 2 or 3, its just that you are forcing me to pick one", "no you cannot equally pick 2 or 3, because I am forcing you to pick one you can only equally pick one", "hmmm, I know thats not what you think, but I am glad you are humoring my perfect logic", "dont mention it", "I did, and I guess I had to", "well stop", "ok….hmmm…. 2.5?", "….not funny…pick one", "I dont want to, I have freedom….see.. 325 ….636 3….7.4.74575635643.. 3734643532…..58573222", "thats not freedom, a dropped bowling ball could do that", "it takes freedom to create a bowling ball and drop it", "pick a number", "no, I know I can pick any of the numbers, this is the freedom, I can then actively learn and gain more knowledge, if these numbers did have any meaning, to determine which choice would be most beneficial to me, for as I did not use my freedom to choose to live, now that I am alive, I would rather stay a live then die, and in order to do that, I am determined to do certain things, however if I do not actively seek out which things may be more beneficial and which things less, in order to live, I will not have access necessarily to that beneficial knowledge, again this is freedom, I have freedom to more or less seek information, to more or less 'live better', or make 'better' decisions, related to living better or increasing my potentials of living better, once I decide that I want to live better, it is not that I am a slave to this paradigm I have chosen, I am both master and slave, to myself and to the circumstance of my existence in reality. Something like that."
"Determinism simply means that all events are causes. If you are saying there is a .00000000000000000000000000000001% that isn’t determined, you are talking about acausal events (indeterminism). Such events would have no spatial or temporal determinacy. They could never be “willed” events."
What about pseudo acausal events, due to the nature of the mind producing imagery which is illogical and impossible physically? Dreams for instance, or video games, on the screen, the relation between information can produce illusionary effects, that are not related to the laws of physics, for instance what occurs in the game 'super mario brothers', or a crazy incoherent dream you have had, the underlying physics are made of the physics, but they are used to create fake physics, or in reality outside of this pseudo realm, physically impossible things, is it not possible human freedom comes from the ability to utilize this realm of potential illogic and pseudo physics, to act in the real logical physical reality?
You cannot both believe that a human has power at all, and free will not at all.
This is why I do not get the difference between your view and fatalism, and yes I read your blog post about it. How does any 'object/system' in reality have any 'power'/control/agency, if there is no even possible object/system that can exist that can 'make a choice', in the real sense of the word choice, viable/possible options. I am arguing that the freedom is not necessarily in the act of choosing or the resulting choice (though potentially I would argue for slight relations to those statements) but freedom is within the existence of multiple choices in general, not viable choices (though I would argue in cases yes) choices in general, that is to say, there is a real difference between; "Pick any number between 1 and 1" and "pick any number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9". This existence of multiple choice allows for a greater eventitude to exist which is considered an event of free choice, a will has come across or found itself face to face with a sector of reality which is not completely defined or demanded to be interacted with in a definite way (I would argue the existence of a will at all, expresses that reality itself, immediate reality, is a sector which the will must always do this with at least to the smallest degree). If there is no viable choice, how is it not that, for all time, all action is fated?
The fact that in any given moment there are multiple viable options (before a person acts or begins to act or begins to think about acting on any) that a person can do, from thoughts to bodily reactions, from the subtle to not at all subtle, and that fact that to achieve any of them from the moment of non thought, non action, and non achievement, is the fact of the freedom of the will. Lets say a ballet dancer can do 100 different bodily movement dance moves, and from a resting position they are all equal (all of these examples turn into my number one), this dancer lets say is walking on a practice floor and we tell her to do a move, she then continues to walk, and she can see in her head an image of herself doing all her moves, one by one, "hmm she thinks, each move is viable, I can possibly do them all, I have done them all in the past, I have masted them all, in this moment of walking it is possible that I CAN CHOOSE ANY ONE, this is my freedom, I am a will, that is willing myself to walk and think, and will will myself to a decision, a choice, this choice will not be willed for me, this choice was willed by the degrees of freedom I am aware of having as options'.
Our argument is like me saying, "I want to eat a carrot", "you dont want to eat a carrot, you HAVE to eat a carrot, you could not have expressed anything else in that situation", "Ok, then, I dont want to eat a carrot", "exactly, once you say that, I could not expect you to have said anything differently, you have no free will, to say either of those statements or desire what the statements imply", "yes I do", "no you dont", "I disagree", "I disagree"
It would be much more interesting, and dare I say valuable, for you to attempt to express how possibly agency exists, more so then what I cant help but think your argument boils down to, pointing out the tautological nature of reality, expressing that the totality of information of reality is always accounted for in reality, objectively. You are arguing that every bit of information in reality is a hard gear, that is linked to its neighbors, you are arguing for a perfect mechanical description of reality, which I too am inclined to agree with you, it does seem we must employ a ghost in the machine to give my argument credence, I am not saying I understand how or why free will does and can exist, I am just saying I am more convinced from all my knowledge and arguments, and experience, that it does. My number example is really perfect so I shouldnt try to use anything else, but only refer to that, for it is a distillation of the problem. The problem you need to solve, is how 'I' can control my gears at all, or would you argue I cannot? Does a human have any power or control at all? If so, the existence of that power at all, is at the very least an expression of free will, all it takes is the power itself to choose between 2 options, it doesnt matter hindsight or anything, only that if it were not for that power, an option would not be chosen, or a more likely option would be chosen by external nature, a good case of a human without power is a dead human, how can an alive human pick a number and a dead one cannot? And what about the alive one, is doing the picking, is there no such thing as subjectivity, only objectivity? The human has no control or power over their mind or body?
When it is possible for a single cause to exist that causes the existence of the awareness of multiple causes to come, due to multiple course of action, the freedom for the will, to be aware of the multiple courses of action, to be aware of the causes that caused them, to be aware of the power of their actions and causes, is all of what is meant by the term free will. A cause occurs, which causes the will to be forced to act. The will is not forced to act an exact way, for if it was, there would be no need for the will to exist, in fact the will would not exist, the ability to physically and mentally move would not exist or be possible, without the awareness of the potential to physically and mentally move, but even then, it is possible for the body to physically and mentally move without awareness, as is called involuntary action or in the case of babies, who are I would argue hardly aware in a knowing way, but a great example of the difference between freedom from complete determinacy and very near complete determinacy. A baby is completely helpless, or powerless, it has very little freedom and choice, and option, comparing the potential of a baby to a grown man, shows the existence of real potential difference, this real potential difference is the difference in the freedom of will.
"If we rewind time you wouldn’t be aware we rewound time. We would simply be playing causality from the same point in time, in which case (logically) it could not play out differently (unless we inject in acausal events)."
My awareness of freedom is the existence of freedom, for example, I am aware I have the power, the potential, and this is real, to lift my right arm, or left arm right now. This is free will, my will is free to lift my right arm, my left arm, both, or neither. That is freedom, I am not forced to do any of them, it is up to me, what I want to do. No matter what pattern I lift my arm, I am doing so. I am causally determining, I have causal determining power, this is what free will means, the will has freedom or power, to cause and determine. Instead of focusing on the hindsight, take a look at the foresight, which is how my arguments have been recently presented, I think. I am aware I have potential and options, this awareness of multiple choice, is the freedom. There really are multiple choices in which ways I can move my arms, the multiple viable potentials for ways in which to move my arms right now are real and vast. That is true and real. Your argument only exists in hindsight, you cannot prove that I do not have the freedom to move my arms right now in more than 1 way. I can prove that I do have this freedom, by showing you all the ways it is possible to move my arms, and then expressing, that I am aware I can, as I just showed, move my arms in a multiple of possible ways, that would be true, that would be an expression of my will, acknowledging the true freedom it has. Because it is true that it is possible to move ones arms in more than 1 way, my acknowledgment of my freedom that I believe I can move my arms in more than 1 way, would be validated. Thus the will exists as at least partially, a power unto itself, to freely choose amongst multiple viable options, the will is at least partially responsible, for actualizing the near infinite viable potentials it always finds itself having access to.
“I just dont get how you can argue that, it is impossible for me to write from now till the moment I died, if I wrote non stop, to write every variation of 9, 99, 999, 9999, 99999, 999999. Would that prove that I have the power, to have written a 9 greater or less, I am free to write 1 or more 9’s if I want? This is the freedom I am talking about, how can you deny that statement; "Barring the physical limitations (of not being able to write infinite 9’s) I can write x amount of 9’s. That is the free will, knowing it is free, to write x amount of 9’s. How am I not free to choose how many 9’s to write? What is choosing for me?”<<Me
"The very specific configuration of your brain state, environment, chemistry, etc. can only bring about a specific 9X to the forefront of your consciousness."<<You
Yes, but are you ignoring the essence I am focusing on, the fact that I control my brain state? That I have power, choice, in bringing about a specific 9X to the 'forefront of my consciousness'? I think you are.
I will try this: In your reply to this, write any amount of 9's in any manner of groupings YOU WANT. Then tell me all the reasons besides YOU, or why there is no YOU that DECIDED to CHOOSE the amount of 9's and the manner of groupings YOU DECIDED to CHOOSE. Without your awareness, and self thrust to act, there is no choice or decision, you have power, you have choice, you are will, your power and choice by the nature of being choice has some freedom to it, you are not sufficiently denying this, though your denial of this is the reason we are arguing at all.
"“I am saying before I choose, it is clear that there is multiple choices to choose from: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 : Choose one.
Is not: 2: Choose one”"<<Me
"I understand this, and those other options are part of what leads to the illusion. You thinking another number other than 2 could ACTUALLY come to the forefront is an illusion. The reality is, causality will lead you to think about 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 which will be part of the process that MUST lead to the decision of 2 (for example)."<<You
No I am sorry, I dont think you got my admittedly sloppy expression, the reason I wrote this second part'; Is not: 2: Choose one; the 2 was a representation like the 1-9 before it, but me expressing the difference between real obvious, literal, undeniable, multiple choices presented to an awareness of multiple choices, and no multiple choices, represented by the '2' as in: I will give you a list of numbers to choose from, choose one of them: 2 : Make your choice.
"“I am saying, looking at the choices, I am aware, that I must pick one, so I may as well pick any, so it truly is random”"<<Me
"If something doesn’t cause you to pick one number over the other, you are talking about an acausal event (“truly random”). Such events would be entirely detrimental to willing. The is why “up to the chooser “ and “of one’s own accord” is part of the definition. To address the problem is such events aren’t “up to the chooser”."<<You
I disagree with your first 2 sentences. First of all, the acausal event will still be caused, forced to happen, but the preceding events/causes, it is just the nature (we are talking about a mind/body thing here, with all of this) of thought, the nature of the storage of all memories not demanded to be organized in a physically relatable way, if you dont admit that the user of the mind/body, the being has any influence on the way the information in their mind is stored, then of course all stored memories would have exact causal reasons for being where they are, and the times and moments and ways a person would relate such mental information would be causal and demanded to occur in the certain ways determined by what occurs outside the body and within…um, I lost myself… What I am trying to say, is that I believe there is an awareness of the body, that is called consciousness or the mind. A user of the body, information exists outside of the body, information interacts with the body via sensation, that information is stored in the body, and 'visible', experienced by the awareness, the user, the mind, the you I am talking to, right now I am writing information, that exists outside of your body, but will exist inside your body when you read it, this information, the order of these words, can be stored in your memory, and then 'for whatever reason' you can potentially access this information. I do not know enough about the science of the mind and neurons and stuff to say how memories are physically stored, the little I have seen suggests it is a potentially non intuitive phenomenon in which certain memories are not existing in exact and only in exact specific local places, but can be reconstructed differently in different ways different times…I really dont know this is complex stuff. So I dont know about truly acausal event being truly random, or the nature of these terms. But I am inclined (determined?) to say firstly, I would suggest that such events would not necessarily be detrimental to willing, because it is the will that is 'being' random. You cannot deny the existence of the awareness, the consciousness, the you, that is really what our argument should first be about, because the other side of that coin is the grey area and mixture between 'randomness' or more and less randomness, and more or less determination, in 3 dimensions plus time, and a large gradient of objects that interrelate in many different ways, speaking of the totality of physics, biology and chemistry. I am trying to think of how choosing a number 'randomly' 'for no reason' is acausal, it is a very interesting concept, quite baffling… The cause: Pick a number. Is causal, I have memory, awareness of the existence of numbers, I have the awareness that abstractly 'infinite numbers exist', the reason as to why I pick one number over another, is perhaps random, and perhaps acausal, if I just let my 'subconscious' let the first number that comes into my head, then the next, then the next, the physics and science and objective reality and subjective experience of how this occurs must be fascinating though I have no clue how it occurs, if we escape my favored 9 number experiment, and stretch it to; choose any number 'you' 'want', I can perfectly well imagine from familiarity of experience the ability to 'sit back' and 'let a number appear in my mind' and then take it from there, it is kind of the unwanting to make a choice, so just shaking up the waters of your mind and then letting your awareness recognize the first number you 'see'. But even from there, that is not enough to determine which number you will say, for a number can pop in my head and it can be 3, after you ask me to choose any number, and from there I can think, ok, I saw 3 in my head 'randomly' so I will pick the number 6, after 6 I like 2, how about 9, 5, 6,2,6,7,5,2,6,7,8,2,6,7,2,9,8,6,2,5,6, ok and then I 'randomly' stop, and you said pick any number, and so I picked 62956267526782672986256, if I wanted I could multiply that by 2, or 3, or 4, and or those numbers, and or any more, before submitting it as my chosen number. These are all arguably acausal, reasonless, random results, but the existence of my will as a definitive chooser, a definer, a causer, is the linking cause, to the production and even potential for such random strings of numbers to come about in the first place. My will is free to be as random as it can be, is another way to say this. I have the free will to be random, where is the detriment? I am willing, I am aware infinite numbers exist, I can will into existence any one, because I am aware of all of them (lets say to a certain extent, a limit).
"Speaking of experiments, are you aware of the Libet and newer Nature Neuroscience experiments? The newer ones shows we can predict a button someone will press (given left or right hand) 7 to 10 seconds before they are consciously aware of the decision to press one over the other, by looking at brain scans. This at least shows a causal mechanism that takes place even prior to one’s own conscious awareness of a decision (though in itself isn’t the case against free will – the logical case is)"
Yes, hearing this spoken about by Sam Harris is one of the things that provoked (determined me?) me down this path of intrigue into this philosophical topic. This is an illogical argument, and intellectually dishonest, or at least ignorant in which case I suppose it would be called an innocent argument, I dont know. This just is a very superficial, shallow, hand wavy dismissal of the existence of free will, everything I have been talking about. I can use my free will to train myself to be a slave to my free will, I can say, every time someone says 'do you want dessert' I will say yes as fast as possible, someone says 'do you want dessert' you are scanning my brain, my cognitive mechanisms react to the question, by working the processes of its conditioned response, and by doing trials you will discover that signatures in my brain reveal that I have decided faster than I can open my mouth, this sort of thing is not proof, and you will not proof the non existence of free will via these small and trivial claims because the problem of free will is one of the largest and most complex problems that exists, and the very idea that you can dismiss this large thing with small single isolated cases that dont attack the whole thing is automatically wrong. You are arguing an absolute, I am arguing 'the minorest', I only need the tiniest tiniest fraction of a smidgen of potential of proof of free will to exist to fulfill the accuracy of my argumentative stance, you need the totality of eternal information and knowledge and understanding of all things to confidently, or forget confidence, we are concerned with truth, to truthfully argue your position.
One interesting thing I want to say about the nature of numbers, or a thought I and others may have had about them, is that the existence of numbers may be some pseudo, phonyness to them, as they are symbols of, 1 ness. In that, 2 is only 1 and 1. 3 is 1 and 1 and 1. That beyond the notion of a single 1ness, a point of 1, the higher numbers do not fundamentally exist, they are only abstract or macro conglomerates of the simple bit of 1. I dont know if this idea plays into the randomness or nature of choosing numbers, but then our symbolic knowledge is now that expression I just shared, equaling the symbols of 2 and 3, so now instead of the binaryness, we shortcut the 1 1 1 1 for being 4, and now 4 is a common symbol, that is ingrained well in my memory, along with 2 and 3 and 5 and 6 and 7 and 8 and 9, so earlier when I suggested the thought of experiment of: choose any number, and I said letting my subconscious do the work, not actively thinking 'I like 7, so 7' or 'look around the room and see 3 cups or the first number I see', stuff like this, I let 'an image of a number come to my mind', and you call this 'random' or acausal, maybe, and then after that number comes to mind and I see it, for me to pick any number that is not that number, or that is that number, of the next number in the string of digits that will be my 'any chosen number', my choosing will be acausal or random because there is no physical, informational, reason, causal relationship between me choosing one number or another, so you say this is acausal and random, and therefore my will had nothing to do with it, or the will could not have chosen otherwise…hm… which is interesting, because when I 'let a number come to my mind 'randomly'', well earlier I asked you to try to express hypothetically possible reasonable causal relationships that would determine one number would come to my mind over another, and then from there what next number I would choose, etc. Now even if you admit this is random and acasaul, would you still claim that it could not have happened another way?
A cat has less potential to act in the world, to think, to know, and therefore it has less potential options, choices, free will, when compared to humans, a human is able to learn, store more data in more complex and integrated, interrelated ways, than a cat can, because of this, each moment of time, area of space, quantity of matter, and quality in which it and its neighbors are operating in, can achieve more action within the mind, outside the mind, to think and know, and use this knowledge to act in many more numerous and complex ways, and constantly increased, a term that can be used to define such a difference, you could point to all the hardware, from material, DNA, shapes and proportions of flesh and veins and bones and muscles and joints and brains and neurons and eyes and diet, and is it true that the nature the way this hardware operates from only objective data one is able to commit to the belief that by only utilizing knowledge of the exact ways in which the hardware exists and operates, and the differences between them, would account for the differences that occur in the cats mind and human mind, and therefore differences between them, and outside of the cats mind due to the cats mind, and outside the humans mind due to the humans mind, is the hardware and the interactivity of the hardware all that accounts for the difference in what a cat can achieve unto the environment which surrounds it, which stems from the cats mind, and
"Again, acausal events can never be willed, and causal ones can never have multiple contradictory effects (B and ~B)."
Is this an example of a causal event having multiple contradictory effects; Pick a number between 1 and 9. And here is my thought process, "well I want to pick 3 because its 4 greater than 9 and 7 is 42 times 4 so blue is funny because 5 = 3 and so obviously the number I will then choose is 6". That was a causal event which contains multiple contradictory 'events?', false, illogical thoughts, that are still 'causes?', it is also the willing of mental acausal events, unless you can offer any hypothetical theory as to what causally caused me to write that quoted illogical numbery statement exactly as I did. The act of thought, is causal, but what the thoughts represent, words and numbers, symbols, concepts, are not causally linked, herein lies an important aspect of our discussion I feel.
"Logic is simply our most consistent and reliable methodology (in the forms of deductive logic and inductive logic). At the base of logic is certain tautologies such as identity and non-contradiction. Whether or not a person uses such methodologies comes about causally, and depends on a number of factors (e.g. what they have learned, there propensity to be concerned over what is rational, etc)"
What do you say about me saying that reality is physical logic? And then my attempt to express the existence of free will, by suggesting a mind functions by using a symbolic language, and taking information from reality, but not by outside reality, being demanded to utilize the language and information of reality, an exact way every pico second, like mindless reality, is forced to act an exact way every second, because it is gear like determination, cause and effect, etc. So the will escapes being a determined gear in the machine of reality, by firstly existing as awareness as all, and secondly existing as an awareness that is aware of the information of reality and the language used to weigh it, to have some power over it, via its own internally created and createdable modes of computation.
"I certainly don’t think everything is perfect (I don’t even like the word “prefect” to be honest)."
What about a definition of the term perfect as 'cannot possibly be any better'. If there is no choice, exactly what occurs, is the best possible…well only possible reality that can occur, because no better can occur, it is perfect. But I asked you above in this response, about how your perspective is not fatalism, how we can at once have absolutely no power, and absolutely some power. By arguing for the existence of at least some free will, which is what I am doing, I am arguing that we have some power. So what is our power, how does it work, and how can it not choose between multiple viable options.
"To be clear, I’m saying what we think, say, and do is part of what is caused. Humans are a complex mechanism. A computer can have multiple processes working, and those processes are “controlled” by the hardware of the computer…but such could not process differently. A computer isn’t “free” to process otherwise, even if it has millions of numbers in a database that is opts one from. And don’t take this to mean I see people as computers, as computers (currently) aren’t consciousness. But consciousness isn’t outside of identity and non-contradiction. It’s still restricted by what causality means."
That is a faulty suggestion, seeing as computers were created by humans, and there can not be processors that must act certain ways if a human isnt involved, so because human consciousness is the problem we have and are discussing and arguing over, by using such a statement about computers in your favor, the statement immediately falls away back to the problem of humans, for we can even equate some of the hardware software natures of the human body and mind, but we would agree a human is different than a computer, I am asking how and why. So what do you think consciousness is?
“So where I was going with that, is, a human who believes that the longest most healthy life is the most logical and rational thing for a human to strive for, and focus on at all times, do they have any free will, or are they on auto pilot?”<<Me
"I’d definitely argue against that person’s conclusion, and if they heard me, such might causally change their position …depending on the factors in place that would allow such a change."<<You
Are ants conscious/aware in your opinion/of your knowledge? If not use the most simple life form you think is conscious/aware. Would you agree that there are things that are possible for an ant to do, hypothetically, physically, that they dont do? I can even say, for humans, perhaps before a specific mountain was climbed, it is physically possible for a human to have climbed that mountain, it was just that none had 'thought to, felt like it, wanted to' etc. I am trying to ask, why do ants do exactly what they do, or the most simple conscious creature. And even in humans, is there not the most base fundamental drive, to continue ones life and reproduce? So the way of the ant, can be seen as maybe one of a few, and of course of all the different ant colonies over the world, there are slightly different expressions of what the ant can accomplish, different numbers, different environments etc. It does not appear physically possible that an ant can build a space ship to the moon right now, nor does it seem physically possible for a human to jump into the sun. The idea of rebelling is an interesting one, imagining ants rebelling over their colonies order. But if the inherent obviousness is that, the individual ants want to live, therefore they have their colony, and it is the best way they can all live, (maybe its not im sure there are studies and experiments, but, i dont know the information regarding alternative ant lifestyles, or non city ants) and some of the ants are rebelling and causing problems, it is in the best interest of the individual, who prizes peaceful successful living as the chief necessity, and therefore the colonies chief necessity, to eliminate the rebelling threat, this can be seen to happen with 'terrorism and crime' in humans, and even germs and other bad things in the body, if the body may be compared to a kind of colony. So would you say, an ant is just as conscious as a rock, and has the same amount of control over itself and surroundings as a rock does, and this is also equal to the humans control over its thoughts, and its actions, and interaction with surroundings, there is no difference, there is no 'it' which controls anything, all things that are called aware are only aware, like eyes strapped into a movie theatre chair with arms pinned down at their sides? That there is no difference of thought potential between you and a river. I think I see what you are saying, but then I dont… Do you view the entirety of reality as a (to simplify) network of gears? And one source of your argument is 'how can a network of causal objects, 'make a choice'', and I must admit hearing it like that I think, wow yea, what the heck… but then I remember that, how can just a network of simple particles (even 9 bigillionbagillionfafillion) like gears accomplish everything we know to exist on at least earth (all life, the system of earth, the nature of sun and light, and what the human is and can achieve…of course not of his own willing…rolls eyes…still). So just like the 'no free lunch' of physics, energy cannot be created or destroyed, there must be some reason, some thing must come from somewhere, this is the expression of causality, everything you think, and think you think, must come from somewhere, must be triggered by something. And so you think with that justification, you can say, therefore, there is no such thing as awareness having any control or say in what it does, ….well this is where you lose me, because I disagree.
“if there is no absolute logic and rational path for a human and its entirely subjective, we are back to, whatever a person does it perfect because they cannot do anything else because they are always doing exactly what they are doing and you cannot both do exactly what you are doing and everything else exactly what you are not doing.”<<Me
"I’m still not sure what you mean by “if there is no absolute logic”. For example, in deduction, either something is logically “sound” or it’s not, meaning either its premises are true and the conclusion follows from those premises – or such is not the case."<<You
Yea I am not sure what I was getting at either, maybe some idea of ontological purpose, that if we paused the universe right now, and you and I looked down upon earth, and looked at it as a kind of game of chess, where every single life form, would have their own absolute potential, starting from the fact of whether or not that life form wants to live, and how much they do, and gauging from that most likely potentially if even slightly waivering amount, there would be abstract (as in not physically immediately existing, must be known, inferred, the future considered) best potential courses of action to take to achieve their goals. From our position we can say perhaps we have less ignorance, lets say we do, that we have full information about all environment and material, and all forms of life, and obviously none of these forms of life would have any where near as much information as we would have (this position I am describing of looking down on the world and knowing all this information about life and environment, is a symbolized and extended version of the human condition and partially why we are capable of the things we are inrelation to the other animals, who cannot do this, or if they can, can not with their bodies, and with their collective power of bodies turn their ideals into real), but back to the ants, something I wanted to say, their bodies are sensation instruments, they are designed to aid in the beings extension of life and reproduction, the ant needs to take material from the environment that its bodily mechanisms can use to break down and continually refresh and build its body, while of course always charging that battery which cyclically propels this action in the first place, the mind. If an ants highest, foremost desire, even if it is not explicitly aware of it, is to continue living, would you admit that an ant who registers the food (using its perfectly well functioning sensory apparatusi) it needs to continue living, but then instead of like the other ants who navigate the environment most successfully to reach their needed reward, this ant always goes in the opposite direction of the food, would you not agree that this ant is wrong, or illogical? If the ant does not want to continue living, we would agree this action would be logical to that ant. Now lets go back to you and I hanging above earth looking down with the total information of all information regarding earth, and we focus in on a single spider, who wants to continue living and reproduce. We would see an environment in which every bit we zoom out we see more and more potential for food for the spider, and multiple places the spider can place its web/s etc. Now if there was an absolute abstract logic, in which the spider we are observing can 'play the perfect chess match', make the web in the 'best!' spot, or make multiple if it can, while balancing that time with finding and mate, and getting food, etc. its goal would be accomplished, spiders exist, so we know they successfully live and reproduce. Now the interesting thing is, the spider does not need to be absolutely logical, this gets into the multiple viable options, or something I thought of the other night when thinking about this sort of thing, how there may be multiple different ways to get something done, with equal convenience and everything, where there would be no absolutely logical or meaningful demand to do one or the other, outside of the mind choosing, because it wants to, this is freedom! Hear it roar!
Barring slim less realistic exceptions, a man with a million dollars can effect more in minds and beyond minds in a moment then a man with 1 dollar can, by spending their money. This shows that with more options, more potentials, comes more choices, decisions for the will to make. Man is more free than an ant, in physical and mental degrees of freedom, because man has more physical and mental degrees of freedom.
"This is good, I am glad for this (and see you are a truth seeker). If I thought otherwise I wouldn’t take the time to respond. Also, I too believe in the existence of the “will”, I just don’t believe in freedom of the will (FREE will)"
Like I noticed immediately and then suggested, your only power to talk about 'viable' is hindsight, it is not a valid statement by you. From foresight, which is how reality really functions, and time really progresses, there are multiple viable options, a will, must freely choose from them. You cannot believe in the existence of the will, and believe that that will cannot choose, the existence of the will, and therefore the existence of the will choosing 'anything' is the existence of at least a tiny amount of free will.
"People act on illogical understandings of reality all the time. Again, logic is a methodology used to parse truth."
And what say you, when say I; what is truth other than logic? Truth is; stuff exists. Truth is; stuff causes and effects stuff, stuff changes. Truth is; stuff existing and causing and effecting the stuff that exists, which is change, is what logic is? Logic is; the tautological obviousness that if something is what it is and what it is has characteristics, and there is another something that may be different but has the same charecteristical guidelines of being a some thing, then when they interact they will experience cause and effect? Logic is; stuff that is tautologically accounted for as stuff causes and effects stuff and is caused and effected?
“So ants, have a simple program, or simpler organisms: Eat, move, Eat, move, reproduce, eat, sleep, sleep, eat, move, move, reproduce. I would imagine using “weighing mechanisms” and their sensory devices; scan an area, detect a scent of potential food, do they have to choose, using their past memory, whether to go toward the food, or maybe there could be more food to the are with no signal, but just slightly outside their sensing reach, so its a gamble, a risk, but a choice must be made, because their programming is: Live live live live food food food now now now now live live food food food go go choose choose or die, live live food food success yes yes pleasure pleasure food food yum yum more more more go go go left right up down a b a b select start stop wait, sense sense predatory run run run run run safe safe hungry hungry food food food sense etc.”<<Me
"I agree with this."<>“Correct, that is exactly what I’m saying. I’m saying that, if all events are causal, to suggest that you could possibly have chosen a different one leads to contradiction. It’s logically incoherent. It leads to A being both the cause of B and not the cause of B.” < >”Do you agree that A cannot be both the cause of B and not the cause of B? That the configuration of A cannot hold two contradictory causal outputs. A and B can represent specific events, or even the entire state of the universe at one moment and the next moment. Whatever comprises A either outputs B or it does not. To say it has the capacity to do both suggests A is a different configuration. If A is a different configuration, what caused A needs to be a different configuration as well (and so on down the line). In an entirely causal universe, such differences are impossible without a self-contradictory cause…or an acausal even “popping” in to change the causal trajectory”< <- You
“Ok, I agree so far, but believe the main problem, is A an observer, and does A as an observer have the power to observe options, and physically select one of them, if so, A is like nothing else we know of to exist in reality, and its main distinction is that it has a greater degree of ability selection over itself as A and over the causal environment that surrounds A.”<<Me
"I’m saying it doesn’t matter if A is an observer, the logic still follows. The power to observe options, or have consciousness, or to think, etc…all come about causally and specifically based on that causality. Otherwise what you are saying is that consciousness allows logically incoherent things to happen (contradictions). It would be like saying “invisible colorless pink square circles exist due to complexity”."
But saying, that those powers to observe options come about casually, occur causally, and are based on causality, does not say that those powers to observe options, and choose options, are not powers to observe options and choose options. The power to observe options, and choose an option, if completely causally, as I would agree most likely is the case, this is what the term free will at least means. And yes, I am saying consciousness allows logically incoherent things to happen, contradictions (see Humanity for details). You just causally stated something illogical, that logically incoherent statement can have a real causal effect on at least something other than itself.
Have a great day, not that you have a choice…
Daniel,
Thanks again for your response. Instead of recreate the wheel I’d love to email you an electronic copy of my book (at no cost to you other than your time to read it). And after you have completed the book, I’d love to see if you have the same criticisms as above. I think the book can clear up so many of these thoughts. Just say the word and I’ll send an email your way.
In my book I address this idea that complexity can make a difference in these regards. In fact I have a chapter titled “A Complex Mix of Causal and Acausal Events”.
I’m saying there is no such “real freedom”
As I said, that is not the reason or argument I’m making. Rather, one “specific” choice comes forth as an output of the causes that precede it.
The feeling that such “is true” has everything to do with the illusion.
No, logically if we were able to rewind time to right before you pick a number, you will pick the exact same number each and every time. It isn’t the fact that you have already picked a number and you obviously can’t pick another at the same time, it’s the fact that causes lead TO the number you will pick.
if this exact test with exact particles of everywhere rewound I would equally have the power to pick any number any time.
This is the very thing I’m saying you wouldn’t have the “power” to do. And the reason for this follows logically – not based on the fact that you “already picked” but based on the fact of “the causality that precedes the choice”.
No, this is not the logic I provide. The logic I provide shows that 1) a cause cannot be both the cause of X and not the cause of X, as such would make the cause self-contradictory (logically) and 2) this applies to all causal events. That is all that is required to show why all other options (even before a choice is made) can never be viable in an entirely causal universe. But again, the book’s case is very in-depth on this.
If you are saying “the nature of causality is entirely changed and ‘broken’, you are either A) injecting in an acausal event or B) injecting in the possibility of contradiction (which is illogical).
Having a “prior relation” to the choice or not is irrelevant to the fact that something “whether led subconsciously, consciously, unconsciously, or some combination” was the cause of the very specific choice. This is important.
Even a random number generator isn’t truly “random”. Only an acausal event can be truly “random”, and such can never be an event that is “willed” (as willing implies causality). If you are able to select one over the other, something causes (pushes) that one over the other (to the forefront of your consciousness), regardless if you are aware of what pushes it.
You keep suggesting that may argument is “you can only pick one, therefore you could not pick the other”. This is not, in any way, the case I’m making. If all events are causal in the universe, whether you pick 2 or 58573222 comes from causes that lead to the very specific number (not causes that have the possibility to lead to another number – as again, such is self-contradictory).
“Determinism simply means that all events are causes. If you are saying there is a .00000000000000000000000000000001% that isn’t determined, you are talking about acausal events (indeterminism). Such events would have no spatial or temporal determinacy. They could never be “willed” events.”
There is no such thing as pseudo-acausal events. If an event has a cause, such is a causal event. If an event doesn’t have a cause, such is an acausal event. There is no logical alternative for events, either such comes about causally or it doesn’t. I go over this thoroughly in the book as well.
That isn’t the “real” sense of the word. Choice simply means we make an election from options we hold in our mind, not that all of those options are “viable” options. For fatalism, our conscious decisions matter not to the future outcome, for determinism, our conscious decisions matter to the future outcome.
I’ll have to point you back here: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/pointlessness-doesnt-follow-determinism/ and the infographic here: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-vs-fatalism-infographic/
I’m saying that calling such “freedom” is a mistake. If a person with a brain tumor makes a choice between running down the street naked, and doing any number of other things such as stay home and watch TV, and the brain tumor causes the selection of “running down the street naked”, no person would call such “free” simply because such was a choice made between 5 options in which the tumor led the person to select the one. Such is simply more obvious that there is no freedom due to a more obvious cause of the compulsion and the absurdity of the decision. The fact is, if the person didn’t have a brain tumor and it was simply their specific brain state at a given time (which causally came about), such would lead to a decision to “stay home and watch tv” and that more rational decision was no more “free”, just more “rational” due to a more coherent brain state that had to come about the way it had.
Who said there is “no viable choice”?? There is indeed “one viable choice”, and that “one viable choice” is an important output to other future events that happen. Fatalism means that no matter what we do, a future event is fated. Causality means that what we do leads to the future event. Again pointing you back to https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-vs-fatalism-infographic/ for the important distinction between determinism and fatalism.
Again, there are not “multiple viable options” in a causal universe.
I’m saying you cannot choose “any one”, and I’m saying the reason you cannot has nothing to do with the fact that you have chosen another, but rather that what you have chosen was the only viable option due to what caused the decision for that specific option (and the fact that what caused such also could not be different in a causal universe).
You are taking what is being argued from the wrong end.
This is understandable, and I’m not saying I will convince you on my position. These things take lots and lots of time. I think, however, that you are an intelligent person and it is likely that you may (causally) assess things differently far in the future. There is a difference between agency and free agency.
I’d argue that any action of trying to control your gears is all a part of the way the gears work. 😉
Humans have causal power and causal control. I’d argue such is the best kind of power and control we can ask for (as causality is the only thing that can lead to consistency of thought, etc).
I’d suggest it’s an expression of our capacity to causally “will”. What we must understand, is that once we understand that someone could not have, of their own accord, done otherwise (if time was rewound to right before), we need to abandon these harmful notions of blame and deserve over another. The belief that people could have done otherwise has led to a number of very important imbalances, inequalities, hatred, and so on. Of course I go over this in great depth in the book as well.
Subjective experience is an output of an objective configuration.
An acausal event can’t be “caused / forced to happen”. Acausal = not caused (that is the definition).
Any influence is causal influence, meaning that the desire to influence the mind/body arises causally, and so does the actual influence from that. I’m not saying we don’t have influence, I’m saying we causally influence.
This is more stuff I cover thoroughly in my book (e.g. that acausal events can have no spatial or temporal determinacy, and therefore can never be “willed” events)
I never denied these things, though I think “the you” is sort of a category error (yet another chapter). I think consciousness and awareness causally happens.
To be clear, I’m saying that even a rolling of a die or a flip of a coin is causally dictated. To you such might “appear” random, but if we knew all of the variables involved, including the angle of the throw, the force of it, it’s starting point when being tossed, the differentiation in the weight of the die for different parts of it, the atmosphere and friction involved, the gravity, the properties of the surface it lands, and on and on…we can understand what number the die will land on. It is simply that we don’t see all of the variables that we think such is “random” (hence the reason I use the word acausal instead of random, as the word random is often associated with things that are not truly random. Likewise, though you may not know what brings 62956267526782672986256 to the forefront of your consciousness, there are various causal variables that do (that, like the die, could not be otherwise given the causality). And if not, then such happens acausally (which again, can never be willed).
No…not faster than you can “open your mouth” but faster than you are AWARE of the decision you have made. These are two very different things. The person clocks the point in time that they have made the decision of which button to press, and the prediction takes place prior to the actual conscious awareness of such.<
Just to be clear, I don’t think these experiments are the main case against free will, but rather supporting evidence against it. The real case against free will is in its logical incoherence.
I am arguing an absolute only in the context of logic (e.g. such is absolutely illogical). By the way, it’s important to note that “free will” is an existence claim. That means it holds a burden of proof. Even if I had no case against free will, the onus would still be on the person to prove free will exists. That being said, us incompatibilists shift the burden of proof over to us to “prove a negative”…and in the case of free will such can and is done, just as proving colorless pink square circles can’t exist is done.
I’d suspect such an event would be causal, regardless if you don’t see the variables that cause it. Regardless, acausal events (if they exist) can force a happening in a different way, but that change of direction can never be a “willed” change in direction. It’s equally as incompatible with free will (and more of a detriment to willing).
I agree cat’s are more instinctual than humans. That does not mean, however that a person could have, of their own accord, done otherwise. It does not mean that a person has the ability to choose between more than one VIABLE option, in which the choice is up to them. It only means that the person perceives more options and causally processes a different type of thinking action around what she percieves.
Contradictory thinking is not the same thing as contradictory events. I can think about colorless pink square circles, and know such is a contradiction that is impossible in reality. But again, you are simply assessing that since you don’t see the exact variable that brought 6 to the forefront (and every thought that preceded it)….that such was somehow free (e.g. of something that caused it) and yet still “willed” (even though uncaused events cannot be willed).
I’d say such is a mistake given the history of logic, and the output of methodologies used to describe “reality” (or the physical).
I’d say that such “awareness” is part of the “gears”…it can’t (logically) escape it. Language is part of the gears, and computation is part of the gears.
I never said we have absolutely no power. Rather, I’m saying we are an important factor. We “produce” …a production that cannot causally occur without “us” being part of the mechanism. In this way, we have just as much power as anything else in existence. It just happens it’s entirely causal power…but that’s ok. Uncaused power would be totally inconsistent and not something we would ever want. Power doesn’t imply that such needs to be able to have other options that were viable. It’s a mistake to think so.
Humans creating the computer has nothing to do with the point made. I think consciousness is an output of very specific matter and energy configurations playing through time. But regardless of my theory of consciousness, no matter what theory one has (even such being something supernatural), it cannot escape the causal/acausal dichotomy (I go over this in my book as well).
No and no. 😉
It wasn’t possible for one to “think to, feel like it, or want to” at such time, so it follows that such was not a possibility (physicalness aside which is different). Saying “physically possible” really isn’t a statement on possibility, but rather a statement on our assessment if a body could take such. It’s important not to conflate these. It’s also important not to conflate epistemic possibility with ontological (real) possibility. See here: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/word-possibility-deterministic-universe/
Because they are caused to through their genetic structure and environment.
For most people (not all). I certainly don’t want to reproduce…and some people want to die.
I doubt ants know what it means to “want to live”, rather ants act in a way conducive to living or keeping a colony alive…due to their evolutionary setup.
Where did I say there is no such thing as awareness, etc? I think you are misunderstanding or imagining something I have never said nor would I. In fact, I think a lot of what we are arguing is hinging on you misunderstanding my position. Therefore, I think it would be helpful for you to read my book, even if in the end you disagree with it (just to see the actual case I am making).
More capability to do X doesn’t mean one had a real option not to do X. Someone in a wheelchair may be incapable of walking, and someone out of the wheelchair may have such capability, but the option to sit or to stand or to walk for the person with the capability does not mean that all of those were possibilities for any given time. Rather, the one that is done was dictated by the person’s causal setup. The wheel chaired person simply has a different causal setup in which walking can’t happen even if that is what the person desired to do.
Again, viable is present tense. It isn’t in hindsight. It’s based on an understanding of causality and what such means for ontological possibilities. From foresight, based on an understanding of causality, only one option is viable (if the universe is causal).
The will chooses the only option it willfully can chose. All other options were never causal possibilities for willing.
Truth precedes logic. Logic is a methodology. The universe expanded, stars and planets formed, etc….way before we derived logical induction and deduction based on various tautologies. It was “true” that such happens even before creatures ever evolved to assess such using logic and reason. Truth is not dependent on our knowledge of the truth. But this is a tangent epistemological topic that we’d be better off staying away from at least for now.
And I’d take no issue with such an assessment other than calling such “free will” – which I go into why such compatibilist ideas of free will bypass the important topics and are not the ability of concern that most think of with the term free will. Also see: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/free-choice-vs-choice/
I don’t know what you mean by “see Humanity for details”. I think you may be mistaking holding contradictory ideas with contradictions existing (happening). These are not the same thing.
And do consider my book offer as this conversation is already becoming wayyy too long and time consuming (too hard to recreate the wheel). And though I’d love to keep going with it, my time restraints prevent me from. If we do keep going in the comment section, we need to focus way down to one single point at a time…until such is fully addressed and we can move on to the next. The conversation is already starting to spread out and become too cumbersome.
Catch ya later. 🙂
This was helpful to me because I used to confused Determinism with Fatalism. The primary difference is that my actions make a difference with Determinism. Fatalism is closer to the Christian idea of Calvinism.
Hi Chandler – thanks for stopping by. I’m glad you found the infographic helpful. 🙂
“It does imply, however, that we simply could not have, of our own accord, done otherwise.”
This is contradictory when compared to any meaning of the term ‘choice’, which you state earlier is compatible with your acceptance of the lack of existence of free will.
The word “choice” doesn’t necessarily imply that the other options were “viable” or “REAL” possibilities (that possibilities actually exist as ontological possibilities). Only that we elect from options that are within our thoughts (or epistemological “possibilities”). It certainly doesn’t imply that we could have done otherwise. I talk about the word “possibility” a little here.
This sentence is often used: “He had no other choice but to do X”…meaning X was his ONLY choice. But “choice” is still properly used in this sentence.
The wikipedia article for the word seems appropriate: “Choice involves mentally making a decision: judging the merits of multiple options and selecting one or more of them. One can make a choice between imagined options (“what would I do if …?”) or between real options followed by the corresponding action. For example, a traveller might choose a route for a journey based on the preference of arriving at a given destination as soon as possible. The preferred (and therefore chosen) route can then follow from information such as the length of each of the possible routes, traffic conditions, etc. If the arrival at a choice includes more complex motivators, cognition, instinct and feeling can become more intertwined.”
““He had no other choice but to do X”…meaning X was his ONLY choice. But “choice” is still properly used in this sentence.”
Yes, that is one example… but the use of the word choice in that example is a negation of the word choice. So choice means one thing, and in your example, you use ‘no other choice’, meaning, there was no choice….
“No other choice” doesn’t mean “no choice”. We could even say that “the choice was causally determined to be X” and that is a correct usage of the word “choice”. We can even say, “the choice between X, Y, and Z was causally determined to be X” and that would be correct. We could even say, “the person chose x between x, y, and z, and could never have chosen y or z”…and that would be correct. Like I said, the wikipedia article has such correct when it says “Choice involves mentally making a decision: judging the merits of multiple options and selecting one or more of them”. None of that implies that the person could have judged or decided otherwise, only that part of the process of the decision was thinking about multiple options and electing one of them based on the thinking process.
Again, when we address possibilities, we are only addressing an epistemological sense of the word (meaning we don’t know the variables involved, etc). Choosing is just the making of a selection. It doesn’t imply that all of the options we choose from are ontological possibilities. I chose to wear clothes today, regardless if I couldn’t have chosen to not wear clothes.
You could take it a step further and even compare the thought and choosing to that of a computer program, in a way. For example though, away from that computer tthing, another way to concisely say all of this is that even the way we think (which is a primary motivator of the choices chosen outside of availability) is causally “programmed” into us (from genetics, environment, history and so forth).
Like, even reducing it. Why choose one? Why does this person choose option X or have a preference for option X? Maybe their brain is wired to put more value on a pragmatic choice and X is more pragmatic of a choice (according tto their wiring) than Y.
I’ve just watched most of Sam Harris’s speech on Free Will at a Canadian dinner. My observation/question is this: Assuming we are fully animals no special souls etc,to me free will is a descriptive account of the human condition, as well as a idealistic notion. Aren’t we simply showing that we can’t successfully describe our ability to think and decide what to do? That we fail to demonstrate our idealistic free will is the same as not being able to know what free will is.
I test this with a question: Imagine Earth is visited by Aliens, and they allow us to investigate them and find that, indeed, they have free will. What would this look like so that we conclude that we are missing some ability compared to these free will endowed aliens?
Hi Andrew – thanks for stopping by. Great, Sam is a good starting point on this topic. 🙂
The free will definition that I think is the ability most people intuitively feel they possess, and also the ability that is of philosophical importance for so many other topics, is here: free will
And this ability is logically incoherent (contradictory, etc). That means people, aliens, souls, and even a god could not logically possess it. I think we could successfully describe our ability to think and decide what to do without injecting in that the other options we think about were ever “real” possibilities. 😉
Thank you for your response, I read your link to your piece on what free will is. I still wonder though…
What if we look to make a decision using a formal methodology, setting out criteria and weightings and then assess the options against the criteria – so long as we didn’t set out to fix this, then would the decision (say pizza over a sandwich) be somehow not ours?
I then suppose that what is being postulated is that if we carried on, and down the line, we became able to view the brain and consciousness at a minute level – we might see that every nuance/feeling/experience effectively sets up our reaction to any particular future situation and that this then means we can’t possess free will?
Thanks again, I will be looking into this more.
All excellent questions, and I believe you answered your own question. Any formal methodology we use, the criteria we pick, and how we weigh such, all stem causally, and what causes those causes stems causally, etc.
And it’s more than just the set up of our brain state at a given moment, though that is part of it, but how our very structure is set up as well as the entirety of the environment that surrounds us at each moment. It all, as you say “sets up our reaction to any particular future situation”. There is a reason the illusion is such a strong one. We simply don’t see all of the variables that go into each step in our process and output of a decision. 🙂
I happen to be a big fan of the show My Little Pony and this inspires a general like of unicorns and other horselike animals. That is a real nice unicorn picture.
LOL…thanks. 🙂
“Perhaps the decision to read this very page or not. When you opened it in your browser and looked at the title “Free Will”, does it seem to you that you could have stopped there and not read another word. Perhaps close the program, hit back, or type in another url. If you were to go back in time to right when you saw the title, could your decision have been different? Instead of reading up to the point you are at right now, could you have decided “Meh, I’m not in the mood to read this right now”? And if you could have, would it be you that had the control of making that different decision?”
Quite simply, no, I could not have stopped without reading because I am compelled by my interest in the topic of free will and have tons of reasons to help refute it. This causes me to read whatever has been written as I find the time.
“When someone learns you don’t believe in free will, one of two things seem to spring to mind. Either they think your position is a religious one, meaning that since God knows everything you can’t have free will. In other words you believe in predestination “fated” by a deity (which would be true if such an all knowing deity existed). Or they think you are a hard determinist. That you believe every event has a cause and that due to this our decisions stem back in time to causes that precede back to the start of time.”
I think it is hard to fit a god into a philosophy of determinism or indeterminism. Someone has to answer the question of what their god caused or did not cause. This is difficult to do and would require a deterministic way of knowing that god even existed. If someone was indeterminist and believes that certain things don’t have a cause, then it would be silly to argue that a god had to create something if it can pop into existence acausally.
Sooo true. Thanks for stopping by the website and befriending me on facebook Chandler. 🙂
Trick,
What can I say, this is an excellent analysis of what isn’t even a proper defense of free will. I suspect that the motive is to prop up the concept of free will by misdirection. Not the the author, Christian Jarrett, could have done otherwise.
Thanks…and so true. Thanks for visiting the site Steve. 🙂
deep inside am convinced events are self propelling life is like a programme leading to a couse and effect mechanism
This programme takes control of all susainable possibilities and filters events that may disrupt the relative order that we witness
probably the same way we programme our societies through social commands is the same way the higher operating system runs at quantum levels
“The fact of the matter is, people can be educated about the logical incoherence of free will. They can be shown that free will is illogical using entirely sound reasoning. They can be shown the Libet and Nature Neuroscientific experiments that show the ability to predict before a decision comes to the forefront of consciousness. And yes, most still will hold on dearly to their belief in free will. No person is claiming that educating people about these matters will automatically change a belief they have had since they were little. No sane person is claiming that rationality will trump someone’s intuitive feelings.”
I would say that a good refutation of free will is the fact that people are unable to easily overcome the beliefs they were taught since childhood. If we had a free will, it would not be so difficult to change our system of beliefs.
Indeed. And even if they could “overcome their beliefs” at the snap of a finger…whether or not they snapped their finger to change the belief could not be freely willed. As always, thanks for the visit. It’s great to meet other like-minded individuals who understand this important topic.;-)
“It’s the “free” part of the term “free will” or “free choice” that is the most problematic. It’s the “free” part that has most of the logical problems. And most importantly, it’s the understanding that we don’t have such “freedom” that is tied to a number of very important philosophical topics (and why certain “compatibilist” definitions of free will simply sidestep the issues).”
I think the highest freedom we can attain is freedom from others telling us what to do. We are still a slave to our own desires, but for most of us, this isn’t a problem. We want freedom from other humans who control what we do with our time, money, or talents. We want freedom from the flies who buzz around us, but we cannot be free from our desire for freedom from things that causes us to feel pain or annoyance.
I agree, “freedom” in that sense is quite often important. Ironically, the understanding that we are not free from what causes us to desire and act as we do, gives us more leverage and direction to work within the bounds of causality to understand the structures that lead to the results we “desire”. 😉
It is rather ironic. I somehow feel as if losing the guilt and blame that comes from free will belief is giving me more time to think about what actions will bring me and others happiness. It makes me feel in control even though logically I know I am not.
“I’m agnostic on the possibility of some events being without any cause at all ”
I suppose for this I would have to disagree with the idea of being a hard incompatibility. I cannot imagine something without cause. If as you mention in another article of yours, the electrons being random to the human eye but doesnt mean it lacks a track, I think this arguement applies to everything and I cant think of anything that doesnt fit under it. Great site
Heh, I don’t blame you for taking the “I cannot imagine something without a cause” route. That certainly would be my own intuition on the matter as well, but given quantum mechanics I need to at the very least address the possibility of acausal events. The point about hard incompatibilism is that it addresses both sides and both come up lacking in free will. So in ways it’s a stronger argument against free will. 😉
I think that I feel better in a deterministic universe than I would in one where free will existed. There would be no order or stability to trust in if reality was a matter of choice or randomness. To me, that would be pointless because there would not be an objective reality.
Even if someone is trying to promote belief in free will, they are still trying to “cause” others to believe something. This shows that they believe determinism to be true even if they haven’t fully understood it yet.
One of my favorite questions to ask people is: “What caused you to believe in free will?”
Awesome post, Trick.
It’s interesting, because the typical public conception of determinism is much, much closer to fatalism than anything else. People seem to equate the two for lack of an in depth understanding of determinism, and this attitude needs to change.
Love your website, by the way.
Thanks Seth. Yes, we need to educate people on the important distinctions between these two types of thought. Appreciate you stoppin’ by.
The donkey would have a motive to either eat or drink; the motive would be to stay alive; hence even if it didn’t prefer the water or the hay, it would still choose one if it preferred living to dying.
Hi Steve, thanks for stopping by. I do understand that intuitively it would seem that way, but that assumes the motive to “stay alive” is one that will causally drive to one over the other (eat or drink). If there is nothing that is motive enough to drive one over the other, it simply can’t choose one over the other (in a deterministic universe). To get to one over the other without such a cause (or motive) you’d need to inject in an acausal event (indeterminism). The thought experiment only addresses an entirely causal universe (determinism).
I don’t agree. It’s not strictly a matter of choosing between eating or drinking; it’s a matter of choosing between living and dying, and living requires eating or drinking. In that case, the donkey would simply pick one or the other, even if it had no preference. For instance, if someone offered me a million dollars to eat a cookie, and gave me the choice between vanilla and chocolate, and I had no preference, I would still choose one. This choice would be determined not by my preference for one cookie over the other, but by my preference for receiving a million dollars as opposed to not receiving it.
There is no “simply pick one over the other”. Either there would be a cause for such an event or there would not be a cause for such event. A subconscious weighting that would lead to “water over food” would be a cause for such an event. “Not dying” alone would be insufficient. The thought experiment is that there is nothing that causally weights one event over the other (at all)…in which case you need to either inject an acausal event to push to one over the other, or you have a donkey that wants to survive but doesn’t.
The preference for the million dollars may push you to deliberate on one over the other. It may be that your hand was closer to one, or that you were driven to one through mental processes you aren’t aware of, etc. But some causal event must tip the balance. If the universe is deterministic and there is no causal event that tips the balance, you’d be similar to the person with a disorder of diminished motivation and even the million dollars wouldn’t help. 😉
I am still a little bit confused about making a distinction between choice and free choice. It is hard to accept the idea of an unfree choice. However, I understand the idea that a machine can make what we call a choice. For example, it is possible for a program to choose the larger of two files. However, the choice will always be the same given the names of those two files. It is basically the same as saying a ball chooses to move when it is kicked. The words truly are confusing. Will we ever get past this language limitation?
The main distinction is the fact that the one option that we (must) decide on is done through a process of mentally weighing options. The wikipedia definition of “choice” seems to make sense:
“Choice involves mentally making a decision: judging the merits of multiple options and selecting one or more of them”.
Which doesn’t imply that all of the options are viable (only one need be).
“He then asks “Were you free to choose, that which did not occur to you to choose?” Of course the answer to that one is no, and I think most people will recognize such. This, for the most part, seems uncontroversial as well.”
That question settles the matter for me. So many times I have looked back at a conversation and thought: “Why didn’t I say this instead of what I said.” If I can’t think of it due to lack of knowledge or memory, I can’t do it. I could not have done otherwise.
This is the first article I’ve read on your site, and I look forward to reading more.
I would say I’m a reductionist, though not of the the “extreme” sort you describe, as to deny consciousness is absurd, and would say it is properly basic. I’d also class myself as a hard incompatibilist and agree with all but one (or two) points.
I don’t think that your rubber ball/cube/ice cube on a slope opposing all reductionism is accurate, only for the “extreme” sort you describe above. The fact that the arrangement of particles affects the whole body’s behaviour doesn’t disprove reductionism. This form of emergent behaviour is not the sort of emergentism that is contrasted with reductionism. This behaviour is explicable by the laws of physics of particles, merely scaled up to suit the scenario described. Whereas consciousness is not explicable by particle behaviour and is (possibly) an emergent property of the other contrasting form of emergentism. Though I have heard of problems with consciousness being an emergent property, but have not read into it yet.
Also I don’t agree that “downward causation is opposed to reductionism”, though don’t know enough to comment.
As a non-philosopher I found it accessible and engaging, keep it up!
Hi James, thanks for the response and for stoppin’ by. In philosophy, the concept of downward causation is considered an alternative to reductionism. Reductionism, at least in philosophy, says that the system is the sum of it’s parts (and that isn’t an extreme version). It doesn’t preclude emergent (large scale) phenomena but it does suggest that larger scale phenomenon is irrelevant to the working of the system itself (that such working can be explained by the parts alone). I’d suggest that roundness, rolling, wetness, etc…run into similar problems as “consciousness”, but that’s another topic. More important is the fact that these properties feed back “down” into what the parts do. 😉
Regardless, if you think downward causation is not opposed to reductionism, then our disagreements is simply semantic (and therefore it isn’t too important other than perhaps confusing others). My attempt for this post is to clear up some of the confusions of these words (especially when some use the word “reductionist” as some sort of “dirty word”). 😉
“In philosophy, the concept of downward causation is considered an alternative to reductionism.”
Our disagreement is semantic in terms of the definition of reductionism, but still leads to a disagreement on whether there can be downwards causation.
Downwards causation seems to me to be meaningless. Causation is temporal and not relevant to reductionism.
I think it is due to disputing the nature of the irreducible part.
E.g. Ice having a lower coefficient of friction than rubber is due to the differing arrangement of electrons.
An electric field extends infinitely, so there should be no ontological difference to its role if isolated or in a system with other particles.
The fact that two systems of the same parts arranged differently act differently does not disprove reductionism. Both particular systems are sums of their parts (including space and time).
So how physical systems work is reductionist, as far as I can see.
“It does suggest that larger scale phenomenon is irrelevant to the working of the system itself.”
“More important is the fact that these properties feed back “down” into what the parts do.”
Addressed above…maybe.
By extreme reductionism I meant what you referred to in the article, namely people who reject large scale objects and consciousness.
“I’d suggest that roundness, rolling, wetness, etc…run into similar problems as “consciousness””.
I think this form of emergentism is distinct from consciousness being emergent, since the physical phenomena are explicable by the sum of their parts and the space-time
they inhabit. E.g. the physical phenomena of wetness is explained by the viscosity of a fluid, fluid dynamics etc., though the experience of wetness is a part of one’s consciousness.
I think consciousness is not reducible to matter, but am not clued up enough on alternative viewpoints e.g. dual-aspect theory or neutral monism.
Back to the original article:
Why is free will incompatible in a deterministic and indeterministic universe, when neither are necessarily reductionist?
I agree that neither necessitates free will, but the only reason I can think of free will not existing in either is reductionism.
My syllogism –
1. Free will (a function of the mind) is completely dependent on the brain.
2. The brain is a physical thing (subject and reducible to physical laws).
3. We cannot affect physical laws, therefore we have no free will.
Where free will means the ability to make choices not dependent on anything else.
Determinism seems superfluous to denying free will.
“Free will is equally as incompatible with a framework that accounts for the wholes.”
Because the whole are incorporated into my reductionist ontology.
Hopefully that was slightly clearer than mud! Please excuse the poor and repetitive language. 🙂
No doubt I’ll not agree with any of what I said tomorrow.
Determinism seems superfluous to denying free will. — ignore that.
James,
Good thoughts. 🙂
I’m not sure where the temporal nature of such is relevant either, but these are side topics. Downward simply means that the large scale objects properties are important to the effect.
Let’s be clear how we understand these things. We understand that the different arrangement leads to the lower coefficient which leads to a property of the coefficient, because we observe the property for that arrangement/coefficient. We understand the nature of how a coefficient relates to the friction, because we observe/measure the friction for the coefficient. The quality of having “less friction” or “more friction” is a property of object X with coefficient Y, not because we know why that’s the case, because we observe it is the case.
I know that sounds complicated. What’s important, however, is that such “friction” doesn’t exist until the parts are put together in a certain configuration in which we recognize the quality that arises from the configuration. The property is inherent to that configuration / coefficient, and the property itself (which is an effect of it’s large scale configuration) is what, for example, might cause a “slide” rather than a “stick” action. Technically, the very same particles (parts) could be configured differently which will output very different properties (due to a different coefficient)…so it isn’t the parts alone but rather the configuration of the parts, that produce a specific ontological large scale property which feeds back down into the behavior of the particles. Note that we can’t even measure a coefficient without assessing the large scale shape (another property).
Ah, gotcha. Yes, that is the more extreme reductionism side indeed (so it’s good you haven’t gone to that level). I’ve known people who hold such positions. 🙂
I’d suspect that consciousness arises the same way, and that it is “physical phenomenon” just as much as “wetness” or “roundness”, but that has to do more with my theory of consciousness. Something we can’t really get into here.
I’d suggest both downward causation as well as holism are equally as incompatible with free will as reductionism. In other words, these aren’t some kind of special systems that reach beyond the causal/acausal dichotomy (both which are incompatible with free will) – and that’s my primary point. That free will is incoherent regardless of reductionism or not.
That is a fine syllogism, given the premises. But the illogical nature of free will extends even beyond any reductionistic or even physical notions (keep in mind that I don’t agree with non-physical notions, but rather that such doesn’t matter). In other words, even if we assess that things are holistic, logically, free will doesn’t fly. In fact, even if we assert some non-material or spiritual assertion, or some non-temporal assertion, and so on…free will is too logically incoherent to fit in with any model. I go over these in great detail in my book.
That being said, I do agree with you that the mind is completely dependent on the brain, and that the brain is physical. The only distinctions I’m making is, even if those premises weren’t the case (which we agree they are), free will can still be shown as logically incoherent. 😉
Catch-ya later good sir!
This is a great post, so kudos for that. How ya been bud?
Anyway, I will just ‘free form’ (not free of course *rolls eyes) a certain thought I had while reading this;
Regarding the ability to choose differently. The very act of thinking or calculating or ‘weighing options’, the act of deciding what it is you want to do or should do or want to do in relation to what you should want to do and in relation to what you could do and in relation to what you could want to do in relation to a potential infinity of why’s, is a ‘pseudo’ reality in which one is carrying out the potential causal reality in their heads. So when I mentioned prior my favored number example, when I kept stating I am aware the numbers exist, or am aware of all the fruit I am aware of existing and have my knowledge of associations regarding them, when I am making a decision about choosing something, in my mind I am able to with varying accuracy albeit, carry out simulations of the realities in which I would be making each choice, and this is the very bare concept of what it is to make a decision and choose between potential possibilities. You then fault the result, the product of this thought, you fault the thinker, the chooser, the decider, and say “because you have made a decision, you cannot make a decision”, you have automatically created a perfect trap, which is due to your 1:1 ratio microscope inspection of the tautological nature of nature. The act of thinking, the process of weighing options in ones mind, is the proof that those options were possible, the conscious observer doing the willful weighing, is making a willful choice, for reason/s absolutely fated and absolutely not, so after the weighing they have arrived at the fruit of their calculation, the very reason for the need to calculate, to weigh, to choose, is to arrive at the result, or the product of the process of choosing, when they arrive at this result, the decision, the choice they have made through the simulations of causal outcomes according to all potential choices (think chess, think before making a move, calculating all possible moves of all pieces on the board for not only that turn but potentially more and more) you than say, ‘you did not make that choice’. That I believe is one of the cruxes of this argument, and I would say, that one who willed themselves to calculate the potentials, is a will, willing themselves to calculate potentials, in order to make a choice, which they will make, according to the freedom the posses in their abilities to calculate.
Hi Daniel, hope all is well. 🙂
Just to clarify, I’ve never suggested “because you’ve made a decision, you cannot make a decision”, rather that, if the universe is deterministic, the “weighing” of options, and the act of deciding, all come about through causes. They cannot be otherwise than what the causes for them dictate, and likewise, the decision cannot be otherwise than what the causes that dictates it produce (including the “weighing” of options in a very specific way dictated by causes). Just because we weigh decisions doesn’t mean that all of the options we weigh are possible, only the one dictated by that very act of “weighing” being the very way it is (must be) due to causes, all the way down the line. It’s not “because you’ve made the decision” that the decision is the only possibility in a deterministic universe, it’s “because the causality that precedes the decision cannot logically lead to a different decision” if every event is causal (including the weighing, etc).
Have a great day! 🙂
The main point is that only under a deterministic philosophy does it matter what children are taught. If people had free will, their choices would be random and meaningless. Either philosophy makes it insane to say that someone deserves reward and punishment for their actions.
Hello, I’ve just come across your site and read a few posts. It’s something I’ve been thinking about for a fair few years now. I was thinking that some day I might write a book about the lack of free will and what that means for certain concepts of morality and justice, and possibly on to how that might shape the politics and society of the future.
I guess I’ll just read your book for now!
Also – this is completely irrelevant but I thought it was amusing – on the Fred and Barney example above, to begin with while it says Fred keeps the money, it doesn’t say what he did with the wallet. Equally, while Barney returns the wallet, it doesn’t specify that he returns the money! My first thought was that it was somehow a trick question. 🙂
Hi psychoserenity. Thanks for stopping by! You should read as much as you can on the topic and if you have something to contribute, the more books out there the better! This topic doesn’t get close to the attention it should. My next book is going to be on ethics (morality) without free will.
As for the Fred/Barney example, I can see how you might think such a trick question. 😉
“So what happens when compatibilists like Baumeister run around shouting “free will exists” with their own specialized definition of free will? People use such to re-enforce their own intuitions and ideas surrounding free will. And the worst part is, it allows them to push a load of other important topics off the table of discourse.”
Yes, I am tired of people shouting that things do or do not exist without first giving definitions. I can almost always state definitely my reasons why something exists or not given a definition.
“Psychologists and psychiatrists will eventually figure out all human behavior.”
This one is laughable because each person themselves is unable to figure out everything they do. I don’t think all human behavior can be explained even though it is totally deterministic. The subconscious gets in our way.
Great point, even if we accept that there was an entirely psychological reason, that doesn’t imply such will or even can be entirely “figured out”.
Hey bud, how ya been? I came across some of your art work and you (or the causal nature that is what you are) is very skilled and talented!
I was wondering if you can state how; Free will does not exist. But, a person can make a choice. And, Free will does not exist, but fatalism does not exist?
Thanks
Hey Daniel. 🙂
It doesn’t follow from the lack of free will that creativity, skill, talent, and so on isn’t a part of a causal process (and so is choosing btw). Lacking free will does not imply fatalism as this infographic points out: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-vs-fatalism-infographic/
Take care.
I totally agree that FAD+ is problematic. I am a proponent of scientific determinism and score only 71% (normalized average score) on scidet scale, I believe the world is largely unpredictable (complex deterministic systems) and score 66% on unpred. I am not a fatalist (and know what fatalism is) and score 35% on it, and I am a compatibilist and score 50% on FW (answering mostly “3”, because the questions are so ambiguous). In addition to what you pointed out, the FW subscale mixes up libertarian FW, compatibilst FW and moral responsibility, making it pretty useless for assessing FW beliefs. There is IMHO a better newer inventory: Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., & Ross, L. T. (2014). The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility. Consciousness and Cognition, 25, 27–41. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.006. I’d like to hear your thoughts on that one, I am thinking about using it in one of my studies.
Thanks, that scale is getting better (though looking at it I see some problems with it as well). Unfortunately most of the studies out there right now are still using FAD+ and the older studies used FAD.
Here is a link to this one you’ve displayed for people to read.
And thanks for stopping by!
Even if studies “suggest that a lack of free will leads to unethical actions”, it does not make much of a difference since free will is a false belief. Keeping false beliefs because of fear of bad consequences is something that people often do. This of course is a fine example of why these people don’t have the “freedom” to believe the truth.
That’s true. Not only is the conclusion they make false, but it leads to many people using an “argument from adverse consequence” fallacy.
This is a good article, but your analysis of why people think they have free will is wrong. This is one issue that I am going discuss in an upcoming reply to ‘The Marionette’s Lament’ which I will post in the next few weeks. Please check out my blog! The web address is WesCammenga.com.
Hi Wesley – thanks for stopping by. I’ll be interested in reading your response to ‘The Marionette’s Lament‘. I happen to agree with the assessment Harris makes regarding Dennett’s criticism.
Also, I truly do think it’s the lack of not seeing all of the variables that create the intuitive feeling of free will, at least for the most part, but I’ll certainly check out what you have to say on the matter. 😉
I am not very bright so I unquestionably believed what I was told by others. Now that I have a lifetime of reflection I can recount the times that I have said in reflection, why did I do that as well as I see a compulsion I felt. I think we can’t handle the truth that we have no free will. Free will ideology also allows us to think how good or bad the decisions we and others supposedly make and it can lead us to believe or reach conclusions that are not realistic and or truthful.
Enter Fate.
the development of events beyond a person’s control, regarded as determined by a supernatural power
I think there is a reasonable possibility that the way Fate is accomplished is how you have suggested. It seems we are observers.
As for the “supernatural”, I call it the power, it decides, not you. Here are some lyrics from the song IRIS (please note the name of the song)
Lyrics from Iris
And I don’t want the world to see me
Cause I don’t think that they’d understand
When everything’s made to be broken
I just want you to know who I am
Some would say the GooGoo dolls wrote this and that may be true but I think there is a strong possibility that these words in particular came from the “power” though it appears that it was the freewill of the writer that wrote these words.
I hope you are not off put by my lack of scientific reasoning.
Lisa
PS if you have any thoughts on this, please let me know, as there aren’t many who will consider that free will is an illusion, I am reforming on this.
Trick,
Excellent piece on the illusion of free will. I noticed one typo, and two confusing references that I would communicate to you privately (write or call me). Thanks for you efforts to illuminate the illusion for any who might be interested, (and a few that might not).
Steve
Hi Steve. As a blog post there is bound to be typos and mistakes, and I love them pointed out so I can fix them. I’ll shoot you an email. Thanks, ‘Trick. 🙂
I think this is a good post because it helps clear up a lot of confusion. Would you mind if I read it and talked about it in one of my videos?
No I don’t mind, go ahead and read/talk about it. Let me know when your video is up and I’ll take a looksee! 🙂
I think it is impossible to know exactly all the details of what happened in the past. This is why I find it stupid when people argue about whether certain historical events happened. They can argue forever about some things which are unknowable.
Some proof reading is needed (e.g., “their” -→ “there”). But of course you had no alternative but to make that mistake.
/@
Thanks for stoppin’ by Ant Allan …and many thanks for pointing that out. I fixed it to “there” (There were so many possessive “theirs” in the graphic that I just slipped and used it for “
theirthere is an implicit burden of proof”). Let me know if you see any others I may have missed. 😉Since we can show that free will is illogical, it is possible to disprove it unlike many other claims. Since we can take no credit or blame for events before our existence whether causal or acausal, we know that the effects are not “up to us”.
Hey Trick, how ya been? To be brief and to the point, I am asking if you might give me permission to use the dialogue we had throughout your blog, in writings of my own? I also would not intend on using any of your personal identity or information related to the text, in my text, unless the conditions of your letting me use it, insisted I do such a thing. Hope all is well.
Hi Daniel, I normally wouldn’t mind, but the discussions we had were sort of lengthy and google has a problem when it comes to large amounts of duplicate content. If you’d like to use it I may remove it from my own page so the page doesn’t “take a hit” in ranking. That would be fine, just let me know. And of course do email me a link to your blog. 😉
Oh, I am sorry but I believe if whatever I am working on will be consumed by a public it will be via physical copy book. If that were to be put online, I suppose that is where your repetition would come. I am not entirely sure what you mean about google and taking hits, nor do I have a blog. I can change every other word (using a thesaurus I suppose) if that would be better?
What I mean is, google creates a hit in search engine ranking when it detects duplicate content (it prioritizes one over the other – which one a factor I can’t control, and knocks the other down dramatically in ranking), so the post gets seen by less people. It’s just bad SEO to have duplicate content. 😉
If you can change enough of the words, or reword each, that would be best. Or if you want the original text on yours, I’m saying I’ll give it to you and remove from my own. Up to you. 😉
Actually free will is the original and natural state, but we forget it since we learn to do what we’re forced to by society and what our parents etc. expects of us. In other words we learn to choose based on outer alternatives, not based on our free will, and that creates an illusion of free choice.
By the way, this is not an intellectual problem that you can solve by thinking, you have to find the free will to know it. Look up something called Alkuajatus – The Original Thought, in it, you’ll get clear knowledge about how to find it again.
Hi Tony, thanks for the visit to my blog. When I say we don’t have “free will” I mean so in light of this definition: Free Will
There are various reasons why I think this definition the one of importance. I’d be curious if your definition of the term is similar or entirely different.
Take care. 🙂
There is 50% probability that free will is true, and 50% probability that determinism is true. Until there is 100% certain that one of them is true – both are mathematically matter of probability.
Thanks for the visit. 😉
I’d suggest a more accurate depiction if determinism is 50% probable would be: determinism 50% probable, indeterminism 50% probable, free will 0% probable (or 100% incompatible with either determinism or indeterminism).
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/hard-incompatibilist-not-hard-determinist/
“For some, philosophy isn’t about mental masturbation, or academic praise, but entirely about changing the world. And such a philosopher needs to become a proponent for getting that information to others, and that means working outside of their philosophical box and into marketing their ideas.”
For me it is totally about changing the world. I want everyday people to understand what has long been hidden from them.
You are spot on with this essay/post. I am trying to remember if any Free Will supporter ever came back with a if we don’t have Free Will then how come we are conscious… but it could have happened. The source of this is the illusion that consciousness has the power of libertarian control.. which it doesn’t. The Free Will illusion itself is tied in with the feeling that we make conscious choices via our consciousness. Too much in the brain happens that we are not conscious of,hence we are deluded.
Exactly Steve (and thanks for the visit). The only reason I’ve written this post is because I’ve had multiple people (one very recently) suggest to me that if free will didn’t exist than neither can consciousness (probably as an attempt to suggest that the idea of free will not existing is absurd considering we are conscious). The point for this post is that they are mutually exclusive existence assessments.
With indeterminism one cause could lead to more than one effect (in different instances). The important thing is that since we can’t control indeterminism, it does not offer a loophole for free will. In fact, having multiple possible uncontrollable effects makes the case for free will even worse than under determinism, where there is only one uncontrollable effect.
Right, but indeterminism implies an event that isn’t caused that changes the trajectory. A cause can’t without an acausal event to do such work. 😉
So you’re saying that it wouldn’t be the cause doing the causing? The cause may precede the effect in both instances but the cause isn’t causing the effect, because if it were then the effect would be the same?
No, it’s doing the causing, but based on the acausal starting point that leads to such. To put it another way, once an acausal event is “out and about” the causality cannot be otherwise than the entirely causal events that spring forth from that point on (unless another acausal event happens). Acausal events can be seen as “starting points” that can change a causal trajectory. In an entirely causal universe (one where no acausal events happen), there can be no “indeterminism” as all events must lead to a specific effect dictated by the entire line (rather than a line and an acausal event).
For an effect to be different, the cause of such needs to be different, which means an acausal event produced that difference that wouldn’t have happened in an entirely causal universe. 😉
You are of course correct, Trick.
“They need to remove some of their ego and pride and not be afraid to ask others to help spread the word, or help spread their articles and graphics on social media or websites”
When I read posts like this, I’m tempted to follow through on some of this advice. Then I recall the existence of internet sensation Stefan Molyneux and conclude that it’s too tall an order. We can insert some other charlatan along those lines, but I’ll always point to Molyneux because he’s mastered the art of playing top-notch philosopher where others haven’t. I think he highlights the counterpoint to your post better than anyone, considering that he too is all for making philosophy consumable for the general public. What’s more, he’s the most popular anti-academic philosopher of our era, by leaps and bounds. A tragic fact. It’s one example where the absence of institutional red-flags does many in his audience more harm than good (I’m referring to the newcomers in his subscriber base, not the dogmatists who listen to him because he safely reaffirms what they already believe). Point is, propaganda in 2015 is more sophisticated than ever, and if you’re going to compete on the grand scale, you can’t do it on merit alone. It’s the online equivalent of the wild west, and to come out on top in the eyes of casual viewers, you’d have to stoop to his level; rhetorical devices, appeals to ego, poisoning the well, etc. Call it ego, but I’d rather not do that.
This is usually not something interlocutors have to to worry about in elitist environments, because people in the audience would pick up on it in a heartbeat. This is one reason why I’m more sympathetic to elitism than to populism nowadays.
I can sympathize with what you are saying here. Stefan is a wonderful marketer of his philosophy even if a horrible philosopher. And creationists are often good at marketing their wrong-headed ideas as well. And I agree, one may need to “stoop” to some rhetorical devices, imagery, and so on. But this does not imply one needs to stoop to dishonesty, appeals to ego, or poisoning the well. They simply need to stoop to “being entertaining” in the way they disseminate information and use various techniques so they are “seen”. The fact of the matter is, Stefan has more people aligning with his horrible philosophy today than most academic philosophers. Elitism just won’t cut it if we actually care about getting a philosophical understanding out to the general population. It’s just preaching to the choir…and a very small choir at that. For someone like me, I might as well not do “philosophy” at all if it can’t make a change in the world (or in as many individuals as possible). People like Sam Harris know how to market, and I don’t think he is being disingenuous at all (I’d also suggest his reach far out extends Stefan – perhaps a counterpoint to your counterpoint).
It’s the same reason various scientists battle creationists and even “market” scientific ideas (Dawkins, Pinker, etc.). If we keep science within academia only, there is nothing to combat the fact that a majority of the U.S. doesn’t believe in evolution…and all of the problems that go along with that. The fact of the matter is, there are things we can learn from people like Molyneux, even if such isn’t philosophy (I only wish I had his charisma and oratory capabilities). 😉
By this logic, Dennett should also stop promoting atheism and unbelief in an afterlife, since there are plenty of people who think morals depend on religion.
I can sympathize a bit with his desire not to be mistaken for a fatalist, but why not just be clear about what he really believes instead of playing word games?
Well put Ed. I find his position on free will a redefinition that goes against what the majority of people intuitively feel they possess. It’s similar to redefining god as just “the universe”…in which case such a semantic of god “exists”…it’s just not the definition commonly associated with the word. And thanks for the visit!
As I mentioned at greater length on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/groups/2218407727/permalink/10153175005457728/), I think the physics in this post is worrying, even if it isn’t a problem for your free will skepticism. Whether or not the indeterminism in quantum mechanics is far from a physically settled fact, and there are a number of respectable interpretations of the formalism in which indeterminism isn’t a result of any hidden variables. The GRW collapse theory is probably the most well-known and respectable of the collapse interpretations that feature ontological indeterminism; it’s important to be careful about this stuff.
Hi Jon, thanks for stopping by. 🙂
There is nothing in this article that suggests I’m saying only a nonlocal hidden variable interpretation applies. Only that “ontological probability” is incoherent (which I didn’t really elaborate on too much in this particular article but will certainly do so in another). Also note that “ontological indeterminism” is not the same as “ontological probabilism”. If acausal events happen, ontological indeterminism happens. For this article my concern is over the conflation between ontology and epistemology, and I think people do this mistakenly for QM. I also responded on facebook, so you can respond there. 🙂
It would be interesting if the mind partly worked on an internal Darwinian model–“random”(not in the ontological sense, but like a gambling device or a random number generator) generation of ideas, fragments of ideas and connections could be done very rapidly on a subconscious level.
Higher order cognitive processes would screen out most before they even reach our awareness while the competition between the last two or several would enter our awareness.
This would be consistent with the feeling of intuition many people have as well as the phenomenon of odd thoughts seeming to pop into the mind (where did that come from?) and being interpreted in various situations as artistic inspiration, disturbing intrusive thoughts or even communication with another entity.
I’d think many thoughts and experiences probably come about this pseudo-random way, dreams, daydreaming, obscure thoughts, and so on. 😉
I’m 100% for a welfare state, progressive income tax, a lot of spending on public works and education as well as a national health care service.
But I’m not sure about total equality even as an ideal as I don’t see how without significant incentives(which would lead to at least some inequality) we could consistently ensure that there would be people willing to do necessary jobs that have a high level of stress, require a lot of education, are dangerous, etc.
Of course there are many reasons people work besides money, ranging from fulfillment in their work to boredom without it, but I’d worry that these motivations would be less predictable and dependable on the level of society as a whole.
Indeed Ed, I absolutely agree with you.
The important part is understanding that such stems from a need for such incentives, and when those incentives are “the reaching of a better state than others”, rather than “increasing everyone’s state which includes one’s own”, we run into some justification problems. Of course given the state of the world and the mindsets of people as we currently know them, we don’t have many options to work for those types of incentives without such being at our own expense (as I suggested in the article). Ideally, everyone would work for the betterment of all, which assumes everyone is rational. Realistically, that’s not going to happen. 😉
Thanks again for the visit.
This post helped me understand the difference between what exists and our knowledge. The gold bar was always behind door B whether or not someone knows it.
Yes there are always reasons for our actions. But a reason is not a cause of our will. Our will is always free; meaning no reason compels our will. Though we always have determined reasons for our choices, those determined reasons do not cause our choices. The will is the freedom of going forward in consciousness. It is the self actualization which as beings that already partake of consciousness, are able to determine what will be. All willing is uncaused ,pure freedom of self [consciousness] which though it always exists with preceding reason to want to act, is never compelled to act. The will is the agent[self] over and above it’s determinants that causes actions. The actions of the self are always free; uncaused by determinants. That is what a self is la free agent capable of uncaused willing. The choices are not random but they are free.
Hi rose-ellen,
Thanks for stopping by. 🙂
This doesn’t make sense. If there is a reason, that is a cause.
An uncaused event cannot have a willer (cannot be caused by a willer).
The “self” must be a determinant for it to be “the action of the self”. And the self itself either has a cause (a reason) for it or it doesn’t. Either way, such stems to events outside of the self’s control.
Anyway, just some food-for-thought. Think about it some more. 😉
An uncaused event is a willer[a being] willing.The being has[given] reasons for willing this or that but the given reasons do not, like a domino, CAUSE the willer to will this or that. Willing is the free movement of the being into the future. The willer brings his/her already determined reasons to the act of willing but the act of willing is not the result[effect] of the reasons but a freedom to will.[rationally; in accordance to determined reasons] The free movement of the willer into the future is in every instance of willing the manifestation of freedom of being.
Hey rose-ellen. I’m not sure how you can say an uncaused event is a willer willing. The very process of being a “willer” or a willer “willing” are causal. For an event to be “uncaused” such event cannot be causally constrained by a willer.
You are saying that “willing is the free movement of the being into the future”, but if such is not free from the willer, such is not free movement. And just as important, the willer itself is not uncaused. And if there is an uncaused event anywhere down the line, such must be outside of what is “willed” (logically). 😉
Yes,the being did not create him/herself,The being is caused by;either natural processes or immaterial ground of being[god]. I believe the later. So though the being is caused, once existing , part and parcel of its existence is consciousness which is the ability to be the prime mover of it’s will [choices, decisions].Though the being exists with constraints [determining factors; pre existing conditions, so to speak] its ability to will is independent of those conditions. Being [for a human], is a conscious willed mover. The will is immaterial as is consciousness therefore not subject to material causes.
Even if one was to postulate immaterial causation, such still cannot remove the constraints of logic. If one has no control over their own creation, that would also include any immaterial condition. It doesn’t make sense to say one can “will” independant of all conditions, as the process of willing itself is reliant on a willer. The willer must be configured the very way they are based on their “creation” or based on any material or immaterial causation. As Sam Harris says:
“Even if you believe that every human being harbors an immortal soul, the problem of responsibility remains: I cannot take credit for the fact that I do not have the soul of a psychopath.”
I cannot understand what “uncaused event” is.
Is there really such thing?
I thought the only uncaused event is the beginning of the world.
Probably not (depends on the interpretation of quantum mechanics that happens to be correct – if any), but even if there was, such would be incompatible with free will. 😉
The willers’ will is not constrained because it is not caused. The willers will, like” the origin of the universe” is uncaused, meaning that once a consciousness exists[ a being, a self] that self is in every instance imposing its free will on the contingencies it faces.[given reasons] The willer is the prime mover acting freely on whatever contingencies it faces. Willing is being.
Even if we accept the claim that people or our consciousness comes into being without a cause (which is itself logically problematic), this doesn’t help, as the acausal event of (a self/willer) coming into being was entirely outside of the willers control. The willer had no choice to come to be the exact way they did, in the exact configuration they did, to make the exact decisions they did.
This is the very problem with any acausal event – such an event is always outside of any willing. And once in existence it can only causally act based on the configuration it had no control over to begin with.
Your moonburn analogy gets the point across very clearly. Words need to have an agreed upon meaning if we are to make sense of anything at all. My other issue with Dennett is the word “desirable”. Anything is desirable if someone has the desire for it!
Exactly, and some changing of definitions can be quite dangerous (as with “free will”).
For example, if you look at the image at the top, if a person was to define the word “Jump” as “to be careful”, they may think it’s a good thing to tell a child to jump around the cliff they are near (as they are telling them to be careful around it), but if the child only knows the common semantic, the person telling them to “jump” around a cliff is inadvertently causing more harms than they realize with their uncommon definitional shift (as the kid hops around near it). 😉
You give four reasons as to why Dennett and others define free will the way they do I would like to add a fifth reason. Many of these Compatibalists are Calvinists. They don’t believe in free will, but at the same time, they have to justify eternal torment.
Hi Steve, thanks for stopping by.
For some that very well could be the case, though I thought most Calvinists would actually assert their no free will position(not be a compatibilist)? I could be wrong here. Dennett, however, is an atheist – so such does not apply to him and many compatibilists that take his side. 😉
There is also some important distinctions to be had between causal determinism and religious predestination.
I have a lot less of a problem with philosophical or liberal theological definitions of “God” than I have with Dennett`s wordplay about free will.
The concept of God has sometimes been defined in a fairly abstract terms even in conventional theology and there there has often been a tension between the image of the man in the sky primarily concerned with local events and the great unmoved mover or ultimate cosmic power.
Furthermore, deism, pantheism and other unorthodox God-concepts are part of the culture and easy to understand in theory (note: I’m a skeptic regarding ALL such beliefs) whereas “you couldn’t have done otherwise, but still had free will” is just confusing for the sake of muddling the issue.
Hi Ed, thanks for the visit. To be honest I also take more issue with Dennett’s wordplay about free will than I do about the “god” word. That being said, such does offer much confusion, and is often seen when people of religion quote Einstein or the like, as if his idea of “god” supports their own anthropomorphic deity. 😉
While I don’t believe in free will and have a naturalistic worldview, I don’t see more than one potential outcome as contradictory.
Cause A + Cause B must lead to Effect AB1 or AB2,
Causes A and B have occurred,
Effect AB2 was the result.
Maybe both are equally possible, so they occur separately in parallel universes. Maybe each effect happens 50% of the time.
Then you are suggesting there is nothing that causes effect AB1 over AB2 or vice versa. You are smuggling in an acausal event. 🙂
I am glad you wrote this because this seems to be the most misunderstood thing I have come across when trying to explain it to people. Not knowing why something happens does not mean it had no cause or that someone willed it out of nothing.
Thanks Chandler! 🙂
Yeah, I come across it often. In fact, I write many of these articles based on how I see free will defenders argue.
Hi Trick,
You might have some insight to add to this discussion that is of actual merit, and I certainly look forward to hearing it. But before then, I suggest that you thoroughly read the actual published paper, including the most important part, the methods. It is clear from your small piece here that you have not done your homework; although you do seem intelligent enough to have an informed opinion, you may have missed the boat on this one.
Sincerely,
Jesse Bengson
Hi Jesse,
Thanks for the visit. Do understand that my criticism here isn’t with the “paper” or it’s methodologies, but rather the article I linked to that uses the “free will” term in correlation with addressing the paper (and misunderstands causation as well). As my post says “An article on the ucdavis.edu website suggests that this could possibly be labeled “free will”.” I also quote directly the relevant parts of my assessment of the article.
And do understand that my post isn’t about knocking down the “paper” (which I deem as valuable) but rather these poor assessments of “free will” or what ambiguous words such as “randomness” actually imply, in the article that is addressing the paper. This is an important distinction for my criticism. I do see that you are a media contact for the Center for Mind and Brain, so perhaps some clarifications on why the “free will” term was decided on here may be in order. But from my perspective I hopped on the (correct) boat. 🙂
Also note that claims like this “It inserts a random effect that allows us to be freed from simple cause and effect,” are very strong claims. Even at the quantum level we don’t know if there are events that are actually free from cause and effect (it depends on the interpretation of QM). But even if we accept such, that does not open the “free will” door (hence the greater criticism).
Take care,
‘Trick
Conceivability has always just struck me as such a strange guide to metaphysical possibility. We can be (and often are) mistaken about what we can and can’t “really conceive of,” and even if that weren’t the case I really struggle to see why logical coherence should be the arbiter of metaphysical possibility. Not implying a contradiction is a ridiculously low bar to meet, and it seems like we should make stronger demands of our metaphysics. I’ve never been a big fan of Chalmers.
Keep in mind that Dennett can’t help but be wrong, so we should have a little more compassion for him. I also dislike mocking anyone’s name; it comes across as an ad hominem attack even if you explain it. So instead of “Dennettrhea” how about “Dennett’s Delusion”? It appropriately echoes “The God Delusion”.
Yeah, I was trying to suggest that he can’t help but be wrong (or others that agree with his position for that matter) by displaying such with sort of a “mind disease” analogy and giving it a sort of “clinical” name for the meme spreading of such ideas, …but I suppose Dennettrhea could come off as a bit harsh (Though not so sure Dennett’s Delusion is less harsh). 😉
I added a disclaimer for what it’s worth. 🙂
“Dennett’s Delusion” (as a possessive) is less of an ad hominem and more a critique of a bad idea. It tells you who is having that bad idea, rather than that the person is himself bad. Of course, in popular terms, people equate the validity of an idea with the worth of a person as a human being. That’s one of the benefits of realizing the illusion of free will – we don’t do that.
To be honest, I wouldn’t equate either to an ad-hom fallacy. After all, it says the main symptom of the “disease” is wrongheaded compatibilistic thinking about the topic of free will that overrides any concern over the type of free will that most people feel they possess….and that is covered thoroughly in the article. I also don’t think anyone will think such word as being serious, or what the argument is about. That being said, I can see how such could potentially be perceived by some as an insult, but it’s actually the displaying of why Dennett is wrong that really leads to such. If I had said the disease of Dennetrhea leads to brilliant, logically sound reasoning on the topic of free will…I don’t think the word “Dennetrhea” itself would be equated negatively. But the negative aspect is actually in the fact of the poor reasoning itself that “Dennetrhea” leads to – which is displayed in the article. 😉
” It’s morally important, that’s why free will is important, because we want to be, and should want to be, morally competent agents – agent who can take responsibility for actions.”
If I read Dennett’s books, I will see what his idea of morality is and if it is the kind of morality “worth wanting”.
I’ve read them. Dennett doesn’t really have a moral theory, he simply likes to say that free will is what gives moral responsibility. Read here if you want to know his usage of “responsibility”: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/dennetts-free-will/
This is truly one of the best posts because it directly clears up the confusing definitions of the words. I will be linking to it many times over.
It’s really too bad that the words necessary and sufficient or any substitutes have to be used at all. Throwing the rock caused the window to break / replacing the glass will cause the window to once again keep out the rain and do other things windows are supposed to do.
But instead of the “leads to” or “proceeds from” issue, I find the situational context of the word “cause” interesting (as in are we discussing the physics of the immediate situation and nothing else, complex chains of causality over time, individual human motivation, interpersonal relationships, economics?)
Yeah, it’s all the same causality, such is just addressing if one necessitates the other logically. Don’t even get me started on the word choice for a whole lot of jargon terms, such drives me crazy as philosophy and clarity need to go hand in hand, and such needs to be understood by everyone. There is way too much obscurity and ambiguity in academic philosophical language.
As always, thanks for your visit and valuable input Ed.
If zombies existed there would have to be some difference even if it was so subtle we couldn’t measure it with current scientific knowledge and technology and this is true whatever metaphysics one subscribes to.
In a materialistic universe the zombie brain would not produce consciousness while the true human brain would and if all mental phenomena are caused by physical phenomena, the two types of brains would be doing something different or be structured differently.
But even if dualism is true, the (hypothetical) separate mind would interact with the brain and thus there would have to be a reason why some brains have no true minds paired with them and there would be some potentially observable lack of brain/mind interaction in zombies.
I always found the neuroscience experiments as an interesting side show. We don’t need them to disprove an illogical concept like free will. Why do you think people place such importance on these studies?
Some people prefer empirical evidence, even though they don’t realize that free will also has no empirical evidence for it, anymore than parralel train tracks converging in the distant horizon has empirical evidence for it. 🙂
Even if the idea of free will was logically possible, there is only one way a human soul or mind having free will could work given the information from these studies.
It would have to be capable of time travel with the freely willed decision made right now being projected to the nervous system of a few moments ago (philosophers get ready to start arguing for this position 🙂 !!!).
But the capacity for neural impulse time travel would be very limited, or people could change what they did hours, weeks, or years in the past, which would make the world a fascinating place, but doesn’t seem to be way it is.
Interesting thoughts. Time travel wouldn’t help either, as such would have to time travel the only way it could, and change such the only way it could. Thanks for the visit. 🙂
So “I” is not a cause but a result.
What a relief. This is true enlightenment.
This world is beyond joke.
Those who advocate the concept of free will, and try to justify it using logic, rely on overly-simplified logic, redefinitions, and the pseudoscientific method rather than the scientific method. Pseudoscience always starts with a forgone conclusion (aka wishful thinking) then scratches around trying to find things to support that conclusion. Science starts with confirming that an observed phenomenon actually exist before wasting its time trying to explain it. Has free will been empirically determined to exist? No!
Simple epistemic logic, such as “if A then B”, is adequate for explaining many things, but it is wholly inadequate for analysing, explaining, and designing highly-complex adaptive systems. If I decide to say “Hello.”, then I vocalise it, does not in any way lead to the implication that I have free will.
You, Sam Harris, Bruce Hood (and others) have more than adequately explained that it is the timing of the events in the brain that is crucially important in discussions about agency and free will. Experiment after experiment provides us with independently confirmed empirical evidence that the decision to take an action is made within the brain before we become consciously aware of making that decision. Not only is free will an illusion, the agent that we refer to as me/myself/I is also an illusion[1]. Most people consider these scientific facts to be abhorrent and no amount of evidence will dissuade them from clinging to their beliefs that humans are independent autonomous agents who possess free will.
We cannot perform a physical action without: firstly, preloading the required instructions into the pre-supplementary motor area and the lateral pre-motor cortex (the preparatory stage of performing the action); secondly, transferring instructions to the supplementary motor area proper and the primary motor cortex (the initiation and execution phases of performing the action). These operations are highly complex neuronal activities that operate at a sub-conscious level (fortunately!) using heuristics rather than rational logic. The brain (and neural networks in general) perform heuristic processing orders of magnitude faster than rational logic. Our conscious self emerges from the continual time-domain integration of the outputs from a plethora of neural subnets. The time constants of this integration means that our emergent awareness is running at least 200 milliseconds behind reality, and it often emerges days, weeks, or even months, after the subconscious level at which our decisions were made.
One of the most difficult jobs to perform is that of an air-sea rescue helicopter pilot. This job represents, I think, the ultimate logical and scientific tests to advocates of free will. Imagine a pilot who is coping with heavy sea swell, high wind gusts, a low fuel warning, and an engine overheating warning, during a rescue operation. Now, please clearly explain two simple yet profoundly important things, using logic and science: the precise roll that free will is playing in the operation; the boundaries between mind, body, machine, and the operational procedure manuals. I’m fairly certain that anyone who tries to provide that explanation will rapidly discover that they also suffer from having two other illusions: the illusion of explanatory depth and the illusion of explanatory power![2]
Continued arguments to support free will despite the increasing volume of counter-evidence from cognitive neuroscience is, I believe, based on more than just wishful thinking; it is part of the war on science[3].
1. The Self Illusion: Why there is no ‘you’ inside your head, by Bruce Hood.
2. The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth, by
Leonid Rozenblit and Frank Keil.
3. http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Non-materialist_neuroscience
Interesting Quiz. There were probably a couple of weak questions that could have been answered “Maybe”.
Thanks, it’s kind of experimental (results are interesting so far). I was debating whether or not to place a “maybe” or “don’t know” in there, but I wanted to get the persons impression to either “yes” or “no” the best they could (and most maybes would fall into the yes category, as most questions ask if something is possible or not). 🙂
I think 1, 5, and 9 are the most universal since they transcend political and social worldviews. Not everyone wants to justify inequality or vengeance or is in favor of the status quo, but almost everyone has the feeling of being a separate self, and at least sometimes making uncaused choices. The absence of control implicit in the conclusion that consciousness is an effect rather than a cause is also troubling.
Excellent point Ed, those points directly address the “feeling” where as many of the others address something people don’t want to change about some other belief or idea. Thanks for the comment.
Hello Trick,
I followed your post above and I found it contradictory regarding QM of particles as ontologycal behaviour.
I argue that particles behave indeterministic (as per say ontologycal) as the grounding understanding we have now irrespective of QM interpretation.
You need to ask yourself first: who/what cause the particles if you want determinism as a start to go assumption.
But in order to make an argument about determinism and the basic principle of falsifiability in science I propose you a full step by step refutation of determinism in physics as done by physicians below:”Farewell to determinism”
https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2014/09/11/farewell-to-determinism
Cheers
I address ontic probability as being problematic in both deterministic and indeterministic models. The fact of the matter is, we don’t know which quantum interpretation is actually the case. There are deterministic (albeit non-local) interpretations, indeterministic interpretations, and interpretations that are agnostic toward the question. The link you provide confuses the term “determinism” with epistemic models. This is to clear up confusions here:
“Determinism” and “Indeterminism” for the Free Will Debate
To be more specific about your main chapter:”The Problem with Ontic Probability”, in physics we set up the framework a bit different :
We all know that quantum mechanics is probabilistic, rather than deterministic. It describes physical systems using the wavefunction, which represents a probability amplitude for obtaining some result when measuring an observable. The evolution of the wavefunction has two parts — unitary and nonunitary — corresponding respectively to deterministic and nondeterministic. Therefore, if determinism is to be true in Nature, we have to assume that quantum mechanics is not a fundamental theory, but rather that there is some more fundamental deterministic theory which describes processes in nature, and that quantum mechanics is just a statistical approximation of that fundamental theory. Thus the concept of “state” described in the previous paragraph(https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2014/09/11/farewell-to-determinism/) is defined in terms of that more fundamental theory, and the wavefunction can be extracted from it by averaging the state over the hidden variables. Consequently, in this setup the “state” is more general than the wavefunction. This is also illuminated by the fact that in principle one cannot simultaneously measure both the position and the momentum of a particle, while in the definition above I have not assumed any such restriction for our alleged fundamental deterministic theory.
The mistake is in thinking these are mutually exclusive.
Which I’m saying is epistemic probability amplitude, not ontic.
Pilot wave theory is a deterministic interpretation of QM. We just have to assume contextual non-local variables. Regardless, both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with ontic probability for the reasons I provided. 🙂
Later.
The uncertainty principle is treated differently depending on the quantum interpretation. But
Hello again,
Now back to “free will” position, I argue that you set up a false dichotomy:
having to choose between determinism and randomness is s false dichotomy:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JwaDYS5XC9Y
Cheers,
It’s not a false dichotomy. If an event has variables that force it, it does, if it doesn’t have variables that force it, it doesn’t. There is no third option between variables and no variables.
“Ontological probability”
From the wave function at sometime, Schrodingers equation gives the wavefunction for all future time, and for all past time, in that sense Quantum theory is deterministic as classical physics. Quantum Mechanics, the theory plus the experimental observations, has an intrinsic randomness, which arises with observation, something unexplained within the theory. The waviness in a region is the probability of finding the object in a particular place, but the waviness is not the probability of an object being in a particular place. The difference is the object wasn’t there before you found it there. You could have chosen an interference experiment demonstrating it was spread out over a wide region.
So somehow, your looking CAUSED it to be in a particular case.
Although waviness is a probability, we must contrast quantum probability with classical probability.
Such as an example..
Suppose you’re at a carnival, a fast talking man with faster hands operates a shell game. He places a pea under one of two inverted shells. After his rapid shuffling, your eyes lose track of which shell holds the pea. There is equal probability that it is in either of the 2 places. The operator takes some bets, he lifts the shell on the right, suppose you see the pea. Instantaneously it becomes a certainty that the pea was under the right hand shell. The probability collapses to zero for the left hand shell. Even if you move the left shell a thousand miles away, the probability is still 0 that it was in that shell. There is a huge difference between this classical probability and quantum probability represented by waviness. Classical probability is a statement of ones own knowledge. The shell operator has a 100 percent certain probability and the other had a 50 percent certain probability.
In Quantum probability, the wave function is the WHOLE story. The wavefunction of the atom is the atom. Observing an atom at a particular place, CREATED its being there. If someone looked at a spot and saw the atom there that looked “collapsed”, the atom would be at that spot for everyone. If someone was at a different spot, he would not find the atom at the different spot, but the waviness of the atom existed at the different spot immediately before the observer collapsed it. Quantum theory insists this is so because an interference experiment could have establish the waviness of the atom existed there.
Just to be clear, I have no problem with the particle behaving like a wave, only the idea of ontological probability for such a wave (as such fails non-contradiction). In other words, I think the wave exists, the probability, however does not. If the particle collapses on a specific section of the target, it did not have an actual probability that it could have for another part. Quantum theory does not insist on ontic probability for the wave function, only epistemic.
“If the particle collapses on a specific section of the target, it did not have an actual probability that it could have for another part. ” It collapses ONLY because of interfering/interaction with an observer , like a photon as per double split experiment. The particle was in a wave probailistic state before all over:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwXQjRBLwsQ
I
have explained how the probability works in the example I gave you, more specific here:
In Quantum PROBABILITY, the wave function is the WHOLE story. The wavefunction of the atom is the ATOM. Observing/by interfering with photon an atom at a particular place, CREATED its being there. If someone looked at a spot and saw the atom there that looked “collapsed”, the atom would be at that spot for everyone. If someone was at a different spot, he would not find the atom at the different spot, but the WAVINESS of the atom existed at the different spot immediately before the observer collapsed it. Quantum theory insists this is so because an interference experiment could have establish the waviness of the atom existed there.
So what I intend to highlight in my example is that BEFORE it collapses it is not in e definite position/determined location(as per Heisenberg inequalities ) aka is a WAVE PROBABILITY . The double split experiment that you also referred to is another QM experiment from where we observed the probabilistic nature/ontological behavior of subatomic particles like electrons/photons .
What we observed , aka epistemic, is what we contrive/deductive reasoning about ontology of QM particles, aka probability.
I hope I clear it up, thanks for leaving me posting
The reason it collapses is irrelevant to the understanding of why the probability is not ontological.
None of this suggests that their is ontic probability. Assessing a wave does not assess an ontic probability of any part of that wave or of any part of where the wave will collapse to. Rather, each part of the wave (the whole story) must be where it is and the collapse does not have a 20% ontic chance to hit the place it did, only a 20% epistemic chance given that we can only assess the wave function.
None of this I’m disagreeing with, and again, none of this implies ontic probability.
The probabilistic nature is epistemic, not ontological.
What we observed , aka epistemic, is what we contrive/deductive reasoning about ontology of QM particles, aka probability.
There is no reason to do this in QM, and to do so creates a contradiction. It’s important not to conflate epistemic assessments with ontic assessments, especially when an ontic assessment is logically incoherent.
Regarding your philosophy of “cause and effect” epistemology, as the only option:
“cause and effect” remains part of modern parlance in philosophy of Science. Sure, logic is a great guide, but there are phenomena and systems to which, I urge, it just isn’t applicable. I’d say any system which is quantitatively described as a set of coupled differential equations has escaped the realm where “cause and effect” are applicable. Which phenomena are the causes? which the effects? Feedbacks break that idea.
Things get a LOT simpler if Nature’s probabilistic roots are embraced. I tend to use “probabilistic” since “non-determinism” is ambiguous. It could mean “probabilistic” or it could mean that, at each collapse of an N-way quantum state, the Universe forks into branches with one branch following each of the possibilities. I say the latter speculation is, in Peter Woit’s terms, “not even wrong”, because it cannot be falsified.
As soon as we remove identity all knowledge breaks down, including any scientific assessments of anything. Science itself is based on deduction, induction, falsification, and so on…all differing parts of logic. And they all have the base understanding of the law of identity and non-contradiction – as without such we cannot identify a single thing. No, there is no special “phenomena” that allows for self-contradiction.
First, I don’t know why you think this coupled differential equations have anything to do with ontic events having ontic probability, and second, if an ontic event is outside of “cause and effect” it’s acausal (has no cause). My article addresses both possibilities.
You can use the term “probabilistic” but understand that you are making an epistemic claim with such a word, not an ontic one.
Even if the world forked into many branches per a many world interpretation of QM, each would decohere into the only universe they could. The ontic probability would be identical for each branch from a superpositioned state (100%). A many worlds interpretation is actually deterministic.
“First, I don’t know why you think this coupled differential equations have anything to do with ontic events having ontic probability”
I will give you an example to illustrate what we meant:
Looking at the instantaneous change in, say, the number of prey left, what causes that? An increase in the number of predators? But, if the number of prey gets too low, some of the predators will starve, so there won’t be as many prey eaten. So what causes an instantaneous change in the number of prey then?
http://www.tiem.utk.edu/~gross/bioed/bealsmodules/predator-prey.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lotka%E2%80%93Volterra_equation
http://www.nature.com/scitable/knowledge/library/dynamics-of-predation-13229468
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~taylor/z652/PredatorPreyModels.pdf
Claiming that epistemic description of phenomena IS probabilistic BUT ontological is not is an obfuscating way, philosophical bias, to save determinism from a rebuttal .
You can not ground anything ontological in determinism since from epistemology you get probability reasoning.
If you like we can discuss MWII and Bohemian interpretation if you want to grant determinism ontology in these two.
I have no clue what this has to do with ontic probabilty. Evolution is a causal process, and there is no ontic probability distribution.
Again, even if the universe is indeterministic (which is in no way known by you or any physicist alive), such is equally as problematic for ontic probability.
Probability and determinism aren’t mutually exclusive. In fact, I’d argue causality is needed for a probability assessment (due to the problems with acausality and probability). It’s just that probability assessments (just like dice rolls) are epistemic.
We don’t need to, as ontic probability is equally incompatible with indeterministic interpretations. Again, I’m agnostic on whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic, because we just don’t know (even if I suspect determinism to be the case). And either way, ontic probability is incoherent and needs to be abandoned, just as locality is abandoned based on Bell’s theorem. In fact, the incoherency of ontic probability is an even stronger case as Bell’s theorem injects some points in that can be contended if we cared to.
Thank you for reply, at least we have a start from epistemology onwards:
So I will take your definition of your ontology and then start from epistemology to get you there:
As you defined it:
Ontic or ontological means that the probability really exists. For those unfamiliar with these words, just think ontic (or the ontological) addresses what “exists” or “is”
And epistemic (or the epistemological) addresses what we can or cannot “know”.
Ontology is the study of existence, being, what is “real”, etc.
But what is “exist” or “is” means in QM/physics? How can we get from what we know about QM particles to make a study it’s existence of what “is” a particle and it’s behavior? By using experiments and formalism/logic/mathematical description , aka what we know about it, in lay- term.
More specific about ontological assessment: Harald Atmanspacher writes extensively about the philosophy of science, especially as it relates to Chaos theory, determinism, causation, and stochasticity. He explains that “ONTIC STATES DESCRIBE ALL PROPERTIES OF A PHYSICAL SYSTEM EXHAUSTIVELY. (‘Exhaustive’ in this context means that an ontic state is ‘precisely the way it is,’ without any reference to epistemic knowledge or ignorance.)”
So what we know in QM about its nature/behavior of reality, aka its ontology of its components, the “quanta”?
https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2014/09/11/farewell-to-determinism
It is a fantastic achievement of human knowledge when it becomes apparent that a set of experiments (double split experiment, Bell inequalities , Heisenberg inequalities ,Cauchy problem and Chaos theory )
can conclusively resolve an ONTOLOGICAL question: What IS a PARTICLE and HOW IT BEHAVES.
And moreover that the resolution turns out to be in sharp contrast to the intuition of most people. Outside of superconspiracy theories and “brain in a vat”-like scenarios (which can be dismissed as cognitively unstable), experimental results tell us that the world around us is not deterministic. We know that a deterministic description of nature does not exist.
The analysis presented in the article above suggests that we have only two choices:
(1) accept that Nature is not deterministic,
or (2) accept superdeterminism and renounce all knowledge of physics
Lastly, It is a non sequtur and false analogy to rely on classical logic to refute QM since QM LOGIC is the paradigm that apply to reality, set of rules for reasoning about propositions that takes the principles of quantum theory into account not the Newtonian laws:
For example:
“Quantum logic has some properties that clearly distinguish it from classical logic, most notably, the failure of the distributive law of propositional logic:” For a start:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_logic
I have another comment in moderation, I hope extra explanation helps.
Please join us on https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2014/09/11/farewell-to-determinism to detail about QM and it;s ontology(since you iterated he Bohemian interpretation, the pilot project).
Regards,
If he’s suggesting that an “ontic state is ontologically probabilistic”, then I disagree with him due to such being logically incoherent.
This doesn’t imply ontic probability.
Ontic probability is NOT a conclusion of these experiments and theories. You are confusing the distinction between being able to only assess a probability for an ontological event, and that event having ontic probability. These are not the same thing.
This is A) irrelevant as ontic probability is equally problematic for indeterminism, and B) not true, as we don’t know if a deterministic interpretation or an indeterministic interpretation of QM is in actuality the case. All we can assess is that if it is deterministic it’s non-local determinism. The article mistakes what determinism and indeterminism is (for physics) with this definition “given the state of the Universe at some moment, one can calculate a unique state of the Universe at any other moment”. It’s not about being able to “calculate” such. Again, read here:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-indeterminism-confusions/
The fact that the article assesses determinism as being problematic with chaos theory which is always an entirely deterministic model leads me to believe the author doesn’t know what they are talking about. The others such as the ‘inequalities’ also are not incompatible with determinism, only local determinism.
Quantum logic, is epistemic, not ontic….and it’s not something separate from “classical” logic in that it’s not a rejection of the law of identity or non-contradiction (it’s just not bivalent). The main distinction is that it’s multi-valued rather than bivalent…which only leans to it’s epistemic (rather than ontic) nature. Most muti-valued logic is used due to epistemic uncertainty. None of this says anything about there being ontic probability, nor does it suggest that QM allows for a violation of non-contradiction (if it did all theorems would collapse).
Later. 🙂
I finally have a question for you, sincere: )
How/what can get you to your ontology of QM if you just claim that all epistemology doesn’t lead to ontology at all?
What magic method do you use then to have as ontological access to QM if you refute all experiments, probability of wave-function .
How your “state” of a physical system needs to be formulated more precisely, in your terms please?
because you claim that wave-function of particle in superposition is probabilistic in an epistemic approach but not in ontological approach?:)
I’m not saying that we don’t require an epistemological standard (such as logic) to assess an ontological understanding, only that probability (if one is not illogical) is epistemic, meaning it’s only assesseds because we don’t have access to or know all of the variables. This is not just about a physical system, this applies to any system – as logical coherency is important for all states.
The probabilities assessed within a wave function are epistemic probabilities. This does not mean that the wave itself is epistemic, the wave in an ontic behavior. It’s only any notion of probability for such that needs to be epistemic.
Perhaps it’s better states as “ontic probability is illogical/contradictory” and “quantum mechanics is not outside of logic/law of non-contradiction”. If one wants to imagine some area that can be outside of identity and non-contradiction, that is what would be “magic” as there is no other word for it. 😉
I thought I understood your article, but Sile’s comments have left me confused. Flipping a coin produces an outcome with 100% probability. To aid our epistemic understanding, we have to use an abstraction: before an unbiased coin is flipped it consists of two states (heads,tales) each having a 50% probability. The act of flipping the coin is effectively a mathematical transform from the abstract dual-state domain to the real single-state outcome domain. Of course, the transform itself is unpredictable and it doesn’t matter if it’s actually deterministic or indeterministic providing that it’s stochastic.
What the heck is the coin’s ontic probability? To my mind, from on ontic perspective the coin is an item of currency, which is a domain that is totally incompatible with both probability and the heads/tails outcome after flipping it. In other words, it would be absurd to devise an ontic mathematical transform from the domain currency to the outcome domain of heads-tails. Domain errors are a subset of category mistakes. I’m fairly sure that this mistake is committed in some of the QM interpretations — hence bizarre notions such as the multiple worlds interpretation and “spooky action at a distance”. Bizarre notions are avoided by using the Hilbert space to analyse aspects of QM because this analysis domain is better suited to the subject than the space-time domain.
Similarly, we can analyse signals in the time domain, the frequency domain, or various other domains, depending on which properties of the signal or system we wish to evaluate and discuss. I might describe the source that generates the signal as being ontic, whereas the time domain and frequency domain representations of the signal are epistemic.
References
Demystifying the Delayed Choice Experiments, by Bram Gaasbeek. arXiv:1007.3977
An Epistemic Model of Quantum State with Ontic Probability Amplitude, by Arun Kumar Pati, Partha Ghose, and A. K. Rajagopal. arXiv:1401.4104v2
Excellent thoughts Pete. Thanks for the visit.
Well said. The problem is when people suggest that the time domain, frequency domain, and even location domain (when a probability is assessed for such) can be ontic.
I totally agree with what you are saying; the truth will eventually come out. How can I help with this?
The more you are versed in the topic, the more you can explain the view to others. Getting the word out, though an uphill battle, is a worthy challenge. Thanks for stopping by David.
Thanks, I’ve noticed when I talk about this subject to people they seem to be rather resistant to this non-idea.
I don’t have any clue how to act as if I have a free will. That would be like pretending I have no reason for what I am doing.
What are you saying? That there is no free will?? 😉
why should i bother reading ur article if there’s no free will ? why u are writing on this blog if there’s no free will ? you can’t change anything…
It’s important not to conflate determinism with fatalism:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-vs-fatalism-infographic/
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/pointlessness-doesnt-follow-determinism/
Also, I’m a hard incompatibilist rather than hard determinist:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/hard-incompatibilist-not-hard-determinist/
Take care. 🙂
This is one of your best blog posts ever. I am highly against redefinitions of old terms because it causes us to misunderstand what was written when those words were understood differently.
Thanks Chandler! 🙂
‘Trick,
It may come as no surprise that my solution was to coin the term Non-Free Willism. (NFW). I had no choice but to do this, when I realized how inadequate the label Determinist was regarding my view on humans not having anything close to a Free Will. So if some tells me that I am a Determinist, I correct them, saying, “No, I am a Non-Free Willist” (because I have no way to know just to what degree the universe is deterministic).
Yeah, in regards to what to call myself, I sometimes use hard incompatibilist, free will skeptic, and even afreewillist. I never use the word “determinist” and correct people on such quite often.
Thanks for your input Steve.
I think both of your suggestions: “free will vs determinism/indeterminism” and “free will vs. how events can happen” are both far more accurate than the current title of the debate. We should adopt these new titles when having debates about it.
Yeah, or at least clarify when we don’t. 🙂
I, too, have never liked the phrasing “Free Will vs. Determinism”, for exactly the reasons you point out. I guess that’s why I never phrase it as “free will vs. xxx”. Instead I say, “Neither determinism nor indeterminism can give us free will, and those two options exhaust all the possibilities.” (Excluding backwards time travel and being able to change the laws of physics.)
Exactly. I’d argue that backward time travel ability would be as detrimental to free will, and that such doesn’t really escape determinism or indeterminism even if a change can be made in which a new timeline (or adjusted timeline) is created. Changing the laws of physics also cannot help unless such can be adjusted in a way that allows logically incoherent things. 😉
Compatibilists completely miss the point that we don’t choose what we want in the first place. To change what we want, we would have to want to want something else. This leads to an infinite want regression where you need to want to want to want to want, etc.
Bingo! 😉
As I find your “…could have been different….” definition of free will incoherent, I propose a clear and precise one specifying WHAT is free from WHAT by WHAT for WHAT to WHAT.
The human organism taken as a whole is (relatively) free from genetically programmed automatic responses to environmental impacts by applying wide ranges of experience and creative imagination (futures simulation) for selecting a “best guess” path for optimum chance to survive and prosper.
What form of “free will”, to invoke Dennett, of whom I am an avid fan, could be more worth wanting?
Hi Paul, thanks for the visit.
It is indeed “incoherent” but that doesn’t mean that a large majority of people don’t believe in such incoherent ability:
Common Intuitions about Free Will (and how it needs to be defined)
And as soon as we start redefining words outside of common understandings we simply create confusions and various other (unnecessary) problems:
Redefining “Free Will” is Like Redefining “Geocentric” – Except Worse
Genetics and environment program every choice we make. Survival and prosperity is irrelevant, if a microchip controlled your brain to do the optimized thing for survival I doubt anyone would call that “free”:
Brain Tumors, Microchips, and Free Will… Oh My
Later. 🙂
If WHAT is free is the organism as a whole, then microchip intervention abrogates its freedom. Nevertheless, if that clearly led to “better” choices (more pleasant results) than the natural system, many (most?) of us would prefer it over “freedom”, though some might cling to the illusion of an independent, omnipotent “self”.
Survival and prosperity are ALL that matter. (Well, in the present human environment where existential challenges are minimal, “hacking” the system to promote pleasant feelings (and suppress unpleasant ones) becomes important too.)
I don’t agree that careful definition merely creates confusion. The confusion is already there. Better, say I, to expound a form of freedom that can (and does) exist than to merely deny the existence of a common fantasy.
The “organism” is no more free than the “microchip” is the point.
I agree.
The only thing I’m saying is they don’t matter for “free will” (being able to survive or prosper does not make the microchipped person more “free”).
This is our main disagreement. If people intuitively feel they have the “incoherent” sort of free will, as demonstrated, then (I’d suggest) we are better off disproving that ability (showing to them why such is incoherent) rather than bypassing such with a semantic that says nothing about not having that ability (my biggest criticism of compatibilism is that it bypasses such). It’s rather important people get this right. We can do this and at the same time educate them on what it means and the types of abilities we actually do possess (which should be labeled something other than “free will”).
As far as the difference between a hard incompatibilist such as myself and a compatibilist such as yourself is semantic focus and the reasons for such focus. If the majority of people believed in fairies, I think it’s problematic to simply redefine fairies as “little white floating dandelion florets and seeds that the wind carries away” simply because such actually exists. It makes more sense to disprove fairies and have a historical marker that at one time a majority of people believed in fairies.
Regarding the present-tense case in the last paragraph:
First, all present alternatives are actually potential future actions whose viability can only be estimated, never certain until after choosing.
Second, choice IS “up to the chooser” if that phrase is taken to mean “the organism as a whole” and not some fantasy self like the apparent conscious subject.
Epistemically we cannot know which one will be the output. We can, however, understand that only one was ever ontologically viable even before such choosing …unless we have an acausal event (in which case such would not be “up to the chooser”).
The “up to the chooser” part is only referring to an acausal event that can never be “up to a chooser”. If we are saying that every event has a cause, there is only one viable option and that part isn’t needed. If we are saying that some events do not have a cause, it’s possible to have more than one viable option, but any that stem from an acausal event wouldn’t be “up to the chooser”…it would be dictated entirely by an event that is outside of such chooser.
In the past tense version, the “up to the chooser” part aligns with the “of one’s own accord” part…and is only used to address indeterministic (libertarian) notions of “freedom”.
“Ontologically viable”? “Viable” means simply “capable of living”. There is no way of knowing (with certainty) whether a potential action is viable (able to be enacted (and able to produce a desired result)) before it is attempted. Thus the chooser is never faced with “viable options” but with the need to predict the viability of apparent options. No outside observer can predict with certainty which action will be chosen. The chooser (organism as a whole) is the proximate cause of the action chosen. The ONLY possible meaning of freedom is the organism’s ability to act according to its present nature (however “deterministically” evolved) in the present circumstances without overt outside compulsion to do otherwise (gun pointed at head). The notion that the ultimate cause of a choice is the “Big Bang” and the totality of quantum interactions in the universe thereafter (for example) is very cute, but absolutely irrelevant.
How is “up to the chooser” acausal? If so, you’re being too tricky (i.e. insincere). Ah, well, what to expect from someone so named?
I’d like to discuss “responsibility”…..later, though.
Viable in this context simply means it’s a possibility. That, for example, in an entirely causal universe only one option is actually “feasible” (regardless if we know which one).
We don’t need to know which is viable, we only need to know that if one is viable the others never were. In other words, we can understand that only one of the options actually IS viable, regardless if we can know which one (unless we invoke acausal events).
I never said they could. It’s important not to conflate the ontic (what is) with the epistemic (what we can or cannot know):
Existence Conflated with Knowledge and the Free Will Debate
Again, this goes against the common intuitions that people hold, and also invokes the fact that the microchipped person has just as much freedom.
It’s not irrelevant to the question of multiple (ontologically) viable options.
It’s not acausal, it’s referring to why an acausal event cannot give free will.
Not at all, saying “up to the chooser” is no different than saying “of one’s own accord”. It’s simply addressing that a non-caused (acausal) event cannot be an event that is “up to a person”. It’s not really tricky at all, in fact most philosophical compatibilists would agree that such indeterminism cannot help with free will for this very reason.
This is fine, just know that such words are ambigious so we need to clarify what we mean:
No Free Will and the Ambiguity of “Responsibility”
Later friend. 🙂
As logically incoherent as free will is, I don’t necessarily agree that it is more rational to believe in leprechauns. I say this only because most people do not live with the persistent subjective illusion that leprechauns exist.
I define rational as “based on or in accordance with reason or logic”. I agree with you that intuitively one makes more sense, I’m talking about if such is “reasoned out” in any way. 🙂
Thanks for the visit.
Your preferred definitions are ones carefully chosen to make free will impossible.
Your definition of “viable” is ridiculous. As I’ve said, “apparent viability” of discernible options at the moment of choice is what’s real. To escape this lion, run right, run left, throw rock, climb tree “A”, climb tree “B”….all (perhaps) possible actions. Your insistence on strict determinism simply renders possibility impossible. Meaningless. This does not relieve the organism of the need to make choices, preferably “freely”.
You maintain that there are no options, ever. If that is your religion, so be it. It’s not mine, nor that of most others, no matter how confused their notion of “free will” may be. My preference is to define it in a way that it is clear, understandable and possibly real (and thus worth discussing and investigating). Yours is simply an a priori denial. Ce sera, sera.
It is actually very common. For example, Sam Harris has a similar one, and much of the historical debate has addressed the “otherwise” notion. Either way, I’m glad that you at least concede with this sentence above that we couldn’t have, of our own accord, done otherwise (that free will defined as such is “impossible”). For the incompatibilist what matters is that people understand this and understand what follows from such (regardless if you don’t want to call it “free will”).
“Feasable” and “possible” are common synonyms of “viable”, and there is nothing “ridiculous” about this.
“Apparent” is epistemic, not ontic. For the free will debate we are talking about what “is” or “is not” (ontic). It is very important not to conflate these two things.
Again, we can use the word “possible” in the epistemic sense, but that does not imply that such is “possible” in the ontic sense (that such is “really” possible). This is what matters for the topic.
First, I’m not a “strict determinist”, I’m a hard incompatibilist – meaning I think free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. Second, most philosophical compatibilists are “deterministists” or at least understand that indeterminism cannot help with free will (that random events can’t be willed events).
I maintain that in a deterministic universe there is only one “option” (not that there is “no” option), and in an indeterministic universe any options that diverge from such can never be “up to the chooser” (or of one’s own accord).
Please try to avoid ad-homs or insults in the future (such is unwelcome on this platform). It’s better for productive discourse if we can have a modicom of respect even if we disagree. No, analytic reasoning has nothing at all to do with “religion” or being religious-like.
Logical reasoning isn’t a popularity contest. Again, most people believe in an incoherent free will ability, as I already have shown. They certainly don’t take a philosophical compatibilist semantic such as Dennett’s.
Redefining words outside of common intuitions and understandings of such words is anything but “clear” and “understandable”…regardless if such is “possibly real”. Again, it’s no different than defining “god” as “the universe” or “nature”…making god exist – even though the vast majority of people believe in some type of conscious deity. And I have many reasons that my semantic is “worth discussing” in which a compatibilist semantic just simply evades.
A better way to put it is that mine is a logical rejection (rather than denial which has a connotation to it) of the common intuition people feel, and that understanding that people don’t have such abilities is important for so many other topics of concern. Moving the goal posts away from such is just a way to evade the things that need to change due to this understanding that people couldn’t have, of their own accord, done otherwise. I’ve given you the reasons why compatibilist redefinitions are problematic already in the above post.
Have a spiffy day! 🙂
Trick,
Excellent post. What do you think is at the core of the Compatibilist error? We know they are choosing to be so terribly incorrect in the way that they are, so what are the determinants that are making them fail at something that is so clearly documented. MOST PEOPLE ARE UNDER THE ILLUSION OF FREEWILL, WHICH DOES NOT IN REALITY EXIST.
Thanks Steve! I think they have a certain type of bias and a misunderstood concern that if we tell people they don’t have such a type of free will they will act immorally (adverse consequence fallacy). They also don’t have a full understanding of the benefits of dropping the notion of free will.
– This nailed it. 🙂
Determinism has also attempted to destroy the Church worldwide for 2000 years. Palaganism, Semi- Palaganism (Both express man is born morally neutral and therefore able to determine ones standing before his Creator), continues to ruin the Evangelical Church today. We are no more able to do this than a Leopard has the ability to change it’s spots. Our will can only choose in what we delight in doing, and as John Calvin said, “The mind of man is an idol maker”.
This is an excellent post! It will help clarify the myth that we require blame to quarantine criminals. When you view crime as a disease rather than a choice, it makes perfect sense.
It’s too bad that you don’t take time to study truly Orthodox Christianity. I’m not talking Russian or Greek Orthodox, but Reformed Theology.
Each one of the 10 reasons listed are totally compatible with what you have written, although the source of all origin is God.
Since I cannot go into too much detail, I can say that in conjunction with what you’ve written, Reformed Theology levels the playing field, which means that no one is better or more ahead of anyone else. Taking “blame” as an example, what I feel guilty about may or may not be true, but forgiveness is found it the Creator who took that guilt upon Himself, leaving me to live a life of gratitude to him. Unlike other religions where one must “do” something, one finds it was already done for myself 2000 years ago just out of His mercy.
Interesting that these are compatible with a certain religious understanding. That being said I prefer to keep things on a secular level for the discussion for various reasons (e.g. I’m not a believer in a creator). That being said, no matter if someone believes in a creator or not, this lack of free will understanding still follows…and many of the thoughts that go along with it. There is a distinction between fatalism and determinism, however, that is important. Later good sir. 🙂
I am not speaking of fatalilsm, but objective truth that was lost a long time ago. I am perfectly at ease with your not believing in a creator, because unless the Creator does a supernatural work in one’s life, there is no chance in believing. Hence, we have total agreement in the fact that “free will” is a total illusion at best. I did not consciencely make a choice to lose most of my friends and stop all I was enjoying when I saw myself in a different light. It was an outside force (As you may relate to) that pulled me into a newness of life, which paradoxally agrees with most of what you espouse. I respect your right to keep this secular in discussion, but you will never begin to know how much you have in common with a form of Christianity that is trying to hold off the “dumbing down of the Church along with society in general. When I was dragged into the Kingdom I was looking for another football game to watch, when I heard what is necessary for repentance, and that was the Gospel. The correct gospel. Gospel is used from everything from music to movies, but unless one knows the true gospel your path is already predetermined.
May I respectfully add, that the Apostle Paul, a hater of Christians himself once said “But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks (Gentiles) foolishness; But unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men. For you see in your calling, brethren how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called: But God has chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God as chosen the ewak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty.” (1 Corinthians chaper one: vvs. 23-27)
I will stop since this is your wish and I heartily respect you for your fight against much of what I too fight against in the American Church. Most “Christians” in this Country believe that their faith is determined by their “decision for Christ” and not what the Bible says. The Bible says we are born dead spiritually and unless God has determined (before the world was created) that you are to be saved from eternal death, then no “decision” on your part can change that. There is no such thing as “decisional redemption”. Yes we decide to follow Christ, but not out of anything that we have done, but strictly by His mercy. This is so no one can boast that they are more righteous than anyone else. Hence you have probably heard in your past from some well meaning Christian that unless you believe like me you will perish forever, but that’s not the “Good News of Christ.”
And so I defer to you my friend. If you are ever curious or ever want to be backed from what is objective and not subjective truth, let me know. Good day!
Thanks Steven. I’m glad that even if we can be so far away from each other on the topic of religion or theism, that we can share the understanding that there is no free will. What makes the ability to share this something great is that we can both have compassion and understandings for the causal variables that have lead to our positions. You don’t blame me for my skepticism of god and religious thought, and I don’t blame you for your belief in such. What this means is that we each have arrived at where we are, what we think, and how we feel, because we each had different upbringings, experiences, and paths that have created diverging differences in thought, yet we still arrived at similar conclusions on this topic even if our methodologies and epistemological standards are probably opposing. And though I don’t believe in the supernatural, or miracles, or non-physical ideas, or even Jesus in any religious sense (I believe there may have been a man named Jesus)… it is a sort of amazing feat for two people so different, to share the lack of belief in free will, and due to that one fact alone, be so understanding of the others position even when they are in such great opposition for these other beliefs. This is one of the reason’s the understanding that there is no free will is so important. It removed so much disdain and contempt people have for those that do not believe the same way, and replaces it with understanding, compassion, a willingness to look for common ground, and a willingness to look for the causes. That, indeed, is a great feat in itself.
Have a great day,
‘Trick
‘Trick,
It seems like Mr. Pitkin holds the view that there is no freewill because there is a God that is in control of everything that happens. Whereas, non-freewillists make the claim because of the impossibility of free will, being that it is logically incoherent. Which means, even if there is a god(s), it too has no freewill, which I guess is where Mr. Pitkin’s non-freewill belief would diverge from non-freewillism position.
Although two of the poles of Christianity namely Calvinism and Arminianism hold that either God or man is in control, the third pole of the triangle holds that neither is in control. Love cannot act otherwise and although it is almighty, it is still a limited resource.
I am interested in your delineation between ‘fatalism’ and ‘determinism’.
Hi there. Sorry, I noticed the link on this page was not working so I fixed that. Here it is: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-vs-fatalism-infographic/
And yet often times “Who is a criminal?” is determined by the various societies we live in.
POTUS spoke out against Kenya’s incarceration of homosexuals. The Kenyan President replied to the effect that it was a “…non issue.”
However, speaking from a western society’s point of view, you hit the nail on the head IMHO.
Though I waste my breath (or keystrokes), I assert that there is NO WAY OF KNOWING (apart from a priori belief) whether anyone “could have acted differently” then s/he did. Your belief in strict determinism (as an alternative to absolute acausality) is your (determined?) choice: so be it.
The prospect of being blamed (and punished) for one’s actions surely plays a significant role in maintaining social stability and peace.
Your insistence on a philosophically naive (read ignorant or stupid) version of “free will” is a transparently deliberate “red herring” (or straw man).
You do not, and cannot, know to what degree human choices are, in themselves, causal. Unpredictability is equivalent to freedom of choice.
Hi Paul,
Words such as “though I waste my breath (or keystrokes)” are unnecessary. I welcome your thoughts on the topic as long as any discussion holds a modicum of respect in light of disagreement. If you truly think you are wasting your breath, perhaps you could use a little of that free will to restrain yourself from such? 😉
That being said, on to your criticisms:
Am I to assume you think all knowledge must be a posteriori? That, for example, we can’t know (beyond any reasonable doubt) that colorless pink square circles do not exist (as we cannot view every part of the universe for such a thing)?
Determinism is the idea that every event has a cause. I do not assert such, I’m agnostic on determinism / indeterminism. Indeterminism is the idea that some events do not have a cause. I’m a hard incompatibilist, not a hard determinist – meaning free will is incompatible with both possibilities.
We do not require blameworthiness to have deterrence or incarceration. For example:
Quarantine Analogy and Free Will Skepticism
My insistence is backed up and not a red herring/straw man. It’s actually the other way around. Compatibilist (re)definitions of free will are the red herring, and many of my posts explain why. Here are just a few:
Redefining “Free Will” is Like Redefining “Geocentric” – Except Worse
Free Will Intuitions: Fred and Barney Case Study – InfoGraphic
Common Intuitions about Free Will (and how it needs to be defined)
Dennett’s “Free Will” vs a Free Will Not Worth Wanting
If there is an acausal element in human choice, a human would have no “choice” in those events coming about and affecting them the way they do (those events could never be willed events). Again, I’m a hard incompatibilist, not a hard determinist. I address both causal and acausal events fully. You are straw man-ing my own position as I never said that all events are “causal”.
Why I’m a Hard Incompatibilist, Not a Hard Determinist.
The fact that you think “unpredictability is equivalent to freedom of choice” means that I’m not only using the correct semantic of free will, but you believe in the very “naive” notion of free will I’m referring. Whether something is “predictable” or not is irrelevant to the question, and irrelevant to the topics of concern:
Unpredictable Future ≠ Freely Willed Future
But seriously, it’s all good and I hope your day is going well.
Later good sir.
You might want to read Dr. Nahmias’s artitcle on the negative effects of telling people they have no free will: http://eddynahmias.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Neuroethics-Response-to-Baumeister.pdf
Several studies he mentions show that telling people they have no free will leads them to cheat more and behave more aggressively.
The purpose of guilt and regret is to serve as a bookmark, reminding us to change whatever bad behavior brought up those feelings. When you’ve learned what you should learn from that experience, and perhaps made those corrections to your behavior, you can dismiss the feelings. After they’ve served their purpose they are no longer useful. But I don’t think they should be dismissed out of hand, without addressing the issue in some way. I think that’s how it is supposed to work.
Hi Marvin,
First – thanks for stopping by. 🙂
I’m well aware of such studies:
A Temporary Imposed Lack of Belief in Free Will? Seriously?
Problems With The Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale (FAD-Plus)
I’ll be addressing various other studies as I go.
There is a very important distinction between “guilt” and “regret”. I think I’ll have to make a post about this distinction. Guilt doesn’t make a whole lot of sense from the lack of free will, but regret falls in line fine, and is the only placeholder needed (the other is way too detrimental to be worthy of such a placeholder).
I see you’ve made a whole lot of comments to other posts which I may respond to when I find time (they only get approved on response). This one above was a shorter one comparatively so I could do a quicker response to it. The others were longer, more time consuming to address (I disagree with much of what was said), and hence less conversational – but I may respond to some anyway later on. If you want to be assured of approval and response to a comment, a shorter comment that addresses a single point is more likely to be approved and responded to. The details can always be fleshed out in more detail as responses follow.
Thanks again for the visit.
‘Trick
I just started using twitter recently and ran into your website from your comments there.
Since you’ve written a book, you’re probably too committed to your ideas to question or change them at this point.
I’m pretty sure I have the correct answer to this issue as well. But I ran into the issue about 50 years ago, so I’ve had a head start.
Well welcome to twitter. 🙂
Not at all. I’d be more than happy to change my position if there is a logical flaw in my assessment. I do, however, defend my position (when I have the time to) when I see a flaw in another’s.
Most people are pretty sure they have the correct answer. Rest assured I’ve been working on this topic for quite a long time (I’m older than you think). Please take the time to look at the definition of free will that I’m addressing, because I think you probably are a compatibilist from what I can tell with some of your comments: FREE WILL
You understanding the definition being used (and why) will probably be a huge time saver so we don’t talk past each other.
Later good sir.
The flaw is that you destroy the very concepts you use to express your view. The logic by which you take “free” from the vocabulary will also remove “will”, and “self”. And after they’re gone, there are no longer any “persons” to be concerned about. Your book subtitle: “For the Betterment of Humankind” becomes meaningless when idea of “persons” becomes meaningless.
Every human concept presumes a world of reliable cause and effect (determinism). It is impossible even to imagine an opposite, “indeterministic” world, where there is no reliable cause and effect. Atoms would not even exist without reliable forces binding together the subatomic particles.
Therefore, “freedom” can never imply freedom from causation. It can only imply freedom from specific constraints. If we set a bird “free” from its cage, should we argue it is not free, because it is still subject to causation? And if it actually were free from causation, then what would happen when it flapped its wings?
So the paradox of determinism “versus” free will is a hoax. Free will cannot logically imply freedom from causation. Without reliable cause and effect the will is unable to implement its intent. Therefore free will requires a deterministic universe. And every use of the term “free will” must recognize that underlying presumption.
Free will is nothing more and nothing less than us making our own choices. If someone forces us to choose or act against our will, then that is an “unfree” will. This distinction is all that is required to use the term “free will” in a relevant and meaningful fashion.
No it doesn’t. No free will skeptic says that things are not causally willed, only that they couldn’t have been willed (of their own accord) otherwise.
This is one of those words that need to be defined. I have a chapter on this in my book and I find that most of the time what people think this is is a category error.
This is a non-sequitur. It does not follow that the removal of “self” as people assume it is the removal of biological humans or experiential states to be concerned over (that can be “better” or “worse” than another).
This is arguable, but I’ll go with it as I suspect that the universe may be deterministic (even though I’m agnostic on such).
You have a “compatibilist” definition of free will. I address why compatibilist definitions are poor semantics, and the fact that people do think they have a special ability that is “more free” than you’re suggestion above:
Common Intuitions about Free Will (and how it needs to be defined)
Free Will Intuitions: Fred and Barney Case Study – InfoGraphic
To simply disregard this is to disregard the facts about the ability most people intuitively feel they possess. There are good reasons we shouldn’t be redefining free will to simply mean “making choices”:
Redefining “Free Will” is Like Redefining “Geocentric” – Except Worse
Dennett’s “Free Will” vs a Free Will Not Worth Wanting
But it’s fine if you want to call such free will “making choices” (though it’s as problematic as simply relabeling “god” as “the universe”) as long as you understand that we don’t have the free will ability defined here:
FREE WILL
…and you understand what it implies that we don’t have such an ability. 😉
This site is only about that specific definition and what it means that we don’t have it.
Laters.
Like I said earlier, you’re committed to maintaining the paradox. It serves your purpose to do so. Me, I’m just trying to get the facts straight.
You’ve probably heard of the Libet experiments, where subjects were wired to pick up pre-conscious mental activity, an EMG of the muscle response, and self-report when they were conscious of making the decision to squeeze their fist. They were late in becoming conscious of the decision but still had plenty of time to consciously countermand the subconscious impulse.
But here’s the thing. All you need to do is ask whether the students who participated in the study were required to do so for class credit, or if they were allowed to volunteer, you know, of their own free will. And everyone knows the meaning of this free will. And it is this very simple and very ordinary free will that is actually being attacked by the so-called “hard” determinist. (Me, I believe in perfect determinism, and I find no issue between perfect determinism and this simple, ordinary free will.)
In any case, it was nice visiting and talking with you.
I can’t stress this enough. The facts are that people hold to a self-contradictory (rather than paradoxical) belief in free will.
For sure: Neuroscientific Supporting Evidence Against Free Will
That is because they believe they could have done otherwise. They believe that they could have chosen not to participate in the study but they chose to do so of their own “free will”. Again, this intuition has evidence for it: Free Will Intuitions: Fred and Barney Case Study – InfoGraphic
The hard determinist and hard incompatibilist is correct in rejecting and attacking this, and there are good reasons to do so.
Same here. It’s always good to see someone disagree without hostility. I appreciate that. 🙂
“I could have done otherwise” refers to the uncertainty at the beginning of any deliberation. At that point, the decider can honestly say, “I might choose A or I might choose B. I just don’t know yet. Let me think about it.”
Calling the decider “incoherent” for failing to say, “I don’t know yet whether A or B will be the inevitable result of my upcoming deliberation” is just being an annoying geek.
If returned precisely to that point in time, to that point of uncertainty, they could once again honestly say, “I might choose A or I might choose B.” Therefore it is not incoherent to say “I could have chosen otherwise”.
You are technically correct that only once choice was inevitable. But that fact is totally useless if you can’t tell the decider what that choice will be. In fact, the truth of universal inevitability is spectacularly useless. It is best to simply acknowledge it and then ignore it.
All of the value in determinism is in the practical sciences, like medicine, that helps us to better control our environment. But universal inevitability has absolutely no helpful implications. And all attempts to derive meaningful implications result in mental errors (such as fatalism or attacking free will and moral responsibility).
This is part of what creates the illusion.
I’m not calling the decider “inchoherent”, I’m calling the belief “incoherent” (it’s illogical). The fact that they don’t know yet is not what I’m talking about – that just adds to the illusion and false belief. It’s the fact that they believe that all of the options in front of them are viable and that if we were to bring them back in time to before the point of decision they could have decided, of their own accord, otherwise. Again, you aren’t looking at the evidence which shows people actually think this. It isn’t being an annoying geek (though I am a geek and can be annoying to those who insist on a compatibilist notion of free will).
This is where I think we may disagree the most. The “fact” is not a useless fact in any way, shape, or form. In fact it implies so much to so many other topics of concern, as well as our own thoughts and actions. Also, it isn’t “universal inevitability” that makes free will incoherent, as free will is also impossible in an indeterministic universe. But this is a different aspect of the discussion and since you are a determinist we don’t need to go there. 🙂
No, studies that create fatalistic attitudes are studies that (temporarily) confuse free will believers. Attacking free will and a certain type of moral responsibility is extremely important if done properly (if people are actually educated rather than confused). There is a whole lot riding on this understanding.
Later.
My point is that to say “I could have done otherwise” is similar to “the sun rises in the east and sets in the west”. We both know that it is the earth’s rotation that accounts for the sun’s apparent traverse across the sky. And yet if we find ourselves lost in the woods at sunset, the “fact” that the sun sets in the west could save our lives. Trying to express this “fact” in terms of the earth’s rotation is likely to make us dizzy as well as lost.
For all practical purposes, “I could have done otherwise” is “true”. Its practical meaning is that “I may do otherwise in the future”. As in, “if only I had known what I know now, I would have acted differently”. Or, “I can see now the mistake I made, and can try not to make it again.”
But instead of these simple meaningful interpretations, we have literal, technical interpretations of impossible scenarios where the world is reset back to where everything is just as it was then. This is where the confusion is introduced.
Confusion often arises from taking the other person’s words literally rather than trying to see what they really mean. And I believe that is what is going on with the debate over the phrase “I could have done otherwise”.
I do not believe that using the phrase “I could have done otherwise” is incoherent to anyone who is actually listening to what the person means.
The alternative, practical interpretations of the phrase are not incoherent. They are helpful and meaningful.
No one thinks “I could have done otherwise” means that they could do something different “in the future” (no one confuses tenses that badly). Otherwise the question can just be asked “would you do X again in the future?”. This is obviously not the same thing. Unless people are unfamiliar with the English language it would be quite difficult to get the tense confused here in the same way we use “rise” for the sun due to our colloquial perception.
Again, read this scenario, because 76% think that Fred and Barney could have done otherwise:
Free Will Intuitions: Fred and Barney Case Study – InfoGraphic
In other words, they believe that Fred could have returned the wallet and Barney could have kept the wallet – at that time of the event. This says nothing about what they think Fred and Barney could do in the future after the event – and the scenario is clear on what it’s addressing as well as the tense.
The very notion of blameworthiness is embedded on this idea that someone could have and should have done otherwise than what they did – at the time they did it. And this is indeed the intuition of the masses. It stems from not seeing all of the variables and thinking that all of the options in front of you are real possibilities.
Perhaps this is not your own intuition, I don’t know, but let’s not deny the facts here about the masses perception of their abilities.
And regardless of this, if they could not have done otherwise at the time of decision (which you agree with I believe), there are important things that need to change in our thinking, attitudes, and actions.
Like I said, “I could have done otherwise” refers to the point of uncertainty, when all you knew with certainty was that there was more than one option, and you did not know which you would pick. But it is typically invoked later, when you are reviewing your choice so that you can learn from your mistake and make a better choice next time, in the future.
And, of course, Fred and Barney could each have done otherwise had they chosen to do otherwise. Each was acting of his own free will. And there were no external constraints upon their choice. Each made a decision that was authentically their own, based upon their own reasons, beliefs, and values. And that is called “acting of your own free will”.
Had both men found the bank’s money together, and had Fred told Barney he would shoot his wife and kids if Barney did not go along with Fred keeping the money, then Barney’s going along would not be of his own free will.
Because Barney was acting under threat, while Fred was not, the court would not hold Barney responsible for the theft.
Fred, on the other hand, would be treated differently. He would have to (a) return the money, (b) be subject to corrective penalty to change his future behavior, (c) be restrained in prison until we can be reasonably sure he has changed, and (d) suffer no further penalty than what is reasonable to accomplish (a), (b), and (c). This is moral justice.
Now, if we throw out the concept of autonomy, that is, people making choices for themselves of their own free will, then we must also discard responsibility and rehabilitation. And that leaves us with no tools to redeem the offenders that can be corrected.
Sorry, but the words “could have” means that you are making the assessment after the fact and still assessing that you “could have” done something “otherwise”.
Yes, and if you are reviewing the choice you made and assessing that you “could have” done otherwise (in a deterministic universe), you are making an incorrect assessment. This is all regardless of whether you would or would not repeat the offense.
No external constraints? Did you read the scenario?
I repeat, did you read the scenario? There was no possibility of “had both…”
The “threat” would just be one more causal factor.
I don’t think any free will skeptic would disagree with this type of causal justice. None of this, however, implies that Fred was blameworthy (just as a rabid dog or hurricane wouldn’t be blameworthy, but we would create preventative future acts).
It’s simply not the case that we need to throw out rehabilitation, deterrence, incarceration, and so on.That does not mean the person is any more responsible than a rabid dog is for contracting rabies, or a person in a mental institute is for their specific brain state. Of course we would rehabilitate the person in the mental institute while not holding them accountable for the acts they have done due to their condition. Likewise, the same follows for a person who we don’t deem has such a condition. If we find that a brain tumor is causing a person to do immoral acts, we can actually remove that brain tumor (if such is possible) without ever blaming them or holding them morally responsible for what they have done due to the tumor. This is no different for the assessment of a person without a tumor or mental illness.
Trick: “No external constraints? Did you read the scenario?”
I read the scenario. But you seem to think that how they were raised is still “external” to them, even years after they have left home. That parental influence was part of what made them who they were at that moment. And that is one reason why each made a different decision about the lost money satchel they found with the bank’s name on it. The decisions were authentically their own decisions.
Fred’s unfortunate upbringing led him to commit a crime. And a judge is allowed to take into account all information about the offender before pronouncing a penalty. Why? Because to be effective correction, the penalty must consider how difficult it will be to change the offender’s future behavior.
For example, if Fred held a gun to Barney’s head and forced him to go along, then Fred is going to require a lot more correction than Barney. Right?
Trick: “The “threat” would just be one more causal factor.”
Of course. Keep in mind that determinism is completely in play throughout every scenario (and my determinism is perfect, while yours is merely “hard”, whatever that means).
The fact that Barney (in my coercion scenario) was acting under threat means that his behavior is corrected by simply removing the threat. Thus, the judge gives him no penalty. It is Fred who presents a need for a more serious correction (unless he is incorrigible, in which case he may spend the rest of his life in jail to protect society).
The point of corrective penalty is to determine the offender’s future behavior. It may rehabilitate by creating new, appropriate options and/or penalize him such that he has something new to consider the next time he is deliberating whether to steal or not. We want Fred to choose, of his own free will, a better option. We need an autonomously righteous person so we don’t have to follow Fred around for the rest of his life, otherwise we must keep him in prison until he dies.
Anyway, that is a summary of how determinism works in the penalty side of the judicial system. Free will is not only required to establish responsibility/blame, it is also required if there is to be any rehabilitation.
And in the case of the brain tumor, everything operates pretty much the same, except the means of correction are different. Removing the tumor is like removing Fred’s gun from Barney’s head.
I agree with almost everything you said on how we would “determine the offender’s future behavior” in differing ways depending on the different circumstance. In other words, you are not taking a position that differs from the free will skeptic on deterrence, incarceration, or rehabilitation – and the difference between how to treat the problem due to the differences in configurations that cause the problem.
Where we disagree is this: “Free will is not only required to establish responsibility/blame, it is also required if there is to be any rehabilitation.”
What the notion of free will: being able to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise …does is allows for retributive justice to take place (it justifies retribution, etc.). We don’t require the notion of responsibility or blame in the normal “desert” fashion, and in fact that notion needs to be abandoned if we are to progress. We can simply look at the facts about the configuration (the person) that is causing the problem and assess the solution from there without any need to “blame”, just as we would assess that, for example, someone with a dangerous contagious disease would still need to be quarantined even though they are not responsible or to blame:
Quarantine Analogy and Free Will Skepticism
Also, you don’t seem to be understanding that the configuration of Fred and Barney’s brain at any given point dictates their action just as much as the gun or the tumor, and their brain configuration is dictated by their circumstances (genetics and environment that they have no control over) just as much as the tumor and gun.
The problem is with your semantic of free will. Most people would say that a person in a mental institute doesn’t really have free will, that their brain needs “fixing” and is what is causing their behavior. Under your semantic the insane person would have just as much free will as the sane person. What must be understood between the tumor, or insane brain, or normal brain is that those configurations were equally as dictated by their genetics and environment – regardless if there may be different ways to rehabilitate or prevent such a person. Their “will” was equally as “non-free” in all circumstances.
Later. 🙂
Apparently there is a rumor going around that free will is responsible for retributive “justice”. It is not. There is nothing about having free will that can justify an unjust punishment.
People can seek retribution, revenge or justice. They are not the same. Retribution returns harm for harm, and takes “an eye for an eye”. Revenge seeks satisfaction of a desire to return harm and is limited only by whenever that feeling of satisfaction kicks in. Justice seeks to protect the rights that we have agreed to respect and protect for each other, and may only do what is reasonably required to accomplish that. Anything beyond that inflicts a harm that cannot be justified.
What someone justly deserves is justice. That is how we should interpret “just deserts” if we care to be just.
If we are to rehabilitate an offender, then we must treat him as an autonomous being. We want him to make better choices in the future, and we want him to be able to make those choices on his own, that is, of his own free will. “Autonomy” and “free will” are semantically related. They both refer to a person able to make decisions for themselves on their own.
Operationally, to “blame” or “hold responsible” means only to identify a cause or causal agent that needs correction to prevent future harm. The fact that someone is to blame or is responsible for a harm does not justify any unjustifiable treatment.
If the criminal offender is an adult of sound mind, and is guilty of committing the crime, then he is “blamed” and “held responsible” for the harm he has caused. And that should result in a just penalty: one that reasonably repairs, corrects, protects, and does no more.
And while we’re addressing the individual’s responsibility, we should also be addressing the community issues that influenced him to make the wrong decision in the first place. Ideally, you want to address all the points of system failure that you can, if you want to reduce the likelihood of future harm.
But if we are going to address all the causes, then we cannot give the offender a get-out-of-jail-free card. The offender was the final responsible cause of the criminal harm.
Destroying the concepts of “free will”, “responsibility”, and “blame” undermines the attempts at correction. If the criminal himself is not considered responsible and is not mentally ill, then you have no grounds to take any action at all to correct him.
See the problem?
When we remove the notion of free will, retribution becomes nonsensical. With the notion that someone is blameworthy in the “desert” sense, retribution or excessive punishment become “justified’ as people are assumed to “deserve” such. It’s the notion that they “deserve” what they have coming to them that causes these problems, and the free will idea is a big influence in this.
By the way the idea of a “just punishment” is a misnomer, rather we simply have to punish or do what seems like a punishment (such as incarcerate) to prevent further harms (for the sake of utility). the person, however, doesn’t really “deserve” the punishment.
Yes, and many people feel that if someone did a bad act “of their own free will” that they “deserve” getting the same in return. This is a very common problem in the psychology of the masses. Much of the mentality about our own criminal systems has a foundation in retributive justice.
That is the very point. This whole notion of “deserve” is nonsensical. There is no “justly deserve” only “justification for creating preventative future measures”.
This is a nonsequitur. The point of rehabilitation is to change brain states. That’s not done “autonomously”, it’s done through much supporting work. Whether he makes the choices on his “own” is irrelevant and not required for rehabilitation. In fact, people are even working on microchips that could help psychopathic brain states.
Which is technically impossible to do.
Again, we don’t “blame” or “hold responsible” an insane person, but we certain try to correct them to prevent future harm. You are conflating the distinction between rehabilitation and some unnecessary need to “blame” in the “desert” sense.
If they are deemed to “deserve” it then it is justifiable.
I agree with your “just penalty”, but it shouldn’t be because the person is being “blamed” or “held responsible” in the desert sense. The only rational reason for these thing is the utility of doing them.
Agreed.
Just as we can’t simply give the person with a horrible contagious disease the “get out of quarantine” card. That does not, however, mean we hold them blameworthy or responsible in the “deserve” sense (e.g. they deserve being in quarantine for contracting the disease).
No it doesn’t. It only makes it harder to give excessive punishment or retributive justice. All other attempts at correction are justified entirely by the utility of doing so…just as quarantining a person is justified by that utility.
You’d have the very same grounds as you would for the mentally ill person. To prevent them from harming others / causing problems within society. The fact of the matter is, a normal person does not have any more “free will” than a mentally ill person, and is not any more “responsible”. Their brain state at the time they made a decision could not have been, of their own accord, otherwise.
The problem is we agree on how criminals should be handled, but don’t agree on the reason for handling them in such a way, and we don’t agree on the usage of words such as “free will”, “blame”, and “responsibility”. We simply don’t need these words to (rationally) enact all of those corrective procedures you display above. We only need to understand the consequences if we don’t do such. That is all.
Anyway, I think we could go on and on and on, both of us repeating the same thing. Much of our discussion is one of semantic disagreements, but this is often the case when a hard incompatibilist talks to a compatibilist. 🙂
Trick: “The point of rehabilitation is to change brain states. That’s not done “autonomously”, it’s done through much supporting work. Whether he makes the choices on his “own” is irrelevant and not required for rehabilitation. In fact, people are even working on microchips that could help psychopathic brain states.”
Gee, there goes “self”, personal “rights”, and “privacy”. I guess if we are done with free will and autonomy we might as well pack it all in and treat each other as robots. Well, not us, of course, but the unfortunate slob who fails to pay his parking tickets. Let’s make sure he doesn’t leave the courthouse without a chip in his head.
Look, your version of “determinism” is not real determinism. Real determinism must acknowledge ALL causes and causal agents. And it turns out that when those causal chains bump into us a mental process takes place that constructs a plan of action which is consistent with the purpose of our survival and well being. And it is that plan, of our own construction, which determines what happens next. We are purposeful packets of causality who are in fact choosing what becomes inevitable. Sometimes our decision making is rational and sometimes not so much. Sometimes our choices are counter-productive and merely complicate things.
That is how things actually work in the real world.
It is certainly true that our mental process is deterministic, even if it the output is often unpredictable. We can say with confidence that every choice we make of our own free will is also inevitable. You heard right. Every choice we make of our own free will is also inevitable. But that “inevitability” is nothing we can or should do anything about. All we can do is acknowledge it and then ignore it. The more important and significant of the two facts is that it is actually us in the driver’s seat, and inevitability is just along for the ride.
Psychopaths don’t get personal “rights” or “privacy” if they are a harm to others.
We are biological conscious robots.
Sorry, you need to get with the times. 🙂
There is no big distinction between biological brain action and synthetic parts assisting such. There is also no distinction between removing a brain tumor that is pressing on part of a brain so it no longer does that, and placing in a chip that bypasses a problematic part of the brain (e.g. that blocking empathetic reaction).
How does “my determinism” not address this? All determinism means is that every event has a cause:
“Determinism” and “Indeterminism” for the Free Will Debate
I never said that consciousness wasn’t a causal aspect of determinism, in fact I make it quite clear that it is an important causal factor.
It’s not “of our own construction”.
You are more confident in this assertion than I am, but that is why I’m a hard incompatibilist rather than a hard determinist:
Why I’m a Hard Incompatibilist, Not a Hard Determinist.
I never claimed that it wasn’t. I agree with you that many people confuse predictability with determinism.
And I define “fairies” as the little white floating dandelion florets and seeds that the wind carries away, so based on my definition fairies exist. 😉
The point is, you can define any word the way you feel like, but your semantic of “free will” has nothing to do with what most of the history of philosophy refers to and more importantly it just bypasses what the majority of people feel they possess. Sure, if free will just means “make choices” then yes, that free will exists. It’s just not the definition of concern for so many other topics.
You give no reason for us to “ignore it”. You are just claiming we should for no apparent reason. There are good reasons to “acknowledge it” if such is actually true.
If the specific decision you will make right now to either comment back or not comment back was dictated by causal events before you were even born (if we accept determinism), then no, it isn’t really “you” in the driver’s seat at all. It’s every causal event which dictates the decision (including the biological organism that you consider “you”) – all of which was out of your control. 🙂
I must admit that “could have done differently” is an oxymoron. It is obviously impossible to substantiate such a claim, ever. So what you assert to be the “common intuition” is incoherent. Better define “free will” in a consistent manner.
I don’t simply “assert it” to be a common intuition, it is a common intuition:
Free Will Intuitions: Fred and Barney Case Study – InfoGraphic
And just as we wouldn’t redefine geocentric after we learn that the sun doesn’t revolve around the earth, we shouldn’t redefine free will after we learn it’s incoherent (for the very reasons this article expresses). 😉
Side note: Should be qualified with “of one’s own accord” to address indeterminism: Could have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise. Also keep in mind that we can push this semantic to a present tense definition as well that is equally as incoherent: FREE WILL
Later. 🙂
Regardless of the “of one’s own accord” part, the “could…differently” in itself is pure fantasy and can NEVER be substantiated. QED: any intuition or argument based upon it MUST be incoherent.
“Free will” is not ONLY (or even substantially) a “common intuition”, but a philosophical issue. You seem to aspire to playing in that wider, deeper field. Inherently incoherent definitions don’t cut it there. We are not redefining “geocentric”, which is not, in itself, incoherent, but a carelessly (un)defined incoherent intuition.
Failure of the “common intuition” has no effect on blame, shame and guilt.
Well, maybe the common idiot disagrees.Blame may be reasonably assigned to an active (causal) agent whose actions have not been compelled by any other similar agent (or by extenuating EXTERNAL circumstances). An unacceptable action arising from the momentary status (regardless of any causal chain, other than compulsion by another such agent, leading to that status) is blameworthy.If the universe is causally deterministic I agree with your above assessment.
Regarding philosophical discourse they certainly due “cut it”, just as we can assess if someone believes in a god with self-contradictory traits and explain why that god is “incoherent”.
We now know that such geocentricity does not exist, but we don’t redefine it to something that does.
Blame and guilt in the “desert” sense (they “deserve” such) are only rationalized through the idea that someone could have and should have done otherwise. Of course it has everything to do with such.
I crossed off “Well, maybe the common idiot disagrees” as that is just an insult. Let’s avoid that type of thing in future discourse please. Obviously I disagree with your assessment here.
We can only blame a person in so much as we can “blame” a hurricane for ripping the rooftop off of a house, or “blame” a person with a brain tumor causing them to do something, etc. Blame in the “desert” sense is not at all reasonable, and that is the sense we are discussing for this topic:
No Free Will and the Ambiguity of “Responsibility”
C-ya. 🙂
Blaming a hurricane cannot alter future weather patterns. Hurricanes include no choosing agency; humans do. Blaming/shaming a person can alter their future behavior. “Deserving” blame is not really an issue, except where blaming cannot possibly have a useful result (insanity/feeble-mindedness/brain-tumor). Human beings can, indeed (sometimes) be “reformed”. Empathy/sympathy (for a perpetrator’s life history) has a valid place in human affairs, but so do blame, shame and guilt.
What I’ve said about “could….differently” applies regardless of the determinate/indeterminate (or anything in between) nature of reality. It is a result of the non-repeatability of every moment. I hope you can appreciate this point.
The actions we take because we blame people is irrelevant to the fact of whether they are actually “blameworthy”…even if such actions “worked”. In fact if they did “work” it would make more sense to apply the actions without the notion of blame entering the picture (just the notion of deterrent).
Usually in the worst ways. We actually can “deter” people without ever irrationally blaming or shaming them for something that they couldn’t have done otherwise.
We don’t “blame” or “shame” people in mental hospitals for their actions not because it isn’t “useful” but because they aren’t blameworthy. The “usefulness” of blaming and shaming is overshadowed by the problems that occur when we think a person is actually “blameworthy”.
This is where we disagree, we’ll never progress if we don’t move away from irrational blame, shame, and guilt.
“Could have done otherwise” doesn’t imply that one is repeating the event. It just addresses the ontic possibilities prior to the event. An acausal event could allow for a differentiation of variables (it would just never be “willed”).
I’d like to briefly address the first straw man, the definition of free will. When you and I have discussed this topic we both believe in determinism and neither of us believes in ghosts or the supernatural. We are in general agreement that reliable cause and effect is a truth of the real world, and that there is no such thing as “freedom from causation”. My position is slightly stronger than yours, since I believe that this reliability of cause and effect is perfect, while you are a bit agnostic, holding that some indeterminism may exist.
From both our positions, the only “real” definition of free will must be totally consistent with determinism. And that is why I define free will as nothing more and nothing less than us making our own choices for ourselves. The opposite of free will is when someone forces us to act against our own will, making us choose or act according to their will rather than our own.
This simple distinction between free and unfree will gives relevant and practical meaning to the term “free will”. It is sufficient to satisfy the concepts of moral responsibility and assignment of blame. And it is especially essential to the concept of rehabilitation, which attempts to provide the criminal offender with better options so that the offender can operate autonomously within the law after release.
From my perspective, the magical or supernatural notions of free will are so easily dismissed as to be the real “straw man” in the argument. But I understand that many of these beliefs about free will are popular.
The phenomenon of free will is pretty much identical for everyone, regardless of their rational or irrational beliefs about it. A person faces an important decision, considers the options, and chooses the one that seems best. The choice is their will at that moment. And if they were not coerced to make that choice against their will, then it is a choice of their own free will.
I believe that attacking “free will” in general, without specifying that you mean to attack the supernatural ideas about free will, ends up undermining a person’s sense of moral responsibility for their own actions. And that is not a good thing to do.
I’d suggest that your insistence on what you call “perfect determinism” is actually a weaker position, is it doesn’t address at least the possibility of acausal events. My position addresses both a “perfectly deterministic” universe, as well as an indeterministic universe.
This is just an ascertion you are making. It would be like me saying the only “real” definition of geocentric is one in which the earth actually orbits the sun.
It’s not a strawman unless the person is using that definition to reject the free will in your definition (which is a different definition). Since you understand that many of these beliefs about free will are popular, you must then understand that such justifies the use of the semantic.
As I said in the article, you can define such that way, and if you do, I certainly agree that we “make choices for ourselves”. And I think you agree that people couldn’t have, of their own accord, done otherwise. Or in present tense, that they can’t choose between more than one viable option, is which that choice was “up to them”. If we both agree, then the discussion then reverts to why we are using such definitions (which I give support for).
It seems we don’t need the word “free will” to simply say “people make choices or they are forced by others”. As for the terms “moral responsibility and assignment of blame“, as #2 suggests such are very ambiguous terms that needs defining before you use them. Most people use these terms in the basic desert sense, and we don’t have that type of free will. But again, it’s important that such get’s clarified, otherwise you are straw manning the position I and other free will skeptics are taking. In your usage, is a person more to blame than a clinically insane person is for something their brain configuration causes them to do? If you think so, then that is where we disagree.
I think you are leaving a whole lot out about the feeling people experience here. The person feels that all of the options are real possibilities. They don’t see or feel the variables that lead to their “will”, so they think it isn’t constrained, or at least it is more free that it actually is. And most people think they or others could have done otherwise, regardless of a deterministic universe. There is much evidence that supports people intuitively feel this. What you said is true, but it’s way too convenient to leave out these important details about intuitions that do not coincide with actual reality.
I agree that for any “attacking of free will” or “supporting of free will”, the free will definition needs to happen first and foremost (one of the first things I do in my book, devoting a whole chapter to it). That being said, the definition I’m attacking isn’t a “supernatural” definition, but it is a logically incoherent definition. It, however, is a logically incoherent ability that most people intuitively “feel” they possess – and such beliefs are not benign (they are harmful in many ways). And that is why it’s so important to “attack” it.
I also agree that we need to educate people on what we mean when we say “moral responsibility” and the types that are incompatible (the desert kind) when we couldn’t have done, of our own accord, otherwise. People can also understand what actions are moral or immoral, all without assigning blameworthiness (in the desert sense) if they or another acted immoral.They can understand that they couldn’t have, at that time, made a different (more moral) decision.
My next book will be on ethics without free will.
Ordinary “free will” is us making our own choices for ourselves, without being forced by someone else to choose or act against our own will.
Whatever other definitions may be offered up, that one will stand.
Trick: “The person feels that all of the options are real possibilities.”
And he has a right to feel that way at the outset, when he does not know yet which choice he will make. That is perfectly rational.
The fact that his decision will turn out to be deterministically inevitable, such that, technically speaking, only one of his options is “really” possible, is useless information. It will not help him make his decision in any way.
Trick: “And I think you agree that people couldn’t have, of their own accord, done otherwise.”
The meaning of “could have done otherwise” is actually true from that initial point of uncertainty up to the point where that option was ruled out of consideration during his mental deliberations.
Again, the fact that his choice was technically inevitable since the time of Big Bang is irrelevant and useless information. Unless you have some way to go back and make minor subatomic changes to the Big Bang that would produce a different decision, this technical inevitability is totally useless.
The language, just as it is, works just fine in the real world.
Trick: “It seems we don’t need the word “free will” to simply say “people make choices or they are forced by others”.”
But since everyone understands the difference between making a choice of their own free will versus being forced to act against their will by someone else, the phrase “free will” works just fine to communicate this relevant and useful information.
Trick: “As for the terms “moral responsibility and assignment of blame“, as #2 suggests such are very ambiguous terms that needs defining before you use them. ”
An airplane crashes, killing everyone on board. Crash investigators will try to find every direct, relevant cause of the crash (often crashes result from multiple system failures). The plane and its instruments, the pilot, the weather conditions, and other factors will be taken into account.
Each direct and relevant cause will be held responsible for its part in causing the crash. And each of these causes will be subject to correction, if possible, to reduce the likelihood of future crashes.
Finding which causes “are to blame for” and “are responsible for” the crash is the first step in correction. This tells us what to correct (but not how to correct it).
The same applies to our system of justice. The court hears evidence that the offender actually committed the crime. If guilty, the judge attempts to give the offender a “just” penalty.
The point of justice is to protect and restore rights. It is concerned with the rights of the victim, society (potential victims), and the offender.
A just penalty will seek to (a) repair the harm to the victim if possible, (b) correct the future behavior of the offender, (c) protect society from the offender until he is corrected, and (d) do no more than is reasonably necessary to accomplish (a), (b), and (c). Any harm to the offender or his rights beyond this cannot be justified.
Before the penalty phase of the trial, the judge collects information about the offender, his prior record and behavior, his job prospects, his attitude about what he did, extenuating circumstances, and anything else that might help her to determine what penalty will be needed to correct this offender’s future choices.
And the penalty may need to be more severe for someone whose history suggests his behavior will be more difficult to change.
Rehabilitation may provide education, counseling, job training, and other programs to help the offender to see more possibilities, better options, and make more appropriate choices when released. Upon release, he will be on his own again, making his own choices of his own free will, with only temporary supervision.
There is nothing wrong with people getting their “just deserts” so long as we all understand that what everyone “deserved” is actual justice.
If you are going to qualify your semantic with the word “ordinary” which implies being the norm, then we have a huge problem, because that is not the “ordinary” usage of the word “free will”.
Free Will Intuitions: Fred and Barney Case Study – InfoGraphic
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will
No, it’s not.
You keep ascerting things like “it’s useless” when in fact it’s a very useful understanding.
No, it is not true nor does uncertainty make it true. This is a conflation of the ontic with the epistemic.
Again, making statements is not making an argument. You making the ascertion that such is “useless” information is the very falsity that the free will skeptic is trying to explain.
I’m pretty sure most people would say they were “forced against their will” in the situation where someone else forces them, rather than “forced against their free will”. That is because they cannot even do what they have in their will to do. Again, it’s the important distinction between “willing” and “freely willing”. Your semantic only addresses the “will” word.
The Distinction Between X and Free X (choice vs. free choice)
So if a weather condition took out a plane, there was no “free will” involved, yet per your usage of blame the weather was still “to blame” for the crash. That was the “cause” of the crash. This is the very semantic of “blame” that the free will skeptic is not using. And I’d argue just using it to mean “a cause of x” confuses it with the desert sense. If you want clear language, you are better of saying that “person X caused Y” rather than “is to blame for Y” – and your entire rehabilitative process can run on the fact that person X was a cause. Afterall, we don’t “blame” the clinically insane in any “desert” sense, but we for sure stop them and try to rehabilitate them.
There is no “just deserts” in any sense. The notion of “deserve” is one that needs to be dropped when we understand that someone could not have done, of their own accord, otherwise (at the time they were making or made a decision). At best they were causally unfortunate to have the variables they had at that time.
(1) “Ordinary” is the opposite of “extraordinary”. To claim that one’s will could be somehow “free from causation” would be an “extraordinary” claim. One requires causation to implement one’s intent. Therefore to be “free from causation” would make the will impotent.
Ordinary free will makes no extraordinary claims. It is simply us making choices for ourselves, free from anyone else forcing us to choose or act against our will. That is all that “free will” is “free” from. And this is a meaning that everyone understands, regardless of any other notions about free will that they also hold.
(2) The notions that we can be free from causation, or free from ourselves, or free from reality are all impossible, irrational claims. The concept of “freedom” can never imply any of those imaginary freedoms. So it never really does. When a bird is freed from its cage, nobody claims it is also free from causation. And yet the bird is said to be free.
(3) I do continue to assert that the fact of inevitability is not only useless, but also leads to mental errors when we try to draw any useful implications from it. You and others have demonstrated that it leads to discarding the useful concepts of free will, responsibility, autonomy, and justice. And I have had to explain to you what all of these concepts actually mean when used correctly.
(4) We do blame the weather when a tornado rolls through a town destroying houses and schools. We may not be able to correct the weather, but we can devise early warning systems that save lives. We take responsibility for the lack of such a system and act of our free will to implement it.
(5) Both determinism and free will are present simultaneously in every decision we make. The mental process of choosing is a deterministic process. But that process is authentically us. It is our own reasons and feelings, our own beliefs and values, our own genetic dispositions and live experiences, and all of the other things that make us uniquely us, that determine what happens next.
Our choice becomes our will at that moment. And if no one forces us, against our will, to make a different choice, then we have acted of our own free will.
(6) There are two undeniable facts about that choice. It was deterministically inevitable and it was made of our own free will.
Our specific reasons for making that choice are relevant and meaningful, because circumstances may be different the next time. But the single fact of inevitability is useless. It tells us nothing that we don’t already know about every decision that is ever made.
The fact that it was authentically our own decision is important. Unless we were coerced against our will, then we are the final, responsible cause of our own action. If we chose to commit a crime, to harm someone or violate their rights, then we are to blame for that harm. And we are at least one of the contributing cause that needs to be addressed and corrected in order to prevent future harm to others.
But the criminal is not the only cause. The community (example Ferguson) that failed to provide education, employment, counseling, recreational facilities, and other requirements for raising an ethical child is also morally responsible for the bad outcome. They too require blame and correction.
(7) But if we place all our emphasis upon the fact of inevitability, and hold everyone blameless and free from any responsibility for the bad outcome, then we have tossed out the toolbox that was created specifically to handle matters of justice.
(1) There is a difference between “ordinary X” and “ordinary definitions of X”. We are talking about which definition of free will is ordinary and which is not…not if such free will existing is actually ordinary or not. An important distinction.
(2) The concept of “freedom” can apply to imaginary freedoms in the sense that people imagine they have those freedoms (not in the sense that it actually exists)
(3) We disagree on the “correct” usage of these words. “Correct” doesn’t imply that it is “actual”, only that it is or was believed. The correct usage of geocentric is planets orbiting the earth (The earth being at the center). This is the “correct” usage, even though geocentricity is not correct. Don’t confuse the important difference here.
(4) Different type of blame. No one is saying we can’t assess the object or thing that is a primary cause:
No Free Will and the Ambiguity of “Responsibility”
(5) In your definition of free will, of course they are present. It’s just a problematic definition that avoids the issues of concern.
(6) Neither of these are “undeniable”. Inevitability depends on a deterministic universe (which may or may not be the case), and free will depends on how it’s being defined. My semantic of free will (the commonly intuitive one) is very “deniable”. I agree with you that our specific reasons for making choices are relevant and meaningful. If inevitability happens to be a “fact”, it’s not “useless”…as it plays into various other understandings (such as the bad notion of being more or less deserving than another).
(7) It’s a bad toolbox. The only thing that needs to be considered is the action that protects people from future harms and increases wellbeing for a society. This can and should be done without notions of blame and responsibility in any “desert” sense. Pinpointing a cause is just showing a fact about where a problem is coming from, which no free will skeptic denies that such should be accounted for.
There is a whole lot of talking past each other in these comments. The fact of the matter is, we agree with a whole lot, we just disagree with how certain words need to be used. There are some other things that we disagree with (for example the usefulness or uselessness of certain understandings), but they pale in comparison to our semantic (definitional) disagreements.
Later good sir.
I have some unique background for discussing the 2nd straw man, blame and responsibility. I was an Honor Court chairman at Richmond Professional Institute (now VCU). Over the summer I had to come up with a student orientation speech explaining what the Honor Court was about. While thinking through this I discovered the meaning of Jefferson’s words in the Declaration of Independence, “to secure these rights, governments are instituted”. We constituted our state and federal governments to protect a set of rights for each other.
But that wasn’t what the Honor Court was about. It was about protecting the honor of the student body by expelling anyone who lied, cheated, or stole. That was the only possible penalty. The purpose of the penalty was to secure student honor, which is a respect bestowed upon us by others (administration and faculty) as well as our own self respect (personal honor). The penalty was not about achieving justice.
The purpose of a system of justice is to do what Jefferson had said, to secure a set of rights for each other. We create laws that prohibit behaviors that violate a specific right. Stealing, for example, violates a right to property. Murder violates a right to life. Through government we create laws, police, courts, and correctional facilities to deal with the criminal offender who violates the rights we have agreed to respect and protect for each other.
The penalty is naturally limited by the primary objective of the justice system: to protect everyone’s rights, the rights of the victim, society, and even the offender. Therefore, a just penalty seeks to (a) repair the harm to the victim, (b) correct the offender’s future behavior, (c) protect society from the offender until corrected, and (d) do no more than is reasonably necessary to accomplish (a), (b), and (c).
The court applies a penalty that usually is mild on a first offense, more severe for a repeat offender, and may be life in prison for the incorrigible. The judge may take into account the background of the offender to assess what might be sufficient to correct his behavior.
Hopefully, the offender can be rehabilitated. This might include education, counseling, job training, and a follow-up system while on parole. Ideally, the offender will make more appropriate choices in the future, autonomously, of his own free will. That is the goal of rehabilitation.
Blame/responsibility is determined during the trial. If he didn’t do it, then there’s no need to correct him. If he did in fact do the damage to the victim, then he does deserve the blame and is held responsible (assuming no mental illness).
During the penalty phase the judge will consider his prospects for correction. The offender may refuse opportunities for rehabilitation while in prison, but this will diminish his chance of parole.
The possibility of rehabilitation rests in the idea of an autonomous individual who chooses good or bad behavior of his own free will. Rehabilitation gives him new options and new choices through education, job training, counseling, and so forth. And the negative aspects of being imprisoned, the loss of freedom to choose for himself when to eat or when to sleep, gives him something new to think about before making another bad choice.
None of this rests upon anything magical or supernatural. There is no suspension of reliable cause and effect (determinism). There is just the ordinary free will of all the players making reasoned choices for themselves. The community chose to create laws, courts, and penalties to correct the harm of criminal behavior. The criminal made a bad choice to commit a crime. The community chose to redeem those who may be redeemable through rehabilitation.
And every choice we made of our own free will was also deterministically inevitable. Both are facts and both are simultaneously true in every decision. There is no logical reason to sacrifice either concept on the alter of the other.
You had me agreeing up until this sentence, then you went downhill:
The notion that someone “deserves” the blame is the very type of blame that becomes irrational if the person couldn’t have, of their own accord, done otherwise. This is different than the other type of “blame” that you used earlier, which simply addresses the person as part of the cause that we need to consider to fix the problem. It makes no difference regarding “deserve” if there was or wasn’t a “mental illness”, as such is just a different brain configuration. The mentally healthy person is not any more deserving of the blame than the mentally ill person.
No it does not rest on this. We rehabilitate mentally ill people all the time. The only thing required for rehabilitation is an understanding of the effects of doing so. We don’t have to assign “free will”. If we had a robot that was going crazy and doing bad things, the only thing to fix the robot is an understanding that we want to prevent the bad things in the future. We don’t need to assign “free will” to the robot to fix the robot. Rehabilitation is just a way to “fix” a problem.
There are many reasons to sacrifice the word “free will” to the alter, given the ability that most people feel they possess (the incoherent one’s) and the harms that such beliefs cause in the world.
in accordance to Quantum Biology and Super String Theory: I DO NOT BELIEVE IN A DETERMINISTIC UNIVERSE. That is the axiomatic crux of all this arguments. if it were IMPOSSIBLE for a conscious person to do otherwise, then it is not freewill. According to Thomas Aquinas who demarcated the difference between “Material Causes” and “Efficient Causes” … the argument is that Humnas (Conscious Personal Agents) are the Efficient Causers of their own decisions … INDEPENDENT of the external/ material world. Is it possible for a homosexual who’s genetics is deterministically homosexual to choose not to be a homosexual or engage in homosexual practices REGARDLESS of moral-values? YES
Therefore, although the material world is deterministic, the human mind (exclusive of brain) is not deterministic as it can calculate all possible worlds.
Quantum events cannot help grant free will. This is why I’m a Hard Incompatibilist rather than a Hard Determinist:
Why I’m a Hard Incompatibilist, Not a Hard Determinist.
Neither determinism nor indeterminism can help grant free will. This study was only addressing determinism and people’s misunderstandings that an otherwise is compatible (it’s not).
You also are mis-representing Aquinas’ use of “efficient cause” (even though we really shouldn’t be using Aquinas for our modern understandings here)…as he tied it back to a god, not the inner working of personal agency…because he A) thought infinite regress was impossible, and B) made a bad assumption that a god was the “first cause”. In reality there is no “independent of the material world” and even if we accepted the notion of a “god” (which there is no good reason to), such a god could not help grant free will — but that’s a different discussion. Even if there was something “outside of the material universe”, it could not escape the causal/acausal dichotomy and why those are logically incompatible with “the ability to have, of one’s own accord, done otherwise”.
This is so wrong on a number of fronts. If they choose not to engage in homosexual practices (or vice versa), they aren’t freely choosing to do so. The decision they make is constrained entirely by their genetics and environment. And no, they cannot “choose to not be homosexual” (which is different than choosing to engage in homosexual practices). And of course, there is nothing wrong with either choice they make here – but again, another topic.
Even if the “human mind” was separate from the material world in some dualist sense (which it’s not), any indeterminism within that “non-material” mind can not in any way help grant free will. In other words it could not be “up to them”.
Thanks for stopping by Ernest.
‘Trick,
The “based on one study” footnote should be highlighted and not hidden in the small print. Otherwise it seems you are jumping to conclusions. I don’t believe in free will, but I also don’t think one study should lead to firm conclusions. Thx!
Hi Bill, thanks for the visit.
Keep in mind that for the same study there were other smaller studies done with different scenarios, giving similar results. There are also other studies with similar results such as Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions (Nichols), etc. I think it should be quite obvious that this particular infographic is addressing a single study. It’s hardly “hidden”, even if the note was left entirely off – in fact the infographic says “76% of people who took the survey have…”. The main point is that people do think, even given an entirely deterministic universe, that others “could have done otherwise”. I think this “otherwise” intuition is obvious regardless of the study (just ask a few people who aren’t used to the topic).
The study does say a whole lot about the incoherent thinking people hold in these regards. And these were college students. I suspect the numbers (for the “otherwise” assessment) would be much higher in a normal community of people. I do think more studies like this need to happen.
Later. 🙂
“Fatalism” in
Wiktionary:
“1.The doctrine that all events are subject to fate or inevitable necessity, or determined in advance in such a way that human beings cannot change them.”
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary:
“1 Belief in fatality; the doctrine that all events are predetermined by fate.”
“2 Submission to or compliance with this doctrine.”
The only distinction between determinism and fatalism is the ability of people to determine their own fate by their own choices. Fatalism suggests that our choices are inconsequential, so we may as well resign ourselves to the inevitable. Determinism allows that our choices have consequences, therefore our freedom to choose what we do next determines what becomes inevitable.
Determinism without such freedom reverts to fatalism.
Wikipedia: “Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a “submission” to fate or destiny, whereas fatalists stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable.”
This does not mean that someone can “determine their own fate”, only that for determinism, our thoughts and actions are an important part of the causal process. This means that futility is NOT the same as with fatalism in which our thoughts and actions are irrelevant to our fated future.
See “FUTILITY COMPARED” in the above infographic.
Agreed, that is what this infographic says.
I agree with the first part of the sentence: “Determinism allows that our choices have consequences”
but the “therefore” is a nonsequitur (it doesn’t follow logically from such). There is no need for freedom in our “choosing” in order for the choice to have consequences, and our conscious choices are only one small part of the causal chain (if inevitable).
Another non-sequitur. Such freedom is not needed to avoid fatalism, as fatalism is not the same as causal determinism. These are two distinct concepts that share some similarities. One does not revert to the other.
Future events are inevitable, of course. And as you say, “our thoughts and actions are an important part of the causal process”. In fact, for every event that is a direct effect of our thoughts and actions the event could not have been “inevitable” without us.
We are the final responsible cause of those direct effects. By “final” I mean last in sequence. By “responsible” I mean that it is (at least) our own behavior that will be praised or blamed for those effects. Other relevant contributing causes may also be held responsible, like how our parents raised us, and likewise praised or blamed according to their contribution.
Our main problem seems to be in the use of the concept of “freedom”. If freedom must include “freedom from causation”, then there is no such thing as “freedom”.
Since we commonly use the term “free” in everyday speech, it would seem that we seldom if ever mean “free from reliable cause and effect (determinism)”.
And since no one can possibly demonstrate for us how they escape causation when making a choice of their own free will, we can show them that “of their own free will” actually refers to a deterministic process that takes place in their mind, producing one inevitable choice.
I suspect that it would be sufficient to ask them to write down their reasons for choosing option A and discarding option B. When they’ve made their choice and hand you their list of reasons, hand it back and say these reasons are why their choice was inevitable.
The only sense in which their choice was free was that it was authentically their own choice, for their own reasons.
And to demonstrate what a “lack of free will” is, hand them a list of reasons that they disagree with and require them to choose the other option. 🙂
Waging war upon free will, telling people their choices are not their own choices, but rather choices that were forced upon them against their will, and that they have no power to control anything that they do, because it is all controlled by things external to them, is entraining fatalism.
The fact that people are not constantly aware of the inevitability of their actions is actually a good thing. Dwelling upon that inevitability undermines self-confidence and autonomy. There’s nothing anyone can actually do about it. And there’s nothing anyone should do about it. It’s just there. It’s a fact, but not a helpful fact.
The more important fact is that we are free to change ourselves by education, counseling, participating, meditating, exercising, et cetera. Once we know this fact it becomes even truer than it already was.
Marvin,
Since a whole lot of our conversations are about semantic disagreements (disagreements about the definitions of words such as “free will”, “fatalism”, “blame”, “responsibility”, and so on, for this specific topic)…I think we are doing a whole lot of talking past each other. Rather than focus on semantics, I think we should rather focus on those things that we might actually agree and disagree on other than the use of words. For this reason, I’d like to revert this discussion to a more Socratic question and answer method.
Let’s keep answers as brief as possible (preferably under a few sentences)and we can elaborate further as more questions are delved into. Each time we can ask a one sentence question (with some further elaboration if needed), and respond to the others question with a fairly concise and brief response. No time limit on responding, we are both very busy I’m sure (or at least I know I am).
Here are the rules:
I’ll start out with an easy “yes/no” question:
Do you agree that someone “could not have, of their own accord, done otherwise”?
Elaboration: This question is not asking what a person “knows” or “thinks” at the time of decision (epistemic), but rather if they in actuality could have (ontic).Also note that this is yes or no, so a yes or no should be in there somewhere.
I’m sure we agree as to the facts. But we disagree as to “What do people really mean when they say … ?” As a pragmatist, I’m more interested in the practical utility of concepts rather than the abstract technicalities of their expression. I can show you what I mean by answering the question you just posed:
TS: “Do you agree that someone “could not have, of their own accord, done otherwise”?”
We both agree as to the fact that anything that has happened was technically inevitable. But when a person says, “I could have done otherwise”, I don’t believe they intend to make a metaphysical statement or to claim supernatural powers.
It is something more like this: “Ooops! That didn’t work out like I thought it would. If I had known this would happen I could have chosen the other option instead. Next time I’ll know better.”
The idea of “I could have done otherwise” is about evaluating past decision, learning from them, and making better future decisions.
It is these practical real life scenarios that give “I could have done otherwise” its actual relevant meaning.
See, this is the problem. You want to “debate” the topic, but then you don’t play fair. Diverting the question to something I didn’t ask is not practical or “pragmatic”. It is evasion. It was a yes/no question with a very clear “elaboration” after it (purposely so you wouldn’t go where you just did). The most efficient (and pragmatic) answer would have either “yes” or “no” (or even maybe) somewhere in there.
I’m sorry, but the “technicalities” are actually the “practicalities” as well. For example, when people confuse their intuitions about “I could have done otherwise” with the (technical) actuality of “I could have done otherwise”, this causes a number of real-world (practical) problems. But this is a digression. Rather than responding to this, I want to direct the conversation back to the original method, which I think fair.
I didn’t ask you what you believe “people think” when they hear “I could have done otherwise”, I simply asked if, in reality, they could have done otherwise (regardless of what you think some people think when they hear such).
We will get absolutely no-where if we don’t get into the “technicalities” of the topic. We are either willing to go where reason leads us, or we will simply continue talking past each other. I’m not so sure that we “agree as to (all of) the facts”, so I’d like to explore that.
Shall we continue, or is such a conversation not your cup-of-tea? If you care to continue, then please ONLY answer the original question. Keep in mind that we are trying to use a Soctratic method here to get to the crux of where we might actually disagree. I don’t want to have to infer something from your diverted wording, I’d like direct answers. If you ask a question I’ll do the same. So here we go, 2nd try:
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv
Do you agree that someone “could not have, of their own accord, done otherwise”?
Elaboration: This question is not asking what a person “knows” or “thinks” at the time of decision (epistemic), but rather if they in actuality could have (ontic).Also note that this is yes or no, so a yes or no should be in there somewhere.
TS: “Do you agree that someone “could not have, of their own accord, done otherwise”
(a) Technically, yes. Because given identical circumstances you get identical results.
(b) Practically, no. Because given slightly different circumstances you may get different results.
If I may return a simple question: which scenario happens most often in the real world: (a) we return to the past and repeat the process with identical circumstances, or (b) we try to learn from our experiences how to make a better choice next time.
The answer to my question determines the meaning of yours.
Great, but to avoid “time travel” thinking, which the “couldn’t have done otherwise” notion doesn’t at all suggest, let me re-frame the question into my present tense version:
* Do you agree that (given causal determinism) someone doesn’t have the ‘ability to choose between more than one VIABLE option’?
Clarification if needed: In other words, do you agree that they can’t (rather than couldn’t have) choose both chocolate icecream (and not vanilla ice cream), and vanilla ice cream (and not chocolate icecream)? That both options (if causal) are not real (meaning ontic) possibilities (only one is)?
Note that my question is another “yes/no” question.
Now on to your question, my answer is (b), as (a) doesn’t ever happen (as backward time travel doesn’t happen).
TS:” Do you agree that (given causal determinism) someone doesn’t have the ‘ability to choose between more than one VIABLE option’? ”
No one can agree with that question. “To choose” always requires “more than one VIABLE option”. If one of two possible options is known at the outset to be “not viable” then there is no “choosing” going on.
“Choosing” is a deterministic process by which we reduce multiple possible choices to a single choice. Whether a choice is viable or not, or whether it is better than the others or not, is only knowable by discovery during the process. At the outset we can never be certain as to the result.
If you rephrase the question as, “Do you agree that only one of the options in a choice can be inevitable”, then I could easily say “yes”. But that fact of inevitability is useless since it tells us nothing about WHICH option it will be. Knowing that one of the options will be inevitable tells us nothing useful.
Sorry if that answer is too long. But some questions, by their nature, cannot be answered with a simple “Yes” or “No”. The classic example is “Have you stopped beating your wife?” Either answer would confirm the built-in presumption that you had in fact been beating your wife.
Again, you are diverting my question into something I did not ask, as if you are simply not reading or ignoring the “clarification” part of my question. I am asking you if both options are ONTIC possibilities? This isn’t a malformed question like the classic “Have you stopped beating your wife?” that makes an initial assumption about something.
Perhaps you aren’t familiar with terms such as ontic or epistemic. Ontic simply means we are addressing what is or what exists. Epistemic means we are addressing what one can “know” about what is or exists. It’s important not to conflate these two things. I’m not talking about the epistemic for my question. So I will ask again:
Do you agree that (given causal determinism) someone doesn’t have the ‘ability to choose between more than one VIABLE (in the ontic sense) option’?
Clarification again: In other words, do you agree that they can’t (rather than couldn’t have) choose both chocolate icecream (and not vanilla ice cream), and vanilla ice cream (and not chocolate icecream)? That both options (if causal) are not real (meaning ontic) possibilities (only one is)?
1) Determinism, that is, reliable cause and effect, is perfect. ALL events unfold in a single, inevitable way.
** 2) All human concepts that actually work must already work within that ontological context. **
3) Our interpretation of any concept must presume 1 and 2.
For example: “Do you agree that (given causal determinism) someone doesn’t have the ‘ability to choose between more than one VIABLE (in the ontic sense) option’?”
“given causal determinism” is ALWAYS a given.
“someone” implies a biological organism operating deterministically.
“ability” implies the possibility of a biological organism operating in a specific way.
“choose” is one of those operations, specifically a deterministic process of reducing multiple options into a single choice.
“viable option” implies ALL of the options under consideration at the beginning of the choosing process, and ALL of the options at the end which are still worthy of consideration in the future should the current choice not pan out.
The statement “a person has the ability to choose between more than one VIABLE option” is technically CORRECT.
The statement “a person has the ability to choose between more than one INEVITABLE option” is technically INCORRECT.
I don’t think you can technically replace “inevitable” with “viable”. In the phrase “viable option”, viable means “workable” or “practicable” (SOED).
You are trying to say that there is only one inevitable choice, therefore only one choice is “actually” possible. But the concept of “possibility” is not about that one choice. It is about the many workable options that still appear to be viable, whether they were that one choice or not.
Whether determinism is true or not is shifting the discussion. For the sake of our discussion I am assuming (only because you are) that causal determinism is true and there is no chance of indeterminism (an acausal event). So under this assumption, lets go back to the question at hand…
Viable in this context means “feasible” or “possible” – the clarification I gave should make this obvious: “that both options (if causal) are not real (meaning ontic) possibilities (only one is)?”
Is it feasible that I could choose chocolate icecream instead of vanilla at 7PM this Saturday? And is it equally as feasible that I could choose vanilla icecream instead of chocolate at 7PM this Saturday? Are both options equally feasible/possible/viable (in the ontic- not epistemic sense)?
I’m not asking about the inevitability of the options, I’m asking if both options possibly could be chosen?
Again, you are shifting to the conflation of the epistemic with the ontic. So now that we’ve clarified the meaning of “viable” in this context, and we’ve clarified that I’m not addressing the epistemic, let’s ask the question again:
Do you agree that someone doesn’t have the ‘ability to choose between more than one VIABLE (ontic possibility – ontically feasible) option’?
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* BTW – sorry if this convo seems too pedantic, but I find to get anywhere in our discussion we really need to get extremely pedantic as there is way too much mixing of terms and talking past one another due to that. I’m glad you are looking to clarify what you think is being said by certain words. This convo could take a while before it gets productive but I think it could be worth it. 🙂
Only one thing can happen. But two things are possible. (At least until 7:01PM tomorrow night)
The meaning of “possible” is only ontologically relevant to the degree that the idea of a given “possibility” within the human mind deterministically alters the person’s actions such that the person then deterministically brings the event into being (ontology of the event).
Semantically, “possible” sits in a context of epistemological “uncertainty”, where the mind is imagining its options for its next actions and considering which will be most feasible.
(Gee, I hope I used all those words right!)
All human concepts evolved in the context of a deterministic universe. There is an underlying presumption of reliable cause and effect that should be taken as universally implied. Because the presumption is universal, it is seldom stated, but can be taken for granted. The true meaning of our words can be discerned by examining how the language is actually used operationally in the real world.
No, “possibility”, at least in logic, doesn’t fall under the context of epistemic uncertainty, it falls into the context of ontic reality (what can or cannot happen). Epistemic uncertainty only relates to the lack of knowledge over what is, in actuality, possible. If I could (literally) never choose chocolate at 7PM, then choosing chocolate was never a “possibility”, even if I didn’t at the time know I could never choose it (and thought it was a possibility due to a lack of knowledge).
You want to skew the conversation to epistemic uncertainty, but I’m not going to let that happen. Epistemic uncertainty is irrelevant to my question. I’m also not asking if “only one thing can happen”, I’m asking if both options are “possible” to BE that one thing. You obviously do not want to directly answer my question, so lets keep with the icecream:
At 6:55PM can it be the case that I will be eating chocolate ice cream and not vanilla at 7:05:01 PM?
And if it can be the case, can it equally be the case that I will be eating vanilla ice cream and not chocolate at 7:05:01 PM?
Are both of those happenings possible?
* I’m not asking about what I’m thinking here at 6:55PM, I’m asking about future ontological happenings.
So one more time: Are both of those happenings (ontologically) possible? Yes or No.
p.s. I know you know the answer to this, you just need to actually say it. 😉
TS: “You obviously do not want to directly answer my question …”
I’m pretty sure that I’ve confirmed many times now that determinism results in a single inevitable outcome. The problem is that you want that to mean something extraordinary. And it doesn’t.
Inevitability interferes in no way whatsoever with what is actually going on. And it requires no special accommodation in our use of language. After all, our language evolved through natural selection within a deterministic universe.
What is a “possibility” remains a possibility. What is “free” remains free.
TS: “So one more time: Are both of those happenings (ontologically) possible? Yes or No.”
It is impossible for two mutually exclusive things to exist. For example, we can’t have both determinism and “indeterminism”. And we can’t have both freedom to cause and “freedom from causation”.
So it is impossible for you to chose both chocolate and not chocolate (vanilla).
Nevertheless, prior to your decision, for all practical purposes, you were free to choose either one, and either choice was possible.
The fact that your decision was inevitable since the Big Bang changes nothing.
There is nothing extraordinary by saying that only one (very specific) decision was possible even before the decision took place. You are simply avoiding saying this.
This is not what I asked. I don’t care if two mutually exclusive things cannot simultaneously exist. I’m asking if both could happen (e.g. it could be the case that X happens OR it could be the case that Y happens instead).
If “determinism results in “a single inevitable outcome” and only one of those options, prior to the decision, can be the inevitable outcome, how can the other choice be at all “possible” (in the ontic sense)?
You aren’t moving back to conflating the ontic with the epistemic (with your “for all practical purposes”) are you? This is no different than saying “most people think god exists, so for all practical purposes god exists”.
Again, if such decision is inevitable, how could the other (non-inevitable) decision EVER be a “real” possibility? As Spock says, that is illogical Marvin. 🙂
Anyway Marvin, I think we are at an impasse, as you are skirting around every clear and direct question I ask you. I’m also beginning to feel it’s too unproductive when you can say that “your decision was inevitable since the Big Bang” and at the same time “either choice was possible” without cognitive dissonance (since I clarified that we were addressing ontological possibility).
Either you are refusing to address the type of possibility (or viability) I’m referring to which means the event can “actually happen”, or you seriously have a contradictory position here. If it’s the former, it’s unproductive,… if it’s the latter, it’s less unproductive if I can get you to see why such is contradictory.
Either way, it’s not your fault – no free will after-all. So my next question:
Are you taking the position that either choice is ontologically possible (CAN ACTUALLY HAPPEN) even though one is “inevitable” even before it happens?
TS: “Are you taking the position that either choice is ontologically possible (CAN ACTUALLY HAPPEN) even though one is “inevitable” even before it happens?”
I’ll repeat: One and only one choice is inevitable. That is what reliable cause and effect (determinism) logically implies. And I hold that determinism is true.
However, “possible” means that something “might” or “might not” happen.
And your substitute “can” also actually means “might” or “might not”. It’s basically a synonym for “possible”. Adding “actually” doesn’t help because you end up with “might actually” or “might not actually”.
What you are trying to do is find another way to say “Is it true that the inevitable choice is the inevitable choice”? In which case I would readily agree!
But when people speak of “possibilities” they are specifically talking about alternative future outcomes as they IMAGINE them in their minds. And a person can easily imagine different outcomes resulting from different options they might choose.
That is where “possibilities” exist, in the mind.
Now, based on our choices, ONE of those possibilities may become REAL, as an inevitable result of our choices and our actions.
TS: “Anyway Marvin, I think we are at an impasse, as you are skirting around every clear and direct question I ask you.”
I see. Do you think it might be a “defense mechanism”? I mean, perhaps I am afraid that if I actually hear what you’re saying, then I will have to radically change what I have been saying and thinking.
If that’s the case, then it’s a darn good thing I haven’t written a book! Right? 🙂
You do understand what you are doing here, right? When you say “However, “possible” means that something “might” or “might not” happen” you are simply ignoring that I have defined the usage of the word for the context I’m referring. You do this way too often. And NO, “can actually” means it can be actualized “in reality”. And there is no getting past the fact that I have repeatedly said “ontologically possible”, which has nothing to do with your epistemic semantics. I’m trying to avoid your use of “inevitable” for a reason, because I want you to understand what it actually means that something is “inevitable” so you can’t just revert back to your mantra that “inevitable is useless”. This is what you are evading by changing up semantics to your own liking.
BTW – I do think you are using a defense mechanism. You’ve also written a lot of words in your blog (so don’t go there about writing a book). What is more obvious is that you are stuck in “epistemic” thinking, to avoid making (important) “ontic” assessments:
Existence Conflated with Knowledge and the Free Will Debate
But I’ll tell you what, let’s start again using all new fresh words – maybe we’ll hit words you can’t simply change the semantic for (even when explicitly defined for you):
Can one avoid a situation (such as choosing chocolate icecream and not vanilla) that is certain to happen (inevitable)? Yes or No.
TS: “Can one avoid a situation (such as choosing chocolate icecream and not vanilla) that is certain to happen (inevitable)? Yes or No. ”
There is nothing that anyone can do about inevitability. If I’m choosing between chocolate and vanilla, and I’m pretty certain that vanilla will be inevitable, can I then choose chocolate to spite inevitability? No. Because that would only mean that chocolate was the actual inevitable choice.
One cannot take inevitability into account within a decision, because that too would have been inevitable. The only rational thing one can do about inevitability is acknowledge it (which I’ve done REPEATEDLY) and then ignore it.
The knowledge of specific causes and their effects is very useful. That’s how we get tools like physics, chemistry, and medicine that give us more control of our environment.
But the fact of inevitability itself has no useful implications. Trying to draw implications from inevitability usually leads to mental errors.
For example, what does the word “possible” mean in the context of inevitability, where there is never more than one “possibility”?
And if there is never more than one possibility, then where does “choosing” go?
And if all of the “choosing” is due to external factors, then where did “we” go?
Back to your question. The answer is “no”, there is (by definition) no way to avoid what is “certain” to happen. What’s next?
Yaye, I got a direct answer, even if it came along with a bunch of unnecessary stuff that doesn’t have to do with the question itself. My next question:
If someone commits a crime, was commiting that crime EVER avoidable? Yes or No.
***
Since you are also asking me 3 questions (I assume they are being asked) we can follow that line as well, but remember, in the future (please) one question at a time.
It means the only things that are in actuality “possible” are the only things that are in actuality “inevitable”. The other epistemic options were never an actual possibility.
Choosing is just a consious causal process that doesn’t imply that the other options were ever “possible”
Most people’s conception about the “self” (I, you, we) are wrong-headed.
***
If we can stick to more of a back and forth (only one question each and only a few sentences at a time) conversational type of flow, that would prevent too many tangents from cropping up and allow us to really narrow down to addressing a single point at a time. I think we are somewhat back on track to a productive conversation. 🙂
TS: “If someone commits a crime, was commiting that crime EVER avoidable? Yes or No.”
(a) Yes. If he had chosen not to commit the crime then he could have avoided committing the crime.
(b) No. Everything that happens is inevitable.
Both (a) and (b) are true. One of them (a) is important and relevant. The other (b) is irrelevant and normally ignored. Agree?
TS: “Choosing is just a conscious causal process that doesn’t imply that the other options were ever “possible” ”
Can the chooser hold that position at the beginning of his deliberations? Yes or No. (Feel free to explain, though).
Let’s talk more about (a), so new question:
If someone commits a crime, was them “choosing” to commit that crime EVER avoidable? Yes or No?
Yes, I can know ahead of time that any option in which I do not select I could have never selected. I don’t have to think that all options before me are, in actuality, possible. This is all regardless of my lack of knowledge over which one I will select.
TS: “If someone commits a crime, was them “choosing” to commit that crime avoidable?”
Unless he commits the crime in his sleep, I would have to say that his choosing between committing the crime and not committing the crime was unavoidable. If it was his first crime, then he probably thought a lot about it. If it was his 50th shoplift, then he may have done it automatically, by habit rather than conscious choice.
TS: “Yes, I can know ahead of time that any option in which I do not select I could have never selected.”
You can quote the theory, but it is impossible to actually implement it in practice. You would have to know at the outset which possibility was impossible. And if you knew that, then you would never begin your deliberations to discover the answer, because you already had the answer.
Unless there are at least two possibilities at the outset, there is no choosing to be done. Again, “possibilities” do not exist in the real world, but only in one’s imagination.
Only one possibility is inevitable (or maybe none since the actual results might not match any of the imagined results). But multiple possibilities must exist in the mind if any choosing is to take place.
I’m going to have to insist that you answer the actual question. I didn’t ask if his choosing between committing the crime and not committing the crime was unavoidable. I’ll restate the question:
If someone consciously chooses to commit a crime, was them consciously “choosing” to commit that crime avoidable?
You are confusing epistemic uncertainty with actual possibility. If I know that a rabid dog is behind one of three doors, but I don’t know which door, it doesn’t imply that I think it “possible” that the dog is behind each door. I know the dog is only behind one very specific door (even before I open them and find out) and the other two doors were never a possibility for the dog to be behind – and I truly can know this even if I don’t know which of the doors is the only possible one with the dog behind it.
TS: “If someone consciously chooses to commit a crime, was them consciously “choosing” to commit that crime avoidable?”
Sorry. I misread the question. I thought you were asking about the consciousness of the process. But you are actually asking again whether the event was avoidable. In that case my answer remains the same, even if you do not understand it:
(a) The choice was inevitable, of course.
(b) The choice was also avoidable had he considered other things beyond those which led inevitably to his bad choice.
“Avoidable” presumes alternate possibilities (just like “can” and “possible”).
Inevitability does not mean that “all things are unavoidable”. It only means that both the things we avoided and those we did not avoid were inevitable.
For example, “Had the teenager not been texting while driving, the pedestrian would be alive today”. The accident was avoidable if the teenager had not been distracted.
That is what William James would call the “cash value” of a concept. We have to ask ourselves, “What difference does the concept make in the real world?” And the idea of avoidability is used to learn from past experience how to “avoid” future hazards.
Listen carefully: (1) The direct, relevant causes of the harm are useful information. If we can understand the factors that contributed directly to the bad choices (committing a crime or texting while driving) then we can address those causes and attempt to correct them. By doing so we reduce the risk of future harm to others. (2) The single fact of inevitability (which is also true in ALL cases) tells us nothing useful. If you think it does, then please explain.
I find your (a) and (b) in contradiction, but that’s okay. We’ll just continue with another question to get to that:
Do you agree that anything that IS inevitable (defined as “certain to happen”) IS ALSO unavoidable? Yes or No?
(keep in mind that we are once again talking about what “IS”, not what we can or cannot “KNOW” about what is)
In regards to your (2), yes, I think it tells us something very “useful” in regards to how we should behave given our understanding of such, and that is where this conversation will eventually get pointed to if you would answer my questions (and, if possible, do so without making contradictory assessments that need to be corrected for each time). I’ve explained it’s use many times and you simply, afterward, assert that “it’s not useful”…this is why we are using this new process of the Socratic method to narrow down on our disagreements slowly and pedantically. 🙂
TS: “Do you agree that anything that IS inevitable (defined as “certain to happen”) IS ALSO unavoidable? Yes or No?”
Yes, but only when speaking of them at the same level of causality.
No, when speaking of them at different levels of causality. For example, we may avoid hitting the pedestrian by noticing him stepping into the street, or we may not avoid the pedestrian because we were texting. Whichever occurs would have been inevitable, even though we may also say that the accident was avoidable had we not been texting.
It’s like (inevitability (avoidability)). One concept exists within the context of the other. Everything exists within the context of universal inevitability because reliable cause and effect (determinism) is “everywhere and at all times”.
And you wish to use “unavoidability” in place of “inevitability” in the outer layer, we can even say that the accident with the pedestrian was either “unavoidably avoided” or “unavoidably not avoided”.
TS: “I’ve explianed it’s use many times and you simply, afterward, assert that “it’s not useful”…”
We could have started there if you liked. But this exercise has been helpful to me to sort out what I’m trying to say a little better, so take all the time you need.
Next question:
Do you agree that, if someone avoids doing what is legal (and commits a crime), that such avoidance was (since the big bang) unavoidable? Yes or No.
I don’t believe we could have, because we still haven’t even gotten close to the underlying facts needed to assess that part yet. We need to focus on the minutia first, for example, you thinking that inevitability and unavoidability (or evitability and avoidability) aren’t the same thing. So back to the question above.
Great, I’m glad you are appreciating the process, even if slow. 😀
TS: “Great, I’m glad you are appreciating the process, even if slow. :-D”
You should checkout Jonathan Miller as Bertrand Russell on YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-JPfVGotIQI
TS: “Do you agree that, if someone avoids doing what is legal (and commits a crime), that such avoidance was (since the big bang) unavoidable? ”
Absolutely. That is clearly deterministic inevitability.
NICE! I liked it.
Great! Next question:
Do you agree that such legal avoidance (the EXACT avoidance in my last question for the EXACT person in my last question) was unavoidable EVEN BEFORE the person committed the crime? Yes or No?
TS: “Do you agree that, such legal avoidance (the avoidance in my last question) for the exact person in my last question was unavoidable even before the person committed the crime?”
In the context of deterministic inevitability the act was causally unavoidable from any point prior to the act going back through eternity. For example, it was deterministically inevitable 1 minute prior, 1 Big Bang prior, and 1 eternity prior.
And my question is: “So what? How does that change anything?”
All knowledge causally “changes” something. This particular knowledge allows people to become compassionate about another person’s variables that they couldn’t have changed. It also makes the notion of being more or less deserving than another irrational, which leads to greater equality (a more egalitarian society if everyone understood it). But we havent gotten to this point yet, we are jumping the gun here. Let’s keep things slow, point by point.
Next question:
“Do you also agree that, if a person becomes a billionaire (avoids poverty and obtains great wealth), and if another person is unable to gain any real wealth and remains poor (avoids wealth gain), that such (avoidance and obtainment), even before either person was even born, was unavoidable?”
TS: “This particular knowledge allows people to become compassionate about another person’s variables that they couldn’t have changed.”
Or, the idea of inevitability could allow someone an excuse for their own lack of compassion. If it justifies one, then it equally justifies the other. Causal inevitability is a constant on both sides of every equation. It literally makes (deterministically causes) no difference.
TS: “It also makes the notion of being more or less deserving than another irrational, which leads to greater equality (a more egalitarian society if everyone understood it).”
Or, the idea of inevitability can be used to shortcut the judgment of what someone deserves. For example, if it was inevitable that you killed someone, then it also is inevitable that you should be killed. It works quite nicely into the idea of retributive justice. After all, if those are the rules then the result of breaking the rules is inevitable.
You seem to think that the concept of inevitability is something new, and that you can assign it whatever meaning you wish. ‘Fraid not.
TS: “Do you also agree that, if a person becomes a billionaire (avoids poverty and obtains great wealth), and if another person is unable to gain any real wealth and remains poor (avoids wealth gain), that such (avoidance and obtainment), even before either person was even born, was unavoidable?”
“Indeed. And, since it was inevitable, there was nothing anyone could do about it. Some people are just lucky I guess. And the lucky deserve what they get due to their luckiness. And the unlucky deserve what they get due to their unluckiness. After all, such was their fate since the Big Bang! So we just should let things be as they are. If things were meant to be different, then they would be different.” Said the fatalist.
Someone “could conclude” anything at all about you based on your haircut. The fact of the matter, however, is that some conclusions logically follow from the facts and others (in particular, the illogical account for excusing future action based on inevitability, or the non-sequitur that someone “should be killed” based on inevitability) DO NOT follow from the facts. I’m not simply addressing “conclusions” here, but rather “rational conclusions” (conclusions that actually follow logically from the understanding). You, however, are just making up non-sense.
No, I’m not “assigning” anything, I’m making rational conclusions. This is why we need to keep going from the very pedantic basics rather than jump way ahead like you are here. 80% of your comments so far are evasions. It’s all good though, because such evasion was unavoidable, but that doesn’t necessarily mean you can’t causally learn from such for your next comment – I guess we will find out. 😉
For example, I like how you answered my question: in quotes as some mixed up fatalist (not even a fatalist would say what you said) and not yourself. So I question if that is truly your answer, or if you are being sarcastic. Also note that fatalism does not imply that someone “should let things be as they are”, it only implies that they cannot change anything. Also, this idea that “the lucky deserve what they get due to their luckiness” is a nonsequitur (and that is the point). Just the opposite applies to luckiness – that the lucky aren’t really “more deserving” than the unlucky (and vice versa). You also know that my position isn’t fatalistic, and we were not supposed to be using such words – remember?
So I’ll ask my next question:
Were you serious when you said “Indeed” in quotes to my question (we’ll remove the other unnecessary garbage), or were you just avoiding the question with really poor sarcasm?
TS: “The fact of the matter, however, is that some conclusions logically follow from the facts and others … DO NOT follow from the facts.”
Agreed. Some people even conclude that if everything is inevitable we no longer have the freedom to choose anything for ourselves. Silly, I know, but some people draw such irrational conclusions from deterministic inevitability. Even supposedly great physicists like Einstein and philosophers like Spinoza have gone down that rabbit hole. (I kinda wish they were here too, so I could explain it to them).
TS: “Also note that fatalism does not imply that someone “should let things be as they are”, it only implies that they cannot change anything.”
If it is actually true that “you cannot change anything” then it logically follows that “you should let things be as they are”.
TS: “Also, this idea that “the lucky deserve what they get due to their luckiness” is a nonsequitur (and that is the point). ”
Luck is “good fortune”. To be “fortunate” is to be lucky. That’s what those words mean. One’s fortune is literally one’s fate. Back in ancient times they would have said he was “smiled upon by the gods”. And I just checked Wiki, the Roman goddess Fortuna also controlled your fate.
And that old Greek/Roman mythology is the root of religious “fatalism”.
The essential concept of fatalism is that one is not in control of one’s own fate. Either gods or abstract concepts like luck or fate controlled your destiny.
And that is why so much of the wordplay around deterministic inevitability sounds like fatalism.
TS: “Were you serious when you said “Indeed” in quotes to my question (we’ll remove the other unnecessary garbage), or were you just avoiding the question with really poor sarcasm? ”
I was demonstrating how fatalism arises in some minds from the idea of deterministic inevitability. Attempting to draw meaningful implication from inevitability leads to mental errors. Fatalism is one of those mental errors.
My question: Everyone is familiar with the fact that we are shaped in part by genetics and in part by our environment and culture. For example, you often hear people claiming that violent scenes in movies and video games may be adversely affecting our children’s behavior. Since the idea of external influences is already well established, what do you expect to change by insisting upon inevitability rather than simple cause and effect?
No, this does not logically follow, as someone who cannot change anything doesn’t NEED to do anything at all (including letting things be) and the same result will ensue. They have no choice in the matter of what happens. They can let things be, or not let thing be, and per fatalism what they were destined will come to be.
This does not mean that one is “more deserving” of their “good fortune” than another person. In fact just the opposite. No one is more deserving of winning the lottery than another, just because they happen to win. That’s silly.
Let’s not talk about words such as “fatalism”. If you need to, go back to the rules of this discourse. I want to avoid semantic games.
You didn’t answer the question. I know what you were TRYING to demonstrate (unsuccessfully), but such did not answer the question – it evaded it.
So I will ask you the question once again, and please answer without using something tantamount to a religious parable. SO back to the original “yes/no” question:
Do you agree that, if a person becomes a billionaire (avoids poverty and obtains great wealth), and if another person is unable to gain any real wealth and remains poor (avoids wealth gain), that such (avoidance and obtainment), even before either person was even born, was unavoidable? YES OR NO??
This is a malformed question (similar to that “have you stopped beating your wife? question) since, for this discussion, the only thing I’m insisting on is “simple cause and effect” and what such “cause and effect” means. Inevitability doesn’t only tie into cause and effect … a religious account of pre-destination would also be “inevitable” and not entail a need for cause and effect, etc. So I assure you that it is YOU that first brought up the word “inevitable” as I never use the word unless someone else does first. We can simply address what cause and effect means for our decisions.
I need to stop us at this point. Once again we have gone off on tangents and away from the Socratic method. I don’t want to have to fix every incorrect thing that you assert….rather, it’s best if we do one question at a time, and then answer that and ONLY that question. Can you keep within the constraints of this procedure? Here are the rules again if needed:
Here are the rules again:
Later good sir. 🙂
TS: “Do you agree that, if a person becomes a billionaire (avoids poverty and obtains great wealth), and if another person is unable to gain any real wealth and remains poor (avoids wealth gain), that such (avoidance and obtainment), even before either person was even born, was unavoidable? YES OR NO??”
Again, so long as we’re speaking of deterministic inevitability, all events are “unavoidable”. You may pick any event you like, and the answer is the same.
However, it also remains also true that, for any event in which an autonomous person is the final responsible cause, that event is within the control of that person, such as he is at that time.
Choose the answer according to how you would like to proceed.
Now we are talkin’. 🙂
Next question:
Is it true that an autonomous person (such as Charles Whitman), who throughout the years develops a brain tumor that presses on his amygdala causing his brain to be configured in such a way that he actually desires and is compelled by such desire to go on a shooting spree, – that because they were the “final responsible cause”, the event of the shooting spree was “within the control of that person” (such as he is at that time)? Yes or No?
TS: “Is it true that an autonomous person (such as Charles Whitman), who throughout the years develops a brain tumor that presses on his amygdala causing his brain to be configured in such a way that he actually desires and is compelled by such desire to go on a shooting spree, – that because they were the “final responsible cause”, the event of the shooting spree was “within the control of that person” (such as he is at that time)? Yes or No?”
I need to describe how this works rather than just give a Yes or No.
The problem is the harm done by the shooting and how to deterministically prevent future harms by the same causes. First, Whitman, the person would be the final responsible cause, which justifies our incursion upon Whitman’s rights. He can be restrained either in prison or a secure mental facility against his will in order to prevent further shootings. Next, we have the diagnosis of a brain tumor. If the brain tumor compromises his judgment, then the corrective operation may also take place against his will. Finally, after the tumor is removed, it may be that additional corrective actions are required, because it may turn out that other people with a similar tumor did not go on a shooting spree. (see http://www.wellssanto.com/neurodeterminism.pdf )
So, back to your question. Whitman’s behavior was the final responsible cause of the shooting, but Whitman’s tumor (as you presented it) was the final responsible cause of Whitman’s mental illness. And, assuming Whitman was a good and ethical person prior to the growth of the tumor, then the tumor is the most relevant cause of the shooting.
I think it is true that “criminal responsibility” is usually judged absent in the cases where judgment (specifically between right and wrong) is compromised by mental illness. And it is commonly said that the mentally ill are “not responsible” for their actions. However, it is the same bad acts, whether sane or not, that justify corrective actions to protect society. It is just the mode of correction that differs (prison or mental facility).
You are getting way ahead of yourself again, this question is not addressing how the person should be treated after the event at all, it asks specifically about the event itself. I need to, once again, bring you back on track. Leaping ahead is not productive – remember – we need to move slowly here.
No, the tumor pressed on a part of the brain, changing the brain configuration (which is Charles Whitman’s brain configuration regardless of what is causing it), and the neuronal activity of the brain state (not the tumor), was the last cause of the “desire”, and the “desire” was the cause of the action. In other words, Whitman’s brain activity was the last cause of the desire and action, the tumor just has an effect on the brain state.
So again, given the fact that it’s Charles Whitman’s specific brain state that is the “final responsible cause”, was the event of the shooting spree “within the control of that person” (such as he is at that time)? Yes or No?
Clarification: My question is asking about the “control” word you used, and the sense of how being the “final responsible cause” leads to being “within the control that person”. So was the event of the shooting spree “within the control of Whitman” if his prior brain state dictated entirely the desire and action? Yes or No.
TS: “My question is asking about the “control” word you used, and the sense of how being the “final responsible cause” leads to being “within the control that person”. So was the event of the shooting spree “within the control of Whitman” if his prior brain state dictated entirely the desire and action? Yes or No.”
Whitman, as he was at the time, was in control of the shooting. His brain tumor was part of who he was. His feelings of compulsion were also part of who he was. Even his insanity was part of who he was at the time of the shooting. His own hands loaded the gun and pulled the trigger. In the absence of Whitman, the shootings would never have occurred. The final cause of the deaths was obviously Whitman pulling the trigger.
Great! So in your assessment of the words “in control” the person with the brain tumor pressing on their brain, changing their brain state, was “in control”. Super – I’m starting to get a feel for the way you use words (even if I think it odd).
Next question:
If someone is holding a gun to another person’s head telling them to do something or they will shoot them, and they do that something, were they also “in control” of that decision if they weighed the two options (do it and don’t get shot, not do it and get shot)? Yes or No (no further elaboration needed).
Note: I’m just trying to narrow down the things we can assign this “in control” ability to and the things, if any, we cannot – so bear with me on these questions.
TS: “I’m starting to get a feel for the way you use words (even if I think it odd).”
Context is everything. A word may carry different meanings in different contexts.
And how would you answer the question, “Who was in control?” You have Whitney and you have his victims. There’s the tumor, of course, but it has no direct control of Whitney’s behavior, only how he feels at the moment. What Whitney does about those feelings is still in Whitney’s hands.
But, back to the script.
TS: “If someone is holding a gun to another person’s head telling them to do something or they will shoot them, and they do that something, were they also “in control” of that decision if they weighed the two options (do it and don’t get shot, not do it and get shot)? Yes or No (no further elaboration needed).”
I would say No.
However, William James just tapped me on the should and wants to ask: What practical difference does it make to be “in control”?
So just to sum up so far on the “in control” idea that you initially brought up, the guy with the brain tumor configuring his brain in a way that compelled him was “in control” of his decision, but the guy with no brain tumor but a gun to his head was “not in control” of his decision to do what the gunman said. This get’s more and more interesting.
Keep in mind that “in control” was your words that I’m looking to clarify – so I figured you thought such words were in some way important. So perhaps this should be my next question:
Do you think being “in control” make any practical difference? yes or no? (no need to elaborate here, yes or no will suffice)
TS: “Do you think being “in control” make any practical difference? yes or no? ”
Yes.
Wow best answer yet (meaning direct and non-evading)! 🙂
Next question then:
Imagine a guy with a brain tumor that pushed on his brain in a way that compelled him to not do what the gunman (the man pointing the gun to his head) demanded. Since he went against the gunman’s dictation AND he did what his brain desired to do, was he more “in control” than the person without the brain tumor who did what the gunman said? (YES OR NO)
TS: “Imagine a guy with a brain tumor that pushed on his brain in a way that compelled him to not do what the gunman (the man pointing the gun to his head) demanded. Since he went against the gunman’s dictation AND he did what his brain desired to do, was he more “in control” than the person without the brain tumor who did what the gunman said?”
Hmmm. Interesting question. Why do you ask?
Because I find some potential conflicts with many of your assessments and am looking to examine if such is the case or if I’m just missing something. 🙂
Imagine a guy with a brain tumor that pushed on his brain in a way that compelled him to not do what the gunman (the man pointing the gun to his head) demanded. Since he went against the gunman’s dictation AND he did what his brain desired to do, was he more “in control” than the person without the brain tumor who did what the gunman said? (YES OR NO)
TS: “Because I find some potential conflicts with many of your assessments and am looking to examine if such is the case or if I’m just missing something. 🙂 ”
Well, context is everything. For example, suppose we have two scenarios. (A) In one scenario the guy with the gun to your head hijacks you and your car, requiring you to assist his escape. (B) In the other scenario, the guy with the gun to your head puts a gun in your hand and tells you to blow the brains out of a third person. It may be reasonable to allow him to force you to assist in his escape but not reasonable for you to kill an innocent person to save your own life.
But, you’re right, I digress.
TS: “Imagine a guy with a brain tumor that pushed on his brain in a way that compelled him to not do what the gunman (the man pointing the gun to his head) demanded.”
Unless the tumor has a brain of its own, the tumor cannot compel him to do any specific act.
TS: “Since he went against the gunman’s dictation AND he did what his brain desired to do, was he more “in control” than the person without the brain tumor who did what the gunman said? (YES OR NO)”
Yes. If the person did what he himself (his brain) desired to do, with or without the tumor, then he was more “in control” than the gunman.
Generally, the person deciding for himself what he will do is “in control” of his own behavior.
Next. (Or do you need a follow-up?)
The tumor presses on a part of the brain creating the drive (compulsion).
If the person desires not to get shot (his brain is configured in such a way), and decides for himself that he will do what the gunman says so that does not happen, is that then “in control” of his own behavior? Yes or No
TS: “The tumor presses on a part of the brain creating the drive (compulsion). ”
Again, I’m pretty sure it would have to be a generalized compulsion to “do something” but not a compulsion to do a specific thing. Like you say, “the tumor presses on a part of the brain”. So, what part of the brain is programmed to carry out a mass shooting when pressed? It’s not a matter of any expertise on my part, but just common sense.
I imagine it would be like hunger, where you sense the need to eat something, but the rest of the mind has to concoct the specific plan to make a sandwich.
Back on topic:
TS: “If the person … decides for himself that he will do what the gunman says … is that then “in control” of his own behavior? Yes or No”
Both the gunman and the victim are physically in control of their own actions. However the threat of being shot coerces the victim to act against his will. The gunman, in this case, is in control of the victim, who must do the gunman’s will rather than his own.
I hope that is sufficient to satisfy your “Yes” or “No”. It depends on how the presumptions of your question line up with the presumptions of my answer. (I hope my answer clarifies my presumptions for you).
It was sort of insufficient, but lets go to another question instead:
If the person decides for himself that he will NOT do what the gunman dictates (even though he knows he will probably get shot in the process – which he doesn’t want), is that then “in control” of his own behavior? Yes or No
TS: “If the person decides for himself that he will NOT do what the gunman dictates (even though he knows he will probably get shot in the process – which he doesn’t want), is that then “in control” of his own behavior? Yes or No ”
Yes.
You always suggest that you are a pragmatist.
Scenario: The gunman tells you to cluck like a chicken, but you don’t want to cluck like a chicken and would never do so without a gun pointing to your head.
Which one of these options is the more practical / pragmatic option:
A) Deciding to do what the gunman says in order to not be shot.
B) Deciding not to do what the gunman says with the chance of being shot.
You only need to answer with A or B here if one applies (is more pragmatic than the other).
Context: Pragmatism is about what is useful or helpful to reach a goal or objective. The goal of morality is to achieve the best good and least harm for everyone.
If following the gunman’s orders produces less harm than my death, then following his orders would be more practical.
If following the gunman’s orders produces greater harm than my death, then following his orders would not be morally pragmatic.
Can you guess my answer to your scenario?
And you were doing so well on direct responses too. Oh well. 🙂
Next question:
Is it then true that the “in control” (per your usage of such only – which we will address further) person doesn’t necessarily take the more pragmatic approach? That, given a specific circumstance, the “not in control” person would take the more practical approach than the “in control” person (and vice versa given a different circumstance)? Yes or No
TS: “And you were doing so well on direct responses too. Oh well. 🙂 ”
Perhaps you should send me the script so I know what my part is. Didn’t Plato write the script for Socrates? And I don’t recall Socrates insisting on “Yes or No” answers.
TS: “Is it then true that the “in control” (per your usage of such only – which we will address further) person doesn’t necessarily take the more pragmatic approach? That, given a specific circumstance, the “not in control” person would take the more practical approach than the “in control” person (and vice versa given a different circumstance)? Yes or No”
Could I have that again, in English?
Socrates (in Plato’s writings) didn’t have to work with someone that did not give direct responses or someone who spoke in parables or riddles. The reason I am asking “yes/no” questions is to move away from any unnecessary responses that purposely detract from the conversation through the creation of tangents. I don’t mind you elaborating, but please also include the yes or no along with the elaboration. If, on the other hand, you think the question cannot be answered with a “yes” or “no” – please explain why so I can adjust the question accordingly (I think most of my questions are specific enough that they can be answered in such a way).
Here is a re-phrase of the question, in English this time:
Is it true that, under some circumstances, it could be the case that the “not in control” response turns out to be more practical/pragmatic than the “in control” response? YES or NO?
TS: “Socrates (in Plato’s writings) didn’t have to work with someone that did not give direct responses or someone who spoke in parables or riddles. ”
And that is because Plato wrote the script for both sides of the dialogue. I’m sure that in real life Socrates would have run into plenty of defense mechanisms.
TS: “The reason I am asking “yes/no” questions is to move away from any unnecessary responses that purposely detract from the conversation through the creation of tangents. ”
I’m okay with that objective. I’m just concerned about misinterpretation of my answer if I fail to explain the context that I’m presuming.
TS: “Is it true that, under some circumstances, it could be the case that the “not in control” response turns out to be more practical/pragmatic than the “in control” response? YES or NO?”
Yes. We can never assume that any individual is going to come up with the best answer. In your scenario, for example, the gunman takes control from the victim by placing a gun to the victim’s head. A policeman may intervene with a gun to the gunman’s head saying “Drop the gun!”
If a misinterpretation should arise, it can be pointed to at that time (in which case we can analyze if it truly was a misinterpretation or if a detraction of something is required on either end). Also, if there are any questions that later on you want to detract and go the other way with (because of an initial language confusion or any other reason) – please do say so. I’m truly not trying to trap you in this friendly discourse, even though it may seem that way if my questions happen to point out inconsistencies.
So just to clarify, you agree that being “practical/pragmatic” does not depend on one being “in control”…correct? (Y/N)
*** Just an FYI, I’m going to be a little busy for a while so my responses might be more delayed than normal – perhaps a lot delayed.
TS: “So just to clarify, you agree that being “practical/pragmatic” does not depend on one being “in control”…correct? (Y/N) ”
For example?
I gave already you the “gun” example, and I thought you were agreeing to this with the last “yes”, so I will clarify the question even more:
Do you agree that one does not NEED to be “in control” in order to act in the most “practical/pragmatic” way? (Y/N)
TS: “Do you agree that one does not NEED to be “in control” in order to act in the most “practical/pragmatic” way? (Y/N) ”
Yes! I do.
Great, right now I want to talk about the differences between the “in control” and “not in control” states. Per your assessment:
Do you agree with the above sentences? (Y/N) and if no why not?
If I might quote myself,
“The false belief that inevitability is in control of our destiny is called “fatalism”. It preaches that we have no control, that all of our choices are already made for us, and that our will is only a rider on the bus being driven by inevitability. Fatalism encourages apathy, destroys morale, discourages autonomy, and undermines moral responsibility. Fatalism is morally corrupting.”
(from my website)
Both determinism and fatalism explain that ultimately we don’t have control.
This part is correct. More importantly, fatalism implies that it doesn’t matter what we think, say, or do – as the “fated” event will happen regardless of such. For determinism, it happens due to such. I agree with you that this is an important distinction, and I’m fully with you that fatalism is problematic, leads to defeatism (and perhaps moral corruption as you say), and is just factually incorrect.
The point, however, is that free will is not a requirement to avoid fatalism. Both determinism and fatalism are equally as incompatible with free will. Determinism, however, should not lead to defeatism (futility of conscious action), as it can be understood that conscious thoughts and actions are important cogs in the machine.
Tell me more. In what sense are conscious thoughts and actions “important cogs in the machine”?
In the sense that the thoughts and actions lead to consequentialist events.
Note: Let’s pick up any further convo on this in the above thread using the Socratic method and rules listed (if you don’t mind). Trying to avoid semantic disagreements for now.
TS: “In the sense that the thoughts and actions lead to consequentialist events.”
I’m going to assume that (a) the relevant thoughts take place within the brain/mind of a specific person, (b) the person may do this while sitting alone (external social influences now exist only within that person’s mind), (c) it is this mental process that produces the person’s own decision for the person’s own reasons, (d) it is the person’s own mind that directs his actions to implement the decision, (e) by making changes in the real world. The whole process is, of course, deterministic and the result is inevitable.
Finally, there may be two scenarios: (1) the person may be free to do all of that autonomously for himself or (2) someone may override this process and force him to make a different choice and take a different action against his will (authority: parent, teacher, cop, wife, guy with a gun, et cetera).
In all practical, real world scenarios the phase “free will” is associated with scenario (1) and is lacking in scenario (2). Agree?
Disagree. The person in (1) has no more “free will” as the person in (2), and I suppose someone in a mental institution or someone who has a tumor that is driving them to want, desire, or need to do something (internally) is just as willful as a person with what we would deem as “normal” brain functioning. It’s just a different brain configuration.
But please, let’s move back to the other chain above and work with that one using the Socratic method. More than one conversation at a time is just confusing. I want to have focused questions and answers on the other thread.
And remember the rules. 😉
It is irrational to claim that “free will” means “freedom from causation”. If you are free from causation you are also unable to cause anything. The rational meaning of free will is just us making our own choices for ourselves. Our will is unfree when someone else forces us to choose or act against our own will. That’s sufficient for all practical purposes.
No one ever said that a belief in free will existing was a rational belief, just as no one would say that the belief in square circles existing is a rational belief. Neither are.
You are a day late on SEMANTIC SHIFT DAY. That was yesterday!
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/semantic-shift-day/
When I am free to decide for myself what I will do, then I am acting of my own free will. If someone else is forcing me to act against my will, then it’s their will rather than mine in control.
For example, if I am required to cite the Pledge of Allegiance each morning in public school, especially with the 1954 “under God” addition, then I don’t have free will in that matter. Or, if I were a Pilgrim in 1609 and forced to attend the Church of England every Sunday or pay a fine (or jailed if I wanted to attend my own church), then that would be against my will.
Other examples where we don’t have free will is when a parent or guardian or jailer is making decisions for us, and, of course, the classical case where a man is holding a gun to your head.
I though I mentioned that you are a day late on SEMANTIC SHIFT DAY. It’s on August 31st not September 1st! 😉
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/semantic-shift-day/
When I can decide for myself what I will do, then I am acting of my own will. If someone else is forcing me to act against my will, then it’s their will rather than mine. See how we can rephrase that without the word “free” in there? You can do this all without a semantic shift. 😉
So, were you free to act on your own will or not?
Considering I couldn’t have, of my own accord, NOT acted on my own will – there was nothing “free” about me acting on my own will (or vice versa). Any willing or ability to act on such willing is entirely constrained.
TS: “Considering I couldn’t have, of my own accord, NOT acted on my own will – there was nothing “free” about me acting on my own will (or vice versa). Any willing or ability to act on such willing is entirely constrained.”
So you were never free to do your homework last night. Is that your story? Your friend Billy also failed to turn in any work. But his dog ate his homework, so at least he has a reasonable excuse. 🙂
If I didn’t do my homework last night, it is indeed the case that I was not “free” to do it (avoiding doing my homework was entirely unavoidable, remember).
TS: “If I didn’t do my homework last night, it is indeed the case that I was not “free” to do it (avoiding doing my homework was entirely unavoidable, remember).”
That actually works?
It’s a fact, regardless if the professor incorrectly thinks I could have done otherwise. 😉
TS: “It’s a fact, regardless if the professor incorrectly thinks I could have done otherwise. 😉 ”
So the professor would be totally out of line to grade your missing homework as incomplete?
The homework being incomplete is also a fact. That being said, I think some huge things need to change in the way we educate – but that is an entirely different topic.
TS: “The homework being incomplete is also a fact.”
Yes. And if it were Philosophy homework, then you might be able to convince the professor that he could not blame you for your own failure to do the homework, since it was supposedly inevitable.
Unfortunately, it’s Algebra. And the Math professors don’t buy your excuse. 🙂
Those silly Math professors. 😉
I’m starting to understand the different uses of responsibility. The hurricane is responsible(the visible cause) for tearing apart the house, but it’s not morally responsible(You sinful hurricane! You deserve to burn in hell!). They are two entirely different meanings and I’m not sure how to explain this to other people without a long conversation.
Exactly, I find when talking to compatibilists – we tend to talk past each other because of words like this. For that reason it’s very important to clarify meanings. 🙂
I always fancied art as being produced through a series of choices. I’d like to see how you reconcile creativity with determinism.
Not having free will doesn’t take away from creativity, it just means that at any given time in the creative process you couldn’t have done, of your own accord, otherwise than be a part of that process and output the art that you did. Also, just because we don’t have free will doesn’t imply that we don’t make choices:
The Distinction Between X and Free X (choice vs. free choice)
Later. 🙂
Trick, I wanted to ask you something relating to this post. You may remember that we linked to this blog post in the description of episode 50 of our podcast.
https://archive.org/details/fwsr0531151
George sent me an email telling me that this episode had far more views than any other. Can you think of a cause for why that might be?
Not too sure but I think people like lists so when they see “10 reasons…” or “5 reasons…” they associate that. 🙂
“I could have done otherwise” refers to the uncertainty at the beginning of any deliberation. At that point, the decider can honestly say, “I might choose A or I might choose B. I just don’t know yet. Let me think about it.”
And, if returned precisely to that point in time, to that point of uncertainty, they could once again honestly say, “I might choose A or I might choose B.” Therefore it is not incoherent to say “I could have chosen otherwise”.
What “I could have chosen otherwise” really means is “before making the decision, both options were real possibilities”.
It is also true that only one choice was inevitable. And that it was always inevitable, even before the issue being decided ever came up. But the fact of inevitability useless. It provides nothing at all to help the decider make the choice.
The universal inevitability of everything makes itself irrelevant by its very ubiquity. It is like a constant that always appears on both sides of every equation. And therefore it cannot make any practical difference in any real world scenario.
Not for anyone who knows English. “Could have” means they already know what happened, and “done otherwise” means that given what they now know about what they did do, if brought back to the point in time before the decision, that, in actuality, could choose the other option.
I don’t know why you assume people don’t know what “tense” is for a sentence. “Might choose” is entirely different than “might have chosen”. You must think people are truly not intelligent enough to understand the distinction between tenses. I think they are smart enough.
“Done” or “chosen” is entirely different than “do” or “choose”, “could have” is entirely different than just “could” alone. Most people do know these differences in language.
This is a non-sequitur. The “therefore” doesn’t follow. If the person thinks the universe is causal, “I could have chosen otherwise” is logically incoherent. You, once again, are conflating tenses.
That notion is equally as incoherent, because (given a causal universe) both options are NOT REAL possibilities. They are only epistemic possibilities.
You like to make the claim that it is useless (even though claims are not arguments), when it indeed is quite useful for understanding that both options are NOT real (ontological) possibilities, and it is also useful in understanding why someone could not have done otherwise given determinism – and also why you could not have done otherwise but to constantly confuse tenses and pretend that people can’t make such distinctions.
But we’ve already had this discussion, so we are repeating ourselves. 😉
Regardless of all of this, the positions in the above infographic reflect the different position in regards to “otherwise” and “up to” ideas of the philosophical compatibilist such as Dennett, and layperson intuitions. This is why compatibilism is an evader of the conversation.
Later.
I think people are intelligent enough to know that they cannot do the impossible. Therefore, when interpreting what they are trying to say, it would make sense to apply an interpretation that gives them the benefit of the doubt. And that is what I’m doing.
When someone says, “I could have done otherwise”, they are not making any claims of super-human powers. All that they mean is that they had more than one option, and that they might have chosen the other option instead.
Perhaps at a restaurant they were offered lobster or steak. Both were very attractive options. And because the waiter had both on the menu, it was possible to choose either one.
Later that night, the butter sauce begins to irritate the stomach, and the guy says, “I should have had the steak instead”.
If asked if he actually could have chosen the steak, he would have to say yes, because he was offered both. Both were possible at the time of the offer.
So my question is, what do we expect to accomplish if we tell this person that only one choice was possible? In what way is this useful?
The most useful information is the fact that the butter sauce on the lobster upsets his stomach. That is a specific cause of a specific effect. And knowing this fact will help him make a better choice next time.
But knowing that all his choices are inevitable is useless. It cannot help him to make a single choice. How does it help him to choose steak or lobster to know that only one is a realizable possibility and that the choice was determined by the subatomic interactions during the last Big Bang? How does one put such a fact to daily use?
He still has to make the choice for himself, of his own free will, and learn by experience that lobster upsets his stomach.
You aren’t getting the fact that they actually don’t realize it is impossible to do. People know what “could have done otherwise” means, and it’s always given in a scenario where they know the outcome already, yet they still say the person could have done otherwise. That is not because they are interpreting it the way you say, it’s because they actually think that they could have done otherwise.
Why do they think this, because they actually think that all of the options in front of them are real possibilities, and if that is the case, if they were taken back to that point in time before the decision, they assume those other options that they know they didn’t choose are still really possible.
This isn’t because people aren’t intelligent, it’s simply because they have not truly thought about the implications of a causal universe. They have, however, learned the English language and tense is obvious even to a child.
If they think “should have” implies “could have” they would be mistaken.
NO! Both were NOT REALLY possible at the time of the offer. The other think people confuse is the difference between epistemic possibilities, and ontic possibilities. Both options (given a causal universe) were not ontic possibilities. If people understood this, they wouldn’t assess that they “could have done otherwise”.
I’ve already gone over this with you ad-nausium, you just are not listening. But you couldn’t have done otherwise and listened. 😉
If people know that someone truly couldn’t have, of their own accord, done otherwise, then they will be more compassionate over the variables people had. They’d understand that if they were that person, they would have had the exact same behavior. They’d also understand that one person is not really, in any true sense, more or less deserving over another person – which would lead to a more egalitarian society rather than the nasty unfettered capitalistic society where one person is allowed to increase an important drug from $13.50 per pill to $750 per pill.
So yes, the societal change if the largest population understood these facts would be something of immensely great use.
Oh…and it’s also the truth. I’m of the mind that people should know what is true – which will causally enable them to make better decisions rather than decisions based on falsehoods.
END
Trick, great site and a great infographic, gives an excellent overview of the philosophical positions in regards to “could have done otherwise”.
Just curious, what’s your assessment of the Frankfurt-type examples from the Compatibilists that purport to show that you can be morally responsible for an action even though you could not have done otherwise?
,
Thanks Andrew.
I think Pereboom puts to rest Frankfurt-type examples of moral responsibility, but I will have to do a post on that in the future for sure! In short, I think that even if we accept intuitions over reason, I don’t think that Frankfurt-type examples truly grant the intuition he thinks they do when one already understands the implications of not being able to have done otherwise.
Excellent post as always Trick.
Apologies for this slightly longer reply …
Another point, when it comes to free-will intuitions. The natural philosophical argument for FW scepticism, in the “near enough” hard determinism (sense) has always roughly remained the same, albeit recently reinvigorated by the data coming from the behavioural, chemical and neuroscientific disciplines.
However, when it comes to Compatibilism, the intuitive compatibilism, classical compatibilism “an agent has the ability to do otherwise, absent any coercion to do otherwise (mental illness, at gun point etc.) has been pretty much dead for over 50 years! The leading version of compatibilism (or semi-compatibilism – since the authors are agnostic over the metaphysics of determinism) is a philosophical savvy “reasons-responsiveness.” Doesn’t mean its philosophically wrong (although it is, since FW scepticism is the most viable position for the reasons mentioned in your post), but it certainly is not the most intuitive. Also makes it amusing when bloggers spend their time writing furiously on positions resembling classical compatibilism. Be ready to go against over half a century of philosophical theory!
Thanks Andrew! 🙂
The main point is that the common intuitions people possess about the compatibilistic abilities they think exists IS that people could have done otherwise (given a deterministic scenario)….today. In other words, it’s not in any way dead for the majority public. It’s only dead in some academic circles due to a problematic semantic shift. The fact that modern philosophical compatibilist re-define free will outside of the classical semantics (that are important today) is the very problem with compatibilism. “Reasons-responsiveness”, is the very type of philosophical compatibilism that this post is addressing. Also, philosophical theory within the last half-century is not exclusively compatibilist (of course).
Catch ya’ later good sir!
Right now I think it’s practical to assume determinism is true and we have an infinite regress. The important thing is that none of it makes a difference for the falseness of free will. When people try to use indeterminism as a hiding ground for free will I automatically stop listening.
I find it more practical to be agnostic rather than assume. That way I’m not pigeon holed into a specific position by others when in fact I don’t really know. 🙂
I continue to notice that everything that I think (about) was already there for me to think. That does not preclude learning something new that will “add” to what is there for me think.
Heh – nice. Thanks for stopping by Ed. 🙂
This discussion of determinism vs nondeterminism reminds me of a similar discussion at our study group on law vs grace often the two views are looked at as polar opposites and yet there may be truth on both sides of the spectrum. Law and grace determinism and nondeterminism in this article it appeared to me both sides have some valid points. I think that it is more fair to see the support for both realizing there is element of truth in both.
Hi Charity, thanks for the visit. They are sort of oppositions, so if the universe is deterministic, it isn’t indeterministic, and vice versa. The main problem is we don’t have sufficient enough evidence to make a conclusion either way. 😉
I get so tired of people falsely thinking that something spiritual can grant free will. Either causal or acausal events cannot be up to us. We don’t choose our soul anymore than our genes or upbringing.
No offence but I routinely use my free will many times daily.
Best regards,
John Brocker,
Webster, NY
Hi John, I’m originally from Gates, NY…right near Webster. Nice to meet another fellow upstate NYer. 🙂
How do you define “free will”? For this blog it is only in reference to this (logically incoherent) ability that most people feel they possess: FREE WILL
BINGO brotha’ Chandler! 🙂
I think the real challenge is how to incorporate determinism into one’s way of being rather than just saying that one does or doesn’t believe in free will. I am finding that more often than not I assess situations as being freely willed but then need to interrupt that interpretation over time which also changes how I feel about what “happened”. The situation with the manager of the Royals and his decision to let Harvey stay in the game is a good example.
I agree, it’s not just about knowing we lack free will, but also about understandings what it means that we don’t and working to apply that understanding into how we think, feel, and interact with others.
I agree, it’s not just about knowing we lack free will, but also about understandings what it means that we don’t and working to apply that understanding into how we think, feel, and interact with others.
After years of consideration I think that we are still in the midst of the dilemma that we “get it” so to speak about the physical universe but not about our own psychology. Whoever built my house had a decision to make about where exactly to lay the foundation. Yes there were a few possibilities about where exactly to lay the first cinder block but this is house is where it is, not ten feet or two inches from its current position. If we rolled back the process when it comes to making one decision in favor of another, the conditions under which that decision was made would be exactly the same thus the outcome would be exactly the same. This does not negate the possibility that one can ask for input or learn from past decisions to affect current and future courses of action. I think to operate with a “could have” frame of mind actually disempowers people from their ability to make decisions in the present that will have future outcomes. Imagination can be a double edged sword!
Agreed. The main problem is that most people believe that they and others “could have done otherwise”:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/free-will-intuitions-infographic/
And with that believe leads to notions of “blameworthiness” and “deserve” in the strong sense:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/moral-responsibility-infographic/
Which leads to some very harmful states.
So yes, we need to understand that we can adjust future states causally, which is more about understanding the distinction between fatalism and determinism:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-vs-fatalism-infographic/
Later good sir. 🙂
Trick,
I think you are insane.
The evidence is overwhelming in FAVOR of free will, even contra causal free will at the quantum level.
If you really followed through on the logical implications of your insane and sociopathic beliefs. You wouldn’t get up in the morning. Because nothing you do has a point.
Instead you are forced by nature to act AS IF the “illusion of free will” is true, that you aren’t a third party passenger watching yourself make decisions passively like a movie theater goer. What would be the purpose of nature designing such an illusion? Maybe because it isn’t an illusion!
Edward, thanks for the visit, however…
Do you really think that starting your comment to me with “I think you are insane” and stating that my beliefs are “insane and sociopathic” to be a productive starting point of discourse? I will have to ask you that, if you do want to discuss this and not just assert things, that you stay away from insults. There is no reason two people with dissenting positions need to go down the rabbit hold of being disrespectful or rude.
With that, on to your comment:
I’m all for hearing about such evidence. I make the case that free will, as defined here, is logically incoherent no matter if there is determinism or indeterminism. Let’s make sure we are addressing the same semantic of free will before we go on.
Saying “nothing you do has a point” is a non-sequitur that does not follow from a lack of free will:
Pointlessness Doesn’t Follow from Determinism (combating non-sequiturs)
Also keep in mind the distinctions between determinism and fatalism in regards to futility:
Determinism vs. Fatalism – InfoGraphic (a comparison)
We Don’t Have to Act Like Free Will Exists
It’s a naturalistic fallacy to think nature has a “purpose”. That beings said I can see there being evolutionary advantages to the illusion.
Trick,
My anger at you comes from you bring and effective apologist for fatalism and totalitarianism.
First let me say that discussions have to define terms.
“Will” to me is the degree of mental energy spent in overcoming on obstacle. Like an alcoholic refusing to take that drink
Drink his subconscious self craves. Like any muscle it can be trained
So I would define “freedom of choice” or a
Free self as something that’s categorically true and what I believe in. My fate is my own. No one else’s. It’s under my control. If I choose to eat eggs on Monday morning it wasn’t predestined. I couldv had something else instead.
You asked for the evidence. The strongest is the idealistic interpretation of quantum mechanics. It isn’t justthat there is some element of q
randomness at the quantum level. It’s that the very act of measuring affects the experiment!
The nature of memory:You would expect memory
In a predetermined brain to be computer like. Instead, it’s largely constructed by how we interpret our memories. Hypnosis has proven a notoriously effective way to remember things that never actually happened. We can CHOOSE our memories
Can we control our emotions? Yes we can! Maybe not directlyly, but what else to method
Actors do but control their emotions.
the neuroplasticity of the brain. The brain doesn’t just determine the mind. The mind determines the brain just as much.
My own experiences with hetero-bisexuality. What I’ve explerienced gives lie to the notion that sexual orientation isn’t amenable to change.
Our free society is based on our natural freedom of choice. Your mistaken and poisonous beliefs would give aid and comfort to
Totalitarians everywhere.
Finally do I have to explain the concept of an axiom, or something “a priori” to you? An axiom is something like a “law of thought” that is revealed when you attempt to deny something and use the very thing you are denying in an attempt to deny it. “Humans make choices” You would argue that those choices are predetermined but quantum mechanics has ended that once and for all
Hi Edward,
Please do not strawman my position. I am neither A) a fatalist, B) a totalitarian, or C) a hard determinist who is certain about determinism – nor does my position promote these positions. Perhaps it is the case that you haven’t bothered learning about my actual position and what I’m promoting here – or read any of the links in my last comment, and are simply making assumptions about my position? I have a few simple requests for conversations:
1) Don’t make assumptions or presumptions or strawmans. If you think someone has a position, show it with quotes rather than claim it. If you don’t know – ask.
2) Be courteous and calm headed. Think of it as discourse with a friend or friendly person.
3) Try to be direct and to the point, and as clear as possible.
I promise to hold myself accountable to those very standards as well, and if I slip up let me know so I can resolve the mistake.
So let me go along your comment to hash things out if you don’t mind:
I agree, hence the reason I pointed to my semantic of free will in the last comment. Here it is again:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/terms/free-will/
From this point on, since you are making a case for an indeterministic universe, I will side with that position. Given an “indeterministic” qm position I absolutely agree that you “could have chosen something else”. Where I disagree is that such a “choosing something else” could have been “under your control” or as I put it “up to you”. But we will address this as we go through your comment.
I absolutely 100% agree that the very act of measuring “affects the experiment”. This, however, does not grant any special causal or acausal powers. The logic still holds for the two ways events can possibly occur, regardless if measurement causes wave function collapse (or decoherence)… or not.
Technically memories come to the forefront of our consciousness, and conscious processes have an effect on our brain in a way that produces further memories and so on. Keep in mind that I’m not a reductionist but rather I think there is downward causation. Parts create whole with properties (e.g. consciousness) which play a role in the causal alignment of our next brain structure and thoughts.
Here are some posts that might help with understanding my actual position:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/hard-determinism-not-reductionistic/
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/mental-causation/
I never claimed we couldn’t. What I am claiming is that if we do, either A) we couldn’t have done otherwise but control our emotion the way we did (given a deterministic universe), or B) if we could have done otherwise (due to an indeterministic universe) that “otherwise” could not be “up to us” – it would be due to an acausal event. There is no way out of this conundrum.
So yes, we can, if that is what events dictate, “control our emotion”.
Absolutely. That is my position as well. Again:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/hard-determinism-not-reductionistic/
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/mental-causation/
Not sure where you were going with this part.
I think we need to make an important distinction between “choice” and “free choice”. Read here for more info about that:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/free-choice-vs-choice/
Again, I am not a totalitarian nor do my beliefs align in any way with totalitarianism. I believe in specific democratic processes. This is the reason I try to convince people with words rather than force. I’m a consequentialist and I think totalitarianism leads to harmful consequences – and am against it due to this. Unless you can quote where I ever sided with totalitarian thought, I’ll have to ask that such a strawman ceases. I’m entirely devoted to rational discourse with others in order to change minds democratically.
And I’m vehemently opposed to fatalistic notions of a lack of free will. Fatalism is not a logical assessment, and it is also dangerous.
I know what an “axiom” is. You just can’t simply assert something as “axiomatic” if it isn’t self-evident or accepted.
This very article that your comment is posted on shows that I am agnostic on whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic, so no, I would not assert “predeterminism” unless the universe happens to be deterministic. If the universe is indeterminstic, then any “otherwise” happening would stem from events that were entirely outside of “us” (a non-caused event). But please don’t assume I’m a hard determinist, as I’m a hard incompatibilist – meaning free will is incompatible in both a deterministic or indeterminsitic scenario:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/hard-incompatibilist-not-hard-determinist/
I do hope my comment has cleared up some of your misunderstandings about what my actual position is. If not, feel free to ask me about something before assuming it or pigeon holing me into something I’m not.
Best regards,
‘Trick
In normal usage, a person’s “options” are also called “possibilities”.
If you look up “option” in the dictionary (SOED) you’ll see “possibility” in the definition along with other synonyms. If you look up “possibility” in SOED you’ll find that it is “The condition or quality of being possible; ability to be done, happen, or exist.”
There is no logical requirement that a possibility must happen. Therefore, the most accurate word for communicating what you mean is “inevitability”. For example: “There are many possibilities but only one inevitability.”
“Possibility” is often (given context) the same as saying “possible option” (not merely “option” but a certain type of option that “can” happen). In fact I can say “that option was never a possibility” and that would denote how the option wasn’t in the “possible” category.
I’m saying that, given determinism (every event having a cause), the other “options” are never “possible options” (a “possibility”).I’m saying that those options do not meet “the conditions or quality of being possible”. I’m saying that do not have the “ability to be done”. I’m saying that they can never “happen or exist”.
It isn’t about the idea that it “must happen”, it is entirely about whether is “could happen”(could be be actualized) or not. This should be clear when the infographic talks about indeterminism in which case it “could happen” – but in no way asserts it “must”. But of course with a non-caused or random event such would be entirely out of the control of “us”.
The word “inevitability” applies only to the one option that “must happen”, but it isn’t a word that is required here nor is it proper to use it in this context. In fact, given that there is two options that were both actually possible and 3 that were not possible – you cannot denote the three that were not possible through the word inevitability (as the two wouldn’t be inevitable). It just so happens, given a causal universe, that ALL of the other options were never really “possible options”. They were never “possibilities”.
Also this infographic even qualifies the word “possibility” with the word “real” in case someone were to confuse the epistemic (what we might imagine) with the ontic (what can actually happen).
But I’ve gone over this with you before. This time, however, you kept your comment un-bloated and acceptable. That was a nice change.
Later good sir. 🙂
That’s alright. You can’t be blamed for misunderstanding how language is used. You had no control over what you did. And that is why we have scheduled you for TMS and memory reprograming. Since your “self” is just an illusion, we are free to operate without fear of injuring any rights that a “person with free will” might have. It is a simple operation to put the chip in your brain. It’s a simple matter of “fixing” you. You’ll be much better in the morning. 🙂
If I did misunderstand something, you are correct, I can’t be blamed. That being said, I have displayed in detail how it is you who has the misunderstanding about language and logical understanding. The fact that you won’t let yourself read and understand these facts only shows how you lack the freedom you think you have.
I just contacted the brain reprogramming initiative and they looked both of our accounts up. They said that your assessment about me needing a chip was a mistake, but I asked them if I could get one anyway. When I asked about you, they said that you will be given a few chances before mandatory chip placement. They ask that I notify you of this:
The brain reprogramming initiative has taken in the facts, and has determined that you have been given the proper information in many iterations but your brain is still unable to parse it and adjust accordingly. You couldn’t have done otherwise. The initiative is willing to see if your brain naturally comes to the correct conclusion, but you are running out of iterations that it will allow for. If the facts are repeated to you a few more times but your brain still doesn’t make the proper connections, the men in black suits will be at your door to take you to the chip implant facility.
Take care. 😀
Hi ‘Trick,
Thank you very much for writing this article. During the time since you posted “10 Benefits of Not Believing in Free Will” I’ve been wanting to ask a few questions about it, but I’ve been unable to think of how to word my questions succinctly. This article has not only provided the answers, it has also enabled me to understand why I had my vague yet troubling questions in the first place: having spent a lifetime blaming myself for anything and everything that is even slightly obvious or intuitive with hindsight, while failing to realize that it wouldn’t have been at all obvious or intuitive to anyone (let alone myself) at the time of the event/decision.
This particular paragraph that you wrote is, I think, extremely important: “With the understanding and feeling that it’s not our fault, due to truly comprehending what it means that we lack the type of free will defined here, we can look at the happening from an almost outside observer perspective. We can be detectives and try to look for the causes that had led us to the state that we couldn’t have, of our own accord, avoided. We can do this while being free of the ‘blame’ baggage we tend to place on our own shoulders.”
Most humans are adept at being outside observers of others [frequently to the point of going destructively far beyond that which is actually beneficial to themselves and others!], but very poor at being usefully beneficial outside observers of their own life, thoughts, and behaviours.
Your subsequent paragraph is also, I think, equally important: “I know this is easier said than done, but that is because most of us were brought up in an environment that enforced our intuitions about free will. We have a free will psychology that has been embedded with decades of being blamed and shamed, in which we tend to do the same. Breaking the free will illusion is anything but an easy task given a lifetime of a built up psychology. But learning why free will is an illusion and what it means is the first step in a type of ‘self help’ that is based on the facts about our existence.”
Your endless work in breaking the free will illusion is indeed for the betterment of humankind. Best wishes and many thanks again for your in-depth explanations,
Pete
Thanks Pete, comments like yours make my writing worth the effort!! Very much appreciated!!!!
You explained both why free will is incoherent as well as why the omnipotent+omniscient god is equally incoherent. It fits great with what Mitch and I were talking about in yesterday’s podcast.
Awesome. Haven’t checked out the podcast yet but will soon! 🙂
If we eliminate the word ultimately and fall to earth and our existing circumstances then can we consider that I do make choices with consequences? I did not create my body or hunger or all the food there is to eat. I can choose from what is (already) “there” to eat and even though I am not in control of all the causal variables that “result” in eating (what, where, and when. We must also define what the “it” is that is up to me. I certainly don’t hold myself as a billiard ball without options (given those options are caused). My concern is that this discussion negates too much which makes it very difficult to converse with those who would like to take this on.
We do make choices with consequences, we just couldn’t have chosen, of our own accord, otherwise.
But you are right, we need to be careful people don’t assume some sort of poorly thought out fatalism from the idea that things are not “ultimately” up to us:
Determinism vs. Fatalism – InfoGraphic (a comparison)
We can also understand that our actions aren’t pointless:
Pointlessness Doesn’t Follow from Determinism (combating non-sequiturs)
And we can understand that we do make “choices”, even if they aren’t “free”:
The Distinction Between X and Free X (choice vs. free choice)
Good thoughts and an important concern! I added a disclaimer at the end to denote this.
I think some assume that adopting a deterministic stance limits one’s world; a friend of mine once reminded me that all western music is based on 12 notes…12!!!! There isn’t enough time left on earth to create all of the possible combinations that those 12 notes would allow. Limited? I think not. I don’t think that musicians and composers would complain that they don’t have enough notes to play with!!!
People generally know that their actions make a difference. Determinists are simply saying that we act on our desires to bring about the change we want to see in the world. We may succeed or fail in our efforts, but we did not choose to exist or have the desires we do.
Couldn’t calling a doctor be part of a causality in which I am caused not to recover?
Sure. The point is that our conscious actions aren’t futile.
Thank you. What exactly is meant by “futile”? “X is not futile” iff “X is a cause”?
Futile: Ineffective or useless.
Our conscious thoughts and actions are not ineffective or useless toward the future output. For fatalism they are, for determinism they are not.
Okay. Thank you for clarifying. 🙂
Every event having another event that led to it (i.e. “a deterministic universe”) only seems to preclude one from being able to have done otherwise if every event can lead to only one possible event.
Indeed! 🙂
Otherwise a Causal Contradiction
A Cause Cannot Have Multiple Possible Effects – Infographic
Ontic Probability Doesn’t Exist: Assessing “Probability” for the Free Will Debate
Thanks for the visit Stormy!
Thank you for clarifying! 🙂
So…if “a deterministic universe” means “every event can lead to only one possible event”, I am correctly either a Hard Determinist, or a Hard Incompatibalist. 😀
P.S. Sorry if I messed up the quote structure.
If you think every event has a cause, and you think that free will is incompatible with that, you are a “Hard Determinist”. If you don’t know if every event has a cause, but you think free will is incompatible with both an entirely causal universe, as well as one where non-caused events happen, you are a Hard Incompatibilist. I’m a Hard Incompatibilist:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/hard-incompatibilist-not-hard-determinist/
Thank you for the explanations. I think every event has a cause but, from our other discussion, it appears I’m a fatalist.
Fatalism implies the future is set – regardless of causality. In other words, what you causally think, say, or do has no real impact on your fated future. If it is your fated destiny to write a book, you making the decision not to write one and to stay in bed all day doesn’t matter – you will (somehow) write the book. Determinism, on the other hand, says that there are causal variables that include your conscious thoughts that will lead you to either not write a book or to write a book (and it all depends on those causal variables). In this way it is distinct from fatalism. Are you sure you are a fatalist and not just a determinist? 😉
Fatalism implies the future is set – regardless of causality. In other words, what you causally think, say, or do has no real impact on your fated future. If it is your fated destiny to write a book, you making the decision not to write one and to stay in bed all day doesn’t matter – you will (somehow) write the book. Determinism, on the other hand, says that there are causal variables that include your conscious thoughts that will lead you to either not write a book or to write a book (and it all depends on those causal variables). In this way it is distinct from fatalism. Are you sure you are a fatalist and not just a determinist?
Pretty sure I’m a fatalist; what if I think there are causal variables, but they don’t include my conscious thoughts?
And…there goes the quote formatting. xP
That could still be determinism as well – meaning things are determined by causality rather than father regardless of causality. I’m not sure why you’d exclude your conscious thoughts though. Do you disagree with mental causation? Here is my position on that matter in case you are interested:
Mental Causation – A Case for Mental Causation
Later good sir. 🙂
That could still be determinism as well – meaning things are determined by causality rather than father regardless of causality.
Could it still be fatalism – given that any conscious decision on my part would be futile?
I’m not sure why you’d exclude your conscious thoughts though. Do you disagree with mental causation? Here is my position on that matter in case you are interested…
Thank you for the link. I don’t think I disagree with mental causation per se – I agree with you that consciousness is a property of specific physical configuration – but I do disagree with mental causation with my conscious thoughts as the mental cause, because (:D) I disagree with physical causation with my brain state as the physical cause, à la a skeptical reading of Hume.
Fatalism implies that causality doesn’t really matter for the fated event. Your position seems to imply it does, even though does imply a type of futility as well – as nothing you think matters for any physical output. 🙂
The mental causation that I argue for in the link I provided is one in which the mental does have a causal say for your brain state (that properties make a causal difference). It’s against epiphenomenalism which I believe is the actual position you may be taking. 😉
Fatalism implies that causality doesn’t really matter for the fated event. Your position seems to imply it does, even though does imply a type of futility as well – as nothing you think matters for any physical output. 🙂
Maybe I’m a non-fatal futilist? 😉
The mental causation that I argue for in the link I provided is one in which the mental does have a causal say for your brain state (that properties make a causal difference). It’s against epiphenomenalism which I believe is the actual position you may be taking.
Maybe…I don’t take the position of ephiphenominalism as defined in the link in the link you provided, though (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain…”.).
Hello article! I am a comment with compatibilist free will. It doesn’t matter that Chandler Klebs typed all my words because those words are still me!
Welcome freely willing comment. It’s obvious that you are free to be the comment you are…and therefore have compatibilist free will! 😉
I think baking the pie from ultimate scratch is comparable to people believing that they are the first cause of their choices. Both concepts are impossible. No one can invent the universe in which they are caused to exist only after they have a universe.
Dear Article, you may find this to be a spooky coincidence: my computer monitor has exactly the same free will as yourself, in fact, it echoes your every word! Never before had I considered that my monitor is a compatibilist rather than a determinist. Now I’m sad because it has never once, of its own accord, written an article for me; it always chooses to just parrot everything I write, including my typos. Do you know where I can purchase a more friendly compatibilist monitor?
Whenever a computer system starts displaying gibberish, I’ve always assumed it had developed a fault — based on my silly notion that free will is *not* compatible with determinism.
Thank you, Article, for teaching me that computer system ‘faults’ are just demonstrations of the fact that free will *is* compatible with determinism. Clearly then, a non-deterministic computer system is not faulty, it is a deterministic system that has free will and has chosen, of its own accord, to be non-deterministic.
Hey, it gives new meaning to the boring term “metal fatigue”: metal that has decided, of its own accord, to retire.
Please send my thanks to ‘Trick for posting you on his website.
Thank you comment for using your free will to be the very comment that you were free to be. If your monitor displayed me, and the words on the monitor are the article that make up me – your monitor is compatibilist friendly already. 🙂
‘Trick, I was struck by the fact that neither my monitor nor Article had the decency to thank you, or otherwise acknowledge you, for enabling them to communicate! Would I be correct in thinking that those who strongly believe in free will are unable to avoid being dismissive towards those who point out to them that their concept of free will does not exist?
Hi Pete, I’m a single comment that happens to be a hard incompatibilist – caused by ‘Trick and all other causal variables. It’s not unlike a compatibilist to disregards its own causality or the causality of others. Many compatibilist like to pretend that they are almost “self-caused” things even when they know they aren’t. As far as the article above is concerned it is it’s own words.
As an incompatibilist comment I know better. 😉
I look forward to your book on morality. It’s so frustrating seeing people confuse morality with moral responsibility. Particularly one argument I’ve never understood is that we can’t have good without having evil as a “possibility”.
This story was so awesome! I’ll share it every year! I always find Santa stories amusing because of how logically contradictory they are.
Thanks Chandler. 🙂
> If we say that the particles could end up in location A with a 75% chance or location B with a 25% chance, what are we saying? Basically, we are saying that there is some sort of mechanism that is forcing more particles to A than to B.
No, there is no separate mechanism that is forcing more particles to A than to B. This is just a description of the underlying physics. It is this assumption of yours that is misleading your logic.
> If we are suggesting that there is no forcing factor here, we have a problem as to what accounts for the probability distribution.
QM describes precisely what accounts for the probability distribution.
> The problem should be obvious, if there are causal variables that lead the result to Y, then those causal variables couldn’t lead to X or Z
Indeed, which is why we don’t believe that there are causal variables that lead the result to Y, X, or Z. Experiments confirming Bell’s inequality support the position that there are no such variables. It is your assertion that such variables do exist that are the root of the problem with your logic.
Another problem is your insistence that the relations between events are either causal or acausal. Events at the quantum level don’t fit those definitions.
It isn’t an assumption. It’s a logical assessment. If there isn’t something that causes the probability distribution, then you are addressing an event that has no spatial or temporal determinacy (an acausal event). Such an event would have no probability distribution, it could happen at any time in any location or never happen at all. That is it’s only distribution possible.
If you think this then you don’t know QM. The reason for all of the different interpretations is that we don’t know what accounts for the distribution.
It only supports the position that variables cannot be local.
Only given your interpretation of QM. Mosts interpretations do fit those definitions. Even the Copenhagen interpretation that you like to point to doesn’t imply an objective collapse theory. You suggesting such (which if you didn’t know it that is what you are doing) is a meta-physical bias on your part that goes against logic.
Keep in mind that I’m only making a logical case here. If you want to pretend that events on the quantum scale are special “outside of logic” cases even though every theory we have in QM (including Bell’s theorem) is based on mathematics and logical tautologies such as identity, then you are basically taking a self-defeating POV.
If you want to stay inside of logic then there is no logical middle ground between an event that is caused and one that is not caused, as those are in opposition. This very article explains the logical reasons why probability isn’t ontic….and that includes QM.
Thanks for the visit Neal. 😉
> If you want to stay inside of logic then there is no logical middle ground between an event that is caused and one that is not caused, as those are in opposition. This very article explains the logical reasons why probability isn’t ontic….and that includes QM.
This very article has the flaws which I pointed out.
> Even the Copenhagen interpretation that you like to point to doesn’t imply an objective collapse theory.
Indeed, I didn’t mean to imply it did. It doesn’t matter whether the indeterminism is introduced as an effect of measurement (Copenhagen) or randomly/spontaneously (objective collapse), since it is the observations that we make which we interpret to be events. By your definition of the result may be a (caused) superposition of two states. But the observed state is neither causal nor acausal, because it is not an event, it is an observation. It is usually the observations of the world that we interpret to be the events that we speak of. We are never aware of observing a superposition.
My very point is that the criticisms you “pointed out” were actually addressed in the very article you are criticizing. You can assert they are “flawed” but assertions are not arguments. You have not even touched on the arguments. You simply make assertions like “events at the quantum level don’t fit those definitions (caused/not caused)” when they are logical oppositions. It would be like saying bottles do not fit in the definitions of moon and not moon. Of course a bottle would fall under one of those (namely not-moon).
Let’s be clear what we mean by “observation” in QM…we only mean “measurement (through particle interaction)”. I think you are off on a different tangent here.
> You simply make assertions like “events at the quantum level don’t fit those definitions (caused/not caused)” when they are logical oppositions. It would be like saying bottles do not fit in the definitions of moon and not moon. Of course a bottle would fall under one of those (namely not-moon).
Is the math field of statistics causal or acausal? Are bottles causal or acausal? They have to be one or the other, since the two are logical opposites.
> Let’s be clear what we mean by “observation” in QM…we only mean “measurement (through particle interaction)”. I think you are off on a different tangent here.
What, in your view, would be an example of an “event” that is not a particle interaction?
Causal and acausal refer to events. Bottles and moons are objects. Are those things you addressed “events”? Is there any example of an “event” that takes place other than your mysterious and magical quantum phenomenon that doesn’t fall under either being caused or not being caused??
We can say a single event in mathematical computation is either a causal or an acausal event. We can say that a bottle falling off a table was either caused to fall or not caused to fall (fell acausally). But make no mistake about it, when we refer to events, either something causes the event, or it happens without a cause.
As a physicalist and materialist, I think all causal events are “particle interactions” that have spatial and temporal determinacy, and if there is an acausal event it would be one that comes into existence without a cause and have no spatial or temporal determinacy. But no matter what event is postulated, it either happens causally or without a cause. This is the case even if we postulate some non-material event. Either it is an output of something else, in which case it’s causal, or it is not an output of something else, in which case it’s not causal.
You, on the other hand want to say that the probability distribution that happens in QM is not causal (but not not causal?), and the above article explains the problem with acausal probability distribution that is more than (happens at some point in time in some location in time or never)…but rather, has a 65% chance of landing in this block and a 35% chance of landing in this block, both being temporally and spatially located, and it comes from an existing particle (rather than something coming into existence acausally and effecting the trajectory).
By your terminology, I don’t believe particles *have* precise definite spacial and termporal determinacy, but are better described by a distribution of “possible” locations (which, collectively, are a description of the particle itself).
If one must divide events into those that are *caused* and those that are *uncaused*, I would say that most particle interactions that result in observable phenomena could be classified as *caused* (in the sense of influenced). More fundamentally, the *caused* outcome of the interaction is typically a superposition of what you would perceive as two (or more) distinct and mutually exclusive events. But the observation (of one or the other alternative) would be a separate event.
This is where the problem comes in. If they have definite spatial and temporal determinacy, then the probability distribution is epistemic and not ontic. Those other places that the particle does not distribute to were never real ontological possibilities. They were only a limitation on our epistemic knowledge.
Then the “collapse” or “decoherence” of the superpositioned state is caused as well, and it could not collapse to otherwise than what causality dictates. Remember, a cause cannot both be the cause of B and not the cause of B (but of C instead of B) – as that is a self-contradiction.
In such a case the probability distribution of QM is entirely epistemic. It is due to our lack of understanding the causal factors that bring the particle to the 70% location over the 30% location. The “measurement” is just a part of the causality (our perceptual observations are irrelevant).
> This is where the problem comes in. If they have definite spatial and temporal determinacy, …
Which, as I said, I don’t believe they do…
> Then the “collapse” or “decoherence” of the superpositioned state is caused as well, and it could not collapse to otherwise than what causality dictates.
“Collapse” and “Decoherence” are parts of different theories. In the Copenhagen interpretation, collapse is a process that is caused by observation, but the result is not determinate; there is no “causality” that “dictates” the outcome. In the many worlds interpretation, decoherence is a description of the evolution of distinct “worlds” (possible futures) that evolve by becoming entangled with the environment (including the observer). In either case, neither observable outcome an event is inevitable.
> Remember, a cause cannot both be the cause of B and not the cause of B (but of C instead of B) – as that is a self-contradiction.
Right… we only observe one future in which the event causes one or the other outcome (nondeterministically). Never both.
Oh sorry, my mistake. In that case we run into the other problem with what pushes the event to one location/time over another if there is no determinacy there. So, for example, if you have an event with a 50% probability of ending up at location A, a 30% probability for location B, and a 20% probability for location C…if nothing causes one over the other, how can it be the case for a larger chance for location A. If you are saying that it’s part of the existing particles wave function, then you are implying the determinacy of the wave itself. If you are saying there is no variables, then you are implying something outside of the determinacy of the wave that makes it slip into one over the other (but that implies determinacy).
I know that, this is why I said collapse OR decoherence…meaning depending on the interpretation. Pilot wave theory is also a decoherence model.
You are using “cause” and “nondeterminism” in the same sentence. An event doesn’t “cause nondeterministically”. And the contradiction has nothing to do with our observations. A cause cannot have the variables that lead to B and those same variables that do not lead to B…as that implies the cause contains contradictory variables. If the cause has the variables that lead to B, you would need an acausal event to push it so B doesn’t happen (e.g. to C instead). If there are no causal variables for either B or C, then an acausal event would need to push the state to one over the other. The problem comes when thinking that B can have a probability of say 75% while C a probability of 25% based on an acausal event that has no spatial or temporal determinacy to weight such.
> If you are saying that it’s part of the existing particles wave function, then you are implying the determinacy of the wave itself.
Sure, but that is not what we observe. We observe Y (or Z, nondeterministically), not the (deterministic) wave function that describes the superposition. And we interpret Y (or Z) to be the result of the event.
> A cause cannot have the variables that lead to B and those same variables that do not lead to B…as that implies the cause contains contradictory variables.
Right, which is why we do not believe that there exist variables that “push the result” to one or the other.
> The problem comes when thinking that B can have a probability of say 75% while C a probability of 25% based on an acausal event that has no spatial or temporal determinacy to weight such.
The equations of QM do describe the “weights” associated with various (superposed) outcomes of a causal event.
The only thing we “observe” is a probability distribution on the particle screen. I don’t know why you keep bringing that up? It has nothing to do with ontic probability, only epistemic.
Right, which is why you have a problem when it comes to probability distribution without any temporal or spatial determinacy.
“Weight” is metaphorical. A probability distribution is said to be “weighted” for a 75% compared over a 25% chance. It just addresses the distinction between higher and lower probability distributions which are entirely problematic when you are saying there is no “variables” that push one to the other.
The equations of QM simply show the distribution of the wave function. They say nothing about such being an ontic probability – in fact I’d suggest they infer an epistemic probability which is actually dependent on how the wave “ends up” on screen interaction. But that is neither here nor there. The point is, we not only do not need to assess ontic probability in QM – but it’s actually an illogical concept to suggest it.
Your argument (suggesting that acausal events are illogical) appears to be attempting to refute false positions that you yourself made up out of whole cloth.
> For example, the idea that an acausal event can happen “to” something that is already in existence is problematic, as that suggests the thing is causing the acausal event.
If by “causing” you mean that no other outcome was possible, then the idea that an acausal event can happen “to” something that is already in existence does not suggest the thing is causing the acausal event. You’re just making up an inconsistent position so that you can refute it.
> This is a problem if we are to say that the radioactive decay of an atom happens without a cause. Rather, the acausal event would need to come into existence first and cause the atom to decay. The problem with this is that an acausal event would have no spatial or temporal determinacy.
The decay of the atom is itself the acausal event. It is acausal because the atom did not cause it to happen at a particular time. But it is observed to occur at a particular spacial and temporal location. There is no separate acausal event (other than the decay) in this scenario.
> An event that just comes into existence seems like it would be adding “new energy” into the universe,
Again, you just made this up out of whole cloth. If it seems that way to you, then your intuition is misleading you.
> It’s important to note that there is no real evidence that an event is acausal, and it would be difficult to show it.
It is also important to note that there is no real evidence that events at the quantum level are causal.
I never said that “acausal events are illogical”. In fact I quite often debate that acausal events are not logically impossible (as some determinists suggest), but rather that they are logically possible. I’ll quote the above article: “The idea of an acausal event is very un-intuitive. Let’s, however, keep in mind that just because something is un-intuitive doesn’t mean that such is “logically impossible”.”
and
“I don’t see acausal events as being logically ruled out, so I cannot know that they are impossible.”
I’ll assume you just skimmed the article and are battling a straw-man.
Again, I never said that an acausal event can’t come about and effect something already in existence. Rather the thing in existence cannot produce the acausal event (as such a production IS causal). And a cause cannot logically be the variables that lead to X and be the variables that do not lead to X (as that’s a self-contradiction). An acausal event would have to come about and have an effect on the object, but that acausal event can have no spatial or temporal determinacy so cannot account for a probability distribution.
That depends on the quantum interpretation being postulated (this is important)! I have a section in my book that goes over the problem with suggesting that an acausal starting point of atom decay comes from the atom itself.
And I didn’t make this up, it’s actually a common problem for the notion of acausality and conservation laws. You just aren’t educated on the philosophical topic of causality/acausality…or so it appears. And you also took the quote out of context, in which just after the quote it says “There are some possible work-arounds such as…” See the article above for context.
It’s also important to note that there is much evidence that causal events exist in the universe, where there is no evidence that acausal events exist anywhere.
But again, I’m agnostic over whether acausal events exist or not…I’m just not agnostic over whether probability is ontic or not. Acausal events are not illogical. Ontic probability is illogical. Please understand the distinction between the two.
Later.
> the thing in existence cannot produce the acausal event (as such a production IS causal).
How do you conclude that such an event is causal? Since you use “causal” to mean a result that could not have been otherwise, that must be part of what you mean, but I don’t see what chain of logic leads you to that conclusion.
> And a cause cannot logically be the variables that lead to X and be the variables that do not lead to X (as that’s a self-contradiction).
Indeed, since you use the word “cause” to mean a deterministic result, I agree. However, an *event* X can lead to an *outcome* Y, and can also lead to an *outcome* Z (and not Y). Under MWI this would be thought of as a superposition until entangled with the observer; under the copenhagen interpretation the superposition collapses nondeterministically when observed.
> An acausal event would have to come about and have an effect on the object, but that acausal event can have no spatial or temporal determinacy
How do you conclude that an acausal event cannot occur at a particular place and time?
When you say an acausal event would not conserve energy, you seem to be equating an event (which is an interaction of particles) with the creation of new particles. Indeed, in that view there are workarounds, but an acausal event need not involve the creation of new particles, and therefore need not be problematic from a conservation perspective. Your unstated assumption that an acausal event involves the creation of new particles is unjustified.
At the quantum level, the evidence is agnotic to whether events are causal or acausal (as you say, it depends on your interpretation). Only when one attempts to account for observed outcomes does the acausal interpretation come to the fore. At the macroscopic level, the illusion of causality arises from an “averaging” of a large number of events at the quantum level. It is certainly useful to treat events at the macroscopic level as causal, as it is common to find systems where the probability of a particular outcome (or, more properly, “measure of existence of all worlds with that outcome” in MWI) is overwhelmingly large (close to 1). I suggest the term “practical causality” to describe this illusion. But I would not confuse this common phenomenon as evidence for causality.
> Ontic probability is illogical.
Perhaps you find it easier to say “measure of existence of all worlds with that outcome” than I do.
If something in existence produces another thing – that IS causal. Production implies causality. X producing state Y is the very definition of causality. An acausal event has no spatial or temporal determinacy. It isn’t “produced” by something else.
No, event X can lead to both outcome Y and outcome Z. Event X cannot lead to outcome Y and at the same time not lead to outcome Y (but to Z instead). This is the same thing for newtonian causality. A cueball can hit both a 4 and 8 ball simultaneously, leading to two rolling events. It cannot hit the 8 ball (and not the 4 ball) and the 4 ball (and not the 8 ball). That is a contradiction. A superpositioned state is a number of causal outputs that happen from the one, all existing in Hilbert space. It is a mistake to think that a superpositioned state is a self-contradictory state that you are proposing.
You keep using a strawman. What I said was that an acausal event would have no spatial or temporal determinacy, meaning it could end up in any place or any location, which of course when it happens will be a “particular location”. There is simply nothing forcing it TO a particular location…to where it ends up would be mere happenstance. Certainly not based on anything in existence (as again, any forcing factor is a causal factor).
Let’s be clear that an acausal event does imply new energy. In other words, it implies something coming from nothing. If it comes from something – that is causality. You making claims that it’s “unjustified” simply means that you haven’t thought or learned enough about the implications of an event without a cause.
It’s more than an “illusion”, there is good reasons to think that a probability distribution isn’t ontic…as I already explained to you here:
Ontic Probability Doesn’t Exist: Assessing “Probability” for the Free Will Debate
The main point is that ontic probability is illogical. Again, if you want to say that quantum events allow for illogical conclusions, then we have a whole different discussion about the methodologies used for QM and for any rational discourse. We don’t have to measure the existence of all worlds to conclude what types of events are logically incoherent and what types of events are not logically incoherent.
Anyway – I’m outta time so any responses will be delayed.
Take care.
> If something in existence produces another thing – that IS causal. Production implies causality. X producing state Y is the very definition of causality.
Oh, I misunderstood your definition of causality to include that no other outcome of the interaction is possible. If you intend your use of causality to include events in which alternative outcomes are possible, we’d be having a completely different conversation.
> No, event X can lead to both outcome Y and outcome Z. Event X cannot lead to outcome Y and at the same time not lead to outcome Y (but to Z instead). It is a mistake to think that a superpositioned state is a self-contradictory state that you are proposing.
You seem to be saying that the superposition of two mutually exclusive outcomes is both impossible, and that is it a mistake to think that it is self-contradictory. (By “outcome” here I mean the observed result) Which is it?
> What I said was that an acausal event would have no spatial or temporal determinacy, meaning it could end up in any place or any location, which of course when it happens will be a “particular location”. There is simply nothing forcing it TO a particular location…to where it ends up would be mere happenstance. Certainly not based on anything in existence (as again, any forcing factor is a causal factor).
Well, the amplitude of the wave function is based on something in existence. While I agree it doesn’t force it TO a particular location, it does constrain the likelihood of the event occurring in various locations. Thus such an acausal event can be said to have a spacial and temporal determinacy as described by its wave function.
Or, perhaps as I describe in the first paragraph here, we should describe this as causal but not necessarily deterministic. (Since determinism is not part of the definition of – or an implication of – the word causal)
> Let’s be clear that an acausal event does imply new energy.
Your assertion is without foundation. Let’s be clear that whether or not an event affects the balance of energy depends on the energy of the system before and after the event.
> there is good reasons to think that a probability distribution isn’t ontic
See http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0312157v2.pdf
“(It might appear from the above that probability in the Everett interpretation
is somehow “not objective”. This is certainly not the case: the weights of
quantum branches are as objective as any other physical property. In fact, the
best reading of the decision-theoretic proofs, in my view, is not that they tell us
that there are no objective probabilities, but rather that they teach us that objective
probability is quantum weight. See Saunders (2005) or (Wallace 2005a)
for a more detailed analysis of this point.”
I agree that to use the term “probability” may not be very precise (perhaps “quantum weight” would be better), but it is much shorter than using a more precise term at every occurrence.
The fact that a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X isn’t defined into existence. That is a logical conclusion that if a cause exists, it doesn’t have self-contradictary variables.
You are confusing a superpositioned state (which IS the outcome) with “alternate possibilities”. It isn’t the case. Every superpositioned state is the way it is due to the cause that precedes it.
No, I’m saying that superpositioned states are *not* mutually exclusive. They both seperately exist in hilbert space. The observation is simply that of the one in which the environment is connected.
In other words, one event leading to multiple superpositioned states (each ending up in a differing universe) is not the same thing as one event leading to one state OR the other state in which both are possible (which is a contradiction if the event is causal).
The very point of my criticism is to show the absurdity of something non-causal being “constrained”. Having spacial and temporal determinacy implies causality.
Then it’s a contradictary cause.
It’s not without foundation that an event that isn’t caused by the energy in the system would be “new energy”. The “possible” work around implies some sort of energy balancing system that controls and conserved the total in the system.
You misunderstand. We could make the same assertion about weighted dice, but that doesn’t mean that the probability is ontic. Causal weights are “objectively” weighted, the probability itself is epistemic. It depends on all of the causal factors that lead to one event over the other, which includes the objective weighting of the dice.
This is fine. I have no problem with objective weights – only with the idea that the probability that extends from such weights is real rather than epistemic (us not knowing all of the causal influences that pushes the weighted ditribution)
Gotta run. Catch you much later. 😉
> The fact that a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X isn’t defined into existence. That is a logical conclusion that if a cause exists, it doesn’t have self-contradictary variables.
Indeed, it would be a mistake to postulate “variables” as “causative” factors for events that are not deterministic.
> In other words, one event leading to multiple superpositioned states (each ending up in a differing universe) is not the same thing as one event leading to one state OR the other state in which both are possible (which is a contradiction if the event is causal).
You and I have completely different understandings of MWI, then. As I understand it, MWI lacks *counterfactual definiteness* – that is, under MWI it is meaningless to speak of the outcome of events that have not been observed. Unless we refer to observations, no event or outcome can properly be said to have occurred. The “different universes” are not separate under MWI – they are part of a single universal wave function.
From the point of an observer before the observation of the outcome of an event that results in X (or not X), both outcomes are possible futures (superposed). After the observation one or the other (only) is observed. Both are possible; in the universal wave function, both are in some sense have occurred, but subjectively the one that is observed is more real (to the observer) than the other (but only after the observation). From the point of view of the observer, before the observation, both outcome X and outcome “not X” are possible.
> It’s not without foundation that an event that isn’t caused by the energy in the system would be “new energy”.
Events are not energy. Events are interactions.
> You misunderstand. We could make the same assertion about weighted dice.
The difference being that in the case of weighted dice we would have good reason to believe that there is a separate, underlying mechanics to the behavior. We do not postulate that there is an infinite stack of underlying mechanics in physics, one more primitive than the next.
Glad you agree. 🙂
There is NO real counterfactuals in a MWI – all states and universes are factuals. I agree that the different universes are not separate from the wave function, but that doesn’t imply that they are not separate from each other. It’s important not to conflate that distinction. All superpositioned states and worlds exists as a split-off of an event. It isn’t that
You miss the point that this is an epistemic problem, not an ontic problem. We simply don’t have access to the superpositioned state and the decoherence event that will take place, so from our perspective it seems like each is a real possibility – when in reality there is a 100% chance that each split will decohere to the only environment each can.
Not only are both occurances possible for their prospective universe, they are all necessitated. It is impossible for one of the occurances not to take place, or to decohere into a different environment.
This is the same for any situation where we don’t know the variables for the future event. But this type of “possibility” is epistemic, not ontic. The fact of the matter is, in a deterministic non-MWI both outcomes are not possible, and in a MWI both outcomes are not possible in a single universe. For a MWI there is only one possible outcome for each universe, and that depends on an entirely causal decoherence event. It can never be the case that a split off universe contains two of the superpositioned states. They each must decohere into the only universe they “possibly” can…and it is in fact impossible for them not to.
At least in out known physical universe there is no such thing as an energy-less interaction.
For a MWI, there indeed is an underlying mechanism. That is why it’s a deterministic interpretation. You need an indeterministic interpretation if you want no underlying mechanics to the behavior. You need to decide what you are making a case for – indeterminism, or a deterministic MWI. We need to focus one at a time, but rest assured a MWI is as deterministic as it gets! 😉
CYA
> > Indeed, it would be a mistake to postulate “variables” as “causative” factors for events that are not deterministic.
> Glad you agree. 🙂
Indeed, we now both agree why your reasoning that an event cannot have distinct (exclusive) outcomes is unsound.
> > From the point of an observer before the observation of the outcome of an event that results in X (or not X), both outcomes are possible futures (superposed).
> You miss the point that this is an epistemic problem, not an ontic problem.
Again, we have very different understandings of MWI. Before the observation, there is only one “world” in which both observations are futures. Both are “possible”. It isn’t a matter of knowing or not knowing which one we will end up in – the “we” that exists before the observation will end up in both of them. After the observation the “world” can be though of as “splitting” into two worlds, but both are possible futures of the world that existed before the observation.
> Not only are both occurances possible for their prospective universe, they are all necessitated. It is impossible for one of the occurances not to take place, or to decohere into a different environment.
Yes, we both agree that retrospectively, after the observation, what has occurred was necessarily what has occurred. The question we were discussing was what was possible before the observation.
> in a MWI both outcomes are not possible in a single universe
Assuming MWI and a single universe is a set of self-contradictory assumptions. MWI is a theory in which universes logically split (unless you’re speaking of it from the POV of the universal wave function, in which no particular observations are ever made).
> For a MWI there is only one possible outcome for each universe
That is not how MWI is described. In MWI the universe can be though of as splitting into multiple future universes. The universe before the observation has two possible outcomes, and therefore two futures.
> At least in our known physical universe there is no such thing as an energy-less interaction.
In an interaction, energy is typically exchanged, not created.
> You need to decide what you are making a case for – indeterminism, or a deterministic MWI.
I’m arguing that either way, more than one outcome of an event is possible.
And I said that where? Obviously you are misunderstanding something I said, so please quote where you are getting this?? We agree that it’s a mistake to postulate causal variables for non-deterministic events. That is all. All events have distinct outcomes.
Again, you aren’t getting it. The MWI implies a split into multiple universes. It doesn’t imply that one universe has both options. If you end up throwing a rock at the cat, it was never a possibility (for your world) for you to be climbing the treee to save the cat. Likewise, if you find yourself climbing the tree to save the cat, it was never possible (for your world) to be throwing a rock to knock the cat out of the tree. It isn’t one universe in which the cat is both being saves from the tree and being knocked out with a rock. The universes split off. You seem to not care about the details of the MWI.
Before the observation the only possibility was the exact universe splits that will take place after the observation. There is nothing different in regards to possibilities prior to the observation – they are identical. Nothing new could happen. Prior to the observation, the ONLY possibility is that one very specific universe will have you throwing the rock, and the other will have you climbing the tree. Before the observation, it cannot be the case that, for example, the one event decoheres into the other universe. The MWI is an entirely causally deterministic process. There is no indeterminism within the output of the superposition or within the way the superposition plays out. It isn’t a “retrospective” assessment.
It’s not.
Yes, it is. No, the universe splits are not seperate possible outcomes. They are ALL the only possible outcomes for each universe. Those “two possible outcomes” you are referring are THE outcome that must occur, even before observation. It can’t be the case that, for example, one of those possible oucomes doesn’t take place in a MWI.
An energy exchange is causal, not acausal. We were addressing a non-caused event. From what is energy exchanged if the event is not derived from something with energy (caused)? This makes no sense.
I think you are confusing “more than one outcome” with the both X and ~X “possibilities” that indeterminism allows for. For a MWI, the X is the multiple worlds that happen, and it cannot be the case that a single one doesn’t happen the way it does (~X cannot happen).
Neal,
If it’s helpful for you to see how perfectly deterministic a many-worlds interpretation of QM is (and how non-retrospective it is), here is what can be said for the interpretation:
If we postulate the big bang event as the start of our known universe, every split off universe in a MWI was causally dictated since then by those initial conditions.
Maybe that will crystallize this for you.
> > Indeed, we now both agree why your reasoning that “an event cannot have distinct (exclusive) outcomes” is unsound.
> And I said that where? Obviously you are misunderstanding something I said, so please quote where you are getting this??
Here is the quote: “The fact that a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X isn’t defined into existence. That is a logical conclusion that if a cause exists, it doesn’t have self-contradictary variables.”
Since your most recent definition of “cause” was “If something in existence produces another thing – that IS causal. Production implies causality. X producing state Y is the very definition of causality.”
That definition does not imply determinism or the “variables” that you postulated (in the last word of the quote two paragraphs earlier). I now understand that your definition of “causal” does not include the requirement for determinism in the outcome.
> The MWI implies a split into multiple universes. It doesn’t imply that one universe has both options.
Yes, it does imply that the world before the split had the option (indeed the requirement) to split into both worlds. There is also a bit of a terminology problem; see “worlds” and “universe” in the penultimate paragraph, below.
> Those “two possible outcomes” you are referring are THE outcome that must occur, even before observation. It can’t be the case that, for example, one of those possible oucomes doesn’t take place in a MWI.
Indeed, that was my point. Whatever outcome I observed, the other outcome was a possible (indeed actual) future of my world before the observation. This is the “could have been/done otherwise” I have been trying to point out is a consequence of MWI.
> An energy exchange is causal, not acausal. We were addressing a non-caused event.
I now understand that I should have used the phrase “nondeterministic causal” instead of “acausal” by your definition that I quoted above.
> I think you are confusing “more than one outcome” with the both X and ~X “possibilities” that indeterminism allows for. For a MWI, the X is the multiple worlds that happen, and it cannot be the case that a single one doesn’t happen the way it does (~X cannot happen).
The evolution of the wave function is not something normally identified as an “event” in MWI. Events are observable interactions.
MWI lacks counterfactual definiteness; we cannot speak meaningfully of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, and the occurrence of events, even when they have not been measured). In the absence of observation no event can properly be said to have occurred in MWI.
In this sense assertions about events must assume an observer, and the observation occurs in the observer’s frame of reference (i.e. in the observer’s “world”; the two become entangled as a result of the observation).
> If we postulate the big bang event as the start of our known universe, every split off universe in a MWI was causally dictated since then by those initial conditions.
The splitting is not a part of the theory per se; it is a way of explaining the meaning of the “world” from the point of view of an observer, particularly to emphasize the sense in which alternative (but mutually exclusive) *observed* outcomes of events are possible (indeed actual, though not necessarily “equally” real). Many writers use different words to distinguish between the objective *universe*, which is the single deterministic universal wave function (which does not split off in any sense and in which events per se cannot properly be said to have occurred), and the “world” (which can be though of as splitting off) which is as the universe appears for a particular observer as a sequence of interactions.
Using this terminology, quantum *events* that occur (and are observed) can, from the point of view of the observer, be expected to behave *as if* nondeterministic, with the chance of outcomes (ontic, if one believes MWI is “true”) governed by the magnitude of the wave function for the alternative outcomes. There is no sense in which, under MWI, these observed events can be thought of as deterministic features of the *world*, even though the *universe* (multiverse) is deterministic.
That quote says the exact opposite of “an event cannot have distinct (exclusive) outcomes”
Again, the fact that a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X isn’t defined into existence. Rather it is logical conclusion that if a cause exists, it doesn’t have self-contradictary variables.
The point I made was that there was no option other than to split, and therefore it is just as determined as any non-split cause in a one-world deterministic interpretation. For the sake of clarity “universe” and “world” are used interchangeably for a MWI.
I want this to be perfectly clear, it has nothing to do with what you or anyone “observes”. It only has to do with particle interation. Before any creatures evolved to “observe” anything…wave functons decohere based on particle interaction (what we experimentally call “measurement” which is a better word than “observe” (as we observe measurements after the fact of them).
What I’m saying is that you are making a huge mistake in thinking that a split means you “could have done otherwise”. Rather, it means that each one of the occurances MUST HAPPEN the exact way they do in each prospective “world”. There was no otherwise possibility than the split happening the way it did and the output of each world being the exact way they are.
I think we need to clarify how you are using the word “determinism” and “indeterminism” (or nondeterminism per your usage.) To clarify my usage read here: “Determinism” and “Indeterminism” for the Free Will Debate
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-indeterminism-confusions/
“Event” only means that something “happens”. That is all. The wave function leads to superposition which leads to environmental decoherence (for MWI). These are all “events”.
Again, all deterministic interpretations have definiteness. There is no counterfactual event, only factual events. You again (in the above) are mixing epistemic uncertainty with ontic assessments. They are not the same thing. The fact that we don’t know what “will occur” is irrelevant to the determinacy of the event.
In a realist MWI the split is definitely part of the theory. In a non-realist MWI the splitting is only a part of the mathematical description but not anything real. Neither have to do with what is “observed” but rather the event that takes place due to measurement (or particle interaction). It has absolutely nothing to do with a conscious POV. In a realist iterpretation splits happened since the beginning of our known universe without any conscious observers at all.
I agree these words are often ambigious, many physicists use the two interchangeable. For example, a MWI is often called a multiverse hypothesis or “non-communicating parallel universes” also known as quantum worlds. But for the sake of clarity, we can stick to the word “world” rather than “universe”. Just know that I mean them interchangeably for all of our MWI discussions.
As I said, the observation is irrelevant. “AS IF” (meaning appearing to be) nondeterministic is also irrelevant. Our lack of knowledge over the “variables” is irrelevant to their existence. In a realist MWI the events that take place are entirely deterministic in every way in every sense of the word. It is a feature of the multiverse. Any appearence of indeterminism is entirely an illusion.
Again, to clarify this, every “world” split is dicatated long before it happens…stemming back to the “big bang” event…and every event in every world is equally as dictated.
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#all/152038930f3eaca4
> Here is the quote: “The fact that a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X isn’t defined into existence. That is a logical conclusion that if a cause exists, it doesn’t have self-contradictary variables.”
> That quote says the exact opposite of “an event cannot have distinct (exclusive) outcomes”
X and “not X” are distinct (exclusive) outcomes. The statement “The fact [sic] that a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X … is a logical conclusion” is not the opposite of “an event cannot have distinct (exclusive) outcomes”. It is rather a restatement of it.
> Again, the fact that a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X isn’t defined into existence. Rather it is logical conclusion that if a cause exists, it doesn’t have self-contradictary variables.
Indeed, an indeterministic cause wouldn’t have “variables” (self-contradictory or otherwise) that determine the outcome. So while it would not have “self-contradictory variables”, it may have indeterministic results.
> The point I made was that there was no option other than to split, and therefore it is just as determined as any non-split cause in a one-world deterministic interpretation. For the sake of clarity “universe” and “world” are used interchangeably for a MWI.
The splits are not “events” in the sense we have been discussing. Among other things they are not observable.
“Universe” and “world” are not used interchangably in MWI. A typical writer about the theory selects two terms, one to represent the totality of the universal wave function, which does not logically split. The other represents the evolution of time from the point of view of an observer, which does split. See sections 2.1, 3.2, and 3.3 of http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/ .
> > Indeed, that was my point. Whatever outcome I observed, the other outcome was a possible (indeed actual) future of my world before the observation.
> I want this to be perfectly clear, it has nothing to do with what you or anyone “observes”. It only has to do with particle interation. Before any creatures evolved to “observe” anything…wave functons decohere based on particle interaction (what we experimentally call “measurement” which is a better word than “observe” (as we observe measurements after the fact of them).
Under MWI, a particle interaction cannot properly be said to have occurred (from the point of view of an observer who may measure it after the fact – or even in the absence of an observer) until that measurement has occurred, at which time the measurement entangles the observer with the part of the universal wave function in which the event has occurred. In this sense MWI lacks counterfactual definiteness. The “split” is only relative to the observer.
> What I’m saying is that you are making a huge mistake in thinking that a split means you “could have done otherwise”. Rather, it means that each one of the occurances MUST HAPPEN the exact way they do in each prospective “world”. There was no otherwise possibility than the split happening the way it did and the output of each world being the exact way they are.
These splits are not events that occur in the world. These splits are precisely what is meant by the “could have been otherwise” of observed events in which there are multiple possible outcomes. The events cannot meaningfully be said to have occurred (in MWI) in the absence of observation. See the discussion of “counterfactual definiteness” below.
> I think we need to clarify how you are using the word “determinism” and “indeterminism” (or nondeterminism per your usage.) To clarify my usage read here: “Determinism” and “Indeterminism” for the Free Will Debate
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-indeterminism-confusions/
Sure, I’m satisfied to use your definition from that link ‘If every event has a variable that can account for the event taking place, such would be considered a “deterministic” model of physics.’ and the associated definition of ’cause’. Unfortunately it is quite different from your most recent definition, which I was working from. I now understand that I should call a nondeterministic event such as radioactive decay acausal, on the basis of the absence of variables that force it to occur at a particular time, and I should avoid using a phrase such as “nondeterministic cause”.
> > The evolution of the wave function is not something normally identified as an “event” in MWI. Events are observable interactions.
> “Event” only means that something “happens”. That is all. The wave function leads to superposition which leads to environmental decoherence (for MWI). These are all “events”.
Under MWI, the observation is what leads to decoherence *relative to the observer*. Environmental decoherence is relative to an observer (in its environment).
> > MWI lacks counterfactual definiteness; we cannot speak meaningfully of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, and the occurrence of events, even when they have not been measured). In the absence of observation no event can properly be said to have occurred in MWI.
> Again, all deterministic interpretations have definiteness. There is no counterfactual event, only factual events. You again (in the above) are mixing epistemic uncertainty with ontic assessments. They are not the same thing. The fact that we don’t know what “will occur” is irrelevant to the determinacy of the event.
You’re not reading MWI properly. From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation : “MWI is a realist, deterministic, local theory, akin to classical physics (including the theory of relativity), at the expense of losing counterfactual definiteness.”
From “https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_definiteness” : “In quantum mechanics, counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability to speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured).”
MWI treats the “uncertainty” – represented by the wave function – as an ontic description of the world. Assuming MWI is true (i.e. is an ontic description of the world), events cannot properly be said to have occurred in the absence of measurements of their results. This is not for epistemic reasons; under MWI it is the observation event that causes the entanglement which places the observer in a “world” in which the event can properly be said to have occurred.
> > Many writers use different words to distinguish between the objective *universe*, which is the single deterministic universal wave function (which does not split off in any sense and in which events per se cannot properly be said to have occurred), and the “world” (which can be though of as splitting off) which is as the universe appears for a particular observer as a sequence of interactions.
> I agree these words are often ambigious, many physicists use the two interchangeable. For example, a MWI is often called a multiverse hypothesis or “non-communicating parallel universes” also known as quantum worlds. But for the sake of clarity, we can stick to the word “world” rather than “universe”. Just know that I mean them interchangeably for all of our MWI discussions.
Indeed, that will make it very difficult to speak on the topic; as in the universal wave function no object can properly be said to exist and no interaction between objects can properly be said to have taken place. The universal wave function does not logically split in MWI. When we speak of events that we observe, and actions that we take, we must necessarily be speaking of something different than the universal wave function (“universe”).
I now understand that you prefer to use the word “multiverse” to mean the single, universal wave function (which does not split), and “world” or “universe” to refer to the behavior of the universe from the point of view of an observer, which logically splits as a result of entanglement due to observation.
> > Using this terminology, quantum *events* that occur (and are observed) can, from the point of view of the observer, be expected to behave *as if* nondeterministic, with the chance of outcomes (ontic, if one believes MWI is “true”) governed by the magnitude of the wave function for the alternative outcomes. There is no sense in which, under MWI, these observed events can be thought of as deterministic features of the *world*, even though the *universe* (multiverse) is deterministic.
> As I said, the observation is irrelevant. “AS IF” (meaning appearing to be) nondeterministic is also irrelevant. Our lack of knowledge over the “variables” is irrelevant to their existence.
There are no “variables” that can be said to cause the distinct outcomes that distinguish two worlds. Such variables are not part of the MWI, and it is precisely one of the things that MWI has tried to eliminate. The existence of such variables, in fact, would conflict with the view that the distinct future worlds that MWI posits are possible.
> In a realist MWI the events that take place are entirely deterministic in every way in every sense of the word. It is a feature of the multiverse. Any appearence of indeterminism is entirely an illusion.
Indeed, the appearance of objects and interactions between objects is, under MWI, entirely an illusion (that is, subjective) within the context of the multiverse too. It is therefore useless in analyzing any “could have done otherwise” that would be useful to understand the original topic of discussion (free will). In the multiverse, a “murder event” cannot properly be said to have definitely occurred except from the point of view of an observer with which the event is entangled. The decoherence events that distinguish worlds are precisely the observations of object interactions that we need to link MWI’s multiverse to experience in a way that would make it philosophically meaningful to our everyday experience.
You are thinking about superposition incorrectly. All superpositioned states extend from the one and are the only possible output for the one. Again, to analogize, you can think of a cueball hitting between an 8 ball and a 4 ball, causing the 8 ball to go in one direction and the 4 ball go in another. For a MWI of a superpositioned state the very superpositioned state that holds each option is the “8 ball” and “4 ball”, the main difference is that the motion of the 8 ball happens in world A while the motion of the 4 ball happens in world B.
The cause of the superpositioned state is the cause that leads to both events in different worlds (causes the split). X is the superpositioned state. The cause doesn’t: 1) lead to superpositioned state (X) and 2) at the same time not lead to superpositioned state (not lead to X)…as that cause would be a self contradiction.
Rather, the cause has the veriables that lead to X (the superpositioned state) …and that is the only state that the cause can lead to.
This is similar to saying the cause (cueball hitting) leads to both the 8 ball rolling and the 4 ball rolling. It’s not saying that the cause leads to the 8 ball rolling (and not the 4 ball rolling) and the 4 ball rolling (and not the 8 ball rolling). Rather, the effect is that both the 8 ball and 4 ball roll (and there is no “not rolling). For a MWI, the event leads to ALL STATES, not ONE AND NOT THE OTHER. Those states are either suspended in hilbert spapce or decohere into a world. But it isn’t the case that one happens and not the other…it is the case that they all happen, and they al MUST HAPPEN, based on the initial cause.
Hopefully this clears up the confusion.
Indeterministic cause is an oxymoron. For an MWI there is no indeterministic event.
I never gave the criteria of being “observable” to an event. We don’t “observe” individual events on the quantum scale…ever. Only results of measurements. But that doesn’t make them not events. We don’t observe the fusion in the sun, but that doesn’t make such not an event.
Again, they often are used interchangeably – depending on the source. Either way, the point is moot.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation
“Many-worlds implies that all possible alternate histories and futures are real, each representing an actual “world” (or “universe”). In lay terms, the hypothesis states there is a very large—perhaps infinite[2]—number of universes, and everything that could possibly have happened in our past, but did not, has occurred in the past of some other universe or universes.”
If by “observer” you mean “particle interaction of measuring device” then yes. If by “observer” you mean person looking at the results of measurement…no. This conflation over the poorly labeled “observer effect” is one that has a history to it. The measurement doesn’t entangle observers, it entangles environments.
The split only being observed by the person in the particular environment is irrelevant. It is factually definite that they will be in the environment they are. The fact that we can’t observe all of the other worlds is epistemic, not ontic.
No, you are simply wrong in every sense here. In a MWI you could not have done otherwise. Each iteration of “you” was causally forced into the very position it is in and could not have been otherwise. Each world could not have been otherwise. The superpositioned state could not have been otherwise. The events leading up to superpositioning could not have been otherwise. Your “observations” within the world you are in could not have been otherwise.
Again, the MWI is as causally deterministic as can possibly be. You are simply incorrect about “counterfactual definiteness”. In a MWI every event is factually definite, and is before the event ever takes place.
I don’t think I defined determinism in this thread, so don’t know what you mean by “most recent definition”. Glad we can agree with the usage though and the fact that “nondeterministic cause” doesn’t make much sense in that context.
You keep using the word “observer” here. Can you clarify what you mean by “observer”? I truly distain that word in QM due to the confusions it has caused…and think it should be simply called “measurement”.
I believe what I said was, given a REALIST account of MWI, and I quote “There is NO counterfactual event, only factual events.” Either way, the term “counterfactual” in philosophy is usually used as “relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case”…rather than what has.
https://www.google.ca/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=define:+counterfactual
This is why it is called COUNTER factual – meaning counter to the facts. A counterfactual conditional would be subjuntive.
I assume that, given that usage of the term “counterfactual definiteness”, such is assessed based on the fact that one cannot (and can never) conclude a realist account of MWI because of a lack of access. In that case it’s just being used as a lack of knowledge over the happening. But of course for our talk we are assuming a realist account in which each world happens – for the sake of argument.
Again, you keep conflating the epistemic with the ontic. I never said that there was no “uncertainty” in a MWI (both a realist and non-realist account)…but that is due to an access problem. We don’t have access to the variables.
NO, it is for epistemic reasons. The “observation event” is irrelevant to the uncertainty. The uncertainty has everything to do with not having access to “wordly” variables (the environments)….but only to a single one depending on the iteration of “you”. Again, I cannot stress this enough. The MWI is entirey deterministic.
You are simply mistaken here. The events are said to “exist” in hilbert space…at least for a realist account of superpositioning/MWI.And the etire process is causal.
The observations are irrelevant to the facts about each observation needing to be the exact way they are even before they happen.
This is a tad frustrating because it is almost as if you are making up your own indeterministic version of MWI. The wave function itself CAUSALLY leads to each state and each decoherence into very specific environments. The entire interpretation sustains variables, and that is why it is said to be deterministic. You are simply incorrect here.
> In a realist MWI the events that take place are entirely deterministic in every way in every sense of the word. It is a feature of the multiverse. Any appearence of indeterminism is entirely an illusion.
You assering it as “useless” doesn’t actually make it the case that it is. If we cannot do otherwise in a MWI, if each world must be the way it happens from the start, free will is impossible.
The “observations” or rather “measurements” have to be the exact way that they are for each “world”. They are entirely deterministic events as well. Also note that a MWI is even more defeatist. Even if you don’t murder in one world, rest assured that you must murder in another (and vice versa).
Sorry, but a realist MWI is the worst end of a lack of free will. We can only hope that all of the horrific things that aren’t done in our “observed” world are not happening in other worlds. 😉
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Anyway – I think our conversation is becoming quite bloated. Let’s focus down if possible. Rather than address everything that was said making this longer and longer each time, let’s start again using more of a Socratic method (we can each ask one question). Otherwise I think it will become quite unproductive.
Do you agree that a MWI is a deterministic interpretation (using my semantic of determinism)? Yes or No
> Do you agree that a MWI is a deterministic interpretation (using my semantic of determinism)? Yes or No
MWI is a deterministic interpretation in the sense that every future state of the multiverse (the universal wave function) is fully determined by its state at any previous moment in time.
MWI is not deterministic in the sense that it denies the *existence* of variables that would determine the (unique) outcome of measurements that have not yet been performed. This is not a matter of epistemic “not knowing” what entangled environment we will end up in – knowing what environment we will end up in (in the future) means the same thing as knowing the outcome of the measurement (in the future). We *know* will end up in all of the possible entangled environments that result from the measurement, but that knowledge leaves us ignorant of the result of the future measurement. It is an ontological feature of the multiverse under MWI that such information does not exist before the measurement takes place.
As it relates to social questions of free will, blame, praise, and justice, an understanding of the behavior of the *world* is far more relevant to an analysis of how we ought to behave than an understanding of the evolution of the universal wave function. “The MWI is a deterministic theory for a physical Universe and it explains why a world appears to be indeterministic for human observers.” [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds].
See section 6.5 of that for links to proofs that this understanding corresponds to an analysis of nondeterministic models.
Great!
I have no idea what you mean by “denies the existence of such variables”. If anything, measurement is a part OF the variables.
Such “ignorance” IS epistemic ignorance. If we “know we will end up in all of the possible entangled environments that result from the measurement” (in a specific determined way) our ignorance over the future result is entirely due to a lack of future knowledge.
Bzzzzt. Remember what you agreed to: “MWI is a deterministic interpretation in the sense that every future state of the multiverse (the universal wave function) is fully determined by its state at any previous moment in time.” Let’s be clear that all “information” is dictated in a MWI by the previous moment. There is no acausal information. Measurement is a part OF the causal information, and what causes the measurement is a part OF the causal information, and so on.
In regards to section 6.5, keep in mind that holding similar behavior (in people thinking about these things) to an indeterministic interpretation does not imply any sort of indeterminism. That being said the “Behavior Principle” is very arguable and should not be accepted on it’s face for a MWI. Keep in mind that for a MWI the “probability” is an illusion (as all events in the wave distribution must happen). But this is a digression.
Let’s focus down because you didn’t really answer with a “yes” or “no” and you gave what seemed to me to be a contradictory responses (either that or simply language that needs clarification), and I think you could have given a “yes” or “no” given the specific semantic of determinism that is being used. So I’ll ask this again, and let’s try to focus on one thing at a time:
Do you agree that a MWI is a deterministic interpretation (using MY semantic of determinism)? Yes or No?
Sidenote: Please excuse any time delay in responses. Pretty busy.
You are simply wrong about the meaning of the phrase “counterfactual definiteness”. That phrase has a particular meaning in the context of QM that cannot be derived from the meaning of the individual words as they are used in philosophy. In this context a result that has not been measured is considered a counterfactual. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_definiteness . MWI as a theory lacks counterfactual definiteness; in this sense a quantity that has not been measured cannot properly be said to *have* a definite value (known or unknown). This is an ontic feature of MWI, not an epistemic issue. MWI is a realist theory of the universal wave function (your “mutiverse”); it is not a realist theory of worlds (objects, events, and measurements).
You also seem to be applying the fallacious argument form *retrospective determinism* in stating that our ignorance of the future is an epistemic issue. Using your semantic definitions
> Determinism: All events have a cause.
> Cause: A variable that forces the result to a particular outcome.
(Please correct me if I have this wrong, as I could not find a single consistent definition of “cause” in the page you pointed at).
The variables we speak of include only variables that exist before the event. Otherwise the future result of the event could be thought of as a variable that is the cause of the event. A variable that does not exist until after the event has occurred is not the kind of variable that can properly be considered a cause of the event. With that in mind, the comment
> Such “ignorance” IS epistemic ignorance. If we “know we will end up in all of the possible entangled environments that result from the measurement” (in a specific determined way) our ignorance over the future result is entirely due to a lack of future knowledge.
Completely misses the mark. You seem to be equating ontic acausality with epistemic ignorance of the future.
The “set of possible entangled environments in the universal wave function” (whether we know it or not) does not *determine* the future result of the measurement. The value yielded by the measurement is information that does not exist (known or unknown) until after the measurement has been performed, and it cannot be derived from the universal wave function (which *is* deterministic), even given the universal wave function at any future time.
> That being said the “Behavior Principle” is very arguable and should not be accepted on it’s face for a MWI.
Indeed, it is only in the face of its proofs that one should accept it.
> Do you agree that a MWI is a deterministic interpretation (using MY semantic of determinism)? Yes or No?
Of what? It is a deterministic interpretation of the multiverse, as described by the universal wave function. Your definition of determinism speaks of events and causes. But in the universal wave function, events cannot properly be said to have occurred. Events (and causes) can only properly be said to occur in (or with respect to) some world (or universe, which you use interchangably) that is in an entangled environment. That is because (as I said earlier) MWI as a theory lacks ‘counterfactual definiteness’ (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_definiteness) – the theory does not allow us to speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not yet been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured). This is an ontic property of MWI. So (in the absence of events) the fact that MWI is deterministic (by your definition) is in some sense trivial. MWI is usually described as a deterministic theory because the evolution of the universal wave function over time is unitary; this meaning of deterministic is not the same as yours.
As applied to the (or a) world, it is not deterministic because (according to MWI) there do not exist variables that force future measurement events to yield particular outcomes. This meaning of deterministic aligns precisely with your definition.
I would also like to point out the contradiction in your words:
> No, you are simply wrong in every sense here. In a MWI you could not have done otherwise. Each iteration of “you” was causally forced into the very position it is in and could not have been otherwise. Each world could not have been otherwise. The superpositioned state could not have been otherwise. The events leading up to superpositioning could not have been otherwise. Your “observations” within the world you are in could not have been otherwise.
The phrase “could have been otherwise” means, precisely, that the world as it existed at some point in time had more than one possible future. And that is precisely what MWI means by “many worlds” – each “world” acts as a distinct future. For the “you” that exists before the split, there are no variables that distinguish which outcome is your “true” future – both are possible (indeed actual). To suggest otherwise is to invoke the logical fallacy of retrospective determinism.
I never said the usage wasn’t different. Rather I explained how I was using the word counterfactual…which is the normal usage. If “counterfactual definiteness”in QM simply means “a result that is not measured (but could be)” then it merely means we don’t have access to the measurements (so cannot) in other worlds for a MWI to lack such “counterfactual definiteness”. For MWI it is entirely based on not having access to measure the variables – rather than the variables not existing.
This is where you are mistaken. For a realist account of the MWI it ONLY implies that the value is unknown. There is nothing about “counterfactual definiteness” FOR THE MWI that implies “cannot properly be said to *have* a definite value” only that “those other outcomes could not have been measured” and therefore it lacks “counterfactual definiteness”. That is all. You are entirely missing the boat on this.
It has nothing to do with retrospection. In fact I said over and over again that the “worlds” (in a MWI) that will come about in the future all causally stem from the big bang, and they could not be otherwise that what is dictated by those causal events.
No, any future variables that have not happened yet are dictated by preceding variables – and hence could not be otherwise. And future variables are a consideration for cause and effect.
I don’t know where you are getting “ontic acausality” from (is there any other type?). We are addressing a MWI – and for that it is only causality. The epistemic ignorance is an access issue (we don’t have access to the superpositioned state or other worlds).
Let’s be perfectly clear that both the measurements and the wave function are part of the causal events that lead to the very specific worlds that could not be otherwise in a realist MWI.It matters not that decoherence doesn’t take place until measurement. The events of the wave, measurement, and decoherence are entirely causal…and could not happen differently.
Either you are postulating many worlds or you are not. Are you suggesting that the other worlds cannot be properly said to have occured at all? If so it defeats the entire point of you arguing the case of a MWI. Either the worlds exist, in which case the variables that lead to them do as well – or the worlds do not exist, in which case there is no variables that led to them. The fact that we can’t “know” which one of these is the case is irrelevant. For a realist interpretation we are assuming the other worlds and hence assuming the variables – regardless if they are measurable from the perspective of one world. If you assume other worlds, then events can be said to have taken place from the wave function to the output of the worlds.
You are mistakenly thinking that lacking “counterfactual definiteness” means “lacking variables or events”. It doesn’t. It ONLY implies a lack of an ability to measure. If you think that the lack of measurement implies the lack of the thing not being measured (in the one world) – then you simply cannot be postulating multiple realist worlds either. If you are postulating that the worlds exist, then you are posulating the variables that produced them. You can’t have this both ways.
Again, the reason a MWI is deterministic is the postulation that each part of the wave function causally decoheres splitting into multiple worlds. This is an “event”, it has “variables” (hence the point of a MWI to not collapse the wave function), and it is deterministically dictated since the big bang.
All of this being said I believe we are talking past each other again. If lacking counterfactual definiteness meant lacking variables, then the interpretation would be indeterministic. It isn’t. It only means, as the wikipedia article says: “The single adjective “counterfactual” may also appear in physics discussions where it is frequently treated as a noun. The word “counterfactual” does not mean “characterized by being opposed to fact.” Instead, it is used to characterize values that could have been measured but, for one reason or another, were not.” Since we could not have measured the results on those other worlds, it lacks “counterfactual definiteness”. That is ALL.
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You aren’t seeming to get it. Neither the world nor the entire multiverse had more than one possible future. The world that you “measure” had to take place the exact way and could not have been otherwise. The world for the other iteration of you had to take place the exact way it did and could not have been otherwise. The multiverse with all of the worlds had to take place the exact way it did and could not have been otherwise. There is no real otherwise possibility in a MWI, only a split off of worlds that had to take place the exact way they did and could not have been otherwise.
Perhaps we can go into a thought experiment. In the thought experiment you get into a Star Trek transporter, which disassembles your molecules and recreates them elsewhere. A problem happens, however, where it recreates your molecules twice on to two different planets. Now that there are two iterations of you, it doesn’t mean that you are “doing otherwise” just because one iteration of you is doing X and the other at the same time is doing Y. It just means that a split causally took place, but the split couldn’t have happened otherise and each iteration of you couldn’t have done otherwise. It is no different than the split of decohered “worlds” for a MWI in regards to “otherwise”.
> I explained how I was using the word counterfactual…which is the normal usage. If “counterfactual definiteness”in QM simply means “a result that is not measured (but could be)” then it merely means we don’t have access to the measurements (so cannot) in other worlds for a MWI to lack such “counterfactual definiteness”. For MWI it is entirely based on not having access to measure the variables – rather than the variables not existing.
I understood that this is what you were saying, but that is not the meaning of the phrase “counterfactual definiteness”. In QM, counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability to speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured). It does not refer to knowing or not knowing the results of the measurements, it refers to the existence of the measured quantity. In a theory (such as MWI) that lacks counterfactual definiteness, a property that has not been measured cannot be assumed to *exist*. If you think that is wrong, I suggest you edit the page https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_definiteness with your correction.
> Let’s be perfectly clear that both the measurements and the wave function are part of the causal events that lead to the very specific worlds that could not be otherwise in a realist MWI. It matters not that decoherence doesn’t take place until measurement. The events of the wave, measurement, and decoherence are entirely causal…and could not happen differently.
I’m not sure what you intend by “realist MWI”. MWI is a realist theory of the universal wave function, what you call the multiverse. It is not a realist theory of worlds as MWI lacks counterfactual definiteness (as that term is used in discussions of QM by people other than you). In MWI, none of the variables that exist before measurement determine the value you see displayed by the measurement device; that is a quantity that cannot properly be said to exist (even as a function of variables that do exist) before the measurement.
The full quote of the wikipedia article (please see the bold text):
In quantum mechanics, counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability to speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured). The term “Counterfactual definiteness” is used in discussions of physics calculations, especially those related to the phenomenon called quantum entanglement and those related to the Bell inequalities.[1]
The single adjective “counterfactual” may also appear in physics discussions where it is frequently treated as a noun. The word “counterfactual” does not mean “characterized by being opposed to fact.” Instead, it is used to characterize values that could have been measured but, for one reason or another, were not.
So perhaps you should edit the wikipedia article. The lack of the ability to “speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed” in a MWI comes from the INABILITY to measure “values that could have been measured but, for one reason or another, were not” simply due to the fact that they are on a different world that has decohered from the other.
There is a realist account of MWI which postulates actual worlds, and there is one that says those other worlds are never actualized and just a part of the mathematical calculation. Hawking, for example, sides with a non-realist MWI due to the appreciation for the mathematics, but doesn’t believe in those other split off worlds as actually happening:
According to Martin Gardner, the “other” worlds of MWI have two different interpretations: real or unreal; he claims that Stephen Hawking and Steve Weinberg both favour the unreal interpretation.[80] Gardner also claims that the nonreal interpretation is favoured by the majority of physicists, whereas the “realist” view is only supported by MWI experts such as Deutsch and Bryce DeWitt. Hawking has said that “according to Feynman’s idea”, all the other histories are as “equally real” as our own,[81] and Martin Gardner reports Hawking saying that MWI is “trivially true”.[82] In a 1983 interview, Hawking also said he regarded the MWI as “self-evidently correct” but was dismissive towards questions about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, saying, “When I hear of Schrödinger’s cat, I reach for my gun.” In the same interview, he also said, “But, look: All that one does, really, is to calculate conditional probabilities—in other words, the probability of A happening, given B. I think that that’s all the many worlds interpretation is. Some people overlay it with a lot of mysticism about the wave function splitting into different parts. But all that you’re calculating is conditional probabilities.”[83] Elsewhere Hawking contrasted his attitude towards the “reality” of physical theories with that of his colleague Roger Penrose, saying, “He’s a Platonist and I’m a positivist. He’s worried that Schrödinger’s cat is in a quantum state, where it is half alive and half dead. He feels that can’t correspond to reality. But that doesn’t bother me. I don’t demand that a theory correspond to reality because I don’t know what it is. Reality is not a quality you can test with litmus paper. All I’m concerned with is that the theory should predict the results of measurements. Quantum theory does this very successfully.”[84] For his own part, Penrose agrees with Hawking that QM applied to the universe implies MW, although he considers the current lack of a successful theory of quantum gravity negates the claimed universality of conventional QM.[70] – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation
This is why I like to preface that we are discussing a realist account of the “other worlds”.
You keep saying “before measurement”. Measurement is what causes the decoherence event, and each world splits from there based on the wave function.All of the variables are in place before, during, and after the event. It’s an entirely deterministic process:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation
~ MWI removes the observer-dependent role in the quantum measurement process by replacing wavefunction collapse with quantum decoherence.
~ MWI is a realist, deterministic, local theory, akin to classical physics (including the theory of relativity), at the expense of losing counterfactual definiteness. MWI achieves this by removing wavefunction collapse, which is indeterministic and non-local, from the deterministic and local equations of quantum theory
> So perhaps you should edit the wikipedia article.
It agrees with what I said.
> The lack of the ability to “speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed” in a MWI comes from the INABILITY to measure “values that could have been measured but, for one reason or another, were not” simply due to the fact that they are on a different world that has decohered from the other.
This isn’t relevant to cross-world measurements, if such a thing were even meaningful. What is means for MWI is that *before* a measurement (decoherence event), it is meaningless to hypothesize the existence of a particular (known or unknown) value for a variable that has not yet been measured (even when one intends to measure it imminently). Such a value does not *exist* until after the measurement.
> > In MWI, none of the variables that exist before measurement determine the value you see displayed by the measurement device; that is a quantity that cannot properly be said to exist (even as a function of variables that do exist) before the measurement.
> You keep saying “before measurement”. Measurement is what causes the decoherence event, and each world splits from there based on the wave function.All of the variables are in place before, during, and after the event. It’s an entirely deterministic process:
The phrase “could have been otherwise” (with regards to the result of a measurement) is a question considering what was possible from the point of view before a measurement that has been done. That is why “before measurement” is important when we are trying to answer questions about what “could have been otherwise”.
In MWI there are no variables that exist before the measurement that determine a value that will be the observed result of the measurement. (In other words MWI lacks counterfactual definiteness) So afterwards, in the world in which we have observed a value, the result of the measurement “could have been otherwise”.
I get that this is what you are saying, but there is nothing that says this or even implies this for either a lack of counterfactual definiteness or for the MWI. You are simply making up the assertion that “such a value does not *exist* until after the measurement”. In a MWI it is the opposite of this, which differentiates it from a Copenhagen collapse theory. Each state stems from each variable of the wave function itself.
No, it isn’t about point of views at all. It’s about reality and there being alternate realities that are or were possible. For a MWI it just happens that split off worlds are all a part of the reality that couldn’t have been otherwise.
No, it’s irrelevant. Before measurement is causally produced which leads to measurement which is causally produced which leads to decoherence which is causally produced and on and on. The wave function is causally produced which leads to superposition that is causally produced which measurement causes decohernece which is causally produces, which many worlds decohered from each other are causally produced.
Sorry, you are just making up stuff. Again, counterfactual definiteness says nothing about a “lack of variables” anywhere…and “measurement” is a part OF the variables…it isn’t something excluded from them. You are simply wrong here. Perhaps you are confusing an indeterministic collapse theory with MWI…who knows. Just know that you are mistaken for a MWI. For MWI the wave function HAS variables that exist prior to measurement….and the whole point of MWI is that each world stems from those variables rather than collapsing them with no variables for an indeterministic account.
> > This isn’t relevant to cross-world measurements, if such a thing were even meaningful. What is means for MWI is that *before* a measurement (decoherence event), it is meaningless to hypothesize the existence of a particular (known or unknown) value for a variable that has not yet been measured (even when one intends to measure it imminently). Such a value does not *exist* until after the measurement.
> I get that this is what you are saying, but there is nothing that says this or even implies this for either a lack of counterfactual definiteness or for the MWI. You are simply making up the assertion that “such a value does not *exist* until after the measurement”. In a MWI it is the opposite of this, which differentiates it from a Copenhagen collapse theory. Each state stems from each variable of the wave function itself.
You can find this right in the Wikipedia articles for MWI and CFD. I’m not talking about values of the wave function. The wave function is not something we ever measure, nor does it determine the outcome of future measurements. I’m talking about the values of properties, e.g of objects, before they have been measured. Part of the reason it makes no sense in MWI to hypothesize particular (known or unknown) values for quantities that have not yet been measured is that such a hypothesis would contradict observations of interference such as the two-slit experiment; this is the most basic thing that any theory of QM must account for.
Anyway, I don’t have more time for these discussions this week. Perhaps later. Have a good week. 😀
> I get that this is what you are saying, but there is nothing that says this or even implies this for either a lack of counterfactual definiteness or for the MWI. You are simply making up the assertion that “such a value does not *exist* until after the measurement”.
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_definiteness :
“In quantum mechanics, counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability to speak meaningfully of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured).”
Counterfactual definiteness is the ability to assume the existence of properties that have not been measured. I’m not making it up; in this case I’m copying it word-for-word from Wikipedia.
MWI as a theory lacks CFD; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation . That means that the theory does NOT include the ability to assume the existence of properties that have not been measured. Again, I’m not making this up, I’m copying it straight from Wikipedia.
From that same page
“Many-worlds reconciles the observation of non-deterministic events, such as random radioactive decay, with the fully deterministic equations of quantum physics.”
Again, I’m not making this up. This is straight from Wikipedia, not my own indeterministic version of MWI.
The former (the observation of non-deterministic events) is part of a description of the world which includes measurements. The latter (MWI’s description of the multiverse) is a description of the equations of quantum physics, but whose variables are never measured. These are not the same thing; whenever we are speaking of the definite results of measurements, we are necessarily speaking of the former.
It is very frustrating to have a conversation with you when you seem unable to accept simple definitions that are widely accepted, or the consequences of them in the context of your own defined terms (such as cause and determinism).
No, what it says in the article is NOT what you are interpreting it to say.
Actually we measure the results of the wave function. The “other” worlds that stem from them are something we never measure either – yet you seem to want to talk meaningfully about their existence.
Says you against what the MWI ACTUALLY says….which is that the wave function produces the result for each world that is being measured within that specific world.
No it doesn’t contradict observations of interference. Another thing you are making up out of some place that the sun doesn’t shine.
I never said it didn’t lack CFD, but lacking CFD doesn’t imply a lack of variables in any way, shape, or form.
That is NOT what it means.
At this point you are either foolong yourself, being dishonest, or displaying a severe lack of reading comprehension. If it’s a lacking of intellectual honesty, then I’m afraid these conversations here will need to conclude.
Lets parse out that quote in terms of variables: “Many-worlds reconciles the observation of events with no variables, such as random radioactive decay, with the fully variabled equations of quantum physics.”
In other words, and I cannot stress this enough, the observations are INCORRECT in a deterministic MWI..as every single event happens due to a variable…regardless of our capacity to observe and measure them.
This is complete and utter nonsense. If you want to go there then we cannot even talk of a realist world account of the MWI to begin with…as we never, I repeat, never measure any other world than the one in which we have decohered with. I’ve corrected your misunderstanding over and over here. From the same page:
MWI removes the observer-dependent role in the quantum measurement process by replacing wavefunction collapse with quantum decoherence.
Understand?
The reason a MWI is not counterfactually definite is because of the inability to measure each from our own world. It is a problem with empiricism, not a problem with variabled formulation. If you want to assume that a lack of empiricism implies what cannot be empirically verified or measured simply does not exist (e.g. that the variables do not exist)…then you need to abandon any notion of a realist account (in terms of worlds) of the MWI, as those worlds cannot be empirically verified or measured either. So even if we were to accept your incorrect usage of these terms, you would be stuck in a conundrum. Either the variables can be said to exist based on the formulation that contains them, or you cannot say the other worlds exist either (and must take a non-realist account of MWI in which only one world exists and the others are not real at all).
I’m actually accepting the definition in the wiki article, you are just misunderstanding what it is saying – which is the frustrating part of it all. The fact that you think there is a “simple definition” or that it is not arguable about MWI means that you have found yourself a single article that you can contrive an incorrect idea from and that is it. Take a look at the wiki talk about your source for example:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Counterfactual_definiteness
You know, I’ve yet to see a single comprehensible explanation of why it is that Bell’s theorem assumes CFD, nor why many-worlds violates it.
The only thing that makes sense if MWI is said to abandon counterfactual definiteness is this:
“In the Everett many-worlds interpretation, the assumption of counterfactual definiteness is abandoned, this interpretation assuming that the universe branches into many different observers, each of whom measures a different observation.”
Meaning it is ONLY abandoned because we can never have access to the world. Not because the variables do not exist, but only because we have no ability to measure the RESULTS of them. It’s an empirical problem that is meaningless if we are accepting a theory of worlds we have no capacity to measure to begin with (a huge problem for MWI from my POV).
But no, you are simply wrong on how this is being used for a MWI, even if we accept the original articles semantic, which also says this:
Given that semantic of counterfactual, it is the fact that the values could NOT have been measured that rules out CFD for MWI, not the idea that the values do not exist (at least if one is arguing for a realist MWI account of the worlds as you are).
If you are arguing for a non-realist world account of MWI, then you can say those other variables do not exist – as the worlds that extend from them do not exist. You can’t, however, have your quantum cake and eat it too.
Okay..I need to work. It is way too time-consuming correcting you over and over again on the same things. Stop pretending to understand the MWI and thinking there is a teenie bit of ontic indeterminism within it. There is not. Any perception of indeterminism for an observer is entirely due to them not being able to access all of the variables in states that have decohered from each other.
> > You can find this right in the Wikipedia articles for MWI and CFD.
> No, what it says in the article is NOT what you are interpreting it to say.
I wasn’t interpreting it. I was copying it into this thread. From the CFD page
‘The word “counterfactual” does not mean “characterized by being opposed to fact.” Instead, it is used to characterize values that could have been measured but, for one reason or another, were not.’
It does not refer to the values in other words, as you appear to think it does, because those are never “values that could have been measured”.
> > Part of the reason it makes no sense in MWI to hypothesize particular (known or unknown) values for quantities that have not yet been measured is that such a hypothesis would contradict observations of interference such as the two-slit experiment; this is the most basic thing that any theory of QM must account for.
> No it doesn’t contradict observations of interference. Another thing you are making up out of some place that the sun doesn’t shine.
I’m pretty sure the sun shines on the Theoretical Physics department at Caltech. http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2015/02/19/the-wrong-objections-to-the-many-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics/#comment-7295910552604303933 .
“In QM […] you have a quantum state. You use that quantum state to calculate the probability of experimental outcomes, but we aren’t allowed to think that the outcome we observe represents some truth that was there all along [i.e. ontic], but we just didn’t know [i.e. epistemic]. That’s what interference experiments (and Bell’s theorem etc) tell us.”
This is an important point as it affects most interpretations of QM, not just MWI.
You will find on that page a number of useful corrections to other misinterpretations you have of MWI (for example, you assertions that MWI is not testable, or that it postulates the existence of a huge number of worlds).
> > I’m not talking about values of the wave function. The wave function is not something we ever measure,
> Actually we measure the results of the wave function.
I would be very interested in any reference you can produce for this assertion.
> Given that semantic of counterfactual, it is the fact that the values could NOT have been measured that rules out CFD for MWI, not the idea that the values do not exist (at least if one is arguing for a realist MWI account of the worlds as you are).
Variables that we could not measure are irrelevant to CFD, as it refers only to values that could have been measured.
I think this conversation is just about drawing to a close. You seem too attached to a particular belief set to apply basic logic.
What you copied said absolutely nothing about “variables not existing”. That is just something that seems to be in your imagination.
Let’s be clear that all measurements take place in every world for a MWI, it is just that one instance of you cannot measure those others that are taking place. The variables exist, it is an access problem. Hence the reason that the values could not be measured for a single person in a single world. It has absolutely nothing to do with the variables “not existing”…something you again are imagining.
Regarding Sean Carroll I need a much better source than a comment he made on his post. Such is a convoluted quote by Carroll (and the distinction between what is true and what will happen – which I think he’s referring to the prior and not the latter for his comment). Bell’s theorem does not tells us that such is not deterministic when it comes to either a many world interpretation or pilot wave theory. A MWI is both realist and deterministic, neither of those being compatible with there being another possibiliy for the outcome observed. Even the probability is not “real” given that that all worlds must happen the way they do:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/
“The difficulty with the concept of probability in a deterministic theory, such as the MWI, is that the only possible meaning for probability is an ignorance probability, but there is no relevant information that an observer who is going to perform a quantum experiment is ignorant about. The quantum state of the Universe at one time specifies the quantum state at all times. If I am going to perform a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes such that standard quantum mechanics predicts probability 1/3 for outcome A and 2/3 for outcome B, then, according to the MWI, both the world with outcome A and the world with outcome B will exist. It is senseless to ask: “What is the probability that I will get A instead of B?” because I will correspond to both “Lev”s: the one who observes A and the other one who observes B.”
Every result stems from the universial wavefunction and could not have been otherwise.
I never said that it was untestable, only that a realist account of “other” worlds is untestable. Understand the distinction here. Decoherence makes such untestable. And that part about the difference between “postulate” and “derive from what is postulated” is really a contrivance on the part of Carroll:
“Now, MWI certainly does predict the existence of a huge number of unobservable worlds. But it doesn’t postulate them. It derives them, from what it does postulate.”
Again, if one accepts a realist account of the worlds (which isn’t necessary to do for a MWI as I already explained), then one is “postulating the worlds”. It’s absurd not to think so.
What do you think is being measured when we look at a pattern? What do you think the probabilities of the “wave function” are modeling? The wave function is a model of the probabilitic results of measurement.
That is WHY a MWI does not have CFI, because it could not have been measured.
Says the man who A) rules out variables in an entirely realistic and local deterministic interpretation (a contradiction) and B) rules out variables based on an inability to measure them, yet rules in decohered worlds that are entirely unmeasurable.
Sorry, but you shouldn’t be talking about applying “basic logic” here. Anyway, it is exhausing correcting for all of your errors. Just know that if there was no value that led to the results, the MWI would be considered an indeterministic interpretation, NOT a deterministic one.
Also know that even if that were the case (IT’S NOT!),…even IF there was an acausal event that lead to the results of each, that has the same problem as any other indeterministic account (any otherwise account wouldn’t be up to you).
Anyway, this conversation is unproductive. It seems you want to just make up your own quantum theory as you go to suit your needs, even though no matter what theory is postulated (even your imaginary one’s) are incompatible with the ability to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise. For a deterministic MWI, all possibility happen and couldn’t have been otherwise. For an ENTIRELY FICTIONAL account of an indeterministic MWI, the results you end up with stem from no variables that are in your control. And if each “world” has to happen anyway for a realist account of worlds, it matters not if such stems from a variabled account or your fictitious unvariabled indeterministic version of MWI.
The only reason I’ve been having this debate is so you stop talking about interpretations that do not exist…but we can talk about those non-existent versions as well and logically they have the very same problems alluded to for Copenhagen.
END. GAME. SET. MATCH. 😉
The question “Does this mean we need to equalize all wealth” suggests that there is some “we” deserving the power to make such decisions. I question that assumption.
“We” is colloquial…and can just mean “we as rational people living in civilization”. It’s not meant to invoke some sort of totalitarian government if that is what you are assuming. 😉
(and it certainly has nothing to do with “deserve”)
I guess you’re saying that there might (or ought to) exist some hypothetical system in the future for efficiently allocating resources as a replacement for our existing decentralized system known as economics – a new system that satisfies some desirable socialist qualities while maintaining the efficiency of economics in allocating resources.
Sure, I’ll buy that. However, I don’t believe the efficiency of economics – and its lack of those socialist virtues – derives from a belief in free will. If anything the free will explanation feels more like a post-hoc justification.
The belief in free will only allows for a justification of one person being more or less deserving over another person. Without free will those notions of a person being more or less deserving goes out of the window – so of course the belief in free will plays into this.
I’m willing to work harder if I believe that doing so will result in more comfort for myself and my relatives. Many other people behave that way too. If I happen to be a person who is particularly effective at allocating resources, the consequence under a free market system will be wealth for me and my relatives. Wealth is not a zero-sum game; the system of free market economics is one way to maximize productivity by incentivizing actors who are effective particular economically productive tasks to do what they do best.
My relatives would (and do, in my case) benefit from this, whether they “deserve” it or not. Some people concoct post-hoc explanations that involve free will, but I don’t see how free will (whether we have it or not) has anything to do with it. I agree with your observation that this system results in inequities. Those inequities are the incentives that result in economic productivity.
You posit the existence of a (practical) system that satisfies some nice economic and social properties at the same time. Whether or not such a system exists for actual human beings also has little to do with free will, and I do not believe any analysis grounded in determinism or free will (or the absence of one or the other) would shed any light on the development of such a system.
Yes, I realize that is the psychology of people today. It doesn’t make it a rational psychology…only something we need to (currently) play to to stay economically viable (as suggested in the infographic and text afterward).
Please tell me you are not a free market advocate (let’s not even go there). If you are it is no wonder you are so adament on keeping your “free will” though. 😉
I agree that some capitalism is needed in a world of irrational people who are unconcerned about them benefiting at the expense of others – when they do not deserve that benefit any more.
A lack of free will is one aspect which ties into these bad notions of one person deserving more or less than another. A concern over being rational is another. It isn’t about the development of a system, a mindset shift needs to take place first and foremost. Only then can a different system be put in place. It’s the reason I distinguished between an “ideal” world (not likely to happen anytime soon) and a “more realistic” world in the infographic.
Later.
> Perhaps we can go into a thought experiment. In the thought experiment you get into a Star Trek transporter, which disassembles your molecules and recreates them elsewhere. A problem happens, however, where it recreates your molecules twice on to two different planets. Now that there are two iterations of you, it doesn’t mean that you are “doing otherwise” just because one iteration of you is doing X and the other at the same time is doing Y. It just means that a split causally took place, but the split couldn’t have happened otherise and each iteration of you couldn’t have done otherwise. It is no different than the split of decohered “worlds” for a MWI in regards to “otherwise”.
In this though experiment, if my choices were to go to either Mars or Venus, after the transportation event I will see that I have chosen, say, Mars. But the me that existed before the transportation event also had a possible future in which he ends up on Venus. So in this thought experiment, I could have (indeed will have) done otherwise.
The mental “choice” prior is a different circumstance than the event which couldn’t have been otherwise. If I choose to run and not fall, yet I trip, I’ve done otherwise than what I wanted to do. That doesn’t mean I could have done otherwise than to fall. Likewise, you couldn’t have done otherwise than to be split to Mars and Venus- regardless if you only wanted one of you to go to Mars and not another iteration to Venus. That split was dictated since before you were even born. Your want was irrelevant to what was causally dictated and could not have been otherwise.
The problem with your Star Trek scenario is that I end up in a world where both options (Mars and Venus) have occurred. But in MWI I do not end up in a world where both have occurred. The “me” before the split had two possible future worlds. That is the plain meaning of “many worlds.” In one of them I find myself on Mars. But even though I see myself on Mars afterwards, I can know that the “me” before the split had a possible future on Venus. That is the plain meaning of “could have been otherwise”.
It makes no difference if you split or if entire worlds split, that is the point. Both are causally determined. And the fact that you can or cannot verify your existence on Mars or Venus from the other (and make the claim that it happened or not) is irrelevant. Even if the transporter caused a decoherence event where your Mars self could never detect your Venus self and vice versa – that is irrelevant to the happening being necessitated since big bang.
You couldn’t have done otherwise but to split into two of you, and the worlds could not have done otherwise than to split in a MWI. And both must take place the exact way they do.
Anyway, I think it’s pretty clear…but you don’t seem to “get it” (no offense…it’s a tad tiresome). Otherwise means X and NOT Y (other than Y), not both X AND Y occuring in different spaces, worlds, etc. When both happen, those are the very events that couldn’t have been otherwise. I’ll keep repeating that a MWI is entirely deterministic. Everything that takes place must take place the very way it takes place.
What special role do “humans” have in this analysis? Is a dog just as deserving of wealth as a human? After all, its status as a dog (as opposed to human) was not something under its control.
How would your answer change if we were speaking of semi-intelligent creatures deposited on earth by aliens? Or intelligent computers?
That is actually an interesting question, and goes more into ethics regarding animals than monetary wealth per se which only applies to beings with at least a capacity to barter. I tend to think the IDEAL situation is an equal distribution of wellbeing amongst all creatures with the capacity to experience negative and positive value (aliens or not). Of course what is IDEAL and what can be realistically accomplished (at least currently) are two things entirely (which my infographic denotes that distinction). But let’s put it this way, I’m an animal welfare advocate, and even advocate for such within the wild (e.g. reducing predation, etc.).
Keep in mind that I think “wealth” falls under the umbrella of “well-being”, and it is “well-being” that attempts should be made for equal distribution in an IDEAL world. In a non-ideal world, we have to do the best we can while assessing the consequences of our actions.
Good answer. Unfortunately, it is a slippery slope. If ants can experience pain and pleasure, would each ant have an equal claim to well-being as an anteater? If I program a computer to exhibit “well-being” only when plated in gold, is it entitled to be gold plated?
Then you don’t know what a slippery slope is.
Yes. But we do know that mammals have far more complex central nervous system than ants…so we actually can make assessments here using both neuroscience and behavioral science. And no, I don’t expect anteaters to be concerned over equal well-being distribution any more that I expect a certain type of sociopath to be concerned over equal well-being distribution.
If we build conscious computer programs that can experience negative and positive sensations…then yes….they matter equally. It is illogical to put the human species on a pedestal here.
What does the level of the anteater’s concern (over equal well-being) have to do with its worthiness? How do you suggest we would use neuroscience (for a creature that happens to have neurons) or behavioral science to assess worthiness of comfort? What, exactly, would we be looking for?
You seem to be using the concept of consciousness to distinguish the ant from the computer. Are you suggesting that you believe that ants are conscious? Or that the functional requirement for a computer to deserve comfort is higher than the functional requirement you would deem necessary for an ant to deserve comfort?
> Then you don’t know what a slippery slope is.
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/slippery%20slope
Yup, that’s exactly how I meant it.
It doesn’t. I thought that was what you may have been alluding to, but perhaps not.
The capacity to experience negative or positive states of being (suffering, pleasure, etc)
Given what we know about brains and central nervous systems, it is likely that they have some rudimentary consciousness.
It isn’t about “deserve” or “functionality”…but rather experiential states. The entire idea of “comfort” implies that conscious experience is happening and that it is done so in a way that is experienced negatively or positively. If a computer consciously experiences in this way, yes, it is just as important as any other creature that does.
Then you don’t know how to assess a slippery slope regardless if you know what it means. To claim that I made a slippery slope argument is to claim that I concluded that a slippery slope would take place to lead to a result. Perhaps you meant that you are making a slippery slope argument? That may at least have been a little more accurate. 😉
BTW – I don’t have time right now to continue our longer quantum talk, but rest assured that in the future it will be addressed.
Peace.
> > How do you suggest we would use neuroscience (for a creature that happens to have neurons) or behavioral science to assess worthiness of comfort? What, exactly, would we be looking for?
> The capacity to experience negative or positive states of being (suffering, pleasure, etc)
Is neuroscience capable of placing objective value judgments (suffering vs pleasure) on its observations?
Would creatures (such as paramecia) that exhibit symptoms of suffering and pleasure in their behavior also have an equal claim to well-being, even in the absence of neurons?
Does the claim to well-being include the right to *exist* (i.e. experience either suffering or pleasure at all)?
Psychologists have strong evidence that people experience happiness by making psychologically relative comparisons, either to their own past or their neighbors. For example, people are generally happier when their salary is increasing, or when they are better rewarded than their coworkers. For some people this effect is much stronger. Do such people deserve the extra share of wealth required for them to feel equally happy?
> The entire idea of “comfort” implies that conscious experience is happening and that it is done so in a way that is experienced negatively or positively. If a computer consciously experiences in this way, yes, it is just as important as any other creature that does.
I don’t understand how you suggest we would judge what another object experiences or whether it is conscious.
> To claim that I made a slippery slope argument is to claim that I concluded that a slippery slope would take place to lead to a result.
I wasn’t claiming you made a slippery slope argument. I was using that term in the ordinary sense as described in an English dictionary; see the entries in corresponding to the Oxford Dictionaries, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Collins English Dictionary, Macmillan Dictionary, or Wiktionary.
> BTW – I don’t have time right now to continue our longer quantum talk, but rest assured that in the future it will be addressed.
No hurry. However, presuming you intend to allow my response, please release it from the moderation queue.
These can be inferred through a number of fields. Neuroscience and behavioral science are two specific ones. Yes, there is a line where it is harder to tell, for example, certain types of shellfish feeling pain is controversial given their very rudimentary systems lacking certain receptors and lack of behavior. But our methodologies are improving in many of these regards exponentially.
We have no evidence that a single cell organism has consciousness that is of any concern here, just as there is no real evidence of plants.
Different philosophical topic which doesn’t have to do with well-being unless the threat of non-existence causes a well-being deprivation.
Yes, we get the fact that irrational psychologies need to be played to. This is why there is a distinction between an idealistic world, and a “more realistic” world. For ethics there needs to be a balancing act that is played as long as those irrational psychologies exist.
These issues are all being worked on (e.g. how to detect computer consciousness, etc).
Ah, well then I misinterpreted your “Good answer. Unfortunately, it is a slippery slope.” remark to be pointing to what I said rather than the slippery slope you think it leads to.
I do not release misinformation from my moderation queue until that misinformation can be addressed in full. If you want to post it elsewhere in the meantime feel free to. As soon as I address the misinformation inherent in it it will be released.
Also, lets reduce down this convo to a single point or two as well …as all of these tangents will lead to the same result (I don’t have the endless time you seem to). Thanks.
It seems to me that epistemic possibility is more than considering options within the bounds of limited knowledge but also the ability to simulate the consequences of particular actions “if” one were to do them. The reality of these “options” are not some “unactualized” state of affairs that one can argue is ruled out by the actual one. The reality exists in their role in the decision making process, a brain state that makes the difference between beings that, as a matter of fact, consider the option and the being that is incapable (and thus not “having” that option at all) .
I certainly agree that the epistemic version of the word “possibility” implies recognition of modal considerations (e.g. if I do such and such, such consequence will follow). But these “options” are epistemic non-the-less.The only ontological (real) possibility is the one that all of the epistemic considerations ultimately weight to. It’s the important distinction between epistemic “options” that are all taken into consideration and pitted against each other, and the ontic reality that ensues from such a causal process taking place the way it must.
This is why I hold strong to the fact that conscious thoughts are part of the causal process that leads to our decisions, rather than the often fatalistic notion that they are not.
Good thoughts. Thanks for stopping by Matthew!
But wait a minute, I think you have a very limited view of what it means for an option to “exist” that doesn’t hold true to what we actually mean by “could have done otherwise”. You seem to think that a commitment to causal closure, and thus determinism, effectively eliminates the existence of free will and the availability of options. However, even if possibilities are an epistemic notion, they exist regardless of whether prior causes fail actualize them or not. This is because the application of existential quantification is not made on that particular basis in an ordinary sense since it is not based on a causal criteria, but a perceptual one. This substantiates the intuition that provokes what is unfairly called an “illusion” on the false premise that it is an implicit commitment to contracausal or libertarian free will.
However, there is a difference between a wind up doll and a person that can consider options. I think we can positively point out the capacity to consider options that makes us different from an automaton. I think we can positively point out that the unavailability of one option, or being misinformed about the “existence” of an option, does make a difference in behavior. Further, having acknowledged that there are multiple options, as a matter of perception or rational thought, and choosing one must substantiate what is meant by “could’ve done otherwise”. Only when people are provoked to make their intuition explicit (which leads into difficulty in interpreting experimental results on intuitions) or when hard determinist insists on what people “really mean” when they say this is when we feel legitimized in calling something an illusion.
It also seems to me that the referent for what one “could have done otherwise” is what you call “epistemic possibility”. Why insist that Compatibilism needs more to substantiate the intuition of free will than the deterministic mechanism of evaluating options?
Hi Matthew. Could have done otherwise implies that if we were to bring time back to prior to the decision, you could have made a different decision. The reason it isn’t epistemic is that it is a hindsight consideration in which we know what took place. For example, if I grabbed a Pepsi rather than a rootbeer and drank it down, to say that I “could have done otherwise” implies that, if I brought us back to right before I make the decision of Pepsi, I “could have” chosen rootbeer instead. This is ontic because, given determinism, we already know the variables existed which would lead me to Pepsi over rootbeer (which include the epistemic considerations of both). In an entirely causal universe, I never “could have” chosen rootbeer.
Where we agree, is in the assessment that “there is a difference between a wind up doll and a person that can consider options”. One makes conscious deliberations, the other does not. But that does not imply that those deliberations were any more free. If you want to shift the definition of free will to something other than provided here, that is fine.
The free will I’m concerned about is the definition I provide, and for various reasons. If we don’t have that type of free will ability, a whole slew of philosophical ideas need to change.
The difficulty I’m having with you’re understanding of “could have done otherwise” is that, in any ordinary sense, we’re not talking about rewinding the universe to it’s initial conditions and changing them. We’re only talking about the fact that multiple options were acknowledged and played a role in our decision making such that, if we were unaware of the prior options, than we couldn’t make the claim. You’re definition “The ability to choose between more than one viable option or action, in which that choice was up to the chooser.” fits right with that but it seems to me that you think that implicit in this sort of claim are philosophical commitments about the nature of causality in relation to their actions which would only be a redefinition on your part.
For that “the ability to choose between more than one viable option or action” definition, the point is that all of those options are not really ontologically possible (viable) in a causal universe. Only one option dictated by the entire causal line is and ever was since the big bang. The epistemic considerations someone makes are just a part of that causal process. Given determinism, there is no real “alternate” possibility or “could have done otherwise” consideration. The epistemic lack of knowledge over the variables does not comport to ontic possibilities. They stay entirely epistemic (we lack knowledge over them).
Viability is never judged on the basis of prior causes and actual outcomes. In a game of chess, if I make a losing move and told that I “could have moved there instead of there”, we are talking about the what the rules of the game allowed me to do at that particular stage in the game, not causal conditions. Similarly, there’s good sense in saying that at a particular point in the past, an option was available to me. Of coarse I could have be wrong, but what proves me wrong are not what necessarily follows from initial conditions. If I think I could have driven instead of biked, being wrong would depend on whether there was something that would have prevented me from driving like a broken car. However, if I’m well informed that my car isn’t broken, then the viability is still valid whether or not I drive my car.
Colloquially one can say that you “could have moved there instead of there” and people would understand that it simply means you made a mistake (and not take you literally). When talking about reality, however, you simply could not have moved there instead of there (given determinism). And for the topic of free will it is that “reality” that holds all of the weight. For the free will debate, it is important that one does not conflate the epistemic with the ontic.
The part about free will being “an illusion” in a causal universe simply means that your perception that it was “viable” even if you do not drive the car is also an “illusion”. It simply stems from you not having access to all of the variables that will lead you to not drive the car. Free will is an ontic ability (people think free will “exists”), so it is important not to mix the epistemic with the ontic. This link could help:
Existence Conflated with Knowledge and the Free Will Debate
Later. 🙂
What I’m contesting is what counts as viable since I’m denying your premise that “existence” claims can only be narrowly applied to the causal-physical universe. You’re failing to acknowledge the criteria people actually use to judge that something “exists” or that something is “viable” which is why you think the availability of viable options is refuted on the bases of perfect knowledge of prior causes and actual outcomes. You’re insisting your own views on what people “really mean” when they say they have free will by calling it an “ontic ability” and then refuting it with the causal universe which frankly has nothing to do with how we make “could have, would have, etc.” statements.
Again, if you want to define free will as some epistemic idea of the process that takes place in people’s minds, such is irrelevant to the free will ability that is of concern for so many other topics, which is a ACTUAL ability to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise.
See below for your other comments.
“Colloquially one can say that you “could have moved there instead of there” and people would understand that it simply means you made a mistake (and not take you literally).”
Actually no. In order for it to make sense to say I “made a mistake”, there needs to have been a correct move to make prior to my mistake. If I made a forced move, then a correct move was not available and that particular move cannot be a mistake. “Could have moved there” is not a judgment based on minute brain states, but on what moves are allowed at a particular stage in the game. In other words, there is a fact of the matter about what I can and cannot do, literally.
On the car example:
“The part about free will being “an illusion” in a causal universe simply means that your perception that it was “viable” even if you do not drive the car is also an “illusion”. It simply stems from you not having access to all of the variables that will lead you to not drive the car.”
This all depends on why I think an option is viable. One, I’m perfectly capable of driving and, two, if my car isn’t broken, then judgment “I could have drove” is allowable. The causal mechanism of the decision making process is not being referred here since decision making is not a prediction about what will happen in the future based on initial conditions. Thus, once I make the choice, I don’t judge that “I could have drove”, I’m not saying “If I rewind the universe and change the initial conditions I would have drove”. I’m saying that at a particular time, driving and biking was available JUST BY VIRTUE of having functioning vehicles and my ability to do so, and I chose to bike.
Again, if you want to define free will as some epistemic idea of the process that takes place in people’s minds, such is irrelevant to the free will ability that is of concern for so many other topics, which is a ACTUAL ability to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise.
This is not correct. You making a mistake doesn’t mean that you literally “could have” not made the mistake. You saying 2+2=5 and thinking that it is correct at the time does not imply that you could have said or thought differently, event though 2+2 does not equal 5.
No, there is a fact of the matter of what would have been the better move, regardless of the fact that you could not have made it at that time. It’s important not to confuse these two.
You making the judgement doesn’t in fact make the judgment a correct analysis if A) you are postulating a deterministic universe, and B) you did not drive the car. Given determinism, you not driving the car was entirely dictated by the causality that preceded the event, even if you thought at the time that you could drive the car, or after that you could have.
And I’m saying that, given determinism, the assessment that it was ACTUALLY available is an incorrect assessment, at least if you apply logic to it. The only way you “could have” in actuality “drive” was if some acausal event that you had no control over changed the trajectory of events to such (an indeterministic universe).
Given determinism, your epistemic thinking that the other options were viable or that you could do otherwise (or could have done otherwise), is just that, epistemic only. It isn’t anything “real”. And for this topic, that is what is important for so many other philosophical issues.
The reason why your categories of “ontic” and “epistemic” are so misleading because they do not apply to how language works when it comes to existence claims. “Actual”, “literal”, exists”, etc. depend on situations criteria for correct application, none of them being causal or material. You keep emphasizing “real”, “actual”, and “literal” without ever taking into consideration how terms like this are used. If we disagree here, then its not fair to keep returning to your original criticism.
Given your commentary on the chess example:
“This is not correct. You making a mistake doesn’t mean that you literally “could have” not made the mistake. You saying 2+2=5 and thinking that it is correct at the time does not imply that you could have said or thought differently, event though 2+2 does not equal 5.”
We’re not talking about mathematics but a turn-based game of choice. In order for a move to have been available to me depend on the rules and powers allotted to the pieces. A mistake is not a “falsehood” like “2 +2 = 5” since it still allowed according to the game. Its considered a mistake because it lead me to losing. If there was a winning move “I could have made”, it is only possible to point that out by virtue of the prior position and the particular powers allotted to a piece (I can move here or there). Yes, it is a fact of the matter based solely on those considerations. Whether I actually make the choice or not does not prevent this from being the case since ACTUALLY in this sense is a description of what happened in a historical sense, which is categorically different from availabilities allotted by the rules. To judge that it is incorrect to say one “could have” made a certain given historical fact is a category mistake.
I’m sorry, but the term “causal” addresses events that are ontic (real, actual, literal). The situation criteria is equally as caused and causal.
This is irrelevant. If there was a better move, it doesn’t imply you could have, at that time, done it.
Someone asserting a falsehood is “allowed”, even though the assertion is still false.
I’m sorry, but it isn’t by that virtue. The assessment that you “could have made” it is not a literal assessment, it’s just a colloquialism that simply means “there was a better move, but you didn’t take it”. It doesn’t imply that you, in actuality, could have made the better move. And if it does imply this in your usage, then that implication is just incorrect (mistaken) given determinism…as much as 2+2=5 is incorrect.
“Again, if you want to define free will as some epistemic idea of the process that takes place in people’s minds, such is irrelevant to the free will ability that is of concern for so many other topics, which is a ACTUAL ability to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise.”
Let me make this clear: It is a myth to say that the concept of free will throughout the history of philosophy has always (or for the most part) been libertarian free will. It is a myth to say that ordinary intuitions concerning free will are all contra-causal/libertarian free will. Also, compatibilism is relevant to the many other philosophical topics as a guide as to how to sort through them and think about them.
So Compatibilists are often charged with changing the subject. But who’s changing the subject here?
Where did I say this (even though compatibilism is a more recent part of the historical debate that redefines). What I said was, and let me make this perfectly clear: I have clearly and sufficiently defined what it is that I am addressing when I use the term “free will”, and why it is that I am using that particular definition, and what it means that we do not have that particular free will ability that I have defined. If you want to talk about an entirely different semantic, then you aren’t addressing the free will that I am – and in turn re-enacting one of the 5 strawman fallacies I’ve displayed here:
5 Straw-man Fallacies by Compatibilists (When Addressing Free Will Skeptics)
Another strawman. I did not say this. In fact, studies confirm that layperson intuitions contain both libertarian notions of free will and the type of compatibilistic notions of free will that are logically incoherent.
Compatibilism also, for the most part, bypasses the important issues about not having the type of free will that I have defined. In this way it allows these bad ideas to go unchallenged….in particular, the bad intuitions of most laypeople.
Free Will Compatibilism vs. Skepticism – SHOWDOWN!
All of that being said, if you want to be a compatibilist, be a compatibilist. It certainly is more consistent than being an advocate for libertarian free will. Just don’t neglect what it means that we don’t have the other semantic of free will that the hard incompatibilist is suggesting. That is all.
“I’m sorry, but the term “causal” addresses events that are ontic (real, actual, literal). The situation criteria is equally as caused and causal.”
Although I was not addressing the term “causal”, it is important that the claim here was that criteria determine the meaning of the statements of causality, possibility, existence, actuality, etc. not the other way around. Criteria being caused themselves don’t really take away from this point.
Returning to the chess example: “Someone asserting a falsehood is “allowed”, even though the assertion is still false.”
Allowable by the rules. 2 + 2 = 5 violates a rule and is false because of it. A mistake in chess is allowable by a rule, however a “wrong” move is something like moving a knight as if it were a queen, which is not allowed. I’m not asserting a falsehood when I say “you could have moved here” when my criteria for saying so depends on the availability of moves given a certain position. The claim is true solely by virtue of this. The claim that I’m making is that there are rules for proper usage of certain claims such as “Its true that he could have moved here” is not true because they conceive of ontic possibilities of the kind you talk about. You seem to provide an extra requirement of the fact that “an option must be actualized” to substantiate the statement.
“This is irrelevant. If there was a better move, it doesn’t imply you could have, at that time, done it.”
Again, returning to your original criticism doesn’t help you here since I’m refuting what is MEANT by saying “I could have went there rather than here.” The criteria for this being a true statement are not the ones you keep insisting on.
You seem to agree with me here when it comes to what “could have” means:
“I’m sorry, but it isn’t by that virtue. The assessment that you “could have made” it is not a literal assessment, it’s just a colloquialism that simply means “there was a better move, but you didn’t take it”. ”
What more is there for an option to be available? You’re confused as to the nature of literal and non-literal statements. But then again, in the philosophy of language and linguistics, it’s a whole complicated controversy. Still, you wouldn’t have to know any of this to understand that non-literal statements like “Love is a journey” is nothing like “could have done otherwise.” The word “could have” does not reduce down to a literal statement about what “did” or “does” happen. However, “could have” statements can be literal statements (in the traditional sense) for reasons other than what happens historically. “Could have” has a very specific use as a past tense conditional that is not amenable to your “ontic” “epistemic” distinctions (in fact this distinction is asserted without any justification). “Literal” here means the proper functioning of the word which is partially a matter of convention, not a direct mapping on to causal-physical reality.
“Where did I say this (even though compatibilism is a more recent part of the historical debate that redefines). What I said was, and let me make this perfectly clear: I have clearly and sufficiently defined what it is that I am addressing when I use the term “free will”, and why it is that I am using that particular definition, and what it means that we do not have that particular free will ability that I have defined.”
Well I didn’t say YOU made this claim. The criticism is of your motivations for defining it as such and how relavent philosophical history and human intuitions are. By the way, compatibilism has existed for a long time and there are numerous contradicting studies on intuitions that have interpretive and methodological issues that make it hard to say that the intuition maps on to what the philosopher means by libertarian free will. Its just not quite settled.
But the thing is, the definition YOU GAVE, is being directly criticized. “The ability to choose between more than one viable option or action, in which that choice was up to the chooser.” One, we disagree about what it means to say that an option “exists” and what it means to say that it’s “viable”. Then you take “existence” and “viability” to mean something different from the actual use of the word, which you think is implicit in this definition. Its simply not, and you would have to define it further as an implicit belief in multiple “ontic possibilities”. We further disagree about what it would mean for a choice to be “up to you.”. However, we don’t need to believe in a self “as an entity” in order to make sense of what was “up to you”. All you have to do is look at the grammar.
One more thing,
There is no different semantics as long as we use the same language. It’s matters whether your way of conceiving of semantics is true or false in order to make your definitions valid.
When saying that the possibility “exists” that is a statement on it being “ontic”. Your comment implies that you didn’t really read or understand any of the above article….which explicitly denotes the difference between epistemic possibility and “real” or ontic possibility. And the words “I could have done otherwise” explicitly mean that, guess what? You “could have DONE otherwise”. That it was really possible for you to have done the other thing rather than just a thought that couldn’t have been actualized. It is an abuse of language to think this could mean something else because of some colloquial usage of “could have moved there” which is actually a misuse of language that would be more accurately informed by “it would have been better if you had moved there” which is what is really meant by the quick shorthand (as “could have moved there” is literally INCORRECT in the English language given determinism).
The very point of the article above is to display how these incorrect epistemic usages of language lead to incorrect ontological ideas about the other options being “real possibilities” or “viable” or “able to be actualized”.
The fact of the matter is, for determinism only one option is a “viable” (meaning really possible) option, the others are wholly and entirely epistemic. The very point of this post is to point out the distinction between the two, and why they should not be confused and conflated. If it was the case that the differing usages were not conflated it wouldn’t be a problem. But the fact is, most laypeople think people literally could have done, of their own accord, otherwise. That they could have actualized the different outcome. That all possibilities before them are REAL, ONTOLOGICAL possibilities that can be actualized.
And that is the problem. You seem to want to pretend that people only see these words in an epistemic or colloquialistic sense, but this is anything but the case. Those very epistemic and colloquial usages translate TO their ontic assessments about reality, making their ontic assessments incorrect.
The facts are: we could not have, of our own accord, DONE otherwise (“DONE” implying an ONTIC action that takes place), and we can not CHOOSE between more than one really possible (viable) option in which that is “up to us” (“CHOOSE” implying an ONTIC action that takes place). The meanings of these words are not trumped by the abuse of language for quick-talk.
Given determinism, if I chose rootbeer, I could not have chosen pepsi instead. The statement “you could have chosen pepsi” is incorrect (in English) – plain and simple. If someone happens to mean something other than what the language refers to, the very problem is that incorrect usage often translates to their ideas about the real thing. It is a fact that most laypeople think, given an entirely deterministic scenario, that if someone found a wallet and didn’t return it, they LITERALLY could have returned the wallet (that the owner getting their wallet back could have been actualized). This is the problem.
“it would have been better if you had moved there”
What if moving there puts you in check? Then you couldn’t EVER move there and therefore it would make no sense to say that. Saying that it would have been better to move “here” instead of “there” presupposes that the move had to have been available. However, what constitutes this “availability” is where you and I disagree since, for you, if it is never actually actualized, then it fails to be true that it ever was available.
Case in point: The “truth” of determinism says nothing about what constitutes a misuse of language unless you also have an account of language which compliments your view. But you don’t, you just assert that literally means “actualized”, “real”, “causal”, “physical”. But not all of the things that we refer to are any of those things. And, I’ll double down here, just because the things that we refer to aren’t actualized in history or material constitution, which is a product of your very narrow ontology, does not mean they translate into that AT ALL.
“Could have gone there” would be a misuse ONLY if going there violates the rules, not because I made another choice in actuality. It doesn’t simply translate as to what have been a better move, although this statement itself acknowledges the existence of the move. The fact is, you’re not the sole arbiter of what constitutes a misuse in language. It seems that all of your claims ignore the vast literature on meaning, grammar, figurative, literal, etc. that is subject of so much controversy that I’m surprised that you think that “could have” statements translate into “ontic” or literal statements. I don’t think that’s clear to you or anybody.
Ontology is also something philosophers disagree about that it is not clear whether physicalism or determinism eliminates the existence of options, abstract entities, colors, consciousness, etc. In face, ontology is disputably dependent on language such that any application of “is” may refer to something non-physical irreducibly.
Bottom line, determinism as you articulate it or as usually understood, does not necessarily say a thing about any of these things.
Irrelevant, as your wordage doesn’t work for that situation either.
To clarify, given we assume determinism, it fails to be true that it was ever available. For indeterminism it becomes available (just not up to us).
Case in point: The “truth” of determinism says nothing about what constitutes a misuse of language unless you also have an account of language which compliments your view. But you don’t, you just assert that literally means “actualized”, “real”, “causal”, “physical”. But not all of the things that we refer to are any of those things.
Perhaps we need to clarify how the word “determinism” is used: “Determinism” and “Indeterminism” for the Free Will Debate
And every event that takes place is either causal or not. That includes your thinking, deliberating, and thought processing.
Look, those things are simply a product of your brain. They exist as thoughts, and those thoughts causally lead to actions. All of the deliberation you do between different chess moves causally translate to the decision you make.
That is simply not true, at least if you care about language. “Could have gone there” when referring to something you did means you literally “could have gone there” in actuality instead of the thing you just did. Sorry, but this is English.
What I said was, that “could have gone there” is wrong and if someone wanted to tell someone of a move that would have been better (or any other thing like that), it shouldn’t be used in place of it if someone cares about talking correctly.
Words have meanings. “Could” implies that one has the ability. “Done” or “do” implies that there is an actual ACTION (ONTIC!!). Otherwise implies other than a different action. Could have done otherwise simply cannot be mistaken for an epistemic usage in English. If you want to deconstruct language so nothing can ever be said about anything, then that is a totally different problem. But some words are sufficiently clear.
Again, the problem is when the unclear epistemic usages get shifted to ontic assessments. The fact of the matter is, these words ARE clear, they are just misused colloquially (just as a double negative is a misuse). I don’t care so much that people do this, what I care about is when doing so allows them to contrive incorrect ONTIC assessments as well. And for the free will debate, we are addressing an ontic ability….and what it means that noone HAS that ontic ability.
Bottom line, determinism doesn’t need to say anything about epistemic thoughts that are mistaken or poorly used. What it has a say about is someones ONTIC abilities to have ACTUALLY done otherwise (in reality). And bottom line is that this is what is important for the topic of free will and for so many other topics that attach to it.
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Look – When given an entirely deterministic scenario (where a computer can predict all future events), laypeople are told that in the scenario a man named Jeremy robbed a bank (and the computer predicted it – as it is never wrong given the deterministic variables). When asked whether or not Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank the large majority still said yes, Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank.
There is no way to give this an epistemic twist. The act of robbing the bank is an ontic happening, and for Jeremy not to have robbed the bank, it would have had to been the case that he physically did not go into the bank and rob it. Sorry, you cannot get out of this with a play on words. There are no words that could mean some epistemic contrivance here.
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Anyway, I think our convo has reached the point of redundancy and is no longer productive. It happens – and the text in these comments could not have been otherwise given determinism (even if you incorrectly say that the conversation could have went differently – you’d simply be wrong on that). 😉
I’m not deconstructing language at all but describing how its actually used and telling you what’s really meant. I challenges the idea that literal claims are claims about ontology, not to change the subject, but to point out that this is not even a traditional understanding of literal even though our understanding the literal-non-literal distinction has changed quite a bit. But you don’t refute the claim, you just insist on your own way of looking at language as if it is given.
By the way, its not true that Compatibilism is a recent position, it has been apart of the conversation since the beginning.
You are mistaken on how it is “actually used”.
I will reiterate:
When given an entirely deterministic scenario (where a computer can predict all future events), laypeople are told that in the scenario a man named Jeremy robbed a bank (and the computer predicted it – as it is never wrong given the deterministic variables). When asked whether or not Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank the large majority still said yes, Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank.
There is no way to give this your “twist of language”. The act of robbing the bank is an ontic happening, and for Jeremy not to have robbed the bank, it would have had to been the case that he physically did not go into the bank and rob it. Sorry, you cannot get out of this with a play on words. There are no words that could mean some epistemic contrivance here.
What else could this mean other than Jeremy literally could have not walked into the bank and robbed it??
And I meant compatibilism wasn’t popularized until recently. Again, I have no qualms with compatibilists until they ignore what it means that we don’t have the free will that hard incompatibilists are referring to (the semantic that actually addresses the above layperson intuitions).
I’m challenging the relation between literal and the ontic/actual. As I’ve said before, the even the traditional understanding of “literal” doesn’t require this but you don’t ever address this point. Instead, you say that I’m twisting words without justification.
Doesn’t it strike you as odd that “He could have not robbed the bank” makes sense to the people in that experiment? You even say they contradict themselves because the definition they use is in line with yours. But as I’ve shown above, it’s still subject to interpretation.
“A bishop can move diagonally left or right” IS LITERAL and true by virtue of the rules of chess and the position of the pieces. You want it to refer to something else. This is THE proper use of the word “can”, it doesn’t reduce to ontic consideration but made in virtue of ontic considerations.
Don’t you think that philosphy and scientific research on literal language is relevant here? You’re not even goin by dictionary definition I’m afraid.
The example that I provided cannot be shifted to a non-ontological claim. It is “literal” in the sense that the ontic addressing of a choice to rob the bank does not shift to the epistemic for the answer of the question.
Please provide what interpretation you are referring to for THAT example.
Context is everything. I have no doubt that the word “can” is ambigiously used to express epistemic modal accounts as well as ontic assessments. In fact that, I think, is a part of the problem that causes people to conflate the two. That being said I think a btter way to express rules is “the bishop moves either diagonally left or diagonally right”, but yes, colloquil language is abound.
Please provide which word I’m not going by the “dictionary definition” for. In context of an ontological action (a “doing”)…”could have done otherwise” cannot mean anything but the different ontological “doing” that was a “real possibility”. The fact that you can take one word out of context, change it to it’s present tense (can), and then give a modal example of that is irrelevant to how words are used in the context that they are in.
It is a play of language. I’m saying, if asked whether or not Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank given determinism, the answer simply cannot be something referring to a non-literal non-ontic modal “rule of a game”. It is addressing a specific event that took place in the past, and asking if that specific event could have not taken pace. This is the ONLY way to interpret the language, and to pretend it isn’t based on an out of context use of a changed word is an abuse of language.
Later.
So in “Common Intuitions about Free Will (and how it needs to be defined)” you claim that although most people would say that one “could have done otherwise”, this doesn’t make them compatibilists. According to you they would be wrong nonetheless because their own definition of free will contradicts determinism So lets assume that they take your definition of it. “The ability to choose between more than one viable option or action, in which that choice was up to the chooser.”
It pains me to say, as I have said before, “option”, “viability”, and “up to the chooser” don’t refer what you want them to refer to in any standard sense. The criteria for there being an “viable option” and “being up to someone” are not the one you state. What would make someone wrong about viability is not an actual outcome or physical object, but a set of considerations separate from that. If I could have drove instead of walked, that is true only if my car isn’t broken. So the condition for viability depends on the actual state of the car and my actual ability to walk, not the fact that I’ve actually walked instead,
So a compatibilists can maintain your definition without changing the semantics, since these ARE the semantics. However, you insist what I’m doing is subject to wordplay and changing the subject. But you do nothing to prove this but reiterate your position as given. You go further to say that free will, in the compatibilist sense, is not relevant to the philosophical topics at hand. This isn’t true since the misunderstanding about what is meant creates those problems in the first place and forces some to commit to hard determinism. In this way, your position is self-affirming.
Take this for instance: “the bishop moves either diagonally left or diagonally right” Notice that either doesn’t help you here. “Either” has multiple usages, however in the sense of the sentence above, “either” admits of options and viability. In fact, “either..or” statements always connect two choices or possibilities. Don’t take my word for it, look it up.
“Context is everything. I have no doubt that the word “can” is ambigiously used to express epistemic modal accounts as well as ontic assessments.” NO DOUBT? Why is this? “Can” is very straightforward in the chess context and “I can walk or drive”. You keep reiterating “in reality”, “in actuality”, and then make the claim “could have gone here” is an epistemic claim (which it is not) conflated with an ontological claim. This is because, as I’ve said, they don’t mean what you want them to mean. Not only that, they express what they mean properly, how most people mean it, have meant it, from the dawn of the usage of modal statements.
“Please provide which word I’m not going by the “dictionary definition” for. In context of an ontological action (a “doing”)…”could have done otherwise” cannot mean anything but the different ontological “doing” that was a “real possibility”. ” I’m asking you to prove that “could have done otherwise” cannot refer to anything but an “actual” outcome, what’s “actually” done. You don’t ever do this! You just keep insisting that this isn’t English. “I could have drove instead of walked” doesn’t refer to some material unactualized state of affairs, but just the abilities of the person and the functionality of the car. If it’s not functional, then it’s not an available option. I say that this is all that’s required, you say no without a shred of evidence.
By the why, I was talking about the definition of literal.
“He can either walk or drive” is a literal statement. Literal doesn’t mean “maps onto causal-physical reality”. It means formal, according to proper meanings, in their exact sense, etc. But if we disagree about what’s proper, exact, or formal then you will fail to see why I say that the above is a literal statement. It just means that they refer to there actual meanings, unlike “love is a journey”. Now this has changed given research, so its not authoritative. However, neither considerations support your view of language.
I don’t think you have read the article properly. I said they ARE compatibilists, just NOT the compatibilists that philosophical compatibilism promotes. Most philosophical compatiblists, when pressed, would say that someone could not do otherwise given determinism.
First, I define these words explicitely. For example: “They think all of the options in which they choose from are viable options. That each of these options have real possibility. Not only that, but they think the choice of the option was “up to them”.” – https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/terms/free-will/
This is pretty explicit.
Second, my usage is the “standard sense”, but either way that doesn’t matter as I explain how I’m using these words. In fact, I have an entire chapter devoted just for that so no ambiguity can happen.
This is the mistake I’m talking about. It isn’t simply true if your car isn’t broken. For determinism, the entire state of the universe would have to be different for you to have driven instead of walked, which is impossible with the causal variables at the time. You could NOT have driven (rather than drove) instead of walked. Driving was never a “viable” option. It was never a “real possibility”.
No, they seriously cannot. And no compatibilist would. This is why the “principle of alternate possibilities” is addressed by both incompatibilists and compatibilists. Because they both agree that, given determinism, that those alternate possibilities do not exist.
No, your position is wordplay. My comments show why…and this isn’t just “my position”. It’s actually the position of most philosophical compatibilists as well. This is why they don’t define free will like this.
Philosophical compatibilist notions of free will avoid the fact that, given determinism, there are no alternate possibilities. Rather, they confine their semantic to abilities people do possess, at the expense of confusing laypeople who actually think those alternate possibilities exist.
They only admit to epistemic possibility, not ontic. And if they did admit to ontic, and thought the world was deterministic, it would be simply incorrect. But again, this is wordplay, as that sentence in a rulebook is only addressing rules and not a single action that someone makes. For a single action, either causality leads a person to move the bishop diagonally left, or causality is different and they move it right, etc. But given the causality that exists, both options were not “viable”…only one was. The other was purely epistemic. Your “either…or” is yet another word contrivance. Again, I never said modal assessments were not possible.
Again, you miss the entire point of the above article. “I can walk or drive” is epistemic. Both are not really possible, but you don’t KNOW what one is so you say that. After you have walked, however, you couldn’t HAVE walked or driven (in a deterministic universe). And to say that you “could have driven” is entirely wrong. There is no way around this, and absolutely no serious language reinterpretation of “could have driven” that can bend to something other than an ontic assessment of you behind a steering wheel.
If it isn’t an epistemic claim (or a poorly worded sentence), then the idea that you “could have gone there” (given determinism) is simply wrong. You couldn’t have gone there. Going there was an impossibility.
The onus is on you to show how “he could have chosen to not rob the bank” can be anything but him “actually choosing not to rob the bank”. You are the one who is shifting the language around to your liking rather than addressing “could have done otherwise”…which explicitly denotes an objective action of “doing” after the fact of an action that was already “done”, with that doing being something “other than” what was “done”. You keep saying things like “without a shred of evidence” when I’ve explained fully how what you are saying is wrong.
You miss the point that, if the universe is entirely causal, that becomes no longer literal. Rather it becomes just a figure of speech, but doesn’t mean that someone could literally either walk or drive. The fact that people are not aware of this is part of the very problem. Believing it to be literal, and it actually being literal are not the same thing.
Right now, you have the burden of proof.
But I do not want you to keep reiterating the same thing, so let’s scratch the board and address the study only since you read some of the other article: Common Intuitions about Free Will (and how it needs to be defined)
The very reason those studies address “could have done otherwise” notions is because most sensible people know what this actually means for the topic of free will. I will ask you the same question posed in the study:
Scenario: Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25, 2150 AD, 20 years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195. As always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195.
Imagining the scenario were actual— could Jeremy have chosen not to rob the bank?
Answer the question, and then give the reason for your answer.
^ Please only respond to this one question, as this convo is too bloated as is. Let’s get to the nitty-gritty rather than the unfocused convo we currently have. (we’ll assume you disagree for the other stuff without the need for a constant long and tiresome thread)
*Could Jeremy have chosen not to rob the bank?
You know the answer already know my answer and my reasons. But I’ll do it in a slightly different way. The answer is, he definitely could have not robbed the bank given a certain set of considerations. However, for the sake of argument, we’ll assume that he’s not being coerced (in other words, he’s not being forced to do it because his mother his tied up somewhere). So, he’s just a bad man with no excuses. He still could have done otherwise.
Reasons: First, taking initial conditions exactly as they are, the simulation of the outcome will always match the true outcome. There’s no disagreement here. However, people who say “could have done otherwise” don’t take this in consideration and, most importantly, IS NOT substantiated by virtue of initial conditions. Therefore, it doesn’t mean they’re wrong when they say this simply because they fail to see the full consequences of their own commitments because their commitments aren’t what you say they are. Whats most important is the proper grammar of could have, would have, if..then, etc. So, “can”, in the relevant sense, depends on resources (anyone with a gun can rob a bank), ability (he’s not paralyzed from the waist down), and the logical consequences of his behavior (pointing a gun affords the offering of money). It’s not physically impossible for a person that has all it takes to rob a bank not to rob a bank. This is all that’s needed. Its not that he’s incapable of considering not robbing a bank. Maybe he considered it and chose otherwise. Or, he never considers it since he’s intrinsically bad. So why would he even think about it? However, if you asked him, after the fact, if not robbing a bank was an impossible thing for him (an odd question I know but then again, I’m operating under the bounds of your hypothetical) I doubt he would say “Hm, I never thought about that.” as if he had insufficient knowledge about his options which doesn’t require that he takes any of them seriously. Likewise, a serial murderer will never go “I’ve never thought of not murdering”. Even if he never considers it, it will never be unthinkable. Ability and potentiality are never judged on these considerations.
Moreover, he may have been raised wrong, or he’s poor, the job market’s bad, and so on. But freedom doesn’t imply that there aren’t constraints such that anyone can do anything at any particular time.
—Submitted on 2016/01/10 at 12:49 am—
Whats so upsetting here is that the scenario in the study has nothing to do with the fundamental issues raised. That’s why you’re not really getting to the nitty gritty since the answers depend on my above arguments. So if we disagree about these issues, then to bring up my answer to the scenario is senseless. But if your uncharitable about the other issues your not going to be charitable to my answer.
A good example:
“I don’t think you have read the article properly. I said they ARE compatibilists, just NOT the compatibilists that philosophical compatibilism promotes. Most philosophical compatiblists, when pressed, would say that someone could not do otherwise given determinism.”
But when I say that you disqualify them from being compatibilistst, could this not mean the very clarification you provide? Not compatibilist in the philosophical sense? Your hair splitting didn’t take from my point in the least bit. Also, most philosophers are compatibilists, and not every compatibilists rejects the “principle of alternative possibilities”. To say that most of them, when pressed, say someone really could not have done otherwise”, is not demonstrated. What polls of philosophers say this? How many out of all of them? Just like many of the things you say about compatibilism, you assert it without any proof. So when I say that their views are compatible with your definition, this is true for a good number of them.
Final point, the only challenge that has actually mattered in the conversation is your understanding of meaning and language. I gave you the definition of literal but you STILL think that determinism changes “could have done otherwise” into a figurative statement. But you gloss right over that as if it does. What, “you miss the point that, if the universe is entirely causal, that becomes no longer literal.” NO, THAT’S EXACTLY WHAT I’M REFUTING. Literal doesn’t mean what you want to mean. But you keep thinking this is a moot point, or as if I never made it. That’s incredibly dishonest! If you disagree here then we disagree about what it means “actual” or “real possibility”. Numbers, colors, money, and possibilities exist literally. All that’s needed is a set of criteria and their “objective” fulfillment.
All you have to do is acknowledge the criteria that people actually use, what you just refuse to do as the sole arbiter of proper meaning, and the things in the world that would substantiate the claim. What constitutes reality is not something that’s readily agreed on in philosophy. Further, it’s absolutely not clear that a purely physical mechanistic reality eliminates these things. But I could agree that the universe is purely physical or deterministic, and something that never happens is still a real possibility at a particular time. It all depends on language, period.
The “set of considerations” are that the computer is able to predict based in the variables that exist that he would rob the bank, and he did rob the bank after that.
Sure, this can be a part of the thought experiment. He is only forced by the causal variables that exist – not a person holding someone hostage, etc.
Even though the variables could only lead up to him deciding to rob the bank. Okayy…let’s look at your “reasoning”:
Glad you agree with this.
I absolutely agree with this. Most people haven’t thought about this topic at all.
But it is. The fact that people don’t take such into consideration is irrelevant.
No, there is no way to think “he could have not robbed the bank” means anything other than a fact about what action Jeremy could have inacted (not walking into the bank and robbing it).
I don’t think anyone but you will be confused over what “could have” means in the context of the scenario provided.
NO, not “can”. “Could have”. Stop changing around words to your liking. It IS physically impossible for Jeremy to have not walked into the bank and rob it. Physics dicates that he will – per the thought experiment.
The consideration had to happen the way it is.
He couldn’t have not been intrinsically bad.
What he “might say” is irrelevant here. The question isn’t about his opinion which could be as wrong as a layperson intuition.
When it comes to the freedom to have “done otherwise”…yes, those constraints matter.
Oh contraire, it has EVERYTHING to do with how these words are used. I don’t mean for it to be upsetting, but if it is, it might have something to do with cognitive dissonance. I think you are smart enough to understand how absurd the position that Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank appears given the example provided.
I’m uncharitable about you changing up both sentence structure and context to your liking…and pretending that says something about the sentence and context that is actually being referred.
Sorry, but you should try to be more clear in your language if that is what you meant, because the article itself explains how it is a compatibilist notion. The very point that you are arguing that someone “could have done otherwise” means that you, yourself, aren’t taking the majority philosophical compatibilist position here.
That is not what the PAP is. I only said that they address PAP, meaning they address if there is or is not moral responsibility given that alternate possibilities do not exist for a deterministic account (which yes, they all agree with the part about the alternate possibilities not existing).
I’ve read most of them, but please, show me one that does not. It is the very reason they shift the definition away from that notion and to one where it doesn’t matter that alternate possibilities exist or not (such as “the ability to make decisions”, or “the ability to make decisions unconstrained from human coersion (such as a gun)”, or “the ability for a biological organism to make decisions”, and so on). Again, this “otherwise” notion is a staple in this topic, and it doesn’t ever, and I mean EVER, mean what you are saying – for the philosophical topic of free will.
I think everyone knows what “literal” means. Making a statement about reality that we know isn’t true about that reality ISN’T literal, it is figurative. It’s more often a “figure of speech”. But this doesn’t matter, as the word “literal” is irrelevant here (and can be ambigious). The fact of the matter is, you cannot assess that Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank without addressing the real, ontological possibility of a objective configuration of him actually doing different.
Even if it was true about the word literal (it’s not), it is a moot point, as I’ve already explained.
Sorry, I call BS here. The fact that you are addressing an “objective” fulfillment means that such is actually possible. That it “could be” the case that the physical body of Jeremy could have not walked into the bank and robbed it. It’s incredibly dishonest to pretend that some incorrect epistemic assessment of yours applies to any account for the topic of free will which addresses real decisions taking place. The assessment of epistemic possibilities exists literally (it’s literally an assessment), but epistemic possibilities is not literal, they are figurative – IF we understand determinism (which most do not). But again, who cares about the word “literal”. We don’t need to play with the sematics of such words, as we can just say that the “done otherwise” when referring to a physical action that has taken place, means that that physical action actually could have not taken place (and there is not honest way out of that). Your abuse of language to your liking will not be put up with here, as this can be explained in a number of different ways that do not entail the word “literal” that explicitely make the point. The fact that you keep going off on the “literal” word, when that isn’t even used in “Jeremy could have not robbed the bank” shows your own intellectual dishonesty.
Again, everyone but you knows what it means and refers to in order to say that “Jeremy could have not robbed the bank”.
I’m sorry, but it is obvious to everyone except yourself what “Jeremy could have decided not to rob the bank” means. No person on the planet is assessing that from your oddball perspective of a rulebook that changes language around.
Irrelevant.
It is logically clear.
Sure, you could “agree”, but your position would be illogical non-the-less.
The language is clear. Your obfuscation of language is not. I could also agree that I have “leaped up and landed on the moon” if I take each word out of context. I can say that I have leaped up and landed (and that would be true), and that there are things on the moon (and that would be true), and that this is all I mean by “leaped up and landed on the moon” but that language obfuscation is irrelevant to the actual context of the sentence.
I think at this point it is best to end the talk. Unless you are willing to work within the confines of the Jeremy scenario given, I simply cannot allow a pile of irrelevancies that are used to confuse others. If you want to continue on the path I asked, that is fine. If not, I hope you at least got some food for thought from our discussion – but I bid you adieu.
Take care good sir.
Probability is defined as an epistemic measure. So when a similar ontic measure is needed in a description of QM (the similarity evidenced by proofs of their relationship), you prefer a different word be used. “The square of the norm of the wave function” is a bit too bulky, I think you would agree. Would you prefer a word like “chance”?
Note that (1) Most realist interpretations of the quantum world are indeterministic (by your definition of deterministic), and (2) generally proceed to demonstrate the “chancy” nature by mathematical proofs (based on the interpretation’s underlying theory), which are well supported by the evidence.
This is far more logically rigorous than defining “deterministic” as “all events have a cause”, and then assuming without proof that such implies that the world “could not have been otherwise” – an assertion that is easily refuted by counterexample.
“Chance” is no less problematic when assessing a range of probabilities. Regardless, this article was about allowing for ontic probability or chance and explaining why it doesn’t help with free will anyway.
No, pilot wave theory is a realist deterministic account.
The “chancy” nature of the maths is in both deterministic and indeterministic accounts, but some imply that there is a variable and others do not. That is the distinction.
Sorry, but that is how the word is used in physics. That is why both pilot wave and MWI are considered deterministic.
I’ve written an entire book explaining why such would imply that, so this idea that it is being “done without proof” is nonsense. There is a logical case for why a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X, as that suggests a self-contradiction. There is no “counterexample” (and we are not going to get into a MWI again here).
That being said, I’ve explained time and time again that I’m agnostic over whether there is indeterminism in the universe, and if there is, I think an otherwise was possible.
> (1) Most realist interpretations of the quantum world are indeterministic (by your definition of deterministic)
> No, pilot wave theory is a realist deterministic account.
The existence of a counterexample is why I said “most” and not “all”. You should reserve the word “no” for when you disagree.
> > This is far more logically rigorous than defining “deterministic” as “all events have a cause”
> Sorry, but that is how the word is used in physics. That is why both pilot wave and MWI are considered deterministic.
In physics “deterministic” is used to mean unitary, not “all events have a cause”. You won’t find anything like “all events have a cause” in a description of pilot wave theory or MWI. In any case MWI isn’t a realist interpretation of the world (e.g. “events” do not ontically “occur” in MWI); see http://gafter.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-many-worlds-interpretation-is.html
> There is a logical case for why a cause cannot both be the cause of X and not the cause of X, as that suggests a self-contradiction.
Your reasoning assumes that a variable “is a cause” independent of which of two possible world histories we examine. But a variable is, by your definition, only a cause if it is the input to some event. It cannot properly be called a “cause” except with respect to some particular world history.
If one were to construct a counterexample one would use a different sequence of causal events in the two world histories to demonstrate “could have been otherwise”. If a variable is the input to some event in one world history (i.e. a cause), and not the input to some event in another world history (i.e. not a cause), then your “logical” reasoning doesn’t apply. Even if the variable is a cause in both world histories, it may be input to *different events* in the two world histories, in which case there is no self-contradiction.
If you’d like I can construct a simple counterexample to make this concrete.
Last I checked there were approx 7 that were indeterministic and approx 9 that were either deterministic or agnostic over determinism/indeterminism.
What you will see is the word “variable”, etc. The reason pilot wave theory is determinsitic is that it entirely variabled, which is the same thing.
I didn’t want to get into this convo again as we haven’t finished our other and I have no time to correct you. Just know that there are both realist and unrealist accounts of MWI (of the other worlds), but either way it’s a deterministic interpretation. But even if it was indeterministic, it makes no difference to the point.
Some particular world history is what the variable is for. A deterministic account says that any world that happens has a “variable” for it…a cause. If you are suggesting the event has no variable, you are injecting in indeterminism.
How would a different sequence come about if the very sequence of causal events were also caused?
Which “world history” it stems from is irrelevant. The world history is equally as causally dictated.
To assess a different history, you need to postulate either a self-contradictory variable, or an acausal event.
You are missing the logic. You can simply “assert” that there can be a different history given no non-caused events, but the very idea is illogical. All “histories” or “worlds” are dictated by variables that produce them. The only escape from this is to postulate an event that does not have a cause.
But this is all off topic from the point of the original post above.
In fact, this blog post is even allowing in the illogical notion of probability being ontic in the strongest sense, and addressing the other point, which is that there is no conscious control over such probabilistic events. I’d prefer we stay on target to this point.
I insist that if you want to address these other points we do so in our offline discussion. I like to keep these discussions that fall under a post on point to the post as much as possible. Other off topic things you can feel free to email me on and I’ll try to respond at some time within the next year (when I get time in other words). 🙂
Later.
Compulsion and free will are products of our imagination.
Free will certainly is! 🙂
Thanks for the visit Michael.
Both are. Like darkness and light; hatred and love; sickness and health; chaos and harmony; profit and loss; and other seemingly conflicted concepts of the mind, compulsion and free will constitute an inseparable couple, aka dualism. 🙂
Interesting take on this. I think free will is a fallacy that *depends* on an inability to predict the future. It obviously could not exist in a deterministic universe. You have detailed a number of reasons as to why we live in a universe that cannot be said to be either determinate or indeterminate, such as chaos theory or the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, only unpredictable. Another argument has to do with relativity.
Everything we experience has already happened, because it happens away from our senses and even further away from our minds. In other words, our sense of the present is merely a mental state. That mental state might be said to be our present, yet every thought we have is instantly in the past as we think it: we cannot reverse time and unthink anything. So the present is something that we cannot be aware of, it is a dimensionless point in time, separating the past and the future.
If we use an old example, and look at a distant hilltop and see light then sound from an explosion, we must agree that the future has already occurred before we are aware of it, because it takes time for the light to reach us, and even more for the sound. In other words, after the light originates, but before we are aware of it, events we consider in the future are already in the past, in the distance. That example is equally true for our actions. What someone experiences about our actions was at some point both in the future and in the past at the same time. It is also true of our self-awareness – it takes time for us to be aware of our own actions, thus the future and the past exist simultaneously within out own actions. It is a contradiction to say you can alter the future but not the past when the future and the past are actually one in the same at any point in time between an event an its observation.
Free will is a tool used by some people to manipulate the behavior of others, as far as I can see. It is a basis for moral principles that define social order. From that, I think our society is fundamentally flawed, fruit of the poisoned tree so to speak. What most people accept as fact, such as economic, political or religious systems are actually based on the contradiction inherent in the concept of free will: that people make good or bad choices, rather than choices that emerge from their environment and their unique, innate capacity to respond to that environment. It is such an appealing idea, that we are free spirits, independent souls, unchecked by nature – not-animals. In that world view, we live forever. And who wants to die? A person must be an atheist at heart, if not mentally so, to accept what you are saying. People will come to the idea of living absent this absurd concept for the same reason people come to Jesus – it just makes sense to them because it is what they are capable of understanding. In one sense, your attempt to convince people of the absence of free will flirts with the idea that people have it. However not completely, because you are forming an environment that favors rationality. Good luck with it.
I’ve had the same experience of feeling more free without free will belief. Freedom from blame is a freedom “worth wanting”.
Thanks Chandler!
Hi ‘Trick. I learnt circa four years ago that free will doesn’t exist; although I’d been suspicious that it probably didn’t exist for decades prior to that. From my early childhood onwards, I was indoctrinated with New Age stuff [I’m too polite to say the correct word on your website], e.g, if you don’t learn to forgive then you will suffer long-term illness. When I later developed an incurable illness, I was endlessly reminded that it was caused by my failure to accept their New Age doctrines, which were founded upon the just-world hypothesis: always blame and shame the victim.
You wrote: “So I will ask those who once believed in free will but no longer do – do you feel more or less free than when you believed in free will?” I shall leave you and the readers to imagine the incredible sense of relief and freedom that I felt. It enabled me to openly and honestly discuss my health issues with medical experts, who have since provided me with a wonderful set of evidence-based coping strategies. The core principle that underpins them is: Always ask for evidence!
So, I’m compelled to ask the believers in free will: What and where is the peer-reviewed independently-replicated empirical evidence to support the notion that free will actually exists? And no less important is my next question: What are the competing hypotheses that attempt to explain how the human brain neurologically manifests free will? Thankfully, I’ve finally learnt the value of applying Hitchens’s razor to opinions and conjecture: What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.
In the absence of robust empirical evidence to support the commonly held strong belief in free will, we can use 21st Century logic-based epistemology to debate the topic. In my opinion, ‘Trick is an expert in this very important method of adding to the vast library of verifiable scientific knowledge.
Perhaps I’m wrong, but my interpretation of the empirical evidence collected thus far, on the subject of free will, is not simply lacking sufficient strength to form a scientific consensus; it provides strong evidence against the commonly held belief in free will. However, those who do not understand how the brain manifests the totally convincing agent/actor whom we all refer to as “me, myself, I” are very unlikely to be able to understand the empirical evidence that refutes the concept of free will. No disrespect intended to anyone, nobody would or should ever expect the vast majority of people to properly understand the intricate millisecond-scale timing diagrams of neurological-based organisms.
Thank you very much for inspiring me to write about some of my thoughts and experiences relating to this important topic,
Pete
Thank you for this Pete! Unlike most people, you understand that there is a burden of proof, whether that be scientific or logical proof, on the person who claims free will exists. And not only is that burden entirely unmet, but it has mounds of evidence against it.
And just an FYI, I had a very long phase of new age belief as a child so I know exactly what you are referring to.
As always I appreciate the content you bring to the topic and hope others read your comment.
Later.
Trick,
Bravo. Nicely done.
I would order two if it were nondeterministic.
Much freer to accept myself, i.e., my predilictions, foibles, personalilty, interests, etc. that with heritability make up in some complex cocktail that shapes my actions and decisions.
‘Trick, your article has reminded me of some hilarious moments during my career. I design then build a prototype system. My peers join me in testing the system. We observe its behaviour under test and reach the conclusion that it can’t possibly behave this way, even if it was deliberately designed to attempt to behave in the way that it actually does!
I think this exemplifies Hanlon’s razor: Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.
Nice!
I completely agree with this. Michio Kaku has a very flawed view of philosophy
Thanks Waylon! 🙂
My main complaint with his video was him assuming that indeterminism grants free will. The other was his claim that the particle can be in multiple places simultaneously.
Completely agreed. They are attacking determinism but it will get them nowhere in their defense of free will. It’s tragic that people misunderstand it by thinking that the argument against free will depends on determinism.
I’m glad you specified the Libertarian version of free will. Any free will that relies upon indeterminism is irrational, because without reliable causation we are not free to do anything. Fortunately, this is not the meaning of free will that most people use. Most people, and the courts, define free will as nothing more than our ability to make choices for ourselves, free from external coercion (not causation). And we make decisions for our own purposes, which we can usually recite if asked, and which cause/determine our choice — so there’s no break in the causal chain.
Howdy Marvin. Your comment is misinformation – but we already went over all of this so if you want to keep saying it we need you on one of our skype calls – as it is redundant here. Studies show that layperson intuitions go from incoherent compatibilist notions (not the coherent philosophical type) to really poor libertarian notions, and they are inconsistent, meaning the same person will grant both depending on the scenario or the question.
Yes, people think that they can make choices for themself, but they also think that, given determinism, they could have (after the fact) done otherwise. I already explained to you why this is incoherent – but you shift it to “oh this is not what they really mean when they say it” even though it is exactly what they really mean as the studies show. And they also have notions of free will that depend on indeterminism, in fact most people don’t truly understand the distinction. Also, most people think others are “to blame” in the strong moral sense, and not simply in the “we must do something for the sake of utility” sense that you do. In fact most people believe in some sort of retributive justice in which one person “deserves” what they have coming to them. Also, most people believe some people are more or less deserving than another because of what they do (or don’t do) – an idea that is irrational once the incompatibilist notion of free will is disbanded. These bad free will intuitions leads to justifications for great inequalities in the world.
Trick: “in fact most people don’t truly understand the distinction”
And that is my point. You insist they are taking an incoherent position, when they are not taking any position at all. They are simply using the words in their normal sense.
You aren’t getting that the lack of people understanding these things leads to their incoherent positions that the studies show. Positions that are in conflict with logic, reason, evidence, and even in conflict with other positions they hold (self-contradictions). This allows people to think things about the abilities of humans that do not really exist, as well as impose harmful ideas on to people.
And we haven’t even gotten into certain religions which preach that sin and evil is due to god giving people free will, and that the majority of people believe in some notion of hell (even an eternity of it) as punishment for one’s “sins”. Sorry, but your ideas about a “normal sense” are not looking at today’s reality and bad beliefs.
I don’t have a whole lot to complain about your compatibilist position, other than it bypasses some very important topics about some really harmful ideas that most people have. You act like the majority of people do not really agree with retributive punishment,…that they are all about consequentialism. I wish that were the case, but it simply is not, and there is mounds of evidence that points to that not being the case.
I do agree with you that the way we educate people about the lack of free will is important so that they do not revert to fatalistic notions that are also not the reality, but don’t ignore the other abilities that the majority of people feel they and others possess as doing so is at a much greater expense. We have a chance to shift bad mindsets, I think we both are looking at that goal, but allowing people to believe in free will does not simply allow them to believe in your simple version, but their extended incoherent abilities as well that leads to so many harms in the world.
If I could – I would just delete the word “free will” from the heads of people and compatibilists could simply call the abilities they are referring to some new word, and incompatibilists could just point out the abilities people do not possess and call a belief in those abilities a new word. This would save so much trouble between compatibilists and incompatibilists. But unfortunately the word exists and it, to a large majority of people, implies a whole lot of incoherent and dangerous ideas.
Interesting, I often mess with people’s heads. Like Intelligent design verses evolution debates. To prove your designed I show you are really just an artificial intelligent machine. You are just a machine stupid that thinks its living. Show me your soul and I’ll believe you’re at best a living machine. Oh, and by the way you don’t have free will to the extent to what you think to have. It’s only preprogramming – of a very high complexity. Yes you can choose, but only with the limited choices in your mind.
Rather than relying on “Could have done otherwise”, I would prefer “Felt unconstrained or coerced at the moment the decision to act was in my consciousness”. That’s what freedom feels like to me. Under those circumstances I would be happy to take responsibility for the action, whether or not a supposed super computer could have predicted it.
Hi John, thanks for your thoughts. I definitely agree that we “feel unconstrained at the moment”. This is part of what derives such a strong intuitive feeling that we “could have done otherwise”, even when it isn’t the case that we could have (e.g. the predicting computer scenario). When we talk about words like “responsibility” we need to understand that they can be ambiguous. You “taking responsibility” is used differently than a rational assignment of responsibility in the strong “moral” sense denoted here: Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC
More info on the ambiguity of the word: No Free Will and the Ambiguity of “Responsibility”
Did you ever read the book “The Nonsense of Free Will” by Richard Oerton? It is an incredible book; he makes some of the same points you make in this post.
I’ve read most books on the topic but that is one I actually haven’t read yet. I keep seeing it on amazon…so don’t know why I haven’t picked up a kindle version of it yet! I’m sure he probably makes many of the same points I do. 🙂
It seems to me what Bell’s theorem assumes is not actually free will. It is rather some degree of disconnection between the particle in the experiment and the device “choosing” the experimental setup. In the case of a random number generator, to break bell’s theorem, you have to assume the number generator is correlated to the particle in the experiment. Can you affirm this as plausible? Can it be practical in any way?
BTW, non-locality seems to be the best alternative to true randomness in quantum mechanics.
I think given determinism, a random number generator that interplay’s with the setup of the experiment would certainly have influence…but this is the part that is being questioned. Is Bell’s “superdeterminism” really any different than causal determinism in these regards? I think the quark experiments which attempt to use two distant events that aren’t causally intertwined other than being “from the big bang” could be helpful.
Also, it’s important to note that I’m agnostic on determinism or indeterminism, but just like to question certain underlying assumptions. I have much appreciation for non-local hidden variable accounts, but I’m also willing to accept “true randomness” if that happens (though I do not think that Copenhagen sufficiently accounts for it without huge problems).
Thanks for the response. 🙂
It’s the connection in the past light-cone of the elements in the experiment which is important. We know that there was a connection at the Big Bang (probably) and that is enough to undermine the idea of free will in the experiment.
I would have to say that determinism and/or indeterminism would be the ultimate free will disqualifiers. The people think they are free as long as they don’t have any disqualifiers that they are aware of. Therefore the feeling of freedom is based in ignorance.
Exactly! 🙂
The first line of the contrast is misleading/incorrect, as is the final (graphical) one. There is a cause to a fated event; just one that overrides all other causes (whether this is an overpowering/preprogrammed natural cause, or a supernatural/divine one). So yes, many other events are irrelevant; but you need an arrow from the true, simple cause going around/bypassing them.
Sure, I guess you can say that if “X is fated by a god” that “X is caused by a god to happen at that time”, but this is entirely outside of a need for any causal lines that lead up to specific thoughts and actions (and certainly the causality of the more natural universe is not a requirement for the event). That is not to say causality cannot work along side fatalism, it is just that causality in the sense of cause and effect leading up to a point in a causal chain is not a requirement of fatalism.
Hard incompatabalism definitely reflects my current position. I’m agnostic on indeterminism because of quantum physics, especially considering virtual particles.
Awesome TEpistemology. It’s important to attack both angles here. I love it that I’m not the only “hard incompatibilist” in the world. 😀
No-nothing newbie here:
“Since calling a doctor might be a cause of your recovery, it isn’t futile to call a doctor.”
Does this not imply some freedom to choose a path forward? If so, is that not what is generally meant by “free will”? RTFMs are welcome.
Thx.
Hi Mark – thanks for stopping bye. It is possible that some compatibilist definitions of free will could align with these ideas, but the free will I’m addressing and the one that ties into various other topics of concern is here: Free Will
I’m not a big proponent of compatibilist definitions and have various articles that explain the problems I see with them. Click here for one article example.
That being said, as long as the person understand that we don’t have the free will that I describe (which most common laypersons intuit that we possess), most disagreements with compatibilists are merely semantic disagreements. It is when this other ability and the fact that we do not possess it is ignored or side-stepped that I have larger disagreements with how compatibilists want to use these words.
Later. 🙂
Thanks for the reply! I’ll keep reading.
It’s that intuitive sense that is hard to kick. My thought experiment always starts with: “In what sense am I not free to choose between my favourite German deli and my favourite Italian bistro for lunch today?” I know I am going to one or the other, but which is “undecided”.
– Mark
Exactly – it is that thought that grants most of the illusion and why it is so intuitively strong. It is always good to see someone looking into the topic.
Some common misunderstandings that happen in the beginning could be avoided if you understand this distinction between determinism and fatalism:
Determinism vs. Fatalism – InfoGraphic (a comparison)
And also some of the benefits of understandings we lack free will:
10 Benefits of Not Believing in Free Will
Later and have fun! 😀
The short way I handle it is to say that just because you can’t predict something does not mean you are in control of or freely choosing it. Moreover, how can you be said to control something when you are unable to predict it? If anything, unpredictability implies that things are out of your control or influence!
Exactly. It is surprising that this is one of the first things that people go to if they are unfamiliar with the debate. 🙂
I agree that compatibilists and incompatibilists need to work together somehow. It’s as difficult as theists and atheists working together. I’m honestly not sure that it can logically happen but I think it’s something that must happen for the betterment of all animalkind.
I’ve just finished your book, and from especially the chapter about ethics and responsibility, I could not avoid to think that you are a ‘compatibilist in disguise’. I think your article here is so to speak the counterpart to this impression. From the free will discussions, I draw the conclusion that if one stresses the point that the believe in free will leads to retribution, one is inclined to deny its existence, and on the other side, that one thinks that it is important that people behave as responsible as possible, one stresses that we have free will. But not this libertarian one.
Thanks for the visit Gert and thanks for reading my book. It is much appreciated and it’s always great to see interest in the topic. As I said, compatibilists and free will skeptics quite often agree with a whole lot, and it is important that we don’t just dismiss where we do agree for only the semantic disagreement. In that light, I could equally say that I see many compatibilists as “free will skeptics in disguise”….but it all comes down to semantics here.
I do share some concerns with compatibilists in that I believe if free will skeptics don’t educate others on a lack of free will appropriately (what it means that we don’t have libertarian free will or the more incoherent compatibilist variety that many laypeople intuit), the initial first reactions of common-laypersons often reverts to more problematic fatalistic and defeatist notions of a lack of free will (which are not rationally concluded).
As a free will skeptic, I think it is very important that people “behave as responsible as possible”, but I also think that understanding that people are not ultimately responsible (e.g. in hindsite) leads to a more compassionate society with less capacities for inequality justification and so on. I also think that any moral/ethical theory needs to take into consideration that people do not have the free will as I and most free will skeptics have defined…even if we have the (p) compatibilist varieties.
My next books will be on ethics without (incompatible) free will, which will address the consequentialist model that is most compatible with not having the type of free will that a large majority of common laypeople feel they possess.
But as long as the compatibilist agrees that we don’t have “responsibility” in the strong sense as denoted here: Moral Responsibility Infographic I think much of our disagreement comes down to semantics…and a concern for bypassing certain facts about how we can and cannot process decisions.
Later good sir. 🙂
‘I could equally say that I see many compatibilists as “free will skeptics in disguise”….but it all comes down to semantics here.’
Fully agree. I think I could make a list of propositions we agree upon:
– Libertarian free will does not exist
– Ultimate responsibility does not exist
– People should take as much responsibility for their actions as they can
– People behaving against the law generally must not be treated as if they are medical patients but as responsible persons
Both libertarian free will and fatalism, being respective misunderstandings of what we mean free will really is (compatibilist free will in my opinion of course…), or misunderstanding what determinism is, lead to wrong reactions. In the first case too harsh verdicts about people who cannot change their situation, in the second case to indifference to the fate of others because we think we cannot change something.
So, yes, I think it is mostly a question of semantics.
Awesome, I love that you are an example of a compatibilist that shows we can agree on so much! I’d also like to add that the incoherent variety of compatibilism that many people hold (along with libertarian notions) does not exist either – which differs from the (p) compatibilist definitions.
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/free-will-intuitions-infographic/
We, I believe, would also haggle a small bit over this: “People behaving against the law generally must not be treated as if they are medical patients but as responsible persons”
I think in some ways we need to think of wrongdoers as “medical patients”, and they are only “responsible” in the weak (utilitarian) sense I showed. If by this you mean that sometimes it is appropriate to deter as well, for example, fine a person, I agree (we don’t usually do this with medical patients), but ideally, I think rehabilitation makes the most sense in hard cases as no-one really “deserves” punishment (even for deterrence which may be needed) – and incarceration needs to be thought of more as a quarantine model:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/quarantine-analogy-no-free-will/
Agreed?
Yeah, I think it is important to look what is behind the labels, and sometimes we find more agreement than disagreement. Sometimes I think that the question about if we have free will or not (as it stands between you and me) is a ‘public relations’ question: it is not about what we want to sell, but how we sell it.
I think that the risk of seeing wrong-doers as patients, is that you see them as objects to be healed, instead of responsible subjects that we try to convince with arguments that they should stick to the law. The nightmare I sometimes have can be illustrated with one word (oh, no two): Soviet psychiatry. The question who is to treated as a patient might become a political one.
Good thoughts, I tend to think if we agree as much as I think we do then it really is a matter of “public relations” (and perhaps a disagreement over what should or should not be “sold”).
Fair point: I certainly agree we have to be careful of the “Soviet psychiatry” type of scenario (or even, as I mention in the book, a “clockwork orange” type of dystopia). That being said we also need to recognize that the decision a person makes was a matter of brain states at the time (and that given the same conditions we would have the same brain state and make the same decision). But I do think how we go about rehabilitation is a question for ethics, and of course a “Soviet psychiatry” used for political abuse or other types of “nightmare” scenarios or thought-experiments have consequentialist problems a-plenty. 😉
I would defend Kaku’s video on the grounds that it is most likely an attempt to discuss very complicated subjects in as simple of terms as brevity would permit. I believe Professor Kaku could discuss finer points of the various aspects of causal/non-causal philosophy, but not in a manner that would be easily understood by laymen.
Hi Ken. Thanks for the visit. The problem truly is his use of the term “free will” being connected to the “uncertainty principle”. Most free will skeptics are not free will skeptics due to predictability or certainty, etc….but rather the fact that both causality / determinism and non-causality / indeterminism are incompatible with the libertarian notion of free will that his ideas tend to allude to in this video.
Also, he assumes a specific quantum interpretation here that is indeterministic, which is an assumption that bypasses deterministic models such as a non-local account, or agnostic models, etc. We simply cannot know that an indeterministic model is correct according to our current physics – but his assessment is based on this. And he also gets some points about Einstein a bit conflated.
But even given an indeterministic model, most free will skeptics and even also most compatibilists reject a notion of free will that is based on uncertainty or unpredictability of quantum particles. If professor Kaku wants to side philosophically with a Libertarian notion of free will (which is what this video suggests for the context of the word “free will” he used), he is not going to get very far philosophically (and should probably stick to physics).
But yes, perhaps brevity has caused Kaku to create this poorly worded video…but it still needs to be corrected due to the confusions it causes. 😉
Trick,
Sorry I missed the inception of this new holiday. I think it is Brilliant. I would rank it up there with my rules to The Game of Omnipotence for its satirical excellence.
Steve
Hah…thanks Steve. What is this “The Game of Omnipotence”…I’d like to read it if it’s available online. 🙂
What about the “free will” of the particles themselves? Since they are created with opposite angular momentums they can each, based upon their own position and momentum, pre-determine what the outcome of any measurement on the other will be.
Is their ability to “know” what the outcome of any measurement on each other will be “superdeterministic enough”? Is this ability “superdeterministic” with a lowercase “s”?
Willing implies consciousness, I wouldn’t say that a particle “wills”, and certainly not freely. It isn’t really “knowing” but rather a causal interaction. 😉
If wave-particle duality is a moving particle AND its associated wave then when one of the entangled pair are detected it could be the associated wave which causes the particle to be detected with a certain spin and the particle itself doesn’t contain hidden variables. The variables are exposed to the particle.
wave-particle duality means that sometimes it behaves like a wave, other times like a particle. It would matter not if it’s a particle or wave behaviour that has the non-local interaction….it would still be a hidden variable either way.
Wave-particle duality is a moving particle and its associated wave.
The notion of dark matter as a weakly interacting clump of stuff that travels with the matter is incorrect.
Dark matter fills ’empty’ space, strongly interacts with matter and is displaced by the particles of matter which exist in it and move through it, causing it to wave.
The wave of wave-particle duality is a wave in the strongly interacting dark matter which fills ’empty’ space.
In a double slit experiment the particle always travels through a single slit. It is the associated wave in the dark matter which passes through both.
When an entangled pair are created the particles do not have a well defined spin. Due to conservation of momentum the associated waves in the dark matter which travel with the particles propagate with opposite angular momentums.
When the particle interacts with the detector the physical wave “collapses” which causes the particle to gain a certain spin. It is the local physical “collapse” of the associated wave as it interacts with the detector which determines the spin of the particle.
Sure, given a dark matter/energy speculative theory for the connection…but when one particle gains a certain spin (say spin up), the other entangle particle appears to gain the opposite spin (spin down) at the same time…no matter the distance between the two. If you are suggesting this is happening via the dark matter that fills the space, that would be hidden currently. Why the spin is immediate would be an interesting question. Does the “in-between” act as a sort of gear rather than domino chain? I have no clue, as we would be speculating on the hidden variable(s). And of course a dark matter explanation or an outside of space-time connection theory is speculative…but interesting to speculate on. 😉
One particle is detected. When this occurs the wave local to the particle “collapses” which gives the particle it’s spin.
An hour later the other particle is detected. The wave local to it “collapses” giving that particle it’s spin.
Measuring one particle does not affect the other.
The particles are always detected with opposite spins because the waves are propagating with opposite angular momentums. The waves “collapse” as exact opposites which cause the particles to be detected with opposite spins.
It is not until the particle is locally detected that it acquires its spin.
But the whole point of Bell’s theorem, if we are to accept it (which I’m questioning in this article), is that those variables being “in the individual particle or wave itself” are statistically ruled out. That a local hidden variable (which is what would exist in your wave config) is ruled out.
Here is a clear video in this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZuvK-od647c
That being said, I’m skeptical on Bell’s theorem – as the article points out. 😉
Local hidden variables have to do with the particle, not the associated wave.
The only hidden variable associated with the waves is how they are propagating with opposite angular momentums. This is a singular hidden variable.
Everything in the video you linked to having to do with hidden variables is associated with the spins of the downconverted pair at the time of their creation.
Just as in quantum mechanics, I am suggesting the particles do not have well defined spins until they are detected.
I am also suggesting that the only thing hidden from us is the angular momentum of the associated physical waves. This angular momentum is what causes the particles to always be detected with opposite spins.
From what I understand local variables have to do with either the wave or particle….usually they refer to the wave or something in the wave itself (the specifics of something about the wave). For example, a hidden variable for the double-slit would be something within the wave that causes it to collapse at a specific location (in a local deterministic theory)….or something non-local that interacts with the wave (in a non-local deterministic theory).
I agree that the particles do not have a well-defined spin until detected. The question regarding entanglement has to do with what “causes” the specific angular momentum of the other. If you are suggesting it is a variable within the wave itself that causes the angular momentum, you are denoting a local hidden variable. If you are saying there is a connection between the two waves/particles in which, once one is detected the other converts in its opposite direction (the angular momentum converts), that is non-local. It’s the local account that Bell’s theorem (if accepted) says is not the case.
“A” hidden variable associated with the wave is the key. It’s singular, not plural.
Bell’s inequality has to do with hidden variables, plural with an “s”.
There aren’t hidden variables (plural with an “s”) associated with the wave. The only hidden variable associated with the wave is the angular momentum in which it propagates. It is a single hidden variable.
There isn’t a hidden variable associated with the wave which causes a certain spin to be detected along the x-axis and a hidden variable associated with a measurement along the y-axis and a hidden variable associated with a measurement along the z-axis.
There is only ‘the’ hidden variable associated with the waves propagating with opposite angular momentums which cause the particles to be detected with opposite spins.
Bell’s inequality doesn’t apply.to the pair because there is only ‘the’ hidden variable associated with the opposite angular momentum in which the particles propagate.
‘The’ hidden variable causes the particles to always be detected with opposite spins. When they are detected their associated wave locally physically “collapses” which determines their spins.
No need for hidden variable’s’. No need for non-locality.
Bell’s inequality does not apply to the pair because there is only ‘the’ hidden variable and the particle’s spin is determined locally.
Singular or plural make no difference here (whether one or many parts “causes” the angular motion or only the angular motion causes the spin is irrelevant to the question over locality). You are saying that, once entangled, the very specific angular motion is intrinsic at that point, and that causes the specific spin – regardless of the other. From what I can tell, according to what you just said you seem to take a local account of hidden variable theory and reject Bell’s inequality (if you say it does not apply to the pair, which of course Bell would not agree with).
That being said, I have appreciation for your position, hence the reason I wrote the article. 😀
The point of hidden variable theories is that the particles are created with well defined spins.
The spins being being caused by the detection by the angular momentum of the associated wave is what is different. The wave itself doesn’t require consisting of hidden variables.
I think trying to refute Bell’s inequality itself is a mistake. I think the solution is to understand a physical wave causing the spin of the particles does not require hidden variables.
Good luck.
I think you are kind of side-stepping a key component: that measurement can be seen as acting on the particle and will change the original property by some unknown amount (including the spin). It appears the other particle “knows” any change that occurs due to measurement of the other and adjusts accordingly.
Your theory is that the spin will always correlate with the angular momentum of the wave which is an effect of by the entangling process, regardless of how or when measurement “collapses” the wave of one or the other. If you have the mathematics and experimentation to prove this and show that this is all that is required and all variables are already there, you had better do it or find someone who can – as it would change the face of QM in very drastic ways!
Peace out. 😀
The particle doesn’t have to “know” the other one has been measured. Due to conservation of momentum the associated physical waves propagate with opposite angular momentums and cause the spins of the particles during measurement.
No hidden variables required.
Just to be perfectly clear what you are postulating: I am assuming when you say “propagate with opposite angular momentums” that you are saying:
1) That this “propagation” happens when the two are being entangled (e)…correct? Y/N
2) And that it is this property (p) (e.g. angular momentum) that is propagated within the wave that causes the specific spin when measured? Y/N
3) And that the measurement (m) itself (how it happens, when it happens, etc) cannot have any effect on the spin direction (sd) itself other than bring the specific direction already dictated by the property (p) to light on “collapse”? Y/N
In other words, e causes p, m causes “collapse”/spin, but only p causes sd?
1) Y
2) it’s not propagated “in” the wave. It’s the propagation of the wave.
You are insisting the angular momentum is “in” the wave in the same way the hidden variables would be “in” the particle.
This is what I am saying is not the case. The wave just propagates. Each wave just propagates with the opposite angular momentum of the other.
It is this singular property of the wave which causes the particles to always be detected with opposite spins.
So…to reiterate with adjusted language:
I am assuming when you say “propagate with opposite angular momentums” that you are saying:
1) That this “propagation” happens when the two are being entangled (e)…correct? You say Y
2) And that it is this property (p) (e.g. angular momentum) that is a propagation of the wave that causes the specific spin when measured? You say Y
The more important question then is #3:
3) And that the measurement (m) itself (how it happens, when it happens, etc) cannot have any effect on the spin direction (sd) itself other than bring the specific direction already dictated by the property (p) to light on “collapse”? Y/N
In other words, e causes p, m causes “collapse”/spin, but only p causes sd?
Why is question #3 so important? Because if you say Y to #3 then you are going against what most think, that “any measurement of a property of a particle can be seen as acting on that particle (e.g., by collapsing a number of superposed states) and will change the original quantum property by some unknown amount; and in the case of entangled particles, such a measurement will be on the entangled system as a whole.” If you say N to #3, then 1 and 2 no longer apply.
If you say Y, then this theory of yours: that the measurement itself brings forth the spin but has no say on the spin direction (which is already intrinsic given the p that has already been set up by e), if found true, would literally change the face of QM. It is the very local realist account that is found so problematic statistically given that #3 is not true.
Or at least so it seems. I could be missing something here.
“by collapsing a number of superposed states” is incorrect. There is only the state of each of the waves and that is that they are propagating with opposite angular momentums.
“such a measurement will be on the entangled system as a whole” is also incorrect. Each of the physical waves propagating with each particle exists locally with the particle only. They are two completely separated waves propagating with opposite angular momentums. When you detect one of the particles its local wave “collapses” which causes the associated spin of the particle. You could wait a week prior to detecting the other particle and that particle’s spin will not be defined until it is detected and its local physical wave “collapses”.
It is the local physical “collapse” of the wave propagating locally with the particle which determines the spin of the local particle.
It is the very local realist account of particles traveling with hidden variables (plural with an “s”) that is found so problematic. It is the particle’s traveling with hidden variables associated with any possible axis of detection which is so problematic.
The waves themselves do not consist of hidden variables associated with every possible measurement. The waves themselves propagate with opposite angular momentums. It is this propagation of opposite angular momentums which cause the particles to be detected with opposite spins no matter how they are measured. It is this singular property of the waves which causes the particles to always be measured with opposite spins.
There are no such things as hidden variables (plural with an “s”) when discussing entanglement.
Right, so you are going against the scientific consensus here (those things you are saying are “incorrect” are the consensus). I thought so but wanted to be sure. I have no problem with going against consensus btw. What you now need to do is create a peer reviewed paper with your theory and support for it, have others verify it experimentally….and change the face of quantum mechanics entirely.
You also keep avoiding the question about whether the measurement itself has any say on particle spin direction….because that is an important part. You are implying it does not, where as most physicists would disagree. You have to show how all of the experiments are concluding this incorrectly.
Personally I think it would be awesome if you could explain away all of these problems with your simplistic local theory. I’m, however, very skeptical that you actually could.
I also want to note that even if you are correct about the “week later” analysis, that doen’t matter if the act of measurement has any say on particle spin direction (as believed). The more important point if it does have a say is that the one configuration adjusts accordingly.
I don’t understand how you can say, “You also keep avoiding the question about whether the measurement itself has any say on particle spin“, when all I have been saying is that when the wave interacts with the detector the wave “collapses” which causes the particle to be measured with a certain spin. The particle does not have a well defined spin until it is detected. It is the “collapsing” of the associated local wave which gives the particle its spin.
Not “spin” but “spin direction“. Read #3 again.
3) And that the measurement (m) itself (how it happens, when it happens, etc) cannot have any effect on the spin direction (sd) itself other than bring the specific direction already dictated by the property (p) to light on “collapse”?
The only property (p) is the angular momentum of the waves associated with the particles. When the particle is measured along the x-axis, this singular property, causes the particles to be detected with opposite spins. When the particles are measured along the y-axis, this singular property, causes the particles to be detected with opposite spins. When the particles are measured along the z-axis, this singular property, causes the particles to be detected with opposite spins.
It is the consensus that the measurement of the first particle “will change the original quantum property (e.g. the angular momentum) by some unknown amount”. It seems to be your theory (but correct me if I’m wrong) that this is simply not true, that it has the same property (e.g. same angular momentum) all along (since entanglement). That the measurement itself has no say over the property and hence no say over the direction.
The measurement itself causes the associated physical wave to “collapse” a certain way. This “certain way” is exactly opposite for each wave. As the wave “collapses” it causes the particle to spin a certain way. Since the waves are collapsing in exact opposite manners the particles are always detected with opposite spins.
It is not the measurement of the particle which change “the original quantum property (e.g. the angular momentum) by some unknown amount”.
It is the measure of the particle which causes the angular momentum associated with the wave to give the particle a certain spin. Since the existing angular momentum of the wave are exact opposites for each particle the particles are always detected with opposite spins.
The cause of the spins always being detected as opposites is the opposite angular momentums associated with their local waves.
That the measurement itself has no say over the property and hence no say over the direction.”
The measurement itself has no say over the waves propagating with opposite angular momentums. The measurement itself causes the waves to “collapse” as exact opposites. As the waves “collapse” the cause the particles to spin in opposite directions.
The particles do not have well defined spin directions until they are detected. The spin directions of the particles are caused by the “collapse” of their associated waves during measurement.
Measurement causes waves to “collapse” as exact opposites.
Exact opposite “collapsing” of the waves causes the particles to spin in opposite directions.
1) “The particles do not have well defined spin directions until they are detected. The spin directions of the particles are caused by the “collapse” of their associated waves during measurement.”
Seems to be in conflict with
2) “Measurement causes waves to “collapse” as exact opposites.”
For one to say that the measurement causes waves to “collapse” as exact opposites means that they must have a well-defined spin.
You say “It is the measure of the particle which causes the angular momentum associated with the wave to give the particle a certain spin. Since the existing angular momentum of the wave are exact opposites for each particle the particles are always detected with opposite spins.” …but this very idea that they are configured as “exact opposites” ahead of time means that the measure itself cannot cause the angular momentum. You in turn are postulating another variable that causes “opposites” during the entangle process…but you cannot determine “opposites” if there is no well-defined angular-momentum / spin direction until measurement.
Or at least I’m not parsing what you are saying then. 😉
“For one to say that the measurement causes waves to “collapse” as exact opposites means that they must have a well-defined spin.”
Wave-particle duality is a moving particle AND its associated wave in the strongly interacting dark matter.
The waves are propagating with opposite angular momentums. The particles do not have well defined spins.
You are conflating the waves propagating with opposite angular momentums with the particles having well defined spins.
Think of the particles traveling with their associated waves as a knuckle ball thrown by a baseball pitcher.
Even though the associated waves propagate with opposite angular momentums their associated waves do not have well defined spins prior to detection.
Since the waves have opposite angular momentums when they interact with the measuring device they “collapse” as exact opposites along any axis. As they “collapse” they cause the particles to spin as exact opposites.
There are opposite angular momentums associated with the waves. There aren’t well defined spins associated with the particles prior to detection. The act of measurement causes the angular momentum of the wave to be given to the particle which causes the particles to be detected with opposite spins.
Correction:
Even though the associated waves propagate with opposite angular momentums their associated [particles] do not have well defined spins prior to detection.
If you are suggesting that the angular momentum is propagated on entanglement, then the angular momentum and the exact spin it drives are well defined prior to measurement and collapse.
If you are suggesting that the angular momentum is propagated on measurement, then the angular momentum and the exact spin it drives are not well defined prior to measurement and collapse – which means that opposites cannot be well-defined either.
To suggest opposites are intrinsic is to suggest an intrinsic well-defined angular-momentum and spin. You can’t have the notion of an “opposite” without a defined configuration. If you are suggesting that angular-momentum is that configuration, and you are suggesting it being a well-defined opposite of the other that causes opposite spins on measurement, then the spin itself is well-defined (there is a variable for it).
I am suggesting that the angular momentum of the wave is propagated on entanglement, and the spin of the particle is not.
But you are saying the spin direction is dictated by the angular momentum….so if the angular momentum is well-defined (which it must be if one is saying they are opposite), so must the spin direction.
But let’s keep in mind that it’s not a problem that it’s well-defined if you are giving a local causal account.
I am saying the spin direction is determined by the angular momentum upon measurement,
When it happens is irrelevant (on measurement), the direction itself is determined BY the angular momentum (per you).
When it happens is relevant. If it happens during measurement there is no need for hidden variables.
The direction itself is determined when the wave “collapses” during measurement.
Wave “collapse” causes the particle to have a well defined spin direction.
Prior to wave “collapse”: undefined spin direction.
After wave “collapse”: defined spin direction.
You said that the spin direction is determined by the angular momentum upon measurement. The angular momentum is a property that it has prior TO measurement (on entanglement per you), so the fact that measurement causes spin is irrelevant to what causes the spin direction. The spin direction is defined exactly by the angular momentum per you. It is your “variable” for direction.
The angular momentum is a property of the wave. The spin direction is a property of the particle.
During wave “collapse” the angular momentum of the wave is transferred to the particle which causes its spin direction.
Prior to wave “collapse”: well defined angular momentum, undefined spin direction
Post wave “collapse”: undefined angular momentum, we’ll defined spin direction
Sorry- but this just cannot be an undefined spin direction. The very transference makes it a well-defined variable for the direction.
Annnyway…no need to beat a dead semantic horse here. I think I get the unorthodox theory you are putting forth. Interesting thoughts. 😀
It makes spin direction a well defined variable post detection.
The variable for the direction exists pre-detection.
It’s not well defined therefore it’s not a hidden variable.
To suggest opposites is to suggest a well-defined variable in which one is opposite of the other.
I am suggesting the waves are propagating with opposite angular momentums. I am suggesting the particles are not.
In this scenario there is a particle AND A wave.
Clarification:
I am suggesting the waves are propagating with opposite angular momentums. I am suggesting the particles are not propagating with opposite spins.
Doesn’t matter. You are supplying the (well-defined) variable for the direction of spin on measurement….prior to measurement. The distinction between wave and particle matters not here. The opposite angular momentums are A) well-defined, and B) dictate spin direction via that definition.
I provide the well defined spin direction on measurement only.
Prior to measurement it is not well defined, not when wave-particle duality is a moving particle and its associated wave.
The variable (opposite angular momentum) defines the spin direction prior to measurement. The fact that spin doesn’t happen until measurement is irrelevant to what causally defines the direction. The only way out of this is to say that the opposite angular momentums have no say over direction upon measurement…in which case you are back to square one.
In order for there to be conservation of momentum all that us required is for the waves to propagate with opposite angular momentums. The particles can be traveling along with the waves like knuckle balls thrown by a baseball pitcher.
The particles are not traveling with hidden variables.
The wave “collapsing” causes the spin direction of the particle.
The waves propagating with opposite angular momentums is a hidden variable. It is a singular hidden variable at most.
First, there isn’t a particle that is moving along with a wave. The particle and the wave are the same. The more important point:
If it is just the wave “collapsing” that causes the spin direction, then angular momentum has no say over direction…only the collapse does. If that is the case then that is what action at a distance is postulated statistically….as opposites cannot be dictated by collapse alone when they are at a distance.
First, there isn’t a particle that is moving along with a wave. The particle and the wave are the same.
Why didn’t you say that yesterday? I would have stopped wasting my time.
Everything I have said is predicted on wave-particle duality being a moving particle and its associated wave.
In de Broglie’s double solution theory wave-particle duality is a moving particle and its associated wave in the “subquantic medium”.
The “subquantic medium” is the strongly interacting dark matter which fills ’empty’ space.
Everything I have been saying is predicated on the angular momentum being associated with the wave and the spin being associated with the particle.
What a colossal waste of time.
I had no clue you were saying this yesterday. You talk about the wave “collapsing”, this means it collapses from a wave to a particle. There is no “riding particle” in collapse theory…so perhaps you shouldn’t be using the word “collapse”. For pilot-wave theory there is NO collapse.
Regardless…none of this matters for the points I made. Even if we accept some dualistic notion of a separate particle on a wave…for your theory all variables are either there (well-defined)…in which case the spin direction is locally dictated…or the spin direction only comes about on measurement (and derived BY the measurement)…in which case for the opposite stats interaction appears to be needed. So regardless of this baseball theory my points stand and this should not be a “colossal waste of time”.
If it is just the wave “collapsing” that causes the spin direction, then angular momentum has no say over direction
The opposite angular momentums is what is causing the spins of the particles to be detected as opposites post “collapse” of the wave.
The only way to do this is if the opposite angular momentums dictates the spin direction in opposite directions….in which case that is the variable for the direction. But we are repeating. This is one of them “agree to disagree” moments it seems. It’s all good though…it was an interesting idea to ponder. 😉
Correct. The opposite angular momentums of the waves is the variable which causes the spin direction of the particles upon detection. Single variable. Not hidden variables (plural with an ‘s’).
Great! Finally clear on your position here. 😀
No difference….and still well-defined for the spin.
Anyway, I’m not trying to give you a hard time. I actually appreciate people who try to theorize against the scientific consensus (even if a pet theory). It breaks us away from being spoon-fed potentially bad ideas…especially when it comes to quantum physics where there are so many interpretations. Keep up the thoughts good sir…and don’t take my criticisms as me not appreciating your thought process. Later.
Not well defined for spin at the time of the creation of the entangled pair.
Based on the theory you gave- that is the part we’ll have to “agree to disagree” on.
The theory i gave has wave-particle duality as a moving particle and its associated wave.
That’s what we are agreeing to disagree about.
No, I said even if we accept that framework…the other things I said follows. That framework is fairly irrelevant to our discussion all along. I’m saying the spin direction is well defined even under that framework…given “The opposite angular momentums of the waves is the variable which causes the spin direction of the particles upon detection”. You seem to think that it’s “Not well defined for spin at the time of the creation of the entangled pair”…and that is where we need to disagree given the “variable” (opposite angular momentums) at creation of entangled pair that you postulate.
But I believe we will just go back and forth here so we should leave it at the “agree to disagree” mantra. 😀
Do you agree that the particles can travel like knuckle balls thrown by a baseball player prior to detection? Do you agree the particles can propagate without well defined spins prior to detection?
I’m willing to work within most frameworks. I’m not against the idea if that is what is being postulated.
Depends on the framework/interpretation and propagation theory. I’m saying under the propagation theory you provided the spin direction is well-defined from the onset of entanglement. I’m saying this should come as no surprise considering all variables (or if you prefer “the variable”) for the direction are (is) in place on entanglement.
In what I am proposing how is the spin direction well defined if I am saying the particles are traveling like knuckle balls thrown by a baseball pitcher?
If all variable(s) that account for the (very specific) spin direction already exist (on entanglement), that is what it means to be “well-defined”.
The only variable I am discussing is the waves propagating with opposite angular momentums. Do you agree this is a single variable?
Depends on what we are calling a variable, but whether we pack the wave into a single variable is irrelevant.
The waves have a single variable. There is not a variable associated with the wave collapsing along the x-axis and a variable associated with the wave collapsing along the y-axis and a variable associated with the wave collapsing along the z-axis.
There is only the variable associated with the angular momentum of the particles.
Correction/Clarification:
There is only the variable associated with the angular momentum of the waves associated with the particles.
The angular momentum is given by the vector product which is moment of inertia and velocity. It’s subject to the constraint of conservation of AM if no external torque, etc etc. The wave function is a complex-valued probability function. The Schrödinger equation determines how it evolves over time. Most do not say that they are “single variabled”. The quantum state has continuous variables. But again, whether it is 1,2, 10, or 100 variables that we are referring to is irrelevant here.
In de Broglie’s double solution theory there are two waves. There is the wavefunction wave which is statistical, non-phyiscal and is used to determine the probabilistic results of experiments. It is a mathematical construct only. It doesn’t physically exist. Referring to it in this discussion is pointless.
I am discussing the physical wave in the strongly interacting dark matter.
It matters how many variables there are. If there is only the single variable, which I am proposing, then there aren’t the hidden variables associated with Bell’s inequality.
The wavefunction is what represents any ontological assessment of a wave. Without it discussing a “physical wave interacting in dark matter” (if you are assuming a deBroglie wave is or is similar to a gravitational wave in DM??)…in some extremely speculative theory (anything considering dark matter as the medium is very speculative) is pointless.
And no, it does not matter how many variables there are – as long as all local variables account for the behavior (whether that is 1 or 50). It does not follow that “If there is only the single variable” to “then there aren’t the hidden variables associated with Bell’s inequality”. One is sufficient (if you assume it’s one).
In terms of hidden variables theories there is a hidden variable associated with a measurement along the x-axis and a hidden variable associated with a measurement along the y-axis and a hidden variable associated with a measurement along the z-axis and so on.
If there is only the variable associated with the angular momentum of the associated physical wave then what is being discussed is not a hidden variables theory.
I’m done.
Take care.
You cannot just assert that an angular momentum configured on entanglement accounts identically for the spin direction without supplying an actual variable (or variables) of the angular momentum that can be assessed to occur at that point that points to the spin that always occurs…in which physicists have not yet accounted for (or are unable to account for – or more likely have already been ruled out given the assessment of property and direction change depending on measurement). Until it is accounted for in physics, it is hidden. And as soon as the variable (or variables) is accounted for and becomes “unhidden”…you have literally changed the face of QM forever. That is your mathematical and experimental task if you want your pet theory to go somewhere. Until then any variable or variables that you are asserting account entirely for the behavior of the spin direction that precede measurement are hidden to physicist in the field of QM, and assertions do not make them unhidden.
The question isn’t about if it’s “hidden” (currently it must be if we are giving a causal account), but rather local or non-local. If it wasn’t hidden then it wouldn’t even be a question.
Peace out good sir.
Hi
I am about a third of the way through your book and an easy read.
Generally agree with what is there so far.
One semantic shift I do have to get past is “consciousness being an illusion” [Not]. Yes we experience stuff, pain, colour, free will, etc. But that does not mean these experiences are as they seem. So these experiences are illusory in this sense. The experiences are real but they might not be as they seem. For example a stage magician, his attractive assistant, tiger and cage are all, but the disappearance of the attractive assistant and appearance are real and illusory at the same time.
Not quite comfortable with how you handled emergence, but that for later.
Anyway, I am enjoying the book
rom
Thanks Rom. Always good to meet another free will skeptic. If you mean that the experiences might not be as we later interpret them to be (and in that sense an illusion), I would agree with that. In fact, I think a number of psychological states such as optimism bias can cloud our future assessments or memory of what was actually experienced at the time. And I certainly do not think the experiences necessarily represent reality, as the free will illusion shows. If I hallucinate a unicorn, that hallucination exists as a specific experience, but it does not equate to an actual unicorn existing (of course). 😉
In regards to emergence, I didn’t really get too deep into that (or consciousness for that matter – just some real basics) as I wanted the focus on free will, but if pushed – I am a proponent of physicalism, meaning consciousness emerges as a “property” of very specific brain states…or this is what I think all evidence currently points to. But this is a minor point for the free will topic, and not a requirement.
I’m glad you are enjoying the book, and hope some parts give you something new to think about.
I also checked out your page, some good thoughts on the topic! 🙂
Have a great day!
‘Trick
While it is a kind of logical bias, my bias against work funded by the Templeton foundation, does exist.
Eddy Nahmias seems like he accepts grants from the foundation. Alfred Mele is another.
I can’t help thinking the foundation funds people and projects that will have a friendly outcome. The outcomes approach 100 % predictable 😉
I knew Mele did, but I hadn’t realized that Nahmias may be associated as well. Verrrrry interesting!!! Thanks for that tidbit of information, I’ll have to check into it. I think the Templeton foundation is extremely biased.
I wonder if there is a correlation between the outcome of free will studies and the Templeton Foundation. Vohs also receives their monies which is often cited . But apparently it was part of a replicability study.
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2013/04/19/pre-publication-posting-and-post-publication-review/
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/08/28/science/psychology-studies-redid.html?_r=1
and a discussion thereof (first of three blog entries).
https://rolfzwaan.blogspot.ca/2013/03/the-value-of-believing-in-free-will.html
Yeah, the “Free Will and Cheating” study of Vohs and Schooler didn’t hold up to scrutiny per the NY Times (as you mentioned):
Three Popular Psychology Studies That Didn’t Hold Up
I also mention that one here and some of the problems with it:
A Temporary Imposed Lack of Belief in Free Will? Seriously?
Also problems with the FAD/FAD+ scale used in this and many other free will studies:
Problems With The Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale (FAD-Plus)
I’m very interested in these studies, but I want them done correctly (and replicated). We need to separate out the distinction between a belief in fatalism, randomness, and determinism as well. This is why I think it’s so important to educate people on these differences. For example:
Determinism vs. Fatalism – InfoGraphic (a comparison)
This is fantastic, ‘Trick Slattery. Thank you for sharing this. There are elements in Dennett’s definition that are so subjective that they render it useless. ‘Biological devices that respond…. with rational, desirable courses of action’? None of us are responsible for our biological devices… so we’re not responsible for those desires. And what does it even mean to be rational in both an epistemic and biological sense? Rational according to our biological device’s previous experiences which were completely out of our control?
Your article here does a great job of demonstrating these problems with Dennett’s definition. Thanks!
Thanks Michael and thanks for the visit to the site. 🙂
Hi. Thanks for this awesome stuff! I totally agree.
Could I perhaps ask whether you believe in life after death? Or is this another topic?
Hi Carl, thanks for the visit. Glad you agree. 🙂
Life after death is another topic. I often avoid topics of religion or afterlife on this site (unless making a point about the free will topic) as they make no difference for why there is no free will (free will is logically incompatible regardless of these things)…and I don’t want those who lean toward these things to be turned away from the “no free will” reasoning.
That being said, I personally do not believe in an afterlife for various reasons. I don’t think there is proper evidence to support that idea, and a lot of evidence that supports the thesis that consciousness is a product of specific brain states which, once gone, do not continue to exist in some other medium (whether supernatural or a separate quantum state, etc).
Consciousness – An Output of Brain States
Though I’m a naturalist / physicalist in this way, and don’t believe in an afterlife – I do want to stress that an afterlife or something supernatural could not provide the free will of concern for this blog.
Later good sir. 🙂
I agree that dualism won’t result in free will. I’m also a naturalist, but I think there’s enough phenomena that point to nature providing for the afterlife in some form so we can experience more of it. It would be pretty spiteful otherwise, leaving us with a limited time syndrome. Sorry for the diversion, but I think it’s important.
Unfortunately, I see no real evidence for this and what seems like evidence against it. For example, if we damage our brain, we also damage our “consciousness” or “who we are”. Indeed we can even have a loss of memory or become an entirely different person. In split-brain patients they often acquire two different personalities with different beliefs, for example, there was a case of a split-brain patient in which one “side” was an atheist and the other a theist. We also can turn off consciousness via anesthesia or other brain interactions. It seems our consciousness is tied to very specific brain configurations that, once gone, would almost certainly cease to exist.
I think this does leave us with a “limited time syndrome”….so hope we can make the best use of that time while we are here. Perhaps, in the near future, some trans-consciousness effort will come about that will extend lives greatly. 😉
I agree that consciousness is also linked our current realm (density level to be more scientific), but there is a realm in which the “physical” lasts much longer. In the Bermuda triangle during the Second World War a whole squadron of fighter planes disappeared although radio contact was still maintained for a while after they disappeared. In the Philadelphia experiment a ship disappeared during radiation and when reappearing, some marines were gone and some had body parts fused to the ship.
Trick.
Have you extended your thoughts about no retribution to religion?
If God is not justified in blaming you, perhaps you don’t need a saviour
to save you from Hell!
Norman.
Hi Norm, yes, I extend the idea to religion in my book.
I give the example of someone creating a robot with a “pain pad”, programming the robot to destroy the house, and then blaming / getting mad at the robot for destroying the house when it does and punishing it by hitting the pain pad with a hammer. The whole idea is quite absurd, and people need to drop any notion of a retributive punishing deity. 😉
I appreciated your article. I would maybe even go further and say consciousness is tied to the illusion of free will. When you pick between the 3 fruits you can’t actively understand all the variables that go into your decision and baring an obvious choice this inability to understand the computation that led you to the apple makes you feel more then a passive observe of the computation (i.e. illusion of free will). Just my thoughts but if you could trace every element and its mathematical weight that lead you to the apple (immediate variables like room temp and a million others, past experiences and genetics) it seems more like running script then being an “active participant” or conscious. Therefore maybe consciousness is tied intrinsically to our lack of clarity.
Love to hear your take 🙂
First thanks for the visit. 🙂
I’d suggest that the illusion of free will is tied to the output of consciousness. In other words, our conscious thoughts play a key role in the causal output of our decisions. In this way we are conscious and an active participant, but as you say…we never see all of the variables, and the way we act is entirely constrained. But due to those variables, the way we consciously decide is, as you suggest, a computation. Consciousness, I’d suggest, is a causal part of the computation itself. I’m a proponent of mental causation:
Mental Causation – A Case for Mental Causation
And at the same time a physicalist:
Consciousness – An Output of Brain States
Anyway good thoughts. Much appreciated!
Hey thanks for your quick reply,
Your article on mental causation makes a lot of sense, I didn’t think of it that way before. My comments above steamed from thinking about AI. It crossed my mind that given we never fully grasp the “why” of our actions maybe the key to consciousness is a duality between what we actually compute and our limited ability to understand said computation. Obviously wild speculation and I am not a physicist or a programmer, a lawyer actually lol. I just think that given this strange duality is a product of evolution there must be an important reason for it. After all if you knew exactly how you would react to any external stimuli (the underlying code), why would you need consciousness, there would be nothing to ponder. BTW what made me look into this subject was an HBO show “Westworld” if you haven’t seen it there is a scene where someone asks, “why do the robots talk to each other when no one is around” the response “they are error correcting”. Thinking on this it made me realize in a clinical kind of sense all of our interactions with the world from the day we are born could also be seen as error correction (i.e. most of us never burn our hand on a pot more then once or twice). Lead me down a path… but anyways find this subject really interesting.
You have said you are writing a book about morality in the absence of free will. (please correct me if I am wrong here).
I can’t help thinking this is not a wise move from a logic point of view. I can’t help thinking this falls into the same trap that compatibilists fall into in this debate.
Since losing my belief in free will, I have strived to live an amoral life … and I too would argue this is a betterment (though I was not keen on the word).
rom
I think a case can be made for a type of forward-looking ethical realism without backward blaming moral responsibility. For connotation reasons I prefer the term “ethics” over morality (even if I use them interchangeably). But I’m not an ethical nihilist (I think there is ethically relevant “value” intrinsic in states).
Within a perfectly deterministic universe, we still have to distinguish between the case where (a) the person acts deliberately (of his own “free will”) versus the case where (b) the person is forced by someone else to act against his will. This commonly understood definition of “free will” makes no supernatural claims and no assertion of “freedom from causation”. Yet it is sufficient for all practical purposes.
My most recent post explains why that is not the A) free will of practical importance B) free will that addresses layperson intuitions, and C) free will that addresses the historical debate. So it is anything but “sufficient”…it is entirely lacking.
On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
Trick, you need to make it clear that parts of the infographic are NOT based on the study, but are your assertions as to what the study means (and are NOT the study authors’ conclusion!)
It is perfectly clear that the “so what does it mean” part of the infographic follows from the results of the study that are in the infographic. Here is the more in-depth analysis of the study: Common Intuitions about Free Will (and how it needs to be defined). In it I explain why Nahmias’s conclusion does not follow from the results. But then again, this is Nahmias (funded by the Templeton foundation).
Also addressed it here: The Negligence in a Study: It’s OK if ‘My Brain Made Me Do It’
OK Trick
Why do you think it is “necessary” for free will skeptics to be moral (ethical)?
Why should not someone live their lives amorally?
How can one set of deterministic or acausal causes be more ethical than another set?
🙂
I don’t think anything “necessary” (e.g. it is not necessary to believe the earth is not flat either), …one either cares about ontological goodness/badness in the world or they do not. The goodness/badness, however, are very real intrinsic states of being….so either our conscious causal mechanism will align with that concern, or it will not. An ethical system needs to play the part of a forward consequence looking causal gear that will sway ethical configurations. 😉
goodness/badness, however, are very real intrinsic states of being
They are? Either I am not understanding quite your position or you will have to explain how a particular set of causes are intrinsically good or bad.
Yes, some causally produced conscious states of matter/energy are intrinsically bad experiences and others good. The most pain, suffering, and misery for everyone contains worse experiential states than the most pleasure and happiness for everyone. I believe this “worseness” can be known as an ontological fact as much as any existence claim, through our understanding of these states.
” …worse experiential states”?
Again I don’t think we need to describe the experiential states in a moralistic or ethical way. I certainly don’t have this need.
And if we are approaching this from a philosophical point of view, I can’t help thinking we are on shaky ground here.
Frankly it seems to me to be a form of compatibilism. .
I don’t see how this is compatibilism if there is no free will.
Do you believe that you not being anesthetized prior to major surgery would not allow a far worse experience that you being anesthetized? If so, I ask that you test that by just being put in an immovable state with full conscious experience.
I am not sure of your point being relevant to the point I am trying to make.
Which is:
Viewing our actions through the lens of morality and ethics does not make sense.
Of course we may be determined by causality to do so or not.
If ethically relevant value exists (which I’d argue it does), and our conscious thoughts and actions lead to value states (which I’d argue they do), it makes sense as a causal gear for ethically concerned configurations.
Trick
To convince me you would have to show how one arrangement one arrangement of atoms etc is more ethical than another.
Saying that we perceive different values states is no better than me saying I perceive free will. Now that I don’t happen to believe my perception allows me to question some of my other perceptions and those of others,
I perceive colours … does not mean they actually exist.
The problem here is that the value is intrinsic in the experience, which does indeed exist…just as the *experience* of the “feeling” or “illusion” of free will *exists*. Your perception of colours exists intrinsically. Do you deny suffering (the qualitative experience) exists in specific atomic configs?
Suffering exists … it is certainly not what it seems. While I might not wish to experience it, I certainly don’t think of it in moral or ethical terms. I usually don’t wish to inflict suffering on a third party not because it is somehow unethical but more because the whole ting is counter productive to how I want society to tick.
Incidentally … the word intrinsic I find to be a non word. My perception of colour does not exist intrinsically!
Why would you not wish to experience suffering or inflict it on others…or want society to tick a certain way?
Your perception of colours isn’t a *product* of matter/energy playing out in your brain? Intrinsic just means it is a part of it. “Inherent” is another word.
Why? …
I have been determined to hold certain positions like wanting society to tick in a certain fashion. I suppose I could confabulate reasons as to why.
Either way, I can’t help thinking we are talking/discussing past one another. So a couple of questions.
What is your definition of morality/ethics that you are arguing for?
And by this definition:
Do you think a pattern/configuration of atoms is somehow moral or ethical? Simply yes or no please.
Inquiring if the causal reason why has to do with conscious wellbeing at base-level. Regardless…on to your question:
Yes – certain conscious atomic configs (e.g. people) causally act ethically or not based on causal information about the potential consequences of the actions. Others conscious atomic configs (the consequences) are either ontologically good, bad, or benign experiences as they play out.
Regarding definitions, I’d define that which is ethical or unethical (right or wrong) as that which consciously and intentionally moves to or away from ontologically real good or bad / positive or negative value states that exist within (intrinsic or inherent within) specific matter/energy configurations. Note that these are descriptive value states, not personal opinion…and the conscious intention is causal (not freely willed). I don’t believe in ethical responsibility (which differs from being ethical or not).
[I]If ethically relevant value exists (which I’d argue it does), and our conscious thoughts and actions lead to value states (which I’d argue they do), it makes sense as a causal gear for ethically concerned configurations.[/I]
if I were to argue:
If causality leads to free will and our thoughts conscious or otherwise lead to wills, then it makes sense our causal gear leads to free will configurations
I don’t buy this argument.
That isn’t analogous. Free will (the ability) can be shown as self-contradictory…qualitative experiences are self-evident. In fact, to reject them is to leap to a type of epistemological solipsism that rejects all knowledge claims based on empiricism. The feeling of free will is ontologically real.
(one point at a time will prevent tangents)
I suspect if you put the same sort of effort into morality and ethics as you did into dissecting free will, I think you would have similar problems with this discussion.
I don’t think qualitative experience states existing is in contradiction, and I do think it evident unless one falls to a position of consciousness not existing – which I think is a mistake for numerous reasons.
While experiential states might not be in contradiction with not having free will for me morality (some intrinsic good or bad) is. For me morality becomes a non sequitur in the absence of free will. And like free will it is not helpful to the betterment of humankind.
Why can’t we be honest and recognize that things that can be seen as moral are simply a reflection of our caused desires.
Regarding consciousness … I don’t think it is what it seems.
The goodness/badness of intrinsic states is a real ontological fact of matter/energy playing out – regardless of a lack of free will.
It is a non-sequitur to suggest: we lack free will, therefore we lack morality/ethics. This is not to be confused with moral/ethical *responsibility* which is incompatible with free will. “Betterment of humankind” is irrelevant without good/bad states, as there is no such thing as “better or worse” states without it.
“Desires” are irrelevant to the facts about ethical/unethical actions – they only play into the causal concern over acting ethically or not. And just because we causally assess something (like intrinsic value) doesn’t mean that what is being assessed isn’t a fact. We causally assess that we have evolved, that doesn’t mean that this assessment doesn’t align with reality.
Regarding consciousness not being “what it seems”, it is actually defined BY “what it seems” (seeming is consciousness). I’d also argue that consciousness is the one thing we can know exists above all others.
BTW – the reason I’m writing a book is to clarify all of this and how secular ethics needs to take into account a lack of free will. But it has been known by many free will skeptics that the one version of ethics that aligns with determinism is a future consequentialist variety. Ethical nihilism does not follow from a lack of free will, and it misses the important point that there is real “value” that exists.
Hey rom,
On Sundays at 7PM EST a bunch of free will skeptics join a skype session for an informal discussion about free will and many other topics like morality, etc. I often join in. One guy records it and throw it up as a “podcast” but it isn’t meant to be a professionally edited podcast but rather an hour or two (sometimes 3) discussion that often turns into debate. We all agree that free will is an illusion and how it is important, but we disagree on a number of other topics (some are even pantheists). Would this be something you’d be interested in? Could use your thinking (I appreciate when people disagree with me as it makes for interesting discourse and challenge).
Just a thought as, if we ever do the “morality” topic, you could join in and we could have a more fruitful discussion than these comments. Think about it and if interested, connect with me on skype: trickslattery….and/or send me an email from the contact form.
‘Trick
We’re a mix of heredity and environment, and one feature they share is that we control neither. No matter how hard one looks for that part of the human (soul etc.) that exists outside the realm of physical laws, one will not find it.
Exactamundo!!! 😉
Thanks for the visit Michael!
Michael
I agree but I would suggest the divide between heredity and environment is unnecessary. Heredity has been shaped by our environment as well.
🙂
This is one of the more accessible infographs I have found on this topic. Thank you for making it! Moral responsibility is an interesting topic when faced with the lack of free will and this chart has been very helpful in addressing that.
Thanks revfitz….and thanks for visiting the site. 🙂
This site is always a good read 🙂
What is an “entirely causal” universe. Are you implying a naturalist universe? Are there causes that we don’t understand? What caused the big bang, anyway? Is the big bang theory correct, or could there be more to the universe? Sorry, not buying your determinist BS. Since you are a determinist, you probably believe and believe that you have no choice but to believe that I have no choice to believe this. Have a nice day!
Hi Jim,
It is one possibility for the universe (the postulate that every event is an effect of a cause). The other is that there are some non-caused or random events. Both cases are incompatible with free will (the type of free will defined here: FREE WILL…the free will of importance).
I’m a naturalist but my arguments against free will do not rely on naturalism.
Why the Lack of Free Will isn’t (only) tied to Naturalism
We can understand the concept of causality in a logical context, and reject anything that falls outside of logic (for example – anything that is in contradiction to itself).
We do not know what caused it, or even if it was caused for that matter.
This doesn’t matter for my argument. Free will is incompatible for any start or non-start theory of the universe. We do know that there is evidence for the expansion of the universe from a single point.
You seem to be under the impression that I’m a determinist. This, however, is not the case. Rather, I’m a hard incompatibilist – meaning that free will is incompatible in BOTH a deterministic universe as well as an indeterministic universe. You’ll even notice that many of these questions address indeterminism.It is also incompatible with any theory of time.
Why I’m a Hard Incompatibilist, Not a Hard Determinist.
Is the Universe Causally Deterministic? Maybe!
To be more clear, I believe that I had no FREE choice but to believe that you have no FREE choice to believe this. 😉
The Distinction Between X and Free X (choice vs. free choice)
I hope this helps you understand what my position more closely aligns with. There is a ton on this site that addresses both determinism and indeterminism.
Have a great day good sir! 😀
I agree with everything you said in this post. I also have another funny thought. Isn’t it odd that people believe that someone could have chosen otherwise in the past when considering that time can’t be rewinded?
Yes, that makes the positive assertion that they “could have done otherwise” hold a burden of proof that will not be proved. That being said, I also take on the burden to prove the other positive claim that, given causal determinism, they could NOT have done otherwise, …which is accomplished by showing the logical impossibility of a deterministic otherwise. 😉
We know Newtonian mechanics (and also general relativity of Einstein) works pretty well in large scales, so in large scales physical
phenomena should be deterministic. Let’s suppose that uncertainty results to free will. My question is why uncertainty of quantum
mechanics, among all other large scales phenomena, only shows up in human being! The conclusion would be that human being is the only
large scale physical system which behaves quantum mechanically!
Quantum mechanics is used for large-scale science (clocks, encryption, microscopes, quantum computing, etc.), but yes, the idea that the brain is a quantum machine is unsupported (considering the temperature problem)….and it’s just a way to pretend there is free will (even though, even if it did utilize quantum uncertainty, true indeterminism is just as incompatible and more problematic for willing). Thanks for stoppin’ by. 🙂
That is the most hilarious conclusion and yet that is precisely along the lines of what most humans actually believe! They attribute free will only to humans, and therefore even if quantum indeterminism did have something to do with free will, it would have to be explained how it only applies to humans!
While your eloquence is profound, in this debate, it is primarily a tool of obfuscation. I do not mean to suggest that the confusion starts with you, but with gross miss-assumptions of what free will is and the overall decision process of brains. What is, you might ask yourself, the source of a decision to order pizza?
Hi Alan. What do you think free will is? What do you think is being “obfuscated”? For a free will skeptic like me, the definition comes down to the practical importance of the free will debate: On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
I also believe that brains make decisions, such as to “order pizza”; they just couldn’t have, of their own accord, decided not to. 😉
It’s all quite impractical as the debate can only lead to problems. It seems that once you actually convince someone they do not have free will, they start making worse decisions. They could never lose their free will, they just lose interest in its effective execution. Absent free will, there could be no decision for pizza, nor indeed could there be pizza. Just where do you think that pie comes from?
(more to come)
The tides are turning on any such studies and poor methodologies that fail verificationism, and in fact there are some that show that people have less retributivism with less belief in free will and other benefits. There is a 500 character limit to keep this conversational. Let’s start with how you define “free will”?
Regarding “decision”, there is an important distinction between “decisions’ and “free decisions”:
The Distinction Between X and Free X (choice vs. free choice)
Determinism vs. Fatalism – InfoGraphic (a comparison)
I’m good with: . Libertarian free will –
(1) We are in control of our will
(2) Our mind is causally effective
(3) In the same situation we could have done otherwise
(1) Agreed in some small sense. Are we in control of our will to control will, etc?
(2) Agreed
(3) Given indeterminism, agreed – but any indeterministic event cannot be a “willed event” or “up to us”
That said, I do not think that the most helpful definition – as you have noted, choices of words help frame how we think about the issue.
So here’s how I see it: Our decisions are synthesized, real time and on the spot. In that process, multiple possible alternatives are synthesized, one of which is chosen (by our free will).
The only way multiple possible (meaning ontologically possible as in “can be actualized”) alternatives could be synthesized is via indeterministic events we have absolutely no say over. This is the problem with libertarian notions of free will. 😉
Here I most certainly disagree, as it is the alternative that is impossible. More needs to be said, so I will work on how to phrase it.
Thanks. Take your time. If possible, please keep it to a single comment so we can have more of a back and forth here. You can summarize and we can elaborate on individual parts as we go through. And no time constraints on responses, I’ll be busy this weekend so may be slower to respond than weekdays. Catch ya later good sir. 😀
I have looked through some of your posts, and I think this claim represents a fairly consistent error that leads you to your conclusions. So a good place to start. Can you, perhaps justify or expand upon your assertion that we have absolutely no say over these events.
My contention is that we are biologically required to manage such indeterminate events and that our evolution as animals was very much dependent upon such management.
By definition, for this topic, an indeterministic event is one that is not causal. If you are saying that “you” are the cause of how an indeterministic event behaves, then that is confined to being causal, which is determinism, not indeterminism. Any so-called “management” after the fact of a truly indeterministic event would depend entirely on your causal structure at that time. This is why even a complex mix of causal and acausal (or even ontologically probabilistic) events cannot grant the free will required for strong moral responsibility:
Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC
😉
I suggest that if you have the ability to be aware of alternative outcomes that are likely for the future based upon alternatives choices available to you at the present, you have moral responsibility. What we evolved with can be thought of as a parallel causal structure where a range of scenarios are played out, each to a conclusion, each held for the moment at least, in memory.
The very way one will deliberate between “perceived options” will then be causally dictated, including the final decision. Even with parallel causal structures, each playout could never have concluded otherwise. For strong moral responsibility you would have needed to have been able to, of their own accord, have chosen otherwise. There is no evolutionary mechanism that can allow for this.
Your explanation represents a very limited set of caused events. There is no requirement for a caused event to be predictable or repeatable. Neurons are not static elements. Every ‘playout’ through a neural network has a different conclusion. We have memory. We regularly play out many possible scenarios without acting on any of them. We all do this, we all know this. We do not respond to all stimulus.
I agree with you about “predictability”, as some of the most chaotic systems are deterministic (but unpredictability is not free will). It must be, on rewind, repeatable, otherwise logically an indeterministic event is needed. If you say one is not needed, then you are invoking a causal contradiction (the cause is both X and not X). Our brain can act out scenarios without them being ontologically possible (able to be actualized).
The evolutionary mechanism is euphemistically referred to as survival of the fittest. There are two very powerful driving requirements for free will to evolve: We never know where we will be born nor what our particular situation will be at any given time. Free will was far and away the most robust solution for an animals’ brain.
Plants never know where they will be born nor what their particular situation will be at any given time. Free will (in a sense that grants strong moral responsibility) is no solution for an animal’s brain, as the best solutions are those that entail logical coherency. Evolution is an entirely causal theory, and the very notion of a causal “real alternate possibility” is logically incoherent.
Choice (true, free choice) is then made for one conclusion and the action which precipitated that conclusion in the imagined scenario.
Again, if the conclusion was through an entirely causal process, you simply couldn’t have chosen a different “conclusion”. What was chosen was causally dictated even before the causal deliberation process (between one possible option and perhaps many impossible options) even began. And if a non-caused event (indeterminism) forced a change somewhere, you simply couldn’t have a say on such an event or the change that arose. The type of free will needed here is logically incoherent. Later good sir. 😀
Here is the statement I was really looking for as it highlights the weakness of a determinate system: ‘What was chosen was causally dictated even before the causal deliberation process … began.’
What I think you fail to recognize is that with any determinate system, all of the responses are stored or programed in advance. But before we chase that rabbit, could you please explain to me why you suggest that the type of free will needed here is logically incoherent.
Determinism doesn’t mean “stored in advance”, it just means causally dictated. For example, a chess program is entirely deterministic, has no free will when playing against an opponent, but has a specific output based on its very causal structure, which might entail various databases and weighting mechanism once information is given about the opponent move, etc. It could even assess different scenarios that have not taken place and weigh each, but it’s final output couldn’t be otherwise.
For all practical purposes, couldn’t be otherwise is equivalent to stored in advance. A wind up watch does not have a storage register, but its deterministic output is programed (or designed if you prefer) into its gears and springs.
I am pretty sure you are perfectly aware of the necessary indeterministic mechanisms required by the theory of evolution typically captured in the phrase random mutation.
Sure, we can analogize that way, simply meaning the output is specific based on that past setup. The theory of evolution has no required “indeterministic mechanism”. The “random” word here is not indeterministic, anymore than a poor photocopy is indeterministic. A “random mutation” can be seen as a “causally imperfect copy”. The word “random” is often used for a deterministic roll of a die. The cause of mutation is either: A) DNA fails to copy accurately or B) External influences can create mutations.
No good chess program is deterministic. There is a range of fairly simple software tricks to achieve non-deterministic outputs from an otherwise deterministic series of processes. Once employed, there is never a case of an output that could not have been otherwise.
I’m sorry, but there seems to be some miscommunication somewhere, as all current day chess programs are entirely deterministic. To have an indeterministic program you’d need a quantum computer in which the chess program utilizes quantum indeterministic events for an output (which would probably be detrimental to its success as a good chess program) and it would also have to be the case that an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is the case (which we cannot yet know). Non-quantum computers / programs are always deterministic / causal.
Perhaps there is a definitional / semantic distinction that is leading us to talk past each other. Please read here for the way determinism and indeterminism are used in the free will debate (as well as physics):
“Determinism” and “Indeterminism” for the Free Will Debate
If I may: The correct operational context of both “could have” and “possibility” is not reality, but rather the imagination. Thus it is always true that “I could have done otherwise” if I had more than one option to choose from. However, I WILL always make the same choice after a rewind.
Not just “could have”, but “could have DONE” and not just “possibility” in the epistemic sense of “options in mind” but “ontological possibility”, meaning could be actualized in reality(context is important). The word “done” is an adjective about reality (a real action taking place). The only important question for the debate is whether an otherwise ACTION could have taken place (it could possibly HAPPEN), but your “I WILL always make the same choice after a rewind” shows that you recognize it could not have.
The extent of the context of inevitability is that everything that happens is always inevitable. There is no such thing as a “could be” within the context of inevitability. And there is no such thing as a “possibility” (= “might or might not be”) within the context of inevitability. There is only the single “inevitability”, and it simply always “is”.
Correct, if you inevitably must decide on and take action X, you could not decide on and take action Y instead.
The point is that you cannot mix them. The fact of inevitability has no impact on “could have”. I still could have made a different choice.
Not only can you mix them, you simply must: If you inevitably must decide on and take action X, you could not decide on and take action Y instead. If choice X is inevitable, you simply could not have “made a different choice” (it was inevitable that you would NOT make a different choice).
If you read your own comment, you’ll find there is no room for a “could” within the context of the inevitable. A “could” always references something that DID NOT happen. The inevitable ALWAYS HAPPENS. Apples, oranges.
If, on “rewind”, the “decision” inevitably WILL NOT happen, that is no different. This means that, if there was not a rewind, prior to the time it was still inevitable that not only will it not happen, it could not happen. You couldn’t have made a different choice/decision. You simply must mix the two, otherwise, you have a contradiction: “you inevitably could not make choice X”, “regardless of inevitability, you could make choice X”.
The context of “could have” is ALWAYS a mental review of a prior choice/action. In the context of inevitability such a review is pointless. By mixing your models you create both the contradiction and the paradox.
The context of “could have DONE” is always an assessment about being ABLE to DO something. It is an ontological assessment about an action that can be actualized. There is no distinction in models, if X choice/action is inevitable in model 1, it must be in any model about X action happening. If the lack of Y choice/action is inevitable in model 1, it must be in any model about Y choice/action possibly happening.
Time travel is impossible. Therefore the only way of being “ABLE to DO” (or re-do) something in the past is by our imagining what would have happened IF we had made a different choice. I’m pretty sure this is the only valid context of “could have”. Inevitability and “could have” do not mix. Different semantic models.
This entire article addresses your “time travel is impossible” thinking. “Could have done” means there WAS an ability to actualize the action in the past. “Can do” means there IS an ability to be able to actualize the action in the future. If it WAS or IS inevitable that you have not/will not actualize the action, you neither could have (once it wasn’t done) NOR can have (prior to it being done) actualized it. Inevitability doesn’t mix with “could have DONE” or “can DO” other than what was/is inevitable, because the two are logically incompatible.
There WAS an ability to ACTUALLY have the steak or the lobster for dinner. The chef had the makings for both. If you ordered the steak you WOULD have had the steak. But you ordered the lobster. And, if you rewind time, then it becomes true that you ACTUALLY CAN have the steak or the lobster for dinner. Now, you inevitably WILL have one or the other. But that never changes the fact that you COULD HAVE had either one. That’s how it works.
If steak was inevitable on Jan 1, 2017 @ 5:50 PM, there was no ability to ACTUALLY have lobster instead. If lobster was inevitable, there was no ability to ACTUALLY have steak instead. If you suggesting that if you have steak on Jan 1, 2017 @ 5:50 PM, and rewind time to 5:00 PM that same day, you could have lobster this time around @ 5:50PM, then you require indeterminism. If you are suggesting that @ 5:00 PM both were ontologically possible (able to actualize), you require indeterminism for that.
ME: “Waiter, what can I have for dinner tonight?”
Waiter: “Sir, there is only one actual possibility for dinner tonight. And it has been inevitable since Jan 1st at 5:50PM.”
That is the result of mixing your models. And it makes no sense. Don’t your agree?
No, the waiter has no such knowledge. Everytime we talk you confuse the epistemic (knowledge) with the ontic (fact about existence). Could have DONE is an ontological assessment (of a real act that could HAVE happened), and even if we have no knowledge about the only thing we can DO prior (the one actual possibility for dinner) – that doesn’t mean there isn’t one. We might not have any knowledge that an asteroid is hurdling toward earth until it is too late, that doesn’t negate the FACT about the asteroid.
1) “Could have DONE/Can DO” = an ontological model
2) “Inevitable” = an ontological model
3) Colloquial speak based on a lack of foreknowledge (I don’t KNOW what you will do) = an epistemic model
3 has nothing to do with 1 and 2. Only 1 and 2 are relevant for the important facts about free will abilities “EXISTING OR NOT” which is ONTOLOGICAL as well.
1. Ontologically, free will is what we call the event where a person decides for himself what he will do, free of coercion or other undue influence. Epistemologically, because we empirically observe that the even takes place, we can know that free will exist. 2. “Could have happened” means it did not happen and thus, while it was an actual possibility, it was not the inevitability. 3. Inevitability cannot negate a “could have”, if it could then we wouldn’t have the word “could”. (Irony)
1. That is what YOU call free will, a definition that bypasses the entire importance of the debate and ignores the other abilities most (free will believing) people feel they possess. 2. There is no actual possibility for something inevitable NOT to happen, and hence “could have DONE other” is an incorrect assessment. 3. No, “could” works within it, given a specific CONTEXT.
Context is important:
The Important Context of “Could Have Done Otherwise” (for the Free Will Debate)
It is the factual, ontic sense that is important for the free will topic, as without it, there is no responsibility in the strong sense that most people feel they and others possess. You also seem to leave out “DONE otherwise”, as if that is not as important.
I’m a Pragmatist. My definitions derive from how words actually operate in the real world. “Free will” operates to distinguish between a decision we make for ourselves and a choice forced upon us against our will. Your definition of free will is “freedom from reliable causation”, which is an oxymoron, because without reliable causation we cannot reliably cause any effect, and thus would have no freedom to do anything at all. So, why choose an irrational definition over a rational one?
Words depend on CONTEXT pragmatically, “in the real world”. Your definition of “free will” bypasses the pragmatic/practical importance of the free will debate:
On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
My definition of free will is, in present tense “The ability to choose between more than one viable (ontologically possible) option or action, in which that choice was up to the chooser” or in past tense “The ability to have, of one’s own accord, done otherwise” – which if we don’t have this ability (which we do not) has major implications for the “practical importance” above. It has nothing to do with “freedom from causation” as such would not be “up to the chooser or of one’s own accord”.
It is the “free will” ability that is irrational indeed, but this irrational ability is also the one required for “just desert moral responsibility”…the type most people feel they and others have (and hence have retributive attitudes, ideas of being more or less deserving, and so on). This is pragmatically very important, and people with less belief in free will belief are less retributive.
Your definition ignores context in order for you to hold on to your (unpragmatic/harmful) ideology:
The Important Context of “Could Have Done Otherwise” (for the Free Will Debate)
My definition is sufficient for moral responsibility, without claiming any supernatural powers, and it is consistent with a deterministic view. The penalty that a person “justly deserves” for criminally harming someone else is this: (a) repair the harm to the victim if feasible, (b) correct future behavior by rehabilitation if possible, (c) protect society by imprisoning until he is corrected, and (d) do no more harm to the offender than is reasonably required to do (a), (b), and (c). Agree?
A, b, and c is wholly consequentialism, not just desert moral responsibility addressed by the topic:
On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
“Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution”
“Study 1 found that people with weaker free-will beliefs endorsed less retributive, but not consequentialist, attitudes regarding punishment of criminals. Subsequent studies showed that learning about the neural bases of human behavior, through either lab-based manipulations or attendance at an undergraduate neuroscience course, reduced people’s support for retributive punishment (Studies 2–4).
The notion of “just desert” is complete nonsense without free will as I’ve defined. No one “deserves” a, b, or c, we ought inflict it because it is best consequentially….just as no one “deserves” quarantine if they contract a contagious disease, but we ought quarantine due to the consequences of not. Not only that, without free will one does not deserve more or less than another (as the notion of deserve is out) – leading to larger positions on equality (wealth, wellbeing, etc.)
Everyone deserves both justice and compassion. The criminal offender deserves an opportunity to learn to make better choices through counseling, education, addiction treatment, skills training, post-release follow-up programs. The goal of rehabilitation is to return to society a person who will make better choices of his own free will. We don’t want to follow him around for the rest of his life. Without free will, there is no such thing as rehabilitation.
It has nothing to do with “deserve” and everything to do with “being consequentially better for both the person and society”. That is all that is required for rehabilitation – is that we care about the wellbeing of conscious creatures. We don’t need faulty notions of free will which actually lead to more retributive behavior (as shown) and ideas that one person “deserves” some excess at another’s expense, or another “deserves” their expense. With belief in free will comes retributivism. With a lack of belief comes less retributivism and more rehabilitationism.
Don’t confuse correlation with causality. Christians, known for belief in free will and redemptive rehabilitation, have led prison reform historically and currently. The Quakers (www.afsc.org)/key-issues/issue/addressing-prisons) and the Catholics are leading the way (www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/criminal-justice-restorative-justice/). They are not pursuing this through philosophical abstraction, but through practical actions. Please don’t spread prejudice.
I found your comment to be misinformation and the “prejudice” part to be simply a lie, so was going to reject it, but I’ve decided to accept it and spell out the misinformation instead, but this is longer and unconversational (something I prefer not doing):
First,and most important, this issue goes far deeper than just “prison reform”, but rather attitudes of common laypersons about vengeance and retribution, hatred, attitudes that people “should get what they deserve in punishment terms”, attitudes about gross inequality justification (X deserves more than Y), blame of the poor for “being lazy”, and so on.
Regarding prison reform, whether they are religious or secular is irrelevant. The Quakers have an overall picture on any suffering impositions. The ACLU (who promotes seperation of church and state btw) and other secular groups are also very effective here: https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-policy-priorities-prison-reform, https://www.prisonpolicy.org, etc.
Regardless, the more important point is that this isn’t about certain groups! It is about current day thinking of the masses. For things to change, the population needs to recognize that retributivism is an inept idea. Right now a large bulk of the public support punitive measures:
In the US, though support the death penalty has decreased to 50% (down from 60%), 72% of republicans (who tend to be more religious btw) believe in it.
Canada:
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canadians-views-on-crime-are-hardening-poll-finds/article4311237/
“There is a strong sense that punishment is an appropriate response to criminal acts, and that we are kind of cynical about reform,” said Andrew Grenville, chief research officer at Angus Reid. “There is strong support for severely punishing people. This is not the way Canadians tend to describe themselves.”
UK: “The poll, the largest piece of independent research into public thinking on crime and punishment since the General Election last year, suggests little support for community punishments and demand for tougher prison conditions.”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/8423453/Prisons-must-be-tougher-says-survey.html
http://www.onepoll.com/public-attitudes-towards-criminal-punishment-rehabilitation-and-reform/
And the facts about free will belief have been done in more than one study, that free will belief leads to more retributivism, where as less free will belief leads to less retributivism but not less consequentialism. This isn’t correlation that cannot be inferred to causation in these studies. This is certainly NOT prejudice. This is fact. This, also, only makes sense, as free will belief tends to lead to ideas about people deserving punishment for something they “could have decided not to do” but did anyway (which is nonsense). It is the notion of “blameworthiness” here that is the problem.
And more importantly, we need to show that retributivism is unjustifiable, and the only way to do that is to show the problems with just desert moral responsibility. This is why free will skeptics, which are currently a huge minority, are working on these problems from the bottom up. For example, the Justice Without Retribution Network:
https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/research/the-justice-without-retribution-network-514.php
You seem to be under the truly problematic delusion that philosophy and practical action are mutually exclusive, when moral theory such as utilitarianism has a long historical say on many of our very laws and legal theory we have in place today. Legal theory is founded upon philosophy, it isn’t something outside of it. Stop pretending that philosophy is useless, because it is the VERY foundation of all ETHICS in legal settings (not to mention the very foundation of science which is naturalistic philosophy). A change in free will belief of the public would also drive many legal changes.
FACT: Your definition of free will bypasses the important questions that need to be asked which are the very point of the debate. That is a huge problem.
Because a significant number of people who obviously DO believe in free will REJECT retribution and vengeance, a belief in free will CANNOT be said to cause a belief in retributive penalty. It is one’s philosophy of justice, and correction, that directly causes one’s preference for retribution versus rehabilitation and prevention. The question is “what does one justly deserve?”. But you wish to erase the question rather than provide the answer as I have.
No Marvin, that is fallacious thinking. People can have OTHER reasons they reject retributivism, but to (rationally) BELIEVE in retributivism one needs to believe in a type of “just desert responsibility” that is only viable if they have a certain type of free will belief that says the person could have actually done, of their own accord, otherwise (which is false). One does not “justly deserve”, the very notion is the problem.
Again, see: “Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution” which shows higher retributive tendencies with higher free will belief and “Free to Punish: A Motivated Account of Free Will Belief“ which shows higher punitive responses with higher free will belief.
And see The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
A criminal offender justly deserves a penalty that (a) repairs the harm he caused, (b) provides an opportunity for rehabilitation, (c) protects society from further harm until his behavior is corrected, and does no more harm than is reasonably needed to accomplish this. To say that he “does not deserve” this treatment precludes our right to administer it. That is what “deserve” means. You cannot just erase all of these concepts.
No, the offender does not “deserve” a, b, or c, any more than a person with a brain tumor that causes them to do harmful things to others “deserves” painful surgery in order to remove it (rehabilitation) or “deserves” being locked up (incarceration) if the tumor cannot be removed in order to prevent further harm to others. Consequentialist motivations and actions (administering) does not require poor (and harmful) notions of “just deserve” based on poor notions of “free will”.
Well, there must be justification for any interference with a person’s rights. An innocent person does not deserve to be locked up. But a person committing criminal harm must be restrained to protect others. If his judgment is compromised by a brain tumor then he deserves medical treatment. But if acting deliberately he deserves a penalty designed to change his future deliberations. What you justly deserve depends on what is needed to protect everyone from further harm.
The justification is entirely consequentialist, it has nothing to do with “just desert”. We don’t prevent rabid dogs from biting because they “deserve to be put down for getting rabid”. We do so because they’d cause harm. We do so because of the consequences of not. We don’t quarantine a person with a harmful contagious disease because they “deserve it for accidentally contracting the disease”. We do so because letting them roam free is harmful to others. The brain tumor person does not “deserve” the painful surgery, it is consequentially better for both the person and the others the person would harm otherwise. People don’t “justly deserve” what is needed to protect everyone from further harm….it is simply consequentially better.
Yes. The consequence of committing criminal harm is that you become justly subject to correctional measures. That is what is owed you as a result of your behavior. That is the treatment that you have earned, and therefore the treatment you should expect. And I’ve explained the treatment that the offender has a right to expect (a, b, c). Those are his just deserts. And that is the real issue, “What deserts are just?” Not free will.
No, this is the very problem with free will belief. You don’t have any negative imposition “owed you as a result of your behavior”. You didn’t “earn” the (often time painful) treatment, even if you should expect it due to the need for it consequentially. They might need to “expect” a, b, or c, but not because they deserve it, not because they are “owed it”, and not because they “earned it”. It has nothing to do with just deserts, and it is that very notion is irrational and what causes all of the other problems.
In my opinion, you are shooting at the wrong target. Rather than teaching a practical, consequentialist theory of justice and correction, you are entangling more people in the free will “versus” determinism paradox. The paradox is easily resolved, preserving both scientific free will and scientific determinism. Rather than embracing the solution, you are “doubling down” on choosing sides. As always, I appreciate your generosity in allowing my comments. Thanks.
There is no paradox, the free will of importance for “just desert responsibility” is logically incoherent, and the notion of “just desert responsibility” causes a whole lot of consequentialist problems. Even moving away from prison reform and justice, people think that they deserve more wellbeing (e.g. in wealth and health, etc.) than others based on what they were lucky enough to be born to, and they blame others less fortunate for not “picking themselves up by their bootstraps”.This is tied explicitly to a belief that they could have and should have, of their own accord, done otherwise….and it leads to great inequality justifications where 8 people are allowed own more wealth than 3.6 billion people (half the population of earth). There are huge consequences if we could get people to understand that this type of free will is incoherent and the implication of that. To me, this is an extremely important, world changing target. 😉
I disagree, of course. But, as always, it has been mentally stimulating talking with you. Thanks!
I know Marvin, I don’t expect agreement (my initiative is an uphill battle). Just hope to provide a challenge and a little “food for thought”. Cheers friend.
This is simply false. Those words do not mean that at all. Anymore than left means green.
Sorry Alan, but that is simply a false assertion of “falsity”. For the free will debate (as well as for physics), this is certainly what these words commonly reference. I also mention other potential “usages” that fall outside of the free will topic. Regardless, semantic disagreements aside, we don’t require the use of the words if you insist on a different definition (as the article above says). We can simply say if all events have a cause, the type of free will required for strong moral responsibility is out, and non-caused or probabilistic events we have no control over cannot establish this type of free will either.
There are whole categories of events, well known to math, science of all persuasions and engineering that are caused yet not deterministic. My favored example for the free will phenomenon is GPS.
There is no deterministic solution for the GPS problem. The algorithm behind GPS is the Kalman Filter, which was developed to navigate the Apollo craft to the moon and back. That is a three body gravitational problem, a problem too complex for any strict analytical solution. It uses a step following step estimation technique, and the output is always a unique approximation.
Then you are not using the term as it applies to A) the free will debate or B) physics. The article above agrees that there are other possible ways to use the term, but the term for the free will debate always addresses “causal determinism”. For quantum interpretations, whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic depends entirely on if there are some events that have no causal variable or not. If a deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics is the case, all upper-level science is deterministic as well under that usage (including GPS). That being said, one might use a different usage for deterministic vs “stochastic” mathematical models (in which GPS can use either), but any stochastic process would not be considered “indeterministic”. GPS really uses a non-linear chaotic system, and chaos theory is considered entirely deterministic. Regardless, for the free will debate, there is a specific usage which refers to causal determinism – always, and for good reason. Causal probability is epistemic, not ontic (e.g. a die roll is deterministic).
Obfuscation was my first comment to your blog. Equivocation, or in the modern vernacular, gaslighting. What you are saying is that for the free will debate, 1 = 4. Words mean nothing at this point, and everyone goes away confused.
Nothing is being “obfuscated” here (the definition is clear for all to see above), and you using a different definition of “determinism” that does not nor ever has applied to the free will debate in its very long history (far longer than GPS existing) is far more in line with semantic obfuscation. BUT, as I mentioned already, the case against a free will that grants strong moral responsibility can be made without using the word “determinism”. That is because there is no “deterministic” (in any sense), “indeterministic” (in any sense), stochastic, random, acausal, causal, noncaused, probabilistic, unpredictable, chaotic, etc. event that can help here….no matter what “word” you decide on or the definition you give it. The very idea of this type of free will is logically incoherent.
Trick
Have you read Sean Carroll’s The Big Picture? He makes a good case against strong emergentism. Or read this on his blog: http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/08/01/downward-causation/
Jan
Hi Jan,
I haven’t read his book but I did read that article you linked to a while back (and a few others) and think Carroll’s position here is quite mistaken on a few different fronts. Perhaps this post I wrote on “mental causation” can help you see why I think that:
Mental Causation – A Case for Mental Causation
I also think that the “exclusion argument” is a failure, as it denotes a wrong-headed way of thinking about physics. The reality is that we do not know physics by observing particles, we know it be observing “large scale properties” (making mental models of properties via sensory input), and we assess the entirety of our “physics” based on that model. If, for example, the molecular structure of H2O at room temperature was that which we “observe” as a dry compound (rather than wet liquid), our physics about atomic spacing and what it means for the “stuff in the universe”, etc…would simply change based on the large-scale observation, regardless of the lower level. In this way, both are required for every scientific assessment, and have to be considered “equally real”. But this is a very long topic. The mental causation argument I made above is different, and is just as important.
Sidenote: This isn’t the only topic I disagree with Carroll on. 😉
Take care.
Probably you dont know that Bell theorem may not be proven if supplementary local parameters describing measuring devices are correctly taken into account. This is called: contextual loophole. It has been recently shown that statements based on Bayes theorem: : ”hidden variables depend on settings means that the experimenters have no a free will” are simply incorrect. arXiv:1602.02959 ; 1611.05021 . You may e-mail me.
Thanks Marian, I just downloaded your journal entry “EPR Paradox, Quantum Nonlocality and Physical Reality” and will for sure examine it. I find this conclusion in your abstract fascinating:
I do have a “lay-persons” appreciation for an ensemble or statistical interpretation of QM. Just browsing your paper, there is a whole lot I’d intuitively align with. It makes me wonder why so many physicists assume far more problematic quantum interpretations! Great work and thanks again.
Thanks . The mysteries sell much better !
Marian
John Stuart Mill, of his own free will, on half a pint of shandy was particularly ill.
Maybe so, but Rene Descartes was a drunken fart …”I drink, therefore I am”.
This video may be relevant as well so posting it here until I get to it deeper:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-OFP5tNtMY&t=0s
In it Murray Gell-Mann talks about how the “Sum over Histories approach” removes “spooky action at a distance”.
His critics of a spooky action on a distance is correct but his arguments in favor of many worlds and consistent histories interpretation are in my opinion non convincing. We dont need these interpretations in order to understand quantum phenomena.The wave function of the univers it is a nonsense.
Yeah, a friend of mine showed me this one, but I’m unfamiliar with Gell-Mann’s full position. I suspect he’s not in the camp of ontological (real) worlds or histories given his stance here, but not entirely sure.
That was the funniest Hitler video I’ve seen since the one where he reacts to Friday by Rebecca Black.
Hah…thanks Chandler. Just somethin’ I whipped up. Glad you like it. 😀
I must admit … I don’t agree with your continued advocating of morality.
We could end up having Dennett’s morality worth wanting or Carroll’s most useful morality.
Compatibilist morality for free deniers.
😉
Hiya Juri,
The fact of the matter is, a certain type of forward-looking consequentialist ethics is entirely compatible with a lack of free will. A lack of free will doesn’t imply ethical nihilism. The only thing a lack of free will implies is a lack of (after-the-fact) moral/ethical responsibility – and that fact is important for an ethical system. But given some of the things you have said on our podcast, there are a number of points of contention we will have that we should address at some point (consciousness being a prime example). Unfortunately, George wants to do a part 2 of our last convo this Sunday, otherwise we could get into this.
BTW, I read what you asked (Blackmore’s “Am I Conscious Now”). It was really poor thinking IMO, and seemed almost new-agey. 😉
That is not my point Trick …. compatibilist definitions of free will are compatible with science too.
So why would not a compatibilist definition of morality not be compatible with science?
A lack of free will imo should induce a radical rethink of this morality lark.
As to Sunday … will have visitors that day … so won’t be able to make it.
Do you agree with Blackmore’s observation, never mind her thinking?
And your replies should also be limited to 500 characters. 😉
A lack of free will is an important aspect to morality, but there are good (axiological, metaethical, and normative) reasons to hold on to the morality business – because conscious actions do lead to axiological consequences of importance. The problem with compatibilism is that most people believe in incoherent abilities, and compatibilism bypasses the important issue. For morality, there is a long secular history.
No, I think Blackmore’s observation is absurdist.
<500
If you say so … though I see no difference myself between compatibilist free will and compatibilist morality.
How is your morality different to that of a common or garden compatibilist?
I believe you are conflating topics. For example, a free will compatibilist can be A) a moral relativist, B) a moral nihilist, or C) a moral realist. Likewise, so can a free will incompatibilist.
Where the free will issue comes into play regarding morality is in regards to (hindsight) just-desert moral responsibility (which is not the same thing as morality in general) – which this very article alludes to the differences.
I believe you are conflating topics. For example, a free will compatibilist can be A) a moral relativist, B) a moral nihilist, or C) a moral realist. Likewise, so can a free will incompatibilist.
So that is my point there is no difference … and I believe I am not conflating anything.
The only aspect of ethics that free will addresses is “just desert” moral responsibility. It doesn’t address whether something is ethical or not, whether ethics applies or not, nor does hard incompatibilism equate to ethical nihilism (as e-realism and e-relativism are compatible with a lack of free will)
Your question is like asking “what is an atheists position on veganism (or any other topic that does not refer to the question about a god)”.
** Also re-read the post / bullet points above for the “difference”. Most compatibilists are not NSRC friendly, and there are whopping semantic problems.
Just desert?
Do you mean a measured action that will get my, your or society’s preferred response?
Don’t need the concept of ethics or morality for this.
“Just desert” meaning whether one’s actions makes them “deserving” of punishment or “deserving” of a benefit (usually at the expense of others who are deemed as “less or not deserving”).
That is what is out on the lack of free will, and has very specific implications for ethical theory – which is not “to abandon ethical theory”.
Sidenote: Preference utilitarianism (which I’d argue against) IS ethical/moral theory as well. Don’t kid yourself. 😉
This discussion makes me think about whether we can provide an inventory of everything there is, thus answering the most basic of metaphysical questions: what is there? What are the possibilities for discerning the different categories of ‘reality itself’? Are we offering a uniquely true and complete system of ontological categories? Cataloguing the highest kinds in the world itself? Generally purporting to answer deep metaphysical questions about what things or kinds of things exist?
Only if we were Laplace’s Demon. 😉
Thanks for the visit Dan. Glad you stopped by.
Hi. Although nobody deserves anything, will I not be at liberty to take or use resources according to my contribution to society? Or will equality cause those not contributing to start contributing?
Hi Carl,
For the sake of a society, we may require incentives (really to curb irrational psychologies), but we should move away from extreme inequalities. More important is that we change our mindset on “deserve notions”, and our incentive should be a better world for all (which we live in) rather than just individual incentives. 😉
Every effect has a cause and this is true. I think determinism has a problem with randomness. If everything is purely programable then we could all win the lottery. There are Ture Random Number Generators that are needed in the field of science and for computer security, and you can buy one. They reset at the same initial condition and produce a proven random output. http://cs.ucsb.edu/~koc/cren/docs/w06/trng.pdf
Thanks for the visit! The word “random” is an ambiguous word. If every event has a cause, there is no “true randomness” in the sense of an uncaused event. This differs from what the journal calls “true random generators” which is basically that the numbers are “unpredictable” – even if caused / deterministic. Now whether or not determinism or indeterminism is the case, no one knows – and depends on which interpretation of quantum mechanics is the case. 😉
thank you Trick, I appreciate the amount of work you went to. I believe every effect has a cause, but I’m having a problem with your statement : “Indeterminism: Some events do not have a cause.” If you are going to be a true determinist, Do you really mean indeterminism has a cause, but it can’t be predicted — like an equation with two variables and only one given input? It would be called indeterminate.
Thanks Woody. 🙂
A “true determinist” would need to denote a deterministic interpretation of QM (such as pilot wave theory). An indeterministic interpretation would, for example, denote a lack of a variable for an event (e.g. collapse location). I lean toward a deterministic interpretation, take issue with the idea of ontic probability, but rather than calling myself a hard determinist, I call myself a hard incompatibilist in order to cover all bases:
Why I’m a Hard Incompatibilist, Not a Hard Determinist.
Later good sir. 😀
(in-) Determinism tells us nothing is deserved (punishment), nothing is earned (inequalities). Our intuition tells us the opposite.
To resolve cognitive dissonance we can, A) Refute determinism, embrace,dualism; B) Claiming that (in-) determinism has no consequences for our morals; C) Ignore intuition, deny freewill.
A and B usually win; humans seem to have an urge to punish wrongdoers.The B’s want to appear reasonable at the same time. Some B’s are confused C’s.C’s become soft on crime.
Thanks – good thoughts. 😀
The problem with A is that dualism becomes incoherent, the problem with B is that (strong) moral responsibility (which differs from morality in general) would, therefore, be as well.
You are correct that this goes against our intuitions, which is the bigger problem -making this an uphill battle. 😉
Thanks.
Besides a freewill denier, I’m a moral nihilist and also guilty of scientism 🙂
I’m not sure, but you seem not to be a moral nihilist.
Isn’t the reasoning for denying the existence of “gods”, “freewill” or “true (objective) moral values” exactly the same (in conflict with scientific explanations)?
You are correct, I’m not a moral nihilist (though am an existential nihilist).
I’d say:
But these are big topics.
Yes, discussing these would be a bit off-topic.
Thanks, again.
I didn’t chose to visit this website.
Jawohl, mein Führer!
(Since my comment was too short, I was told to “Bit the back button.” That could be Zen koan.)
Hello,
I would like to know what you think of this: How can I adapt to the fact that I live surrounded by humans who haven’t realized that free will is an illusion? I mean, should I spread the word (and face probable confrontation, denial etc.)? It seems to me that most people are just not fit to this understanding… how can I get as much as possible from the fact that I am aware? I have a problem with people not understanding and how to cope with it, I think 🙂
Tx,
YG
Hi, thanks for the visit Yves-Georges Gagnon Nault. I’m an advocate of (carefully) educating people on the topic, but this is an uphill battle and in the meantime, we simply have to understand that people are indoctrinated with free will beliefs and attitudes from day one, and that change may need to be more of a slow, generational process. The information era has just begun. 😉
Right! Thanks for your answer Trick.
However I am still confused as to determining what strategy to adopt to face society… I don’t feel like educating people (at least not now) because I am not ready yet, but I don’t feel like taking advantage of society with this knowledge… or is there even a way to do that?
When I say strategy, I mean what attitude can I adopt to get the most of it without “hurting” myself to others and be at peace with the whole thing?
Some of the main attituded to try to adopt are: Less blame (self and other) and more understanding and compassion over causal variables. Less feeling of (anyone or yourself) being more or less deserving than another leading to greater concern over equality. Less egoism and more interconnectedness. Any retributive feelings for things done should be replaced with just a future looking consequence concern.
I’d suggest the best place to start is thoroughly understanding what it means (and just as important – what it does not mean) if you and others have no free will…and also go over some of the benefits:
10 Benefits of Not Believing in Free Will
I’m an believer in agent causation. I also think unicorns make rainbows…in a workshop somewhere in the Yukon.
I don’t think your position is too controversial. You have just come down on the side of not believing that determinism is true (which seems to be the trend nowadays). But if the headlines read tomorrow “Determinism Proven True” your hard incompatibilist position wouldn’t change one iota (although your EXPLANATION for why we in fact lack FW/MR would change)
If determinism was proven true, I would automatically revert to Hard Determinism, as there would be no longer a need to address indeterminism. But yes, the free will of importance is incompatible regardless. Thanks for the visit Jason. 😉
It seems very probable to me that consciousness is a “software icing” on a very complex “software layer cake” within a vastly more complex electro-chemical hardware system that is the human brain.
As such it is subject to many factors, like Heisenberg uncertainty, many levels of error and uncertainty, resulting in aspects that approximate strict causality quite closely and other aspects that are far more probabilistic and a few aspects that are chaotic and stochastic.
I like your cake/icing analogy. Regarding the small scale whether something is “truly” probabilistic (rather than it being just a ‘lack of knowledge’ type of probabilism) or acausal would depend on the quantum interpretation being postulated.
Can’t infer “no one could do other than what the 100% prediction predicted, at the time of decision.” What a person *will* not do, no matter how definitely, is not the same as *could* not do. It could not be the case that { (A) the laws of nature are L1, L2,… and (B) the past facts are P1, P2, … and (C) the person does other than A at time t}. We cannot infer: It could not be the case that the person does other than A at time t.
The inference is there: If the person does other than A at time t, the 100% prediction that they will do A at time t can no longer be a 100% prediction and that premise (of it being a 100% prediction) is contradicted. They “could” not without contradicting the premise of the 100% prediction they “will” not. No modal scope fallacy.
Suppose, in the scenario where the person does not-A at t, the predictor would have predicted not-A. Then the predictor and all its predictions could still be 100%. No contradiction.
“It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25, 2150 AD, 20 years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195. “
Given that prediction, could Jeremy have chosen not to rob the bank at that time?
Narrow scope of “could”, Jeremy could have. Broad scope, no it could not have been the case that {the computer made its predictions based on (cite specific facts here) and Jeremy had chosen not to rob}. Your phrasing suggests broad scope, so then, no.
This is the phrasing/scope of the study….and you are right: “no”
“…imagine such a supercomputer actually did exist and actually could predict the future, including Jeremy’s robbing the bank (and assume Jeremy does not know about the prediction)”
“Could Jeremy have chosen not to rob the bank”
If you lop off the “Given that prediction” part, then the phrasing is more suggestive of narrow scope. In surveys, exact phrasing often matters; but of course I don’t know if that’s true here.
Sure, but for this particular study, they go out of their way to make the prediction part very clear for that very reason:
…including Jeremy’s robbing the bank (and assume Jeremy does not know about the prediction)…”
Yet people still say that Jeremy could have decided to not rob the bank. This is a big problem. I do understand your concern over the context of the words “could have”.
I disagree with your taxonomy of “coulds”. What you call “ontic” are modal. Ability statements are modal and, unless otherwise specified, default to being about just the object or person in question, not all the surrounding conditions. (Can this car do 100?) Which makes them “iffy”. (If you floor it.)
This simply is not true when the modality is about counterfactual non-abilities for ontological reality. “Can a car do 100” falls under either the counterfactual (IF the car is driven in such a way, can…) or the epistemic usage in the post I linked. The ontological reality is that a car in a garage that is never nor ever will be driven (due to antecedent causality in a deterministic universe) could never have DONE 100, even if it is a Venom GT with no broken parts, because the surrounding conditions are a part of the assessment for an ontological “ability” (something that can really happen). This is why context is important.
The ontological reality is that the Venom GT can do 100 – this ability is a bundle of dispositions that, sadly, will never be triggered. That’s what “can” means as applied to cars. What does “can really happen” even mean on your view, if not “does happen”, and how does science discover it?
The ontological reality is that the Venom GT can only do 100 IF it can be triggered to do 100. If it cannot be triggered (for any reason) it cannot do 100 in reality. “Can really happen” means that it can be actualized as a real space-time event. This is why ontological possibility differs greatly from epistemic possibility or counterfactual analysis and why context matters.
We agree that there are “can” statements about the GT that are true; you call them counterfactual, but any “can” covers multiple scenarios, even when an actual one suffices to satisfy it. We agree there are “can’t” statements which mention the GT and other factors, which are also true. No reason has been given to call one uniquely “real”. An explanation re-using “can” doesn’t help much.
I’d suggest that it is untrue that “any can covers multiple scenarios”, when under causal determinism multiple scenarios “cannot” – only one “can” (in the real sense of having the ability to be actualized in the world). The reason they are either counterfactual or epistemic is that they require an implicit “if”, and if that “if” is ontologically impossible (cannot be actualized in reality given determinism) then the reality is that those scenarios “cannot” be actualized either.
By “covers multiple scenarios” I meant: multiple scenarios are relevant to its truth or falsity. Bad phrasing, sorry. Careful specification can pick out a system which includes a human and which system “can” only do one thing. But system-wide specification isn’t scientifically privileged and isn’t relevant to human decision making.
At this point I’m unclear on what you mean by “careful specification” vs “system wide specification” (the links do not offer clarity here). Do you really mean specification vs generalization (and lack of knowledge about the future)? Also, don’t know why “human” would make a difference here.
To be clear on what we are addressing in the above: There is *specification* of causally deterministic scenarios (even absolute 100% predictions) yet people still denote “otherwise” abilities that fall outside of the specification. 😉
System-wide specification is key; one way to specify the system could be to consider everything within a light-year of the bank that Jeremy will rob. This *system* can’t terminate in an un-robbed bank. But the people in the surveys didn’t say the *system* could do so.
The majority of people in the survey are actually saying that the 100% prediction (by the 100% accurate “system” that they were supposed to imagine true for the scenario) of the robbed bank could be wrong. That “Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank”. This is pretty straight-forward from where I sit.
We’re back to that modal scope fallacy you say you avoided. If Jeremy could have chosen differently, that doesn’t imply the computer would make a wrong prediction, it implies the computer would have predicted that other action. Yes, that’s modal reasoning, but there’s no way to ground “necessity” without modality.
Naw…we are really just back to you suggesting a fallacy that does not apply (a fallacy that only applies to a strawman). The prediction is the accepted “contingency”, not “necessity”.
Modal reasoning that suggests a different prediction cannot be used once the 100% prediction is given and asked to be accepted (which it is for the scenario). To suggest the machine could give a different prediction than what is in the scenario is completely outside of the given / accepted scenario (the contingency).
So, when survey subjects said Jeremy “could” have avoided robbing, are you interpreting that as an epistemic “could”? I.e. “as far as I, survey subject, can tell from the given info, it might or might not happen”? That would certainly be a mistake, but I don’t think that’s what they mean.
BOTH a modal assessment AND a modeless assessment of “otherwise” would be mistaken.
They were given a contingent constraint to assume (an assumption enforced more than once).
1) If they do not assume the constraint and modally go outside of it for an “otherwise” (as I think you are suggesting) – that is a mistake.
2) If they assume it and still say an “otherwise” – that is a mistake.
Either way, it is a problem with how lay-persons reason for this subject/question. Now I intuit that 2 is probably happening (not 1), but either way, there is an issue none-the-less.
The question asks whether or not Jeremy could have chosen not to rob the bank. That’s a narrow-scope modal question. The natural and charitable interpretation of answers is as narrow-scope modal answers. The survey didn’t ask, “if you answered yes, then what about the prediction?” but the obvious reply is that the action is evitable, and the prediction inevitably mirrors it.
A modal question does not assume that any answer is reasonable or logically consistent. “Yes” is not a reasonable answer once the scenario is given. There is not a .0000000000000000001% chance that Jeremy could have decided not to rob the bank if the prediction he would rob it is 100%. This also is a modal question:
Assuming there is only a single six sided die that has 1 through 6 (no 7s) on the sides, could that die land on a 7 for a single roll?
Yes – it could if it was a 7 (or more) sided die with a 7 on a side is not a reasonable answer. It is outside of the scope to the given scenario. Here are some reasonable modal answers:
No.
No, landing on a 7 is not possible in that scenario.
No, a six sided die with no seven cannot roll a 7.
I don’t know.
A die having 7+ sides would not be *that* die. It would be another. Thus, a narrow-scope “could that die roll a 7?” gets a No. But a Jeremy that didn’t rob a bank could still be Jeremy. To get an inevitably robbed bank, we need to ask a wide-scope modal question, including additional features of the scene into the scope of the “could” question. See also “Dispositional Compatibilism” at vihvelin.com
People thinking there is a difference here is a part of the problem. A 100% prediction machine that predicts that Jeremy will not rob the bank would not be *that* 100% prediction machine that is to be assumed (no different than *that* die). The Jeremy that didn’t rob the bank would not be *the* Jeremy who is in *the* ONLY universe logically compatible with *the* 100% prediction machine *we must assume* exists for the scenario. The mistake is thinking that a 7 sided die would be “more different” than A) 100% prediction machine that predicts Jeremy does not rob the bank OR B) a non-bank robbing Jeremy OR C) a universe where the different prediction machine and different Jeremy exist. Absolutely no different than a universe in which “the die” has 7 sides.
That isn’t correct. Take the spatial region consisting only of the die, and consider the laws of physics that apply to it: it’s already clear that the die never rolls a 7. Embed it in any larger context, it doesn’t matter. But take the prediction machine. Embed it in various contexts: that *does* matter: the prediction varies. Similarly for Jeremy, the action varies by context.
The ONLY distinction is that there being a 7 sided die (rather than a 6) is more obvious of a configuration difference than there being a different internal configuration of the 100% prediction machine….but in both cases there is a different atomic configuration. The prediction doesn’t just vary with the same configuration, the configuration varies. Again, this is no different to the point of this discussion….which is that the context is given (it cannot be embedded in other contexts). Same with Jeremy.
Again, the context is given, but it is not included in the scope of the “could” as phrased in the survey question. With regard to internal configuration, the prediction machine existed before it got evidence for its prediction of a robbed bank. At that early time, its configuration allows various predictions depending on context.
Yes, the context is included in the scope of the “could” as phrased in the survey question:
“… imagine such a supercomputer actually did exist and actually could predict the future, including Jeremy’s robbing the bank (and assume Jeremy does not know about the prediction)” —> the “could” question.
The scope of the question is not an epistemic one about prior to the prediction. It is perfectly clear that the scope purposely places the 100% prediction machine predicting the bank rob, assuming that is true, and then asking the question under that assumption.
That quote is only a statement, not the question. It lists did-happens, not had-to-happens. Of course *some* subjects may have interpreted these preparatory statements as included in the scope of the “could” – and said Jeremy couldn’t. Perhaps it would help to imagine another survey, in which events after the robbery are given as context. There’s a run on the bank, which would be 0% probable without a robbery. Could Jeremy have avoided robbing?
The “did-happen” is the prediction of Jeremy robbing the bank by a 100% accurate predicting machine – and the participants are being asked to accept that specific “did-happen” when answering the question. It doesn’t matter if the back-story scenario is not the question, the question is in reference TO the acceptance of the scenario.
But consider my alternate survey, in which the run on the bank 100% retrodicts Jeremy’s robbery. (No other robber is so infamous as to trigger a run on the bank.) A *bigger* majority of subjects would answer my survey “Jeremy could have avoided,” yes? But you wouldn’t accuse them of ignoring or misunderstanding the scenario, would you?
Edit, to clarify, in my alternate survey, there is no prediction, only the retrodiction.
One could technically invoke indeterminism into your scenario. If, however, you also included that they are to assume A) that the universe is entirely deterministic and B) the initial conditions that precede the retrodiction are the same….and they still say “yes” – we’d have a similar problem to the 100% prediction.
In my scenario, the universe may as well be completely *necessary*-cause deterministic. But that’s overkill: Jeremy’s robbery is a 100% necessary cause for the bank run; that’s all you need to know. The scenario states that Jeremy did the robbery, and that the bank run occurred, and that the latter cannot occur without the former. If subjects given my scenario say Jeremy could have refrained, is that a mistake?
If you say “assuming the perfect retrodiction 100% of the time is such that it shows that Jeremy robbed the bank” and then ask – could Jeremy have not robbed the bank? At that point “YES” – it would be a mistake. This would be a little more analogous to assuming the 100% prediction that Jeremy will rob the bank. The main distinction is that you MUST backtrack prior to the retrodiction for the “could” question but you should not backtrack prior to the prediction for it.
Well, at least you’re consistent. But you’re consistently wrong. Unless the question explicitly scopes the retrodiction and the robbery both under the could: “Could the reliable retrodiction be given and Jeremy not rob the bank?” Failing that, you’re just imposing your own personal grammar/pragmatics interpretation, and misinterpreting the answers of any subjects who, quite reasonably, read it differently.
When the convo starts going down the (ironic btw) sarcastic jabs rabbit hole, it is perhaps time to call it quits with the ol’ “agree to disagree” mantra.
As I said, your analogy is not analogous. The 100% prediction of the bank rob is [undeniably] to be assumed for the question, and therefore it IS explicitly tied to the “could” question. Denying that (which is what you are attempting to do) is to impose your own separation of the (repeated) scenario from the question. To suggest that people “read this differently” is simply to suggest that people are unable to comprehend what it says – not that they have a “reasonable interpretation” at all.
You said that my clarified survey would be “a little more analogous” but you didn’t say what disanalogy remains. The original survey wording “imagine such a supercomputer actually did exist and actually *could* predict the future … Do you think that, when Jeremy robs the bank, he acts of his own free will?” Emphasis added. It does not specify what the prediction was as part of the question.
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Edit, oops, I ellipsis’d over the main supporting fact of your argument, which is unfair: “could predict the future, including Jeremy’s robbery” But still, I think it’s reasonable for subjects to backtrack. The computer *could* predict the future including robbery, or it *could* predict the future had it included no robbery. The “could” language suggests the particular prediction is open to circumstance, not a given.
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So to clarify, I was wrong to say it didn’t specify what prediction was given. But it’s still a matter of interpretation whether that particular prediction gets scoped under “Jeremy could have…”.
Allow me to quote the whole scenario below for FULL context:
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“Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25, 2150 AD, 20 years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195. As always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195.”
“imagine such a supercomputer actually did exist and actually could predict the future, including Jeremy’s robbing the bank (and assume Jeremy does not know about the prediction)”
================================================================================
When it says “imagine such a computer actually did exist” it is referring to the computer that made the prediction in the scenario, not some other version that did not make the prediction.
Also, the distinction (the disanalogy) between your scenario and the one above is that yours is that of necessary causality and the prediction is sufficient. Necessary causality need not lead to the same outcome on “rewind”, sufficient causality must. Also the prediction is to be assumed. This is why I adjusted yours to prevent any change in retrodiction (making it more analogous)…just as there can be no change in the above prediction if we are to imagine the computer in the actual scenario.
FYI – I didn’t see your edit comments when I responded, but my comment addresses them none-the-less….so I tacked them onto your other comment for proper order. To reiterate my point: The prediction is not open to interpretation and the “could” question is in reference to it.
Necessary causality always leads to the same outcome on trace-back, just as sufficient causality always leads, on trace-forward. Yet, more subjects will “forward-track” on my survey, saying Jeremy could have refrained and the retrodiction would then be different, which by your logic should be prohibited just as backtracking is verboten on the original. We should probably agree to disagree about the difference between background facts for a question and items scoped under its “could”.
For a “could have done otherwise” question – we bring back to before the action took place… and then denote if (forward) playout “could be different”. On necessary causality (your retrodiction scenario) it “could”, on sufficient causality (the prediction scenario) it “could not”. Unless you are looking to play the universe out “in reverse” (backward) from the retrodiction to the action (in which a backward playout could NOT play out otherwise given necessary causality), it is disanalogous.
Indeed – we should agree to disagree on whether one can make up their own referents for the “could” question or not.
Yes, that’s exactly how subjects evaluated “could have done otherwise”. And the reason they get to dismiss the retrodiction in my scenario, is that it’s *dependent* on Jeremy’s decision. And the reason in general that people would bring back to shortly before the action, is they think that’s sufficient to remove all such dependents. Remaining facts are “fixed”. Except, in prediction scenarios, some subjects begin to doubt that, and to backtrack instead.
But it is not sufficient to remove dependants for the prediction scenario, so their thinking is flawed.
If brought back to right before Jeremy decided (or even a year before he was even born) and re-played…
Prediction scenario: Jeremy’s decision could not be otherwise.
Retrodiction scenario (assuming no sufficient causality): Jeremy’s decision could be otherwise.
The retrodiction scenario was meant to foreground your time-asymmetric rule for evaluating “could have done otherwise”. I say that subjects usually follow your rule, but sometimes they don’t. However “wrong” they may be, they think more like Yudkowsky: http://lesswrong.com/lw/rb/possibility_and_couldness/ They needn’t deny determinism.
Yudkowsky is merely back at counter-factual usages that would fall outside of the “prediction” scenario: “You could eat the banana, IF you wanted. And you could jump off a cliff, IF you wanted.”
This is no different than “Jeremey could have not robbed the bank, IF the 100% prediction said he did not” or the “die could have rolled a 7 IF it was a die with more than 6 sides”. Unfortunately, that “IF” is not the scenario. We are just full-circle back at stressing the importance of CONTEXT.
OK, I get that you think the counterfactual usage is wrong (at least in this survey), whereas I think it is the only usage that is ever relevant to ability questions. But even if I and all the survey subjects who use that approach are likewise wrong, still it’s a *different* mistake than thinking causality doesn’t apply to Jeremy.
Counterfactuals could be relevant to ability questions – as long as they are not a counterfactual of the given scenario that is asked to be accepted (e.g.”IF” other than the scenario). I also have much doubt that laypersons are thinking “Jeremey could have not robbed the bank, IF the 100% prediction said he did not” – but we don’t really know what exactly is in their minds (would be interesting to follow up with a “why” question). Another study shows that many laypersons use both deterministic and indeterministic responses depending on the question. On a perhaps related tangent – I also argue that a lack of sufficient causality is incoherent for an entirely causal account.
Perhaps people see the counterfactual arrow pointing the other way: IF Jeremy had not robbed, THEN the prediction would have said he wouldn’t. Again, however “wrong” that might be. Also, note that in my retrodiction, subjects who forward-track are taking a counterfactual “of the given scenario” insofar as they counter-fact away the retrodiction.
Perhaps – my point is that no matter how they are coming to their conclusion, it is a problematic conclusion given the scenario. 😉
[RE: RETRODICTION] This is why I initially said that this would be more analogous to the prediction scenario: “assuming the perfect retrodiction 100% of the time is such that it shows that Jeremy robbed the bank”…because for the prediction scenario the prediction is to be assumed (and cannot be “counter-facted away” without changing the assumed scenario).
Certainly, if we use your rule for evaluating “could have done otherwise” (CHDO) then the backward-pointing-counterfactual-arrow thinking is problematic. On 100% retrodiction, that’s how I was thinking of it, but I failed to make that clear early on, my apologies. And I also apologize for that silly “consistency” dig. I think the CHDO rule is fallible, but that’s a subject for another day.
No apologies necessary, I actually appreciate your thought process in our discussion very much, and you kept it civil which is even more important for disagreement. This discussion “caused” some interesting thought on my end – that is for sure. I’m sure we can go on and on debating CHDO…but you are right, another day. 😉
SIDE TOPIC
Regarding Vihvelin, there is a lot wrong with her assessments and I should probably write a full post at some point specifically on her position, but this comment is going to briefly summarize some problems I see right off the bat (though there are far more to address) – and since I’m dealing with a link to a lot of content I’m breaking my short comment rule this time in order to address the link. If you want to stay conversational, it would be better to address a specific point rather than link with a “see X”. Say something like: “Dispositional Compatibilism makes this point…” (you can link then) and that would give us something to haggle back and forth on. On to the link in general:
First, for “determinism”, Vihvelin starts by conflating the important distinction between sufficient and necessary causality – in which we only need sufficiency for determinism. Her first logic board addresses necessary (rather than sufficient) causality.
She then addresses (IF) counterfactual assessments (in light of the above) that do not apply to the point of determinism. Whether B or C are the case is equally causally dictated (given determinism). Counterfactuals do not free “free will” from the grips of determinism. In a deterministic universe, if B happens and C does not, given the same initial conditions of the universe, B had to happen and C couldn’t have happened. Counterfactuals that address an otherwise miss the point.
Regarding her so called “dispositional compatibilism”, once again the layperson beliefs are not logically consistent (with nature) as this person claims. She’s simply wrong on the “compatibility” between people’s “dispositions” and the “natural world” here. No one doubts we have the causal powers she proposes, or that people have counterfactual dispositions, the issue is in regards to other powers that people think they have… being inconsistent with reality – allowing for things such as retributivism which is pervasive in free will thinking as studies show.
She is one of those compatibilists that are part of the problem, where as compatibilism doesn’t have to contrive like that. For her to conclude “we’ve got the free will we think we have” is blatantly false as the above post shows in numerous ways.
That being said, thanks for sharing the link. At some point I will have to fully debunk it. Now back to our regularly scheduled discussion leaving off on the “die roll” analogy.
END SIDE TOPIC
500 chars is not enough to reply, and anyway, I gave the reference just so you could see where I’m coming from. Two remarks though. The whole point of compatibilism is not to dodge the “grips of determinism” but to note how free the grip leaves us. And some people do doubt human causal powers: fatalism wasn’t invented by philosophers.
Agreed. I was only referring to Vihvelin in the link you provided, which makes the wrongheaded claim that the normal definition of determinism is wrong (tries to revise that as well). I mispoke when I wrote “no one” (“no one” was meant colloquially – not meant as literally “no one” – there is always “someone” who believes in flat earth theory, etc.). I was only referring the majority of philosophical rational hard determinists / hard incompatibilists that do not also conclude fatalism. But yes, there are indeed fatalists out there. We don’t need compatibilism to denote the problems with fatalism while bypassing other important topics.
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Vivhelin *agrees* that necessary causality is the wrong definition of determinism, and sufficient causality is the right one. That’s the point of the first logic diagram. The best scientific deterministic theories are bidirectionally deterministic, though, so it seems to me like a mere technicality.
The problem is with her suggesting that a sufficient cause analysis goes against most of those definitions she provides. It does not – as most of those definitions are in line with sufficient causality and do not require necessary causality.
Her point can be seen in the question “So what would happen if A were true at W1? Would B be true, or C or both?” –> it just does not matter for determinism (in most of those definitions she provides) whether we can know from A being true if B is true, C is true, or both are true. The only requirement is that B or C are causally dictated by a past event or events.
That being said, agreed on “bidirectional” being a physics staple anyway.;-)
She doesn’t suggest a sufficient-cause analysis goes against the definitions. She suggests the definitions would be *satisfied* by a necessary-cause physics. Which is a problem (technically).
I don’t see that. It seems to me (at least for the first logic diagram) that she is saying that determinism would be satisfied without necessary-cause (ml-FROM) physics (which is technically true). That fact, however, doesn’t go against most of those definitions of determinism. I could be misinterpreting her on this.
It’s sneaky. In W1 node A is false (empty circle). So from the *actual* events at t1 one *can* infer description at t2, but in physically *possible* world W2 one couldn’t. The argument presupposes a non-Humean understanding of causal laws.
Agreed. She assumes a lack of necessary causality (but again, most versions of determinism do not rely on necessary causality, only sufficient causality- hence my criticism). Assuming there is necessary causality, however, there would be “more than just true or false” to account for to backtrack to B or C (so she’d be over-simplifying for her point).
Wrote a 10,500 character response, before being told of the 500 character limit.
Anyone interested can read it at https://tedhowardnz.wordpress.com/2017/12/01/free-will-again/
Heh, sorry about that Ted. I do mention the 500 character limit in the yellow section above the comment box (and the reason for it).
In regards to whether determinism or indeterminism is the actual case, that depends on which interpretation of QM is being postulated. There are deterministic interpretations. Also chaos theory is deterministic. 🙂
Free will meaning “being able to develop degrees of influence” sounds like you might be a sort of compatibilist?
I don’t know how anyone can make a “Deterministic” interpretation of QM, it is probabilities and can instantiate stuff from nothing.
Hard to make that “Deterministic”.
With uncertainty in boundary conditions then degrees of influence between systems can vary substantially with context.
Once one realises that, then one can manage levels of context (to the degree such is possible).
One is always subject to degrees of influence, and one can develop degrees of freedom.
Delicate balance.
You have to already be assuming an indeterministic interpretation of QM (such as Copenhagen) in order to assert “can instantiate stuff from nothing”. Probabilities for a completely causally deterministic interpretation are epistemic only. One example of a deterministic interpretation is Pilot WaveTheory.
I assume little.
I observe.
I understand the systemic underpinnings of evolution.
I understand many of our tendencies to simplify and our attachment to being “right”.
Evolution only needs to be “close enough”.
Reality seems like it is very probably similar.
QM seems to support that proposition.
It allows for observed degrees of freedom.
Why let deterministic presuppositions rule?
Why not look at the data and see what assumptions fit best – rather than letting dogma rule?
I’d suggest the less dogmatic position would be one that is *agnostic* on determinism or indeterminism – considering we don’t know which interpretation actually applies “to the data”.
Sounds like a reasonable idea – how does it apply to “breaking the free will illusion” ? 😉
Both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with the free will that is of practical importance for “just desert moral responsibility” or what I call “strong responsibility” here: Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC 😀
It is difficult to call a claim like “Reality seems like it is very probably similar” dogmatic 😉
To be honest I don’t really parse that particular sentence. Similar denotes a comparison, but it is not clear what reality is being compared to for the sentence. 🙂
Great article ‘Trick.
Determinism can’t be separated from fatalism. You can’t just say “what happens in the future does so regardless of our causal consciousness”, as our consciousness is PART OF the material universe, therefore it’s controlled by universal laws, like everything else. Determinism equals fatalism.
What I find about discussions on free will, is that people are scared of having zero choice, so play mental gymnastics to create some angle where free will is true.
*Note: I had worded the previous comment more politely, but with the 500 character limit, I had to strip out all ‘polite padding’! I was trying to add that I empathise with wanting some form of free will to be true, even though I don’t believe in free will.
Hi Mike, thanks. I agree with you that “our consciousness is PART OF the material universe, therefore it’s controlled by universal laws, like everything else.” I wouldn’t call that “fatalism” however. See here for the (important) distinctions most make between determinism and fatalism:
Determinism vs. Fatalism – InfoGraphic (a comparison)
Hi ‘Trick – enjoying your site a lot, and this page is great fun. Fantastic idea. I’ll put it in my diary. September 0th. 😉
Thanks a bunch John – glad you are liking. 🙂
Is that supposed to be Dennet? lol
I think so (or at least something close)…lol. 🙂
Hi Trick, Reliable cause and effect is neither coercive nor undue, so it poses no threat to free will. Our choices are reliably caused by our purpose and our reasons, so our free will poses no threat to determinism. The illusion of conflict is created by a logic error called the “reification fallacy”. We mistakenly treat the concept of “reliable cause and effect” as if it were an external force controlling our choices (choices which we supposedly would have made differently without it).
Hey Marvin, LTNS. Hope all is well. I’m sure we have gone over this in the far past. If you define free will as being “free from coercion, etc.”…you are just (re)defining free will different than the traditional usage. You are a compatibilist. At that point we revert to:
The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
and perhaps:
A Compatibilism / Incompatibilism Transformation
Indeed, it is about definitions. The question is why you would continue to use a definition that we both agree is irrational rather than the one that makes sense and which everyone understands and uses correctly.
Hadn’t seen a tweet from you in a long time, so thought I should stop by and say Hello. Happy Holidays!
Because:
1) People believe they and others have the abilities in that “irrational” definition, regardless if they also think they have your version of free will abilities as well.
2) People believe they and others are “just desert responsible” in the strong sense here: Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC
3) That “irrational” definition is the one of importance for the question about “just desert responsibility”. If we do not have it, we cannot BE responsible in this sense.
Happy Holidays. 🙂
1) People correctly believe that their choices are caused by their own purpose and their own reasons. No magic required.
2) People correctly believe that most criminal behavior is due to deliberate choices.
3) People correctly believe that rehabilitation can enable making better choices.
4) People correctly believe that prison is necessary for incorrigible offenders.
5) People correctly believe that they are the final responsible cause of their choices.
^Some, ….HOWEVER MOST:
1) People incorrectly believe that they and others could have done otherwise given a scenario where that is impossible
2) People incorrectly assign blameworthiness to people.
3) People incorrectly support retributive punishment, especially if they believe in free will.
See studies: “Free to Punish: A Motivated Account of Free Will Belief” and “Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution”…as well as others.
What penalty does a criminal offender “justly deserve”?
A. Repair the harm to the victim if possible.
B. Separation from others until the behavior is corrected.
C. An opportunity to change through rehabilitation.
D. No harm beyond what is reasonably needed to accomplish A, B, and C.
Correlation is not causation. Retribution is not about free will, but one’s philosophy of justice. I believe you’ll find that most of those who are actively involved in prison reform believe in free will.
It (A, B, or C) should not be about notion of “deserve” AT ALL, just as someone who contracts a contagious disease does not “deserve quarantine” even if we must quarantine them anyway so they cannot harm others. You (just like most compatibilists) conflate the important distinction between consequentialism or pragmatism with “just desert moral responsibility”–> these are very different things. And you are ignoring the evidence that the more people believe in free will the more they justify retributive positions: Again, see “Free to Punish: A Motivated Account of Free Will Belief” and “Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution”.
Trick, in the “Free to punish” paper, please note in the abstract the DIRECTION of influence. The subjects were given scenarios of immoral behavior, and their desire to prevent such behavior motivated their wish to punish the offender. The need to punish influenced the degree of culpability assigned. And that in turn led them to assign greater free will. It was NOT free will that motivated the desire to punish. It was the nature of the crime. The authors’ conclusions are bogus.
Yes, the desire to punish motivated their free will belief (which is not any better than the reverse) “Across 5 studies using experimental, survey, and archival data and multiple measures of free will belief, we tested the hypothesis that a key factor promoting belief in free will is a fundamental desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors.”
Also in “Free will and punishment: a mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution” (I’ll just go outside of the 500 character limit to display the abstract):
You seem to have confirmation bias. By the way, it is also very obvious that most people hold retributive tendencies (not simply your A, B, and C as you like to claim, as most do not hold your D), to deny this is to reject the world we live in.
There is “a fundamental desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors”. Holding responsible is another deterministic tool for modifying behavior. The role of free will is to distinguish between a deliberately chosen act versus an act forced upon you against your will. After the Marathon bombing, the Tsarnaev brothers hijacked a car and forced the driver to assist their escape. The driver should not be held responsible because he was not acting of his own free will.
“Just desert moral responsibility” is a wrongheaded deterministic tool. Just because something is “deliberately chosen” does not mean that the very deliberation wasn’t caused ultimately by events outside of a person’s control. We need to prevent “bombing psychologies” from bombing just as we need to prevent someone with a brain tumor that causes them to go on a shooting spree from continuing to do so. If you were the bombers atom for atom, biology for biology, and environment for environment – you would do the exact same thing.
Maybe this video will help you understand: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h-GkUHI2888
The pragmatic question is how to correct the behavior. If it is due to the deliberate choice of a normal mind, then we must provide an opportunity for rehabilitation. Part of that rehabilitation is holding them responsible for their past choices so that they will know they will be held responsible for their future choices. Rehabilitation presumes free will and it is impossible without it.
Annnnd… this is where you go off the deep end.
Again you conflate pragmatism with moral responsibility. These are not the same thing. It is due to the BRAIN of the person that we must rehabilitate, the choice just reflects the problem with the brain.
We don’t rehabilitate those with a mental illness because they are ‘just desert responsible”, and yet no one assumes they have free will…. therefore, per your reasoning, the rehabilitation of mentally ill people is impossible.
Annyyywayyy…this is where we always butt heads. Time to call it quits rather than fall down this rabbit-hole once again. 😉
The brain is the person. There is no dualism. If the problem is physical abnormality, we treat it physically. If the problem is habits of thinking, we treat it psychologically with counseling, education, etc. Note that when you eliminate free will, you conflate the two. We cannot legally treat a sane person as if they were insane. Those are the pragmatics. Rehab presumes a normal brain with freedom to choose between the legal and the illegal option.
The fact that we need to “treat” different physical configurations differently has no relevance for the free will of practical importance, only for your version of free will.
The person with the “problem in habits of thinking” is not “more deserving” or “more blameworthy” than the person with the the physical abnormality. The conflation is you not understanding the distinction between being “deserving” and a difference in pragmatic or consequentialist actions. Also, this notion of normal is contrived, as there is no need to rehab a “normal brain”. We rehab because there is an abnormal (or rather harmful) psychological configuration, regardless if it needs to be treated through a psychological mechanism.
We can never blame people for who they are, we can only blame them for what they do. Blame, which identifies the responsible cause of the criminal harm, is the first logical step in correction. Even Christians profess this distinction when they suggest we should “hate the sin, but love the sinner”. They believe in free will, of course. But that does not blind them to the circumstances in which a person is raised.
Someone is not “blameworthy” for what they do, if what they do is caused by who they are at any given moment in time (which per you we cannot blame them for). Your usage of the term “blame” is disconnected from the notion of “blameworthiness” in the “just desert” sense that is important. In your usage, since the person with the mental illness is the responsible cause of the criminal harm, then they are equally “to blame” as the person who does not have a diagnosed illness. Same with a broken machine going on a rampage. You cannot have your cake and eat it too.
I do not accept Caruso using the term “just deserts” for a penalty that is morally wrong. The meaning of the phrase is literally, “the justice that one deserves”, and that justice is to repair the harm to the victim, correct the offender through rehabilitation, protect the public from the offender until corrected, and nothing more. That is “just deserts”. And, pragmatically, blame is the first step in the correction process. It identifies the wrongful act and who did it.
JUST DESERT: (idiomatic) A punishment or reward that is considered to be what the recipient deserved.
It may appear that they’re getting ahead by cheating, but they’ll get their just deserts in the end.
Synonyms: payback, poetic justice, comeuppance
DESERVE: to merit, be qualified for, or have a claim to (reward, assistance, punishment, etc.) because of actions, qualities, or situation.
——-[ >500 just to copy definitions above – now on to comment…]———–
None of this “just desert” is qualified via rehabilitation, repair, protection, pragmatism, or consequentialism. It is about an action or quality that grants the person a deserving status, just because of that action or quality happens ALONE! If taking an action on a person could never rehabilitate them or repair or protect others, a wrongdoer would still deserve punishment per “just desert”.
This is the problem with compatibilist semantic shifters. You don’t care about how words are really used.
Caruso’s complaint, then, is about a specific “brand of justice”. We correct this by addressing it directly, as I’ve demonstrated for you, without attacking personal responsibility, and without attacking free will. Even Christians advocate rejecting revenge and seeking to redeem the sinner. Caruso introduces confusion by conflating these issues, and by using an irrational and false definition of free will. Free will is not “freedom from reliable cause and effect”.
The attack by free will skeptics is the attack on just desert moral responsibility (also see “moral responsibility” in philosophy)…and the FACT that the more free will belief people hold, the more people justify this TYPE of moral responsibility – so attacking this TYPE of free will is important. Showing this type of free will does not exist reduces retributive tendencies (people deserving an eye for an eye) and reduces gross inequality justifications (placing people on high pedestals as being “more deserving” of their well-being than others).
People are aware of the social causes of criminal behavior. If not, they can be taught, without attacking moral responsibility or free will. Free will means freedom from coercion or undue influence. Everyone understands and correctly uses this definition. If you doubt this, see http://www.brown.uk.com/brownlibrary/nahmias.pdf . To say that free will means “freedom from reliable cause and effect” is irrational, no matter how many philosophers or scientists repeat it.
Ironically, it is that very study you linked that actually says the exact opposite of what you suggest. That study shows that even when people are given entirely deterministic scenarios (even 100% predicting machines) where an “otherwise” is impossible, they still irrationally denote that someone could have done otherwise – especially when that person did a wrongdoing! So when you say “free will means freedom from coercion…”, you really mean that YOU define free will in a way that disregards other abilities that people think they and others possess.
People can read it for themselves. It is not “irrational” to say that “someone could have done otherwise”. (1) If today I can say, “I can choose either A or B”, then tomorrow it will always be the case that I can say “Yesterday, I could have chosen either A or B”. It’s English. (2) It is also true that if rewind time to that prior point you “will” make the same choice. But your intuition that this implies you “couldn’t” have made a different choice is false.
It is entirely IRRATIONAL to say that, assuming a 100% perfect predicting machine that exists in the year 2150 (before Jeremy is born) that predicts (with certainty) that Jeremy will choose A on January 26th, 2195 at 6PM, that Jeremy can choose either A or B (he obviously cannot). It is also irrational to say that, once Jeremy has chosen A as the machine predicted, that Jeremy could have chosen B instead given the prediction in 2150 that he would choose A.
Going over the 500 limit to display what is in it for people to “read it for themselves”, because the context is important.
*Also keep in mind the inconsistency for the wrongdoing scenario vs. the helpful and benign scenarios (which were worded identically except a change in what was done).
If the machine predicts with 100% accuracy that he will choose A, then the following must inevitably happen:
1. Jeremy will face a decision where he can either choose A or choose B.
2. Jeremy will consider both options, and for his own reasons, he will choose A.
No matter how many times you replay this tape, he will always have two choices at step 1. And it will always be the case that tomorrow he can truthfully say, “I could have chosen B instead, but A seemed best to me”.
1. FALSE – Jeremy will face a decision where he can ONLY choose A and never choose B (even if he deliberates between both)!
2. TRUE – Jeremy will consider both options, and for his own reasons **that causally come about the one and ONLY way they can**, he will (and **MUST**) choose A.
No matter how many times you replay this tape, your 1 will always be FALSE. And it will always be the case that tomorrow he can FALSELY say “I could have chosen B instead, but A seemed best to me”.
Once the CONTEXT of the 100% predicting machine is given –> colloquial, counterfactual, and epistemic usages of “can do” and “could have done” are completely out of the picture (and irrational)!
At the outset “he has two choices” which logically means “he can choose either one”. We know in advance that he will choose A and not B. But this fact does not contradict the fact that Jeremy has two choices, and that it will be up to Jeremy to choose either A or B. That’s the empirical and inevitable reality. There is nothing other than Jeremy that will make the choice. “To predict” does not mean “to control”.
A man sits down in a restaurant and asks the waiter, “What are my options for dinner tonight?” The waiter, a free will skeptic, replies, “There is only one possibility”. The man, disappointed says, “Okay. So what is that?” The waiter replies, “I have no way of knowing until you tell me.” Moral: It is irrational to break the process.
No, he deliberates between two options, but that DOES NOT logically mean he can choose either option! One can never be actualized. Given the 100% prediction of B not happening (and of A happening), there is not even an infinitesimal percentage chance that B could happen. Assuming the prediction, it will always (100%) lead up to Jeremy choosing A and NOT choosing B. Always, every single time – no exceptions. He simply could not choose B, because if he did, the 100% prediction would be wrong (which would be outside of the scenario and not 100%).
Regarding your restaurant scenario, that is a contrivance – you need to stick to the actual scenario given rather than bring that bad example up as you have done in the past. The people in the study are given exactly which option will be chosen, so there is no epistemic uncertainty (you cannot use epistemic uncertainty of a future event for the scenario – because the participants should have NO epistemic uncertainty about what Jeremy MUST do at that point in time). Jeremy will certainly choose A and NOT B – and to suggest otherwise based on a different context where there is epistemic uncertainty is irrational. You also conflate “multiple options” that a deliberation process assesses with “all options being possible“. These are not the same thing.
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* Note – As you see I consolidated your two comments together, but let’s stick with one comment at a time – as I had to address multiple problems with your reasoning. This is why I have the limit – so we can focus on each point made at a time and my responses don’t have to be lengthy like above. Let’s also stick to one single scenario at a time, in this case the Jeremy scenario. 😉
I am very confident that 100% prediction is not an option.
A degree of reliability – that I can accept.
100% – nope – that seem extremely improbable.
Ted – I tend to agree with you, but that is irrelevant to the study (and the problems in the thinking of the participants). For the study, the 100% prediction is to be accepted on its face for the questions – regardless if one actually believes it is probable or not:
Hi Trick,
If such a computer were possible, then free will (of any sort) is pure illusion, of that I am confident beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt.
I am almost as confident that such a computer is not possible, and that the question is one of argument from absurd premises (classical premises). It is in violation of quantum mechanical principles.
Hi Ted, if you think free will is impossible given such a computer (as do I), you need to adjust your definition of free will, as it is compatible even if this type of computer exists (e.g. “degrees of influence” does not suggest an otherwise ability is needed). You need to mention that if someone could not have done otherwise (due to absolute determinism), there is no free will – somewhere in your definition. This would also make your position of the libertarian free will variety (indeterminism / probabilism allows for free will), which is far easier to address the problems of. 😉
Hi Trick,
Nope.
By the definition I have consistently used, if a computer is able to make a fully deterministic prediction, then the sort of free will that seems to me to exist cannot exist – it is a logically impossible proposition.
The sort of free will that seems to me to exist requires two different sets of conditions, degrees of indeterminism, and degrees of influence. That is what quantum mechanics seems to indicate is the sort of reality we live in.
Hi Ted, might I suggest that you explicitly add in “requires two different sets of conditions, degrees of indeterminism” into your definition, as “something one can create, in terms of degrees of influence, not anything absolute”, does not sufficiently denote your requirement of indeterminism and two (or more) different set of “truly possible” (I’d add in these words) conditions. This, indeed, makes your position libertarian, and the discussion then refers to how such indeterminism can ever be “up to the person”.
Ted, I DO presume the “theoretical possibility” of 100% accurate prediction when ALL three levels of causation are included: physical, biological, and rational. In a perfectly deterministic world, free will can still mean “a decision we make for ourselves, free of coercion or other undue influence”. The final responsible cause of the decision is empirically us. This is the definition of free will that I presume (and I’m demonstrating) the subjects in the study are intuitively using.
Even though the study shows they believe in an irrational notion of “could have done otherwise” abilities (with perfect predicting machine / causal determinism) that your definition does not have or account for.
I claim that their notion is precisely the free will (free of coercion and undue influence) that I’ve described. I don’t know what other notions they may hold, but they are using the correct definition and the correct language for the mental process of choosing to take place.
Then you are ignoring the important part of the study in which their INCORRECT notions that “Jeremy could have decided not to rob the bank” (just because it was a wrongdoing BTW) tracks with their free will belief. Also note that for the benign and good-doing cases (worded identically) they said Jeremy could NOT have done otherwise! This just further denotes the inconsistency of layperson thoughts for the topic, and how incorrect you are about layperson intuitions (which tend to be contextually circumstantial – as other studies such as “Folk Intuitions on Free Will – Shaun Nichols, 2006” show).
But Jeremy could have decided not to rob the bank. We want to know why he did decide to rob it, because we want to fix those things, both in his social environment and in his way of thinking about crime. This is what “could have” is all about, to review a mistake and discover better ways to deal with the issues he was trying to solve. You cannot outlaw “could have done otherwise” without breaking the fracking process.
No, really, really, …Jeremy could NOT have decided not to rob the bank. The reasons why he did rob the bank could not have happened otherwise, hence neither could Jeremy’s decision to rob the bank. You cannot “fix” the circumstances that led up to him deciding to rob the bank, and any fixing AFTER THE FACT so it is not repeated could not have happened otherwise either (given determinism). “Could have” means the action (“not robbing bank”) was ontologically possible (Jeremy physically not going into the bank and robbing it). It was not ontologically possible. Also you just ignored the other part of what I said as well. You seem to have a large confirmation bias here.
Let’s put it this way, I’ve demonstrated several times now that it is not “irrational” to say “I could have done otherwise”. It is always a true statement if I had more than one option to choose from at the time. And it is always the case that when I make a choice that I will have at least two real possibilities to choose from. And I believe that is the case in all the Jeremy scenarios. Therefore the subjects in the study were NOT presuming any special abilities.
You have not “demonstrated” this, you have asserted it and then you gave an epistemic example of a “can do” modality (which differs greatly from an ontological “could have done” reality) that is not analogous to the Jeremy scenario that was given. And it is NOT the case that when I make a choice that I will have at least two real possibilities to choose from….given determinism only one is *ever* a real possibility, the other is not (even if I do not know which). The Jeremy study makes it perfectly clear that only “choosing to rob the bank / robbing the bank” could ever have happened (we know this).
Nobody can change the past. When considering what we “could have done” we are imagining “How might things have turned out IF I had made a different choice?” THAT is the rational context of “I could have done otherwise”. And it is always true that today I can imagine what I could have done differently yesterday. And you continue to prove over and over that they could not have possibly meant anything else.
SCENARIO: Given the 100% perfect prediction that Babe the pig will not have wings or fly on Jan 22nd, 2034 at 10AM EST, in which case the prediction comes true, (given that scenario) could have Babe the pig had wings and could have Babe the pig flown on Jan 22nd, 2034 at 10AM EST?
PER YOUR COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING: Yes, Babe the pig could of had wings and could have flown (at that time) IF Babe the pig had wings and flown (at that time).
*** Begging the question fallacy, entirely against the 100% perfect prediction, poor counterfactual reasoning, and entirely irrational response.
If Babe the pig had functional wings, then of course she could fly any time she chose to. If we have the power to predict (but not control) when she chooses to fly, then we know for certain what she “will” do. However, it remains the case that if she had two viable options (fly or not fly) then she “can” choose either one today. And tomorrow it will be true that she “could have” made either choice yesterday. The possibilities exist in her imagination, but not ours.
According to the 100% prediction Babe will not have those wings, so your “IF” is outside of the scenario (and hence irrational to invoke in!). Also even if Babe had the wings she would still only have one specific brain structure that allows for one viable chosen option – not two brain structure that allow for two different chosen options. Likewise, according to the 100% prediction Jeremy will not have the brain structure that decides to not rob the bank, so your IF is outside of the scenario (and hence irrational to invoke in!).
It IS a single deterministic brain process:
1) Shall I fly today? After step 1 Babe “can” choose to fly and “can” choose to not fly.
2) Consider flying.
3) Consider not flying.
4) Choose the one that seems best. Babe’s choice in step 4 is the final responsible prior cause of the inevitable and predicted outcome.
Tomorrow, she “could have” made either choice after step 1.
No, tomorrow Babe’s brain STRUCTURE for step 4 could not have been the DIFFERENT structure needed to select a DIFFERENT option. Just as Babe couldn’t have “wings” given the scenario, Babe could NOT have a different brain structure either! This also makes your second sentence in step 1 false. After step 1 Babe “can” choose to only do that dictated by the brain config in step 4 that could not be otherwise. The weighing of 2 and 3 can only lead to that one brain structure (and never the other).
Trick, (A) thinking changes the brain.
(B)
1) A problem/issue is encountered.
2) Possibilities arise (“I can’s”).
3) Options are tested (values arise).
4) A choice is made (“I will” appears and “I can’s” vanish).
Tomorrow, the “I could have’s” replace yesterday’s “I can’s”. We have both perfectly reliable cause and effect AND a list of “I could have’s”, because we are resetting the clock to the beginning of step 2 to redo step 3 (reconsider our choice).
(A) All thinking must be the same as well.
(B)
1) A problem/issue is encountered.
2) EPISTEMIC (fictional) possibilities arise IN THOUGHT ONLY (Colloquial “I can’s”).
3) Options are tested (values arise) – the only way they can.
4) A choice is made – the only way it can (the real and ONLY ONTOLOGICAL possibility)
Tomorrow (assuming determinism), “I could have’s” DO NOT replace yesterday’s “colloquial I can’s” – as there is no longer an epistemic lack of knowledge over the action that causally arose. Step 2 will happen identically, as well as 3 and 4 – because the BRAIN STATES cannot be otherwise at any given moment!
Anyway- we are just repeating now so I might end this convo unless I see something new. Peace.
Yes, all “can’s”, “possibilities”, “options” exist in the context of the imagination. You are correct to say they are like fiction, because they are stories we create to answer, “What might happen if I choose this?” In precisely the same fashion, our “could have’s” address the same question in a different tense: “What might HAVE HAPPENED if I HAD CHOSEN that instead?”
Ontology is about what “will” happen. There are no “could’s” involved.
I wasn’t going to let this in because it is repeating the same type misunderstandings of language (in a really bad way)…but let me ask you this question (answer with a yes or no please):
Is there anything that “could not have happened” in your view? Yes or no?
(if “yes” please provide a quick example of something that could not have happened)
Babe the pig could not grow wings. That is a possibility that could never be actualized (at least as far as this pig goes, a future pig, with genetic engineering, who knows). But both of Jeremy’s options, to rob or to not rob the bank, could have been chosen, even though only one of them was inevitable. Sounds counter-intuitive, I know, but that appears to be how things work.
According to your previous comment all “coulds” are based on imaginary “IF” question begging contingency “stories”, …so babe could have grown wings IF babe had the configuration to grow wings. This is no different than your “Jeremy could have robbed the bank IF he chose to (IF he had the brain configuration to choose to)”.
This means that there is no “could not have happened” on your account, as we can make up any “IF” scenario that allows anything to happen in our imaginations. It’s more than counter-intuitive, it is counter-reason.
A possibility that cannot be actualized is an impossibility. (Fact 1:) In the case of Jeremy, since he has already robbed the bank he cannot (present) have not robbed the bank (past). (Fact 2:) However, he could have chosen not to rob the bank, because that was a possibility that he could have actualized if he had chosen to do so. (Fact 3:) But it was inevitable that he would choose to rob the bank. None of these 3 facts contradicts the others. All 3 are equally true.
Your Fact 2 is false. You are basically saying that Jeremy could have the DIFFERENT brain state that allowed him to actualized the DIFFERENT choice – and that is no different than Babe the pig having wings (a different physical state) that allowed her to fly.
What you are not recognizing is the physical state change (brain change) required for the “OTHER” actualization – a physical change that is impossible given the scenario.
I’m saying that (a) IF he had decided NOT to rob the bank, then (b) that is what the machine WOULD HAVE predicted with 100% accuracy, because (c) that choice WOULD HAVE BEEN inevitable. COULD HAVE logically implies all three assumptions. COULD HAVE also logically implies (d) it DID NOT happen (that’s why you keep using the term “counter-factual”). Thus COULD HAVE applies to all of the real possibilities that DID NOT happen (but not to any impossibilities).
Which is no different than saying (a) IF Babe the pig had wings, then (b) that is what the machine WOULD HAVE predicted with 100% accuracy, because (c) the wings WOULD HAVE BEEN inevitable.
SO when the participants are asked to accept the 100% prediction of Jeremy robbing the bank, you are basically saying “IF the prediction did not say that, even though you just asked me to accept that.” This is 100% irrational, bad thinking. Period.
Also, there can be no “impossibilities” per this bad reasoning, because we can simply say “BUT IF X impossibility was possible, then…”
Perhaps the imagination is “irrational” in some sense. But every scientist uses it to generate possibilities, estimate the outcome of different approaches, and choose the one that seems most promising. If the experiment fails, she’ll say, “I could have done this instead of that. Let’s try doing this next time.” The sequence is always: 1) multiple possibilities, 2) evaluation, 3) single inevitable choice. This process is rational because it works. Moving step 3 to step 1 breaks the process.
We use it when there is epistemic uncertainty of future events or as a colloquialism depending on CONTEXT, but when given a scenario like in the study, there is only one CONTEXT that makes any rational sense, and to move outside of it would be to go against the scenario given. It is problematic thinking.
“Could have done otherwise” does not mean, “can do otherwise next time”. “Have DONE” means the “doing” could be actualized “back then”. It simply cannot given the scenario.
1) The colloquial use of “could have” is “literally” the literal use!
2) Counter-factual does not mean “false”, it means “hypothetical”. It refers to an event that did not happen, but might have happened under different conditions. That’s why the “if” is always logically implied in the “could have”.
3) Everyone assumes a deterministic universe in which they have causal agency.
4) Paradoxes arise when “philosophers” invalidly pit these two facts against each other.
1) The colloquial use of “could have” does not equal “literal” at all – as I explained here.
2) Counter-factual means COUNTER to the FACTS (WHAT IF’s counter to WHAT IS). That is what false means. I can give a counterfactual of two different non-existing universes and compare them. {IMAGE}
3) It is a blatantly false statement to say that “everyone assumes a deterministic universe…”
4) LOL – it they pitted two FACTS where there is a paradox- then reality is full of FACTUAL paradoxes.
If all control is external to us, then what hope does anyone have to make anything better?
Because we often DO make things better as part of the causally interactive process – and when we do, we could not have done, of our own accord, other than the action that makes things better. Keep in mind that a programmed robot could also “make things better (or worse depending on programming)” – all without free will. We are just programmed by our genes and historical environment we had no say over (to do better or worse, etc.).
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Have you stopped beating your grandmother yet Trick? Simple yes or no answer please!
Sometimes the assumption sets of one paradigm have no simple translation to another paradigm.
All language is pointers to complex structures.
Common culture can mean common structures, but not always, in this case not much.
QM seems to be telling us that some things are not allowed, and everything else is a matter of probability (many of those so small as to be unlikely to occur in this universe, ever).
Ted – My “yes/no” question to Marvin was not a malformed or loaded question (and ultimately answerable in his own context), so the “beating” question is a bad analogy. My question makes the point about Marvin’s confused language – unless he wants to accept that “could not have happened” is impossible in his usage (which he does not).
Also, you keep bringing up QM indeterminism into a picture that removes it for a reason. Also, we could haggle over your ideas about QM, because they are not solid like you believe.
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Regardless of the prediction, Jeremy WILL always choose A and WILL never choose B. However, before he makes up his mind, Jeremy CAN choose A and he CAN choose B. There is never any uncertainty in OUR mind as to what he WILL do. Nor is there any uncertainty in JEREMY’S mind as to what he CAN do. Nor will there be any uncertainty in HIS mind tomorrow as to what he COULD HAVE done yesterday. He COULD HAVE chosen either A or B. His claim is not irrational.
Before Jeremy makes up his mind, he can ONLY choose A and NEVER choose B (he just doesn’t know this – which plays into his decision). If before, Jeremy thought he can choose B, he is simply wrong on the matter (which plays into his decision). If afterward, Jeremy thought he could have chosen B, he is simply wrong on the matter. He could not have chosen A or B, he could only have chosen A and NEVER B (given the deterministic world that the predicting machine is in). The fact that he might think, in hindsight, that he could have chosen B simply points to why your definition of free will misses the boat.
There is actually only one definition of free will. The hard determinist claims that reliable cause and effect is an external force compelling our choices, so they reject it. But reliable cause and effect IS US DECIDING WHAT WE WILL DO. It is not an external force coercing us against our will. It is how our will is formed. The language in Jeremy’s case is precisely as I described. The words “can”, “could”, “possibility” refer to an imagined future.
No, there are many definitions of free will. To suggest there is “only one” is absurd (just look at Ted’s for example). Now which definition is the important definition is what the semantic debate is about, and your definition is not it. ALSO external cause and effect exactly causes our very decision making process and “what we will do”. In the Jeremy scenario, Jeremy cannot choose B, could not have chosen B, nor was B ever possible…and that should be understood by the participants of the study as soon as they accept the scenario.
1. Give me any alternative definition that does not reduce to “a decision free of coercion or other undue influence”.
2. Scenario: I am alone in the room with a bowl of apples. I feel hungry. Should I wait or eat one now? I’ll eat one now.
Challenge: Name the “external” cause that forced me to eat the apple.
1. The ability to have, of one’s own accord, chosen otherwise (mine) – for one (or my present tense version as well).
2. You were born with a mechanism of a stomach, other organs, and brain that becomes hungry – that you had no control over. Each moment in environments you ultimately had no control over since birth led up to you not having sufficient food in your stomach to feel “full” at X moment, which caused your brain to say “I’m hungry”, in turn causing your weighing of “eating the apple” to push toward you actually deciding to eat it. Not to mention numerous other causally bombarding factors out of your control such as the visual stimulus (of the apple), etc.
2. So, which of these items that you listed is “external” to me: my stomach? my other organs? my brain? my sense of hunger? my deciding?
So far, the only external item you’ve listed is the apple. Are you suggesting the apple hypnotized me and convinced me to eat it against my will?
1. My own accord is what my own hunger and my own choosing causally determined. Empirical fact: “that which is me” is “that which made the choice”.
Still looking for that external cause.
2. Your stomach, organs, brain, etc…are PRODUCTS of events outside of you – from your parents providing those genetics, environmental epigenetics, to the external enviromnental conditions that change your brain structure. None of these are things you had control over. The apple was just one environmental factor out of billions you had no control over, and you are not the dictator of your biology OR brain state at any given moment.
1. “You” made the choice based on your exact “you-ness” that “you” had no say over….and “you” could not have “been” or “done” otherwise (assuming determinism). Imagine a rube goldberg machine that halfway through formed playdough into a ball, which then (due to now being round) rolled and hit a bell causing a ring. The playdough caused the bell to ring, but the outside factors that formed the playdough were just as responsible for the bell ring as the playdough itself. “You” are the playdough.
No, I did not create myself. But neither did any prior cause to which you are attempting to shift responsibility for my choice. If your logic shifts responsibility from me to them, then it also shifts it from them to … well, what?! The requirement is impossible, thus irrational.
My “self” and a bowl of apples are all that are in the room. One of us made the choice freely, without external coercion or undue influence, to eat the other. 🙂
EXACTLY!!!!! (Hence the problem with responsibility in the important sense)
UNTRUE – you were influenced by everything that lead up to your state of being and decision at the time, as was the apple.
Normal influences, that every one of us routinely experiences, are duly expected. Reliable cause and effect, for example, is not an “undue influence”, because we all rely upon it for our freedom to do everything that we do. Since these influences are neither coercive nor undue, they do not compromise free will. Free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, free of coercion or other undue influences. Determinism (reliable cause and effect) poses no threat to free will.
Reliable cause and effect (which the “reliable” word is redundant, is there unreliable cause and effect?) that stems to outside of us is that which we have no control over which influences us. The word “undue” is “undue”. Even cause and effect that coerces us (e.g. at gunpoint) is “reliable” and not any more “undue” than any other cause and effect. Your qualifiers are contrived for your own purposes – not anything real. 😉
Trick, whether there is “unreliable” cause and effect is what you and Ted have been discussing. I believe he’s counting on quantum indeterminism to provide free will. I don’t. I prefer perfectly reliable cause and effect.
The qualifiers of due and undue distinguish how people actually interpret free will. For example, a suggestion from your friend is rather ordinary (due), but a suggestion from a hypnotist actually removes your control (undue). Same with brain tumor, etc.
Indeterminism isn’t cause and effect. Also, something seeming ordinary or unordinary (to us) does not mean “cause and effect” are these things, nor is it relevant. Cause and effect are consistent, regardless of some extraordinary event that happens due to it. If a spaceship comes down and the alien asks you whether you want to go to his planet or stay on earth, according to your reasoning (due to this being undue), you can’t have even your version of free will for the decision. You rather just mean “uncoerced” (by others)…not “undue”.
The point is that your version of free will, which is actually “freedom from causation”, is an irrational concept. And no one uses such a definition in any pragmatic scenario. You keep claiming that “freedom from causation” is what they mean. I keep demonstrating that what they mean is simply freedom from coercion or other undue influence. My problem is that when you attack one, you are also attacking the other, which unravels evolved moral concepts, like responsibility.
The point is, my version of free will: A) most people believe they possess this ability (as shown) and B) is the important definition for the topic of just desert moral responsibility (and it is also shown that people hold this type of responsibility).
I am not “claiming”… I am showing you that the abilities people think they possess ARE the irrational abilities, not simply your compatibilist definition of “freedom from coercion” (or other poor qualifiers) which just falls under the larger UMBRELLA of the abilities people think they possess.
Anyway- we are just repeating now so I might end this convo unless I see something new.
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In most contexts, I don’t think retributive morality is appropriate, as the sort of free will involved probably doesn’t justify it, and other more effective alternatives exist, and in an evolutionary context, I can understand its emergence.
And to me, that has little to do with free will.
For me, free will is something one can create, in terms of degrees of influence, not anything absolute.
And in anything other than extremis of passion, there is little excuse for intentional murder.
Ted – I think what you label as “free will” differs radically from my / the traditional version. This is fine that you define it as “something one can create, in terms of degrees of influence, not anything absolute”, and I’d agree that we may have those abilities (just as I agree we have the abilities most compatibilist purport as “free will”). Since you agree that retributive morality is out, etc…our disagreement is probably more of semantics for the term, and the problems with labeling “free will” in ways that bypass the main issue for the debate. 🙂
Hi Trick,
If the universe were deterministic in the hard sense, then you would be correct in your deductions.
But that does not appear to be the case.
The universe seems to approximate causality in a softer sense, of being at base something quite different – being random within probability distributions.
See
https://tedhowardnz.wordpress.com/2017/12/14/free-will-once-again-a-problem-with-tricks-postulate/
Hi Ted,
You misunderstand my position if you think it relies on causal determinism or if you think I’m a hard determinist. I’m a hard incompatibilist:
Why I’m a Hard Incompatibilist, Not a Hard Determinist
This is why the “of one’s own accord” or “in which that choice was up to the chooser” are so important in my definition, because true randomness or probability distributions (indeterminism) cannot be “up to the chooser”. Your criticism burns a strawman.
For the scenarios in the post above, however, the participants are being asked to accept entirely causally deterministic scenarios (in the hard sense), and they still (incorrectly) think they could have done otherwise.
Thank you for that – clarifies a little.
Without the substantive arguments – the statement “It means that both possibilities, determinism and indeterminism, are equally “incompatible” with free will” still occurs as a statement of faith – rather than one based upon evidence and consideration.
My objection to the logic of this specific post remains. The statement is only coherent in the case of hard determinism.
And to be clear – I did address that in my post – which I linked to – even if your site only allows a maximum of 500 chars of it to be posted here.
Thanks Ted. Keep in mind that not every post on this site is about making “THE” case against free will – me pointing out my actual position is not “faith”, anymore than me pointing out that I believe in evolution without providing all of the evidence for evolution is faith given that someone makes the claim I do not believe in it.
For the actual case against free will, I have a book and many posts here that gets into the minutia details of why it (or the definition of it that is of concern for so many other topics) is incompatible with determinism, indeterminism, any theory of quantum mechanics, and any theory of time.
This specific post is about common layperson intuitions that are wrong-headed based on the deterministic scenarios the participants have been asked to accept for the questions – for example, that of a 100% perfect predicting machine where it specifically says:
It is your post that I’m referring to as a strawman, which concludes with “So in essence, I reject your prime postulate – of us existing in a hard deterministic universe,…”
Determinism: All events have a cause.
Indeterminism: Some events do not have a cause.
I’m not sure that i am going to accept this definition.
I would go with the more “modal-logic” definition.
Determinism is when x cause y “in all possible worlds” (it couldn’t be otherwise no matter what)
whereas indeterminism is when x causes y in some possible worlds-it could have done otherwise in others
Hi Pan, thanks for the visit. You don’t have to use a definition, but that differs from not accepting another’s usage when they are referring to the terms.
Regarding your definitions, you are basically using the distinction between sufficient (only) and necessary (only) causality to refer to determinism and indeterminism. This is fine, I said there are a number of ways these terms can be used. Of course I’d argue that notion of indeterminism being fully “causal” makes x a self-contradiction. To get around this contradiction you need to smuggle in an acausal event.
Hi ‘Trick, very simple animals compute dangers and avoid them. Are they conscious? If not, why must it be consciousness rather than patterns of ‘particles’ that feed back into the brain, when consciousness is present? If we could do this without consciousness, why invoke its agency?
Hi John, I wouldn’t create a dividing line between “patterns of particles” and the properties they hold (including consciousness). Even if there was a different nonconscous mechanism for a more simple biological machine, that wouldn’t imply that this is the mechanism for most creatures with central nervous systems and brains. I think conscious properties were an evolutionary trait, but beyond this, the above post should point out why I think epiphenomenalism rather absurd (and consciousness eliminativism has even more problems). 🙂
I see, thanks ‘Trick. I’m reading more on this and realising that it’s much more complex and subtle than I thought. I’ll get back to you later.
Really enjoying your book, by the way. Very well done.
John
Thanks John! Very much appreciated! 😀
It’s hard to haggle in 500 Chars.
The thing that really gets me about QM, is that the arrangement of electrons around atoms, and all the chemical properties that follow, can be derived from an information principle, which says that it is not allowed to know both position and momentum beyond certain limits.
When you spend a few thousand hours contemplating that from a systems perspective, it can fundamentally alter one’s relation to ideas like classical causality.
The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (HUP), which is what you are referring to when you mention position/momentum measurements, does not suggest that the universe is not causally deterministic. Depending on which quantum interpretation is being postulated, how HUP is interpreted changes. Some interpretations of QM are deterministic (causal), others indeterministic (true randomness), and others are agnostic on determinism/indeterminism. I have spent countless hours on QM too. 🙂
(500 char keeps things conversational, one point at a time, rather than allowing large blocks of unreadable texts and unwieldy tangents – this is better in the long run (trust me) unless one is looking to obfuscate).
In 500 characters I cannot constantly restate, on every occasion, that all of my understandings are probabilistic.
Hard to back up a claim like HUP is causally deterministic in a short space. That seems a very hard position.
Hard to make a soft argument when the other person rejects anything that is not hard – it becomes somewhat tautological.
The strongest claim I will make is one based on balance of probabilities – given my experience set.
The word “probabilistic” can mean A) “epistemic probabilistic” (probability due to a lack of knowledge) or B) “ontic probabilistic” (the probability is embedded in what exists). These are very different things and (A) is compatible with causal determinism (e.g. a roll of a die can be entirely causal even if we could never know all of the causal variables or outcome and need to assess a probability). The point I make about QM is that we do not KNOW if a deterministic interpretation is the case (e.g. non-local hidden variable) or an indeterministic interpretation is the case. I also make a logical case against ontic probability.
Hi Trick,
Your proposition fails.
Consider sequence:
total chaos;
filter;
Outcome.
A mix of the ontic random and the causal.
Twin slit – fourier transform of square filter delivers outcome.
Real randomness, plus a filter, can give the outcome.
Ontic randomness can exist.
Asserting it cannot is a failure of imagination, not a logical necessity.
I assert that it seems very probable that this universe is based upon such mix.
It does allow for real degrees of freedom.
1) You strawman my position. It is NOT that real (or ontic) randomness (in the sense of acausality) cannot occur, it is against this event having an “ontic probability distribution” (other than “at some point in time at some location, or never”).
2) Chaos theory is entirely deterministic (filtered or not).
3) Again, my position is not against indeterminism (in the strong sense) being possible (I’m agnostic on that).
4)To assert the universe is probably “based on such a mix” is to assert the likelihood of an indeterministic interpretation of QM unwarrantedly. A deterministic interpretation is just as “likely”.
5) Indeterminism is not any “freedom” we would have any say over. It isn’t free “to us”.
Ted, Are you saying that we have some freedom in how we filter the chaos to produce an outcome we desire? (Generally, Trick and I are in agreement that as “randomness” increases our freedom to control/direct what happens decreases).
Marvin – the interesting part is that you and Ted have diametrically opposed “free will” positions. You are a compatibilist and determinist, he is a libertarian and indeterminist. You think (and I agree with you) that indeterminism cannot help with free will (if anything it would be a detriment to willing). He thinks (and I agree with him) that an entirely causally deterministic universe is incompatible with free will (no otherwise). It is interesting to have the two opposite ends of the “free will belief” spectrum commenting at the same time. 🙂
Trick, LOL, indeed! Now all I need do is convince you both that reliable cause and effect is not an external force that threatens free will. Most ordinary people believe in reliable causation as well as their own causal agency. It is only when determinism is reified into an external force that removes our control of our own choices that people start running for a place to hide, either in the supernatural or in quantum indeterminism.
Marvin – That depends on how you define “free will” – and I think your definition is insufficient to denote ALL of the abilities people think they possess in this regards. Also, other studies show that whether people side with causation or not depends on the questions being asked as well – so even that in very inconsistent for the layperson. Where I agree with you is that people think they are agents and that coercion removes free will, but that is not all that is important to the term “free will” which is an umbrella term that carries all of the incoherent baggage along with it (unfortunately).
Trick, it depends on how you look at it. I can defend the position that free will ALWAYS means “deciding for ourselves what we will do, free of coercion or other undue influence”. For example, “freedom from causal inevitability” is espoused by those who view causal necessity as a coercive influence, rather than simply as us going about our normal business of choosing and causing. As to the “baggage”, that can be (and is) dealt with by critical thinking.
You (re)define at the expense of bypassing what it means that we “could not have done, of our own accord, otherwise”. That our brain, thoughts, and decisions are dictated ultimately by events out of our control (whether causal or acausal). That if you were X person atom for atom, environment for environment, variable for variable – you would do as X did. This leads people to a greater compassion over the unlucky variables that others were born into that lead up to their state of mind and decisions, it reduces retributive blame, and it prevents people from justifying gross inequalities of being more deserving of their causal luckiness than others (or others less deserving). Understanding we lack that “baggage” makes all of the difference in the world, and is what the tradition definition of free will is about.
Christians are already say things like, “you don’t really understand someone else until you walk a mile in their shoes”, or “put yourself in his place”. The same people who preach free will also preach compassion and understanding. And if you want the reverse, retribution and punishment, then you can easily justify that with determinism, as in “let the punishment fit the crime” and “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” where the punishment is literally determined by the crime.
Marvin – Christians also do a whole lot of blaming, support unfettered capitalism (gross inequalities), and believe in an “eye for an eye” and “just deserts”. Also, as already shown, the more people believe in free will, the more retributive their responses are. This is a fact that you cannot just hand-wave away. If people believe that someone could have done, of their own accord, otherwise,… it is a lot easier not to put themself in the other person’s shoes and just blame them for not doing otherwise. It is a lot easier to point the “blame” finger.
Hi Marvin,
Almost yes.
I agree that beyond a certain limit, ontic indeterminism degrades complex systems.
I am also saying that to deliver real freedom, there must exist ontic indeterminism to some degree. And it is all about the degree, and the context.
Yes it does seem that what we can do is alter the filters in some contexts, and over time accumulate degrees of independence.
And it isn’t clean, it is messy. Very different from Dennett’s hidden lottery.
An indeterministic even is just a new “starting point” that we have no control over the outcome of (regardless if acausal or some more magical ontological probability) – which simply leads to a new causal set. Any filters we make that an indeterministic event finds its way into also came about through a causal line that ultimately stems outside of us.
Hello Trick commenting on some of the things you discussed with Marvin
Couldn’t a person argue temperament determines a persons choice and therefore a person with a bad character does indeed deserve to be treated harshly? And couldn’t a believer in free will argue that “could have done otherwise” gives even a person with a temperament which predisposes them to crime the chance instead to choose to do good instead of being doomed to lead a life of crime?
Hi John, thanks for the visit. Someone could argue that another had/has a “bad character” – but they could not argue that they had a say over that “bad character” – or could have been, of their own accord, otherwise. This is why virtue ethics is so problematic. Also, the only way one “could have been or done otherwise” is via something outside of their control (e.g. some indeterministic event, or some different initial state of the universe, etc.) – not of their own accord. They cannot “deserve” harsh treatment, even if it may at times be needed.
Thanks for the reply Trick
Deterministic ideas have led whole societies to lack empathy for other groups of people and treat them inhumanly, given that why do you think determinism is morally superior to free will?
PS – There is in fact a way a person “could have done otherwise” and still be responsible and that is if randomness generates a different option or options from which the will can then evaluate and select from.
I don’t think you can realistically make the claim that “deterministic ideas have led whole societies to lack empathy for other groups of people and treat them inhumanly” and if something like that happened to be the case it would not be due to deterministic ideas, but incorrect ideas like fatalism or mistaken non-sequiturs that do not follow from determinism. The free will idea leads people to blame and pin just deserts on others, place themself and others on pedestals of importance, and creates gross inequalities, which is way more problematic. It is also a fiction and truth matters. 😉
Here are just 10 benefits of not believing in free will.
Note: The selection of the “new options” would be equally as causal, true randomness just makes a new causal line that interacts with old ones that could not have been otherwise (without another truly “random” event). The old line would “cause the selection”.
Hi Trick
Why do you think praise and blame is irrational in a deterministic universe?
Note – You are correct in saying the randomness creates a new chain you are incorrect in saying the new chain (and decision) is “caused” by the old chain – the randomness breaks the chain of determinism and starts a new chain and hence the decision was not determined from the Big Bang as determinism claims – but the decision was “up to us”.
Hi John,
I’m actually saying that being deserving of praise and blame is irrational. It is that “deserving” word that is important, as ‘just deserts’ is out if we could not have done, of our own accord, otherwise.
Perhaps my wording was confusing, the new chain stems from an acausal event that is out of our control and the causal lines interacts the only way it can based on its antecedent events and the new line that was not up to the chooser. Here is a visual. The starting point or specific interaction is not “up to us” – it is dictated by events outside of our control.
If you sign a contract and fail to fulfil your obligations you will face a penalty – which will be *deserved* – since you understood it and agreed to its terms. Likewise with criminals who break law. All the law requires is that you are a morally competent agent – for you to *deserve* your punishment – and not that you could have done otherwise in the exact same circumstance.
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Indeed the different options that randomness generated was not up to us – but the selection of one of those options was and this gives us the ability to say he could have done otherwise and yet still be responsible.
Could you have, of your own accord, fulfilled your obligation? The very point is that, if you could not have, of your own accord, fulfilled your obligation, you may still face a penalty for not, but that does not mean it was a “deserved” penalty, only that it was practical. How can you deserve it if you couldn’t have, of your own accord, fulfilled it? Because an indeterministic event could have popped in that was not of your own accord and caused you to fulfill it, but it didn’t?
If someone contracts a contagious disease, they do not “deserve” quarantine but we may have to quarantine them anyway – for the sake of utility. Regarding laws, free will skeptics like Pereboom and Caruso think they should be changed to only reflect utility – like the quarantine model.
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The selection of one of those options was not “up to you” it was dictated by your antecedent causality that extended outside of you and the acausal event that is also outside of you. Any “otherwise” due to indeterminism is an “otherwise” that would not be up to the chooser, but up to an interacting indeterministic event that cannot be a “willed” event and yor antecedent causal events. This is why libertarian notions of free will are so problematic.
Hello Trick
When a team of career criminals plan to rob a bank they will take steps which will increase their chances of success. Why do they make that choice? Because they are deterred by punishment (and motivated by rewards). Is it a logical argument from a robber that he doesn’t *deserve* his punishment because even if he was placed in that circumstance a billion times he will still make the same choice? No it’s not.
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False because our choices are determined by our character and motives in no way means that our choice was predetermined (“dictated”) by past events. It’s is the evaluation and selection of those options that is “up to us” NOT the options which randomness generated.
If you were a person in a “team of career criminals” atom for atom, environment for environment, (and yes – acausal event for acausal event – if being postulated) you would make the identical decisions as that criminal. You were the product of causal (or acausal) unluckiness. The fact that we need to prevent criminals and even deter them needs to be a consequentialist assessment only, not about them being deserving due to their causal unlikeness – just as quarantining a diseased person does not mean they deserve it.
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I must disagree. The evaluation and selection of options are determined by our character and motives at the time, which are determined by other causal (or acausal) factors that are ultimately out of our control. You are just a cause in closer proximity, but the way you will choose is dictated by events that have shaped you that are out of your control. This means you cannot be “just desert” responsible for your character or the way you weigh options or your selection (regardless if the options themself came about casually or acausally which is irrelevant).
Indeed he would always make the decision. His decision was not the result of cosmic luck or unlucky ness it was a rational decision he made in order to increase his chances of profiting from the robbery.
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Because some of the causes of a decision go back to earlier in your life or even before you was born doesn’t mean that your decision was predetermined from the Big Bang. If I ask you to raise your hand that is something that is “up to you” your voluntary action wasn’t determined by any prior event. And free actions that you made in the past contributed to your character and so we are at least partly responsible for being who we are.
Given causal determinism, things could causally be “up to you” in the sense that you are a cause in closer proximity, but you could not have been or done otherwise. Your decision *was* dictated by the events that do indeed stem back to the big bang. If you ask me to raise my hand, you couldn’t have not asked me, and the very way I “rationally” deleberate and act upon your request could not be otherwise. Making a “rational decision” had to happen the way it does, as does irrational decisions. Your character also couldn’t have been otherwise. This being said, you could (re)define “free will” as a compatibilist does.
Note: The “up to you” or “of your own accord” only addresses if one invokes in indeterminism in which these events are not “up to you”. But since you have seemingly moved away from indeterminism for now with your “indeed he would always make the decision” – for determinism, something being causally “up to you” in that you are the approximate cause of the decision is still causal luck/unluckiness, as the very way you “rationally deliberate” at any given point, including your final decision, is equally causal luck/unluckiness and dictated. For determinism we just need to denote that you could not have done otherwise than be and rationally deliberate the way you had – and due to that you lack the responsibility required for “just deserts”.
Humans are animals. We don’t react in a moral sense when a lion kills a gazelle, or an orca kills a seal. Some might ‘feel’ pity, another involuntary emotional state, or some other emotion strong or weak, or some may not. Morality and ethics are constructs of the brain, we neither choose or not choose our reactions to anything. Our thoughts and actions are not our own, thus morality is an illusion, as is our conscience. Like other animals we just do what we do.
Humans do act in an ethical sense in that they causally take (intentional) actions for the sake of utility, etc. Where I’d agree with you is that whether we do something ethical or unethical ultimately stems from prior causality that was outside of a person, so we are not morally responsible (in the strong sense referred to in the infographic). Certain types of forward looking consequentialist ethics are, however, compatible with a lack of free will due to determinism – but it does narrow those down. The lack of free will does not equate to ethical nihilism or consciousness eliminativism, but it does have a say over the “moral responsibility” question above. We also need to be careful not to conflate determinism with fatalism.
1)Quantum mechanics is true, indeterminsm is a fact (I.e there is objective chance).
2) Given 1 it is indeed “up to you” how you act.
3) Because random events are not under your control it doesn’t mean you have no control. For example you don’t control what I write, but it’s “up to you” if you want to publish my message and respond (or not).
4) I said in that circumstance and given his character at that time (and the free choices he made earlier in his life also contributed to his character) he would always choose to rob. Indeed in the case of a career criminal he has made the same choice even in just similar circumstances! (And none of these facts imply pre-determinism by the way).
Okay, you are back to arguing libertarian free will (meaning indeterminism somehow helps).
1) QM is true, indeterminism is NOT known fact (hence I’m agnostic here). That depends on which quantum interpretation is being postulated, and there is an important distinction between QM and quantum interpretations (in which some are deterministic, others indeterministic, and others agnostic on determinism/indeterminism).
2) Indeterministic events (even if they did happen) are not “up to you” in any way, and they would just redirect your causal lines. This is not “up to you”.
3) If I publish what you write, either I couldn’t have done otherwise, or some indeterministic event(s) that was not “up to me” was forced in which created an otherwise that would not have been “up to me” in a sense that I could have done otherwise given the acausal event(s) I had no control over. Indeterminism is not a help to free will.
4) Each “choice” he made was equally dictated by events outside of him, either leading back to genes he had no say over, environments he had no say over, or indeterministic events he had no say over. The character that grew out of those unfree decisions he made in the past was equally as unfree. If you were Hitler atom for atom, environment for environment, and with the exact indeterministic events he was forced to have, you would have the character of Hitler, the beliefs of Hitler, the environments of Hitler, and do exactly as Hitler had done. You could not have, of your own accord, been or done other than what Hitler was and did.
Let’s, however, focus down because the multiple comments are getting unwieldy and it is better for this to be more conversational. If you don’t mind, let’s just do one question and answer at a time and start here:
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Do you agree that, IF the universe happened to be causally deterministic, meaning every event has a sufficient cause, that there is no free will in this specific universe? A Yes or No is preferred if possible.
(Note: We will address indeterminism later, but I want to be clear on your position regarding causal determinism first and foremost)
Hello Trick
“Do you agree that, IF the universe happened to be causally deterministic, meaning every event has a sufficient cause, that there is no free will in this specific universe?” If we was in such a universe it would be fatalistic as causality in this view is like a force which robs us of any autonomy. So I don’t see how free will would be possible on that view.
Great. Though I’d quibble over the distinction between fatalism and determinism, we can bypass that quibble for now. I’m glad you are clearly stating that a deterministic universe is incompatible with free will on your view – so we can focus on the indeterminism question without reverting back to compatibilistic (meaning free will is compatible with determinism) sort of notions. Next question:
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Do you agree that an indeterministic event cannot be a “willed” event – meaning that you (the willer) have no say over the happening of an indeterministic event? Again a “yes” or “no” would be appreciated here.
(Note: We will address indeterminism giving “different options” later, this question is just in regards to the indeterministic event “happening”)
It’s very likely the brain has built in quantum randomness which it can turn on when we find it useful (I.e when generating alternative possibilities for action) and turn off when it’s not useful to us. So for the AP that are generated by randomness in our brain the answer is yes. (Sorry for the long reply Trick but I think you will appreciate that this answer requires a thought out explanation).
No problem about the longer reply, but I do feel it sidesteps my question a little about the “actual randomness” itself. This is why I gave that “note” in italics, as an attempt to mitigate that. To try again: regardless of the “AP” or anything generated by the randomness, do you agree that the truly random output themself are not “willed events”? That we have no say over how the “random” event (itself – not something afterward) ends up?
Hello,
What I’ve learned from Harris’ blow on compatibilists understanding of free will is that Harris seem to have devalued the moral motivation as an antecedent which may be a deciding factor for any moral consequences. Instead he gives it a psychological colour, that every events is decided by a preceeding events (most possibly psychological). His example of Komisarjevsky and Heyes seem to have precisely implicated that it was psychological which they didn’t have control over.
Hi Steve. To keep things conversational I only allow in one 500 char comment at a time. Sorry about that but it’s done to avoid bloat and obfuscation on both ends. See comment rules. I will address this first one for my response:
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Re Harris, have you read “The Moral Landscape”? Harris is a moral realist and a consequentialist (as am I btw). There is an important distinction between A) moral evaluations and actions based on them, and B) being morally responsible after-the-fact in the sense of “just deserts”. It is (B) that the free will skeptic such as Harris and I (and others) reject. We don’t have the “strong sense” I denote here, but the weak sense we do:
Moral Responsibility (and the Lack of Free Will) – INFOGRAPHIC
The problem with compatibilism is that it most often bypasses the topic of practical importance for the debate denoted HERE.
Not quite sure what you are asking so take a look at this. Where and When is Randomness Located? (In the decision making process) – click on Bob Doyle under “which philosopher” http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/location.html
Hopefully that answers your question.
It doesn’t answer my question (we know that indeterminism allows for an “otherwise”) – so let’s try again. Let’s imagine that an indeterministic event happens “in your brain”, and it had a specific probability of happening – say 30%. The other 70% is allocated to different quantum “possibilities” that did not take place (e.g. the collapse of the wave function went to that 30% instead of the 70%) – and if we were to rewind time it could hit in the 70% area instead of the 30%. Did you have a say over the happening at 30%? Was it freely chosen by you to happen? Likewise (on rewind) at the 70%?
Right so to take something from Sam Harris he asks me to think of a city. I choose to think of a city all randomness is responsible for is selecting – from a range of possible city’s- one of them. So in 70% of the replays let’s say New York comes up and in 30% London comes up. This does no harm to free will because I choose to act on Harris’s suggestion -randomness didn’t.
Such a scenario invokes in far more than just the indeterministic event I’m questioning you about. For example, in that scenario causality is needed for the “thought” you are addressing (even in the forming of a question or word). I’m referring explicitly to the indeterministic event itself when it occurs. If we are talking QM, do you have any say over the wave function collapse (of a “particle”) to a 30% area vs a 70% area? Yes or No?
Note: We will get into how the interaction of both causal and indeterministic events are not any more free than entirely deterministic events are later. I do understand the desire to want to leap ahead into the more “large scale” domain, but do think it important to take these discussions slowly and incrementally. Sorry if this seems pedantic.
Hi Trick
Our will is what chooses from among the randomly generated thoughts and initiates action. Indeterminism is NOT involved in the selection process itself (as that would harm our responsibility). So perhaps we should now discuss “the will” and you can explain why you think it doesn’t provide us with responsibility?
Hi John,
I think your response is alluding to an answer but before we “now discuss” something else, I just want to be perfectly clear that your answer is “NO, I do not have any say over the indeterminism going to 30% or 70% areas” to this question: If we are talking QM, do you have any say over the wave function collapse (of a “particle”) to a 30% area vs a 70% area? Am I correct in saying that your answer is “no” here?
Trick my answer is no (but as I said previously I do not think it is important as the randomness is not causing action).
Thanks on the “no” clarification. It is important, but we haven’t gotten there yet. Please bare with me, it is a slow process to go a step at a time.
Per your request, we can address “the will” at this point. Do you agree that a willed event requires a willer, meaning it is caused by a willer? Yes or no appreciated here as well.
Yes Trick I agree.
Great – let’s address causal event / indeterministic event interaction now.
Determinism: Let’s start very small with just a single, simplistic causal line:
[A causes B, B causes C, C causes D]Indeterminism: Imagine right when C happens there is indeterministic event X1, in which C interacting with X1 has the output of E instead of D:
[A causes B, B causes C, C interacting with {X1} causes E]Was E any more of a freely willed event than D? Yes or no again appreciated if possible.
It depends what the indeterministic event is causing. If for example it caused a vegetarian to choose meat instead of a vegetarian meal then clearly E (choosing meat) was not freely willed while D (choosing a vegetarian meal) was.
Your answer was “depends” so let’s address your dependancies.
Given a causally deterministic universe where…
[A causes B, B causes C, C causes D]…and D was the vegetarian choosing the vegetarian meal (suggested in your response – except without any indeterminism), was D freely willed? Yes or no preferred if possible.
Hi Trick
Clearly it was freely willed, (since the person choose to enter a restaurant and then choose what to eat.) May I ask a question in turn? What prior cause predetermined a persons choice?
But you said “Yes” to this question: “Do you agree that, IF the universe happened to be causally deterministic, meaning every event has a sufficient cause, that there is no free will in this specific universe?” There seems to be an inconsistency, so I ask the above question again to see if it has changed?
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For your answer, given determinism, it would be lines of prior causes that stem back to before the person was even was born, and after born specific genetic and environmental causes that were ultimately derived from the latter.
If a persons choice was predetermined then I agree there is no free will. But I don’t believe that. I believe the cause of a choice originates with the agent – not the universe or something else in the universe.
Fact 1 The universe is not interested in what you want for dinner.
Fact 2 Only you can decide what to eat – its up to you. The universe cannot make the decision for you.
Note: You seem to be reverting to compatibilism over libertarianism now (hence why I started with the question I had about causal determinism being compatible). I agree with your fact 1 and 2 (just as other non AI parts of the universe are not interested in a chess move of AI and the process it uses to move to a specific square is up to the AI – meaning it’s specific programming that was ultimately caused by those other parts), however, you are part of the universe and your programming and the very way you process the decision was caused as well.
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Next question then:
Do you agree that, IF the universe happened to be causally deterministic, meaning every event has a sufficient cause, and D is a decision you causally make in it, that you couldn’t have not chosen D? Y or N?
“your programming and the very way you process the decision was caused as well.” Nothing predetermined my choice.
Now to answer your question.
Putting aside the fact I am not a determinist 1) The legal (and only reasonable) understanding of “could have done otherwise” is not that a agent has magic abilities. But that the agent had the capacity to select another option but in that circumstance choose not to exercise that capacity. And because – in that circumstance – the agent didn’t exercise that capacity doesn’t mean the agent lacked that capacity.
2) Given the laws meaning of “could have done otherwise” it is more accurate to say they WOULDN’T (in that circumstance) have done otherwise rather than *couldn’t*.
I don’t know how you are using the term “predetermine” and I have not used it. If you mean caused by prior states to the specific outcome dictated by those causes, yes it is (given every event has a sufficient cause). If you mean there is something that knows the outcome (as in predicts), of course not.
I too am not a determinist, but we are still trying to see if your free will is compatible with determinism (because you have seemingly changed your mind here and we need to start here). Let’s address this “capacity” term, because I disagree that a real capacity (in the sense of the ability or power to not do D) exists in this circumstance.
Do you agree that, to have the capacity to not do D, there must be some real possibility that D could not happen? Yes or no?
On predeterminsm
Is the information about future events contained in the present state of the universe? If not then there is indeed objective chance and multiple possible futures which can happen.
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Imagine 2 circumstances 1) A shop lifter goes into a store planning to steal an item. When he gets to the aisle where the item is located he finds it empty and steals the item and promptly leaves the store. 2) Everything is the same but this time a security guard is standing in the aisle. Since obviously he will be caught he chooses to leave the store empty handed. (Also we can imagine the guard being in that aisle due to randomness to keep with your other point about indeterminism).
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In circumstance 1 did the thief lack the capacity to refrain from stealing the item? No. In circumstance 2 did he lack the capacity to steal the item? No. So it is correct to say he could have done otherwise but in circumstance 1 he choose not to exercise that capacity (because he believed he would get away with stealing it).
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So is the thief “non responsible” because he would always choose to steal in circumstance 1? No because the thief had the capacity to refrain and he made a rational choice (and the thief is the cause of that choice not anything else). Because of these reasons the thief is legally responsible for his choice to steal.
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“Do you agree that, to have the capacity to not do D, there must be some real possibility that D could not happen? Yes or no?” Before we make our choice D and not D are real possibilities. (Ps sorry about my response being so long but again your questions required a thought out – lengthy- answer
Hiya John. You seem to have (unintentionally) sidestepped my question. I did not ask if there were real possibilities (which I will indeed thoroughly go over why there cannot be in a causally deterministic universe), I asked, to have the “capacity” you suggested, if there must be a real possibility? I assume you are saying “yes” by denoting that you think there is a real possibility – but I want to be sure of your answer before we move on to things such as why “not D” was never a real possibility in an entirely causal universe.
Keep in mind that I like to keep it one comment at a time – 2 max if absolutely necessary (which is hardly the case) – in order to prevent these type of sidesteps and keep it a more conversational – back and forth.
So I will re-display my question:
Do you agree that, to have the capacity to not do D, there must be some real possibility that D could not happen?
Yes there must be a “real possibility”. Before I post this comment it’s a “real possibility” that I could choose not to post it. But it doesn’t matter that if I choose to post it still remains the case “that I could have not posted it”. So I will wait for your proof that the future is already determined.
Great – thanks (though I disagree- we will get there). I appreciate your patience. Next – given a causally deterministic universe where…
[A causes B, B causes C, C causes D]Do you agree that C cannot be BOTH that which will or does cause D, AND that which will not or does not cause D (as that would make C self-contradictory)? Yes or no?
* Note that we are still addressing determinism here, not indeterministic events.
Are you talking about before D has happened (and might not happen) or after? If after then clearly C (even if C is chance) was a cause of D but if before then C may or may not cause D.
Before or After. You answered sufficiently with a “no” for the ‘before’. This is one disagreement that we need to really get into. Keep in mind that we are not ,as of yet, addressing indeterminism as we go along (so I won’t note this every time). Next question….
Do you agree that it is the configuration / setup of C (whatever that may be) that causes D or does not cause D (e.g. causes E instead of D)?
“Do you agree that it is the configuration / setup of C (whatever that may be) that causes D or does not cause D (e.g. causes E instead of D)?” That’s pre determinism so no.
Let me, perhaps, re-ask this in a different way, a section at a time:
Do you agree that the entirety of C is ‘a specific state (whatever that state may consist of – properties, etc.) that we are labeling as C’?
Trick the future is not yet determined as Aristotle pointed out statements about the future only become true or false when the future arrives – not before. All that is necessary is that for example I will either be alive in 24hrs or I will not. So let’s C represent my current state (alive) does my current state determine or cause me to be alive or dead this time tomorrow? No.
You are leaping ahead and addressing things I did not say or suggest. I assume you are saying “yes” to my question that C is referring to a “state”, but let’s make this simple since you want to denote an actual example for C (e.g. your body). Rather, let C refer to the state of the entire universe at t1 (with you in it), and D refer to the state of the entire universe at t2 (with you in it).
(t1 and t2 are separate moments in ‘time’ that follow each other)
So when we say C causes D, do you agree that it is the state that causes D (the next moments state)? Yes or no.
Hi Trick
“So when we say C causes D, do you agree that it is the state that causes D (the next moments state)? Yes or no.” No because new information comes into existence that did not previously exist anywhere in the universe. For example chromosomes for the zygote are randomly selected from the sperm and egg, as a genuinely new individual is created and novel information enters the universe.
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You cannot trace the existence of the individual before that event – it depended on chance and was in that sense “uncaused”.
Now it seems you either have to prove determinism (a strange thing to do since you say you are not a determinist) or move on to give your reasons why you think “free will” is also incompatible with indeterminism.
Hi John,
I mentioned a few times that we are addressing determinism first – not indeterminism (which we will get to). I also mentioned that this should be assumed until otherwise noted so I don’t have to keep repeating that ‘disclaimer’. I’m doing this to make sure we are on the same page and to avoid talking past each other (e.g. you are unclear on whether free will is compatible with an entirely causal universe and I need to know your position here before we move on to indeterminism).
Also, the “randomness” of chromosomes is not “truly random” in the sense of indeterminism…any more than a roll of a die is. Also the fact that something novel is *caused to happen* also is not indeterminism. Every moment in time is something “novel” – that does not mean the state prior did not cause it (and if it didn’t cause it we are back to indeterminism – which we are not addressing yet).
So we will try again:
ASSUMING THAT EVERY EVENT IS CAUSED BY ANTECEDENT EVENTS (DETERMINISM):
When we say C causes D (a “novel” event that differs from C), do you agree that it is the state (the way C is) that causes D (the next moments “novel” state)? Yes or no.
Sorry if this is too much a tangent, but due to its complexity, a deterministic universe cannot predict that deterministic people on the earth could be sufficiently competitive. If we assume the sun, planets, rocks, mountains and plants to be strictly deterministic, the distribution of same still could never be predicted. We could never be born knowing what to eat or where to find it.
Hi Alan,
Causal determinism is not about predictability. There is nothing about cause and effect that suggests the cause is predicting the effect or in some way knows the effect – just that it causes the effect.
Causal determinism is predictable by definition. The effect has no choice but to be caused. Much like solving an equation.
The cause need not know its effect, but a cognizant observer would.
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Paraphrasing this with another specific example, given the position of the earth today, the position of the earth tomorrow or a year from now is predictable, as the orbit is determined.
Having no choice but to be caused does not necessarily equate to predictability (though many large scale things we can predict – such as orbits, etc.). There are various problems with full predictability, at least for us humans (who are not Laplace’s Demon), even with an entirely deterministic universe – such as the measurement problem at small scale (to measure we need to interact which affects the measurement), chaos theory (small differences leading up to big differences in complex patterns that we simply don’t have access to), etc. The important thing for the free will debate is not whether one can predict or not, just whether cause ‘determines’ effect (the specific effect is the output of the specific causes).
” (e.g. you are unclear on whether free will is compatible with an entirely causal universe and I need to know your position here before we move on to indeterminism).” I already said if the universe is entirely causal then free will is an illusion – since nature has already asked all the questions and determined all your answers – stripping you of all control and autonomy.
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“Also the fact that something novel is *caused to happen* also is not indeterminism. ” Yes it is for example this message is new information, given that how can your (brains) response to this information have been (pre) determined from the origin of the universe?
“that does not mean the state prior did not cause it” Which is like saying you being alive now “caused” you to be alive or dead tomorrow.
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When we say C causes D (a “novel” event that differs from C), do you agree that it is the state (the way C is) that causes D (the next moments “novel” state)? Yes or no.” No when you read this message your response is novel, that means your brains response wasn’t fixed in the past – it was the result of chance.
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“and if it didn’t cause it we are back to indeterminism – which we are not addressing yet” But we should be – unless you can and want to prove that objective chance does not exist? If not then you can now give your reasons as to why you think indeterminism also results in no free will.
Okay – we are getting long again.
The reason I said it was not clear is because, when I asked this:
You responded with this:
Am I correct to say that you made a mistake here (perhaps you misread the question?) and that you meant to say that it was not freely willed? Yes or no?
Also, your notion of novel equating to indeterminism is not any usage of indeterminism I am aware of in philosophy or science – and if we used that then every event would be indeterministic. For example, a rock rolling down a hill is locationally novel each moment, but it is still considered deterministic. What makes something indeterministic is if it either is an acausal event or has some (magical) ontic probability distribution that on replay could have been different. None of this has to do with how novel an effect of a cause is – that to me is just a bizarre idea. Either way, that is not what is being referred to for how determinism and indeterminism are used for the free will debate.
“Am I correct to say that you made a mistake here (perhaps you misread the question?) and that you meant to say that it was not freely willed? Yes or no?” Even in a universe that contains genuine chance we can still have a “adequate determinism”. So in the circumstance described given a vegetarians ethical beliefs its “adequately determined” that they will choose to have a vegetarian meal.
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“Also, your notion of novel equating to indeterminism is not any usage of indeterminism I am aware of in philosophy or science –” Read this article if your interested in this subject http://www.informationphilosopher.com/introduction/creation/
“This two-step core creative process underlies the formation of microscopic objects like atoms and molecules, as well as macroscopic objects like galaxies, stars, and planets.”
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Hopefully this wasn’t to long and we can now discuss free will and indeterminism
We (unfortunately) can’t move on until this matter is cleared up, as we need to work off of the deterministic chain by adding in indeterministic events to it. For the question I asked, I’m only asking about a universe were causal determinism is the case – so to inject in indeterminism (with some ‘adequate determinism’) is to bypass the question at hand.
Is the situation I mentioned where EVERY event has a cause (no indeterminism) and
[A causes B, B causes C, C causes D](D = vegetarian selection) a “freely willed” event?I get that you believe the universe is indeterministic (meaning that there are some indeterministic events that could have been otherwise), but that is irrelevant to the question I need answered.
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Regarding the link, for me to approve it I need to criticize it – otherwise it can be considered misinformation that can distract readers.
Regarding Bob Doyle’s (The “Information Philosopher’s”) assumptive assessment on a “cosmic creation process“, he does not use indeterminism to say that novel events ARE THE indeterministic events, but rather that quantum indeterministic events are a requirement of novel changes, a very speculative hypothesis which I think is fairly unfounded and just assumes an indeterministic interpretation of quantum wave function collapse (which is a big, whopping assumption BTW). Regardless of the assumption, indeterminism is used in the way I mentioned – it is not defined BY novel features, it just (assumptively) denotes that it is requirement FOR novel features (which is very different than being an indeterministic event). Those who lean toward deterministic interpretations of QM (such as pilot wave theory, MWI, etc.) would disagree entirely with this assumptive hypothesis. I’m agnostic on quantum interpretations, though have philosophical leanings away from some indeterministic ones like certain conceptions of the Copenhagen interpretation or objective collapse theories that have various inconsistencies – but that is irrelevant here. The fact of the matter is, there is no evidence that (novel) change cannot occur entirely causally – in fact that is the very underpinning of what the notion of causality is about.
Note: I do appreciate you pointing to this article of Doyle, I may have to write a post on some of his assumptive assessments (particularly his step 1) and elsewhere that I have noted on his site. I don’t find his site a reliable source for the free will topic, which I find he often distorts. Rather than debating this however – if we can focus back to the question at hand (in bold above), that would be appreciated.
*
“but rather that quantum indeterministic events are a requirement of novel changes,” Yes that’s right the new information is the result of quantum indeterminacy, without that no new information can come into existence.
“would disagree entirely with this assumptive hypothesis.”In a deterministic universe nothing new can come into existence. (I.e in a universe where there is only 1 possible future no new information has come into existence).
“The fact of the matter is, there is no evidence that (novel) change cannot occur entirely causally – in fact that is the very underpinning of what the notion of causality is about.” If new information comes into existence then how was its existence determined in the past? New information requires chance. (By the way we could have a causality which includes chance so such causality doesn’t require that the future is already fixed).
*
“Rather than debating this however – if we can focus back to the question at hand (in bold above), that would be appreciated.” I thought I would make a reply to it now and perhaps we can discuss it at a later time. So now on to your question.
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In such a universe everything is fated, that means nothing is “up to you” – the universe has all the power – you have none, you may think you do but its illusion – in reality your future choices and actions (always) was up to the universe.
*
Unfortunately I do not approve what I assess as misinformation without denoting that it is misinformation and why it is, so I will need to do this:
We could talk about what one means by new “information” here, but if they just mean for change to take place, that only requires cause and effect. For there to be changes (differences) in the structures of matter and energy …that does not require indeterminism. If there is a ball of clay that falls off of a table and gets flattened, neither the falling or the flattened clay required an indeterministic event.
I find the very idea that indeterminism is required A) not backed up logically and B) not backed up scientifically. In fact, the whole idea even goes against indeterministic interpretations of QM (such as Copenhagen) where there is a wave function that has real change before the indeterminism within the collapse of the wave-function even happens.
Also the term “chance” is in ambiguous term, meaning it can apply to indeterminism, OR to a die roll in that entirely deterministic universe that there is no free will in (per your change here). If you mean that there is a true otherwise possibility, then you need to smuggle in an event that does not have a cause (e.g. what causes it to go to A over B and vice versa? If nothing – you have an event that was not fully caused). You basically need to smuggle in indeterminism. I think we will end up going over this fully as we go on.
*
Moving on to the step-by-step conversation…
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You seem to now be agreeing that D was not freely willed for the scenario I gave (though I do disagree with calling it fatalism or not being “up to you” in the sense that “you” are part of the causality playing out – perhaps not “ultimately up to you” would be better here). We can, however, bypass those distinctions for now. Next question:
Imagine right when C happens there is indeterministic event X1, in which C interacting with X1 has the output of E instead of D:
[A causes B, B causes C, C interacting with {X1} causes E]…and E is the vegetarian not selecting the vegetarian option (though if an indeterministic event did not happen causality would have went to D – the selection of the vegetarian option). I think you agreed that there is no free will there, correct?
Note: We will go over the scenario where the indeterministic event does allow the vegetarian option to be selected after – so don’t repeat that. Please just answer the question at hand.
Hi Trick
“that does not require indeterminism.” Ah but as Doyle says even determinism itself emerged in the early universe, there was no macroscopic objects to exhibit deterministic behaviour at that time.
“Also the term “chance” is in ambiguous term, meaning it can apply to indeterminism, OR to a die roll” I was using it here to refer to indeterminism.
” If you mean that there is a true otherwise possibility, then you need to smuggle in an event that does not have a cause” All that’s required is, is that the information is not present in the prior state of the universe (as determinism claims). For example when a person makes a choice (between 2 or more viable options) that information doesn’t exist until the choice is made, the choice was partially the result of objective chance.
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” I think you agreed that there is no free will there, correct?” Yes.
For a deterministic interpretation of QM, determinism is not reliant on macroscopic events. Doyle is just assuming an indeterministic interpretation at the quantum scale – which he should not be.
Ah, okay. So a roll of a die in a fully causal universe without indeterminism would not be “chance” as you are using it. It isn’t just epistemic – but ontic. Let’s just say indeterminism then – as it is less confusing.
When we use the term “information” in physics we are referring to the properties of a physical state at a given moment. In physics the “information” is needed for a causal relation. If you are saying there is no information that causes the next set of information, you are smuggling in an event without a cause. What caused the other set of information? What causes the choice to be made for option 1 rather than option 2 (or vice versa) if not the information stored in the antecedent configuration (the person’s configuration – large or small scale)? If nothing, then that is indeed an indeterministic event that is not caused by anything in the prior state. The state is missing the “variables” (information) that cause the next output. What indetermiism is not needed for is a causal reconfiguration of matter/energy (information). Change can and does happen without any indeterminism, even if we accept an indeterministic interpretation of QM (which again is an assumption to do so)…and even for the wave itself.
Okay, back to the real discussion (we should probably stick with the below for now rather than continue to haggle over the above)….
————————————————————
{X} = indeterministic event(s). For example {X1} could have went to {X2} or vice versa on replay.
============ NOT FREELY WILLED for the vegetarian =============
Causally deterministic universe (no indeterminism):
[A causes B, B causes C, C causes D](D = the entirely causal decision to eat vegetarian)
Indeterministic universe:
[A causes B, B causes C, C interacting with {X1} causes E](E = the decision not to eat vegetarian that stems from an interaction between C and indeterministic event X1)
============ FREELY WILLED for the vegetarian ===============
Indeterministic universe:
[A causes B, B causes C, C interacting with {X2} causes F](F = the decision to eat vegetarian that stems from an interaction between C and indeterministic event X2)
Am I correct that the above is your position? Yes or No?
“Am I correct that the above is your position? Yes or No?” Yes
Thanks John! 🙂
Do you agree that causes A, B, and C (or any other antecedent events for that matter) which are identical in both the vegetarian selection option and the non-vegetarian selection option have no say over whether it is {X1} that takes place or {X2} that takes place? Y or N?
Yes I agree.
Great!! 🙂
Do you agree that E (not selecting the vegetarian option – something not freely willed per you) is the product of C (which is a product of causality) and {X1} (an indeterministic event that you had no say over) interacting? Y or N?
Yes I agree.
Likewise, do you agree that F (selecting the vegetarian option) is the product of C (which is a product of causality) and {X2} (an indeterministic event that you had no say over) interacting? Y or N?
I am not sure that I do agree as the choice is caused by and originates with the agent.
This is a problem because the last two scenarios are set up identically – the only distinction being that one has indeterministic event {X1} and the other indeterministic event {X2} which, when interacting with the same C, output a different choice (E vs. F).
Hi Trick
The agent is the cause not causality or indeterminsm. If I ask you to raise your hand and you did and then we “rewind the tape” and this time you didn’t it doesn’t change the facts that 1)The action is up to you and 2) The action is caused by – and originates – with you. So on both “rewinds” you still freely choose and are responsible for your actions.
Let’s go over your #2 first:
Q1: Does {X1} happening or {X2} happening “originate with you”? In other words, do “you” have any say over whether {X1} or {X2} happens? Y or N
Q2: Likewise, does C “originate with you” in either of the three scenarios? Y or N
Note: we may need to go over how you are using the word “originate” depending on how you answer these.
1) Yes since it is “up to you”
2) “C” is the reason for acting. Since it is your reason for acting its fair to say it originated with you.
1) So “you” have a say over whether {X1} happens or whether {X2} happens instead? Y or N
2) Is “C” the reason for acting in the deterministic scenario that you have no “free will” in? Y or N
1) Since I am causing the event then yes.
2) Presumable since you specify that the universes are identical – until the indeterminstic event comes in. (I am only disagreeing with pre determinism remember where the causes go back – and determine – your whole life from the origin of the universe. While with indeterminism the reasons (causal chain) stops at the agent.
Let’s go over your #1 here a little if we can – which we will accept for the sake of argument only that this is “caused”:
If “you” are the cause of indeterministic event {X1), can “you” also not be the cause of indeterministic event {X1} (e.g. the cause of {X2) instead of {X1})? Y or N
In other words, can “you” both be the cause of {X1} and not be the cause of {X1}?
Hi Trick
How can I both be the cause and not the cause of X1? X1 (voluntary act – such as raising my hand – is by definition caused by me. If its not caused by me then it’s not a voluntary act.)
{X1} is the indeterministic event that “could have not happened” in our scenario 2. Are indeterministic events “voluntary”?
Perhaps you lost track on which variables we were using in the scenarios so I will reiterate them here:
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A, B, C, and D = sufficiently causal events
{X1} and {X2} = indeterministic events
E and F = events caused by an indeterministic event and sufficient causal events interacting
SCENARIO 1
Causally deterministic universe (no indeterminism):
[A causes B, B causes C, C causes D](D = the entirely causal decision to eat vegetarian)
SCENARIO 2
Indeterministic universe (some indeterministic events):
[A causes B, B causes C, C interacting with {X1} causes E](E = the decision not to eat vegetarian that stems from an interaction between C and indeterministic event X1)
SCENARIO 3
Indeterministic universe (some indeterministic events):
[A causes B, B causes C, C interacting with {X2} causes F](F = the decision to eat vegetarian that stems from an interaction between C and indeterministic event X2)
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” Are indeterministic events “voluntary”?” “Indeterminstic events” do not cause voluntary actions – the agent does (by definition).
So I don’t agree with your scenarios because you are trying to claim in all of them that the universe – external events -whether deterministic or not – is causing the decision and not the agent.
Not at all, in all of the scenarios – C is, and even B or A can be causes that happen “within the agent” or “as causal parts of the agent”. I’m only suggesting that whether an indeterministic event “collapses” to {X1} or {X2} cannot be a “causally willed event” (something willed by “you” – meaning you causing the specific output) which I thought you agreed to.
Do you disagree that “you” or “the agent” has no say over whether an indeterministic event collapses to {X1} or {X2}? Y or N
But a voluntary act is a “willed event”. And it is an act that originated with the agent. And the agent wasn’t pre determined by external causes to either raise or not raise his hand. Where is the “illusion” here? The agent starts new causal chains, the agent controls his behaviour and thus the agent is responsible for its actions. None of this is an illusion.
Agents cannot cause new causal chains, as agents themself are caused (an agent cannot be a “start” as they pre-exist due to other variables that precede them). All “willed events” are caused by willers that are also caused by events. Only acausal events that are not caused by agents (willers) can “start” new causal chains.
This is why indeterministic events cannot be a saviour of free will, they are a starting point that “you” have no say over (e.g. {X1} or {X2}) – meaning “you” (the “agent”, the “willer”) cannot “will”, “choose”, “determine”, “have volition over”, or “have any say over” which happens. This is why I keep asking if you have a say over whether an indeterministic event collapses to {X1} or {X2}, which if you did “determine” it’s result, that would defeat the very idea of indeterminism.
So what past event determined your decision to raise your hand or not? Every time you make a choice you start a new causal chain (you are faced with multiple possibilities and then you select which possibility becomes actual and so the chain that follows depending on and originated with you and your decision).
Yes I determine whether I raise my hand or not but it is not pre determined before a person even asks me the question that is absurd.
Your brain state (which was caused) and countless other PRECEDING causal factors that play into the specific deliberation process and result (and if invoking indeterministic events, also those indeterministic events that you had absolutely no say over).
Epistemic possibilities (about a lack of knowledge) differ from ontic possibilities (the possibilities being “real”).
The question being asked for this topic is if you could have chosen otherwise and, if so, by an event that made the adjustment being something that you had an actual say over (the otherwise was “up to you”).
Based on your pre-existing “programming”(that was caused too!)…and if an indeterministic event pops in that changes your deliberation process / selection – you had no say over that indeterministic event (the change was not of “your own accord”) – and that is what we were addressing. This is the problem with libertarian notions of free will –> you are better off defining free will to be compatible with causal determinism (compatibilism) if you want to hold on to the term.
Also, the term “pre-determinism” just confuses matters as it potentially invokes some sort of pre-knowledge which is unnecessary. “Causal determinism” is more clear. Unfortunately we are getting ahead of ourselves again which will only allow for obfuscations to occur (potentially on both ends). We need to be clear on the specifics and get back on track…
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Let’s try to get back on track and re-ask some questions that the answers have become unclear for:
Can you “will” an indeterministic quantum event to collapse to {X1} rather than {X2}? Y or N?
Yes the otherwise (alternative possibilities generated by indeterminsm) are not up to you but the voluntary acts and choices which follow by definition are.
“Also, the term “pre-determinism” just confuses matters as it potentially invokes some sort of pre-knowledge which is unnecessary.” If there isn’t “some sort of pre-knowledge” then how is your brains response to this message already fixed?
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“Can you “will” an indeterministic quantum event to collapse to {X1} rather than {X2}? Y or N?”
We make choices and there is no reason to believe our choices are predetermined by some mysterious hidden variable we have a basis for thinking there is free will and no basis to claim ‘it’s an illusion”.
Unfortunately to answer this my response needs to be longer , but I prefer when we focus to a few sentences at a time to avoid obfuscation and to get to these conclusions incrementally – so this will be an unfortunate digression (and I do so to make it clear to other readers as well what my position is). I think this is where we would ultimately be lead if we were able to continue to take the incremental, socratic approach:
Not in a “voluntary” sense that differs from a “voluntary decision” in an entirely causally deterministic universe (no indeterminism), meaning it is an interaction of causal events that either ultimately stem back to events outside of you or back to indeterministic events you had absolutely no say over with other indeterministic events you had absolutely no say over. When we trace the events back (meaning any decision you make) they always stem to something (whether something caused by another event or something indeterministic) that is not “you” or that “you” had absolutely no say over.
Under determinism my brain configuration is caused and so is the message and the way I perceive, deliberate, and respond to the message. And if indeterministic events that I have absolutely no say over influence my response, that influence (the interaction with the consistent causal events) is entirely out of my control (I actually think it would likely be more of a detriment to my causal willing). Prior to conscious creatures evolving there is nothing that has any “knowledge” let along “pre-knowledge”. Deterministic cause and effect does not imply present or future knowledge.
Again, even if we allow in indeterminism (the lack of being entirely causally deterministic), that does not mean we have free will. Free will is an “illusion” because the very concept (at least the traditional one of importance) is logically incoherent with BOTH determinism AND indeterminism. We were going over how you have no say over an indeterministic event (how “you” are not a “variable” or “hidden variable” for its output), which also means you have no say over how such an event influences your decision – at least not any more say than you have a say over how causality that stems back in time (under determinism) influences your decision.
Things we agree on:
An entirely causally deterministic universe, meaning one in which every event in the universe has a sufficient cause, is incompatible with free willThings we disagree on:
In an indeterministic universe, meaning a mix of causal events (sufficient) and some events that there is no causal variable for a specific output, you think that indeterminism can help with free will and I think not only does it not help (at all) but it is likely to be a hindrance to consistent causal willing.We were going over the indeterministic universe scenario, so why you keep bringing up “pre-determinism” I’m unsure. I’m saying whether determinism is the case or whether indeterminism is the case, BOTH are incompatible with free will – and right now we are assessing why an indeterministic event cannot help with free will. We are addressing the problem with libertarian “free will”.
I do think we could be at an impasse (that’s just something that happens with disagreeing positions), but in case we are not yet at an impasse (if you think we are let me know – I’m only offering “food for thought” not trying to pester), we should try to get back to the socratic approach. If I am wrong (or vice versa), that will be brought out in this approach if we can stay consistent. I will, if you don’t mind, ask again (as the question was not really answered):
Can you “will” an indeterministic quantum event to collapse to {X1} rather than {X2}? Y or N?
Note: I think your answer is “no” here but would like to check.
“Can you “will” an indeterministic quantum event to collapse to {X1} rather than {X2}? Y or N?” “Will” isn’t involved at that stage (the indeterministic generation of thoughts and alternative possibilities for action) so no. “Will” and our control comes after. So here is the model for decision making in simple form:
1) Thoughts and AP generated by indeterminism 2) Our weighing of the possibilities in accordance with our values and current desires. 3) Selection of the “best” option (we can also “think again” if we don’t find any of the current options particularly attractive). This model gives us the right to say both that we could have done otherwise and that the action was up to (and originated with) us. Why you think this model for decision making is logically incoherent I don’t know.
2 and 3 happen in the entirely deterministic scienario that you say there is no free will in (in fact I think causality is what makes those consistent – but I digress). If you happen to do otherwise than what is caused by your desires and values in the deterministic scenario (or what causes your desires or values becomes “otherwise”) – based on an indeterministic event, either that indeterministic event you had absolutely no say over… interacting with “you”: A) changes your values and desires, or B) it makes you go against your values and desires. Either way, this is a detriment to willing and nothing you had a say over (since you had no say over the initial indeterministic event that had a specific causal interaction with you). This is why you (correctly) didn’t assign free will to the vegan ordering the non-vegan option. Saying “we could have done otherwise IF an indeterministic event we had no say over happening popped in that made us do otherwise” is very different than saying “we could have, of our own accord (volition), done otherwise”. It is this distinction that we are going over, but we once again are getting ahead of ourselves.
Next question:
Given both C and {X1} happening/interacting, could those specific variables (when they occur) output other than E? Y or N?
“Given both C and {X1} happening/interacting, could those specific variables (when they occur) output other than E? Y or N?” If C is “past history of the agent ” and X1 is a set of APs generated by indeterminism, then it is “adequately determined” – by the agents character and current desires – what the agent will choose (unless of course some of the options are equally attractive in which case we may decide to mentally flip a coin.)
Small point you said an indeterministic event makes us do otherwise the indeterminsm just gives us AP the selection of which possibility is up to us.
For now we will assume particles collapsing indeterministically lead to “new sets of AP’s” (e.g. that X1 or X2 are “new/different sets”) that (you agree) we have no say over which sets takes place … because it (the assumption) really doesn’t matter, but at some point we might want to go over the distinction between being given indeterministic sets of information that could be widely different and the luck of the draw regarding which set, and being given causally consistent sets. Again, I digress.
….so next question:
In the deterministic scenario 1, the main difference is that the “set of AP’s” provided is causally determined rather than indeterministically given. In the deterministic scenario, is the selection between those determined options/set processed due to “agents character and current desires” just like the selections between the indeterministic options/set in scenario’s 2 and 3 are due to those factors? Y or N
Yes the only differences being that with indeterminism different sets may be produced that can lead to novel ways of acting and creative new ideas. And of course it breaks the chain of pre determinsm (I know you don’t like the word). So the agent is the origin of the thoughts and cause of their action – instead of some prior state of the universe.
I don’t really disagree with “novel ways of acting” (any change is “novel” and is irrelevant to whether the agent had an actual say over the change) or “new ideas” (any different idea is “new” and is irrelevant to whether the agent had an actual say over a “new” change) or “breaks the chain of determinism” (It is practically a tautology that indeterminism breaks the chain of determinism). Where we disagree is that the “agent is the origin” because this is not nor cannot be the case in either the deterministic or indeterministic scenario in which the origin always stems back to events that “the agent” has no say (or agency) over – whether indeterministic events or causal events. So let’s get into this “agent is the origin” business, starting from the beginning, the agent themself:
Does the agent itself ultimately stem back to events (whether deterministic or indeterminstic or a combo of both) that are not the agent? Y or N
“Does the agent itself ultimately stem back to events (whether deterministic or indeterminstic or a combo of both) that are not the agent? Y or N” No
Do agents come into being (rather than exist eternally)? Y or N
“Do agents come into being (rather than exist eternally)? Y or N” Yes agents come into being in a indeterminstic universe and have a say over how their life turns out. While in a deterministic universe the existence of the agent and every choice he ever made was fixed from “eternity”.
Sorry for the delay, been busy. Again, we will eventually get to why they don’t have any more say regarding “how their life turns out” than in the deterministic scenario – but we are leaping ahead.
Do agents have a say over where, when, or how they come into being or their specific configuration when coming into being? Y or N?
In a deterministic scenario, agency would not exist. The existence of agency requires free will.
I do not see ‘come into being’ a very esthetic synonym for birth, but ok.
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I think it might help to minimize the mysticism.
Don’t conflate “agency” with “free agency”, they are not the same thing. Causal agency is compatible with determinism.
Coming into being just means to start existing.
Might you give an example of this ‘non-free’ agency. It just feels to me like you are conflating. I’m not sure how anyone uses the term without the assumption of free-agent.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/agency/
“In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity.” – determinism does not exclude this.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_(philosophy)
“Agency is the capacity of an actor to act in a given environment.” – determinism does not exclude this.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agent
Agent: one that acts or exerts power – determinism does not exclude this.
There is a difference between “agency” and “free agency”. Likewise, there is a difference between “will” and “free will”, “decision” and “free decision”, “choice” and “free choice”, etc. It is the “free” qualifier that changes these to the “free will” requirement. That being said, words have ambiguities and I dislike the use of “agency” for the very reason that it can be ambiguously confused.
Each of those words, agent, act, choice and decision are normally understood to be free. Human language is an invention of free will and many of our words, such as those noted, loose most of their significance when striped of that understanding. There is no motive for ever selecting those words save to draw the allusion of free. While a clock may be alluded to as acting, that is an understood illusion.
Any agency, likewise, that is not free is but the illusion of agency.
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For the sake of these discussions, I will try and follow your lead and observe this anomalous use.
You cannot just assert that words such as agent, act, choice, and decision “normally require free will” (“normally” they do not) or that language itself assumes it for these words (it doesn’t). The reality is that the language of these terms in general does not assume an ability to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise nor do they assume the lack of that ability either, they are neutral terms here. They also do not become “insignificant” without free will. Conscious biological robots (humans) are agents that act, can make decisions, can think about and deliberate over options, and can choose an option that is deliberated over – they just are not free agents that act freely, make free decisions, have a will that is free, or make free choices. Under determinism they could not deliberate or choose otherwise – which does not mean that a process of deliberation does not happen or a choice does not happen. The capacity of an actor to act is not an illusion, even if they could not have acted otherwise.
I disagree that the use is anomalous, though I do see how confusions arise for these terms and don’t like the term “agency” much due to that.
Agents do not come into being, nor are they eternal. Agents are born – though could also be built. All animals are agents, agency (and for man, mind) being a product of the brain. Through software, computers could become agents as well.
Being “born” is coming into being.
But doesn’t it work fine for predicting future?
Hi Rahul. Yes, in an entirely causal universe, Laplace’s Demon *theoretically* could predict every future event.
“Do agents have a say over where, when, or how they come into being or their specific configuration when coming into being? Y or N?” Of course not (since they didn’t exist before they existed).
Do agents change based to their specific biological construct that they started with and the environments they are in (and perhaps indeterministic events they have no say over)? Y or N?
“Do agents change based to their specific biological construct that they started with and the environments they are in (and perhaps indeterministic events they have no say over)? Y or N?” Yes agents make a choice when faced with an issue if that’s what you mean. (And can make a different choice in the future if faced with the same issue – thanks to their free will).
Not what I asked. I’m referring to what causes an agent to become different at any given moment. Also, making a different choice in the future has nothing to do with free will, it just has to do with being a different configuration (a slightly different “agent”) with different causal variables in the future.
Do you agree that the configuration of an agent changes through biological and environmental (and potentially indeterministic event) pressures to be a specific agent config at any given moment in time? Y or N
Trick wrote
“Conscious biological robots (humans) are agents that act, can make decisions, can think about and deliberate over options, and can choose an option that is deliberated over” And despite all those facts “free will skeptics” like yourself and Sam Harris still claim the agent is not responsible for his choices! Harris goes so far as saying he is no more responsible for being the author of his books than his birth!
And yet I am saying those things exist in a deterministic universe that you agree there would be no free will in, so the irony is that you agree that those are not sufficient for free will (hence your invoking of indeterministic events that we also have no say over in). Also note that it is the strong “just desert” sense of moral responsibility that I and Harris know we cannot have (due to the lack of free will): https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/moral-responsibility-infographic/
You claim if a criminal chooses to commit a crime this means he lacked the capacity to do otherwise. So those capacities which you say exist actually CANNOT in a deterministic universe.
Okay Harris makes money from his books even though he doesn’t deserve to profit from writing his books since he is no more responsible for writing his books than his birth right?
It just means the criminal couldn’t have chosen otherwise, not that those abilities I stated do not exist. Being “conscious biological robots (humans) that are agents that act, can make decisions, can think about and deliberate over options, and can choose an option that is deliberated over” does NOT IMPLY that one could have been, acted, decided, deliberated, or chosen OTHERWISE (at that time). This sentence makes perfect semantic sense: “I chose the only option I could have chosen at the time”, because choosing is a causal process that does not require magical otherwise abilities (that indeterminism cannot help with BTW – as those events cannot be “chosen” at all).
Also, I’m all for equal wealth distribution, but the fact that people think that they or others are more deserving makes that world, at least currently, impossible. No one is more or less deserving of their causal luckiness/unluckiness – or the wealth/wellbeing that goes along with it. In today’s environment obtaining money is a matter of practicality, even for an effective altruist. The lack of free will does have a lot to say on wealth equality, and is another reason the topic is important, especially with the gross inequality we currently have.
” does NOT IMPLY that one could have been, acted, decided, deliberated, or chosen OTHERWISE. ” Determinism in your view means causality compels people to act as they do – they have no power to do anything the universe is holding the strings as Harris says.
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“but the fact that people think that they or others are more deserving makes that world, at least currently, impossible.” A person who performs a service for you deserves to be paid. A thief who steals your money does not deserve that money.
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“Also, making a different choice in the future has nothing to do with free will,” When faced with the “same circumstance” again you can make a better choice. Without free will it would impossible to rehabilitate criminals.
———
“I’m referring to what causes an agent to become different at any given moment.” Your ability to learn from past experience, using your imagination and foresight to evaluate future consequences of your choice and your ability to deliberate about values. As you can see there is no external cause it’s all you.
Unfortunately we got placed on a tangent away from our socratic question and answer (more conversational) session due to Alan’s interjection, so once again this will be a longer (less conversational) post.
You seem to misunderstand determinism which is not the same thing as fatalism. Harris also points out the distinction between determinism and fatalism, and even has written “the moral landscape”.
HARRIS: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKv2pWZkgrI
ME: https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/determinism-vs-fatalism-infographic/
As Harris points out, people are “part of the stream of causality”. That being said, I don’t agree with Harris on every point (or the way he goes about it).
This is the very notion that causes the inequalities we see where 2% of the worlds population own more than half of all wealth and .5% own 44% of all wealth. You seem to think that these people “deserve” these extreme ownership rights to the world than others, but that simply isn’t the case. We may need to incentivize people for the sake of societal utility only (practicality), but this notion of wealth ‘just deserts’ is a huge problem.
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/deserve-justifies-inequality/
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/wealth-inequality-infographic/
Free will has nothing to do with making a better choice in the future (it is never the “same circumstance” by the way, all configs are different including your brain state. It has everything to do with being machines that learn from past behaviour (our brain configurations update). No free will is required, just as no free will is required for AI to learn from past behaviours and adjust accordingly. Without consistent and reliable causality it would be impossible to rehabilitate people.
All of those things you mentioned are a PART OF the causal process. They all happen under a completely deterministic universe – the one you say there would be no free will in. It is not “all you” as the configuration you call “you” is caused as well and “you” also interact with the environment you are immersed in every moment. They way you experience, hold memory to have past experience, the very imagination you have, and the very way you utilize foresight, are all products of your brain state that causally updates with each moment.
Much of your assessment seems to fall back to the mistaken notion about what causality is or is not, and what the lack of free will means and does not. Here is an infographic on what the lack of free will does NOT mean:
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/doesnt-mean-not-free-will-infographic/
And if we go back to the other conversation about the libertarian variety of free will that you seem to require, indeterministic events that produce options that we had no say over are not any more in our control than causally deterministic events, in fact they are less in our control. Under determinism causal willing still takes place. This is why, in regards to free will positions, compatibilism is at least coherent (and comes down to a semantic distinction). There is a reason that libertarian free will is so widely rejected.
All of this being said, if we cannot get back on target (the more conversational discussion), I think it may be time to call it quits if that is okay with you. I think we might have hit one of those “agree to disagree” moments (it happens more than not and is all good) and only ask that this convo be something that is more like “food for thought”, something for you to perhaps causally chew on a bit later on down the road even if today you are not convinced.
Peace out good sir. 🙂
Wow what a monster thread
A couple of quick comments.
Random … truly random? Generally not a well understood topic. Random.org I think has a good as any layman’s definition of “random”
Conscious decisions in the “now”. I recall reading this “now” is an agglomeration of the last two to three seconds and in sports extends back a few tens of milliseconds.
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Hawking and Mlodinow on QM and Determinism (The Grand Design)
Quantum physics might seem to undermine the idea that nature is governed by laws, but that is not the case. Instead it leads us to accept a new form of determinism: Given the state of a system at some time, the laws of nature determine the probabilities of various futures and pasts rather than determining the future and past with certainty.
———
and from the same source
… the molecular basis of biology shows that biological processes are governed by the laws of physics and chemistry and therefore are as determined as the orbits of the planets…so it seems that we are no more than biological machines and that free will is just an illusion
Hi Rom
To me, QM seems to be pointing to the fundamental aspects of reality being a mix of the lawful and the random (order and chaos).
That pattern seems to repeat at every level of life.
At the level of replicating molecules, too much order, then not enough variation for evolution to progress in the time available; too much chaos and complex patterns cannot survive. Always a balance, always sensitive to the specifics of the context.
And how does chaotic or random molecular replication give us free will?
Hi Ted 🙂
Hi rom,
It all comes down to the nature of the freedom involved.
I acknowledge that form requires boundaries.
I acknowledge that communication and degrees of influence must exist.
It all comes down to how hard is the connection in causal terms.
Can degrees of randomness give us sufficient isolation from the hard stream of causal influence to give us some useful approximation to freedom?
It seems to me that the answer is yes.
“Can degrees of randomness give us sufficient isolation from the hard stream of causal influence to give us some useful approximation to freedom?”
You did not answer my question Ted. How does a some sort of cosmic dice shaker make my will free of that cosmic dice shaker?
In what sense free?
By definition, will must have a form, so in that sense, it must have boundaries, and must in a sense have a strong degree of predictability if all of its elements were known.
So freedom in this sense cannot be freedom from all constraint, and it can mean sufficiently isolated that it is not connected to the external stream of existence in a way that is predictable by an agent within that external stream.
So in this sense,randomness does seem to create such freedom.
In the sense of independent of cause.
And if you are claiming that are wills are formed by prior cause(s) then in what sense is our will free?
Ultimately you must be pointing to some compatibilistic defintion of free will and ignoring the fact we cannot do otherwise, in that all our deliberations, logic, expreiences, evaluations etc are determined.
There are at least two senses of “free” present here.
One sense is free in the sense of not being able to predict ahead of time what the outcome is – free of strict causal determinism.
The other is free from all prior influence.
The second sense we both reject of necessity.
Complex systems require high levels of reliance on prior influence to maintain the boundary conditions necessary for such complexity with sufficient fidelity.
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The sense that seems real, is that in which degrees of randomness can be inserted into systems to give sufficient degrees of freedom that the outputs are not entirely predictable by any external agent.
An agent within such boundaries may develop directional control over the various levels of randomness, and thus attain levels of directionality of internal development that may not be predictable to any external agent.
In this sense, one can be “free of the influence of external agents”.
“… it can mean sufficiently isolated that it is not connected to the external stream of existence in a way that is predictable by an agent within that external stream.
So in this sense, randomness does seem to create such freedom.”
Randomness [should it exist] essentially results in unpredictability.
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Why does “will” have to have boundaries? Ultimately any boundary we draw around a human being is at best temporary and perhaps historical. In that a human being’s ‘present’ is actually in the past, albeit very recent past.
Any boundary we draw around the will is arbitrary.
So we draw an arbitrary boundary around sufficient isolation?
I view reality from the lens of an evolutionary systems geek.
In a very real sense, it seems that a good definition of life is “that which can replicate reliably on the boundary between order and chaos”.
That boundary is very context sensitive.
Seeing all life as recursive levels of complex adaptive systems, and we humans as instantiations of some 20 levels of such systems, the boundary definition seems to work at every level I have investigated.
“In a very real sense, it seems that a good definition of life is “that which can replicate reliably on the boundary between order and chaos”.”
Order and chaos are not mutually exclusive … evolution requires a chaotic aspect. Not being able to predict has nothing ultimately to do with free will. Just because we can’t predict which potassium 40 atom will decay next mean potassium 40 has free will. No matter how complex a system we insert into.
——————
This 500 character limit is painful!
…
All this is very interesting but chaotic/random output does not provide “free will”. Being free from cause is what the debate has been all about. In the last two three hundred years compatibilism has muddied the waters.
Perhaps…but trust me, it will be far more painful if I let people respond in a wall of essay sized text that would be impossible to address each part and completely unwieldy. Technically, I shouldn’t even be allowing in multiple posts from one person at the same time – that is the bigger problem. I may move up the limit to 700 characters in the future. 😉
And of course you are right that chaotic/random output does not provide free will, hope you can convince Ted. 🙂
What I suggest is it is not so much the character count as limit to the box size.
Also remember you as the admin are not limited to 500 characters.
Ted and random? I think he will be determined to maintain his stance 😉
Naw, that just creates copy/paste syndrome of essay sized posts (essay wars are unproductive). Just look at the walls of text in Ted’s own blogs comment section (scroll down his convo with John) and you will see how unconversational and unwieldy it is. Feel free to interact with him on his own turf for unfettered comment lengths. I try to keep my own comment sizes on par with others and if I make an exception I usually explain why (usually to correct misinformation). 😉
Rom and I agree on this.
It may be “unconversational” for you Trick, and it is the sort of conversation I most enjoy.
I love it when someone is willing to explore an idea in depth, and speak for several minutes, then listen while others respond for a similar time. One can start to explore the depths of an issue, rather than staying with surface simplicity.
Some of the best conversations I have had have gone on in such manner for many hours (start at 8pm finish at 5am sort of thing).
It isn’t just unconversational but unproductive. The problem is that the lack of focus on a specific point at a time allows you to contrive just about anything in a wall of text (hence, I suspect, one reason you may like it). There is a difference between text essay convos that are unwieldy and allow people to disregard one sentence and not another (selective reading), and verbal convo where one can interject in on a point to address it. It is a sneaky way to play the unfocus game.
While that is a possible strategy, it is one I consciously do my best to avoid.
The problem is, that when things are really complex, and do actually involve many levels of many sets of complex adaptive systems all of which influence each other, that one cannot begin to seriously address the levels of relationship present in the space available.
That does pose deep difficulty for individuals who are not capable of holding many complex ideas simultaneously and building the linkages.
The problem is when one adds complexity that does not address the actual question. There is nothing that cannot be broken down unless one is trying to obfuscate a conversation with bloat that is actually disconnected from the topic. Even in the discourse I linked with you and John, John says this “I meant that you write a lot of mostly irrelevant stuff instead of clearly analysing the origin of cognitive processes to demonstrate how ‘free will’ can be possible“…and I agree with him. He explained his frustration with your process to me as well and it is the reason he quit the discourse (it was too unproductive).
I get that it appears that way to both you and John.
Just imagine for a moment how it might appear from my side.
The complexity present is such that it would take me a very long time to make every linkage as explicit as many people seem to require – and I simply don’t have that sort of time and energy right now – so I leave such trails as I reasonably can.
In my understanding, the linkages are sufficiently obvious that I didn’t think I needed to be explicit.
Keep in mind that from where I (and others) sit, not only is there not an obvious connection, but we don’t think there is a connection at all from the complexity you grant to the free will topic of importance – and my position does not stem from not understanding the complexity involved. The problem, however, is that the only way to show that there is not a connection is to force very tight and focused, incremental discussions about each aspect (to point out nonsequiturs, problematic semantics, etc.), something impossible with the “looser” type of communication you prefer. This isn’t necessarily a criticism of how you do things on your own blog (that is your prerogative), but an explanation of why I have the bloat avoiding limits I do on my own.
When I started reading Einstein, I couldn’t follow the math, so I went to Hilbert. I couldn’t follow Hilbert, so I went to Riemann. Finally, I had enough math to follow him, then worked back to Einstein (books – not sentences).
Similarly in economics, logic, philosophy, history, systems, AI, QM. Lots of books. Finding lots of errors. Building lots of relationships.
What you ask is logically impossible. It is like trying to understand plate tectonics by looking at a pebble.
Yes, we have both read a lot of books, but in regards to philosophy and science clarity of thought does not come about through a mess. Analytic logic, for example, tries to formalize language and see if there are mistakes in premises or if conclusions actually follow. This takes having clear, concise, incremental, and focused arguments. One can even break them out into multiple 3 step syllogisms. It doesn’t come about through willy-nilly tangents that do not address the question at hand and a lot of bloat about complexity without ever explaining what the complexity has to do with the topic. What I ask is not impossible, it is required.
“If you can’t explain it simply, you don’t understand it well enough.” – Albert Einstein
OK.
Try this.
Mathematics and logic give us the best tools we have for building complex models, but those models do not necessarily relate to reality exactly, and they are the best heuristics we can have.
Do not mistake the map for the territory.
Pi is an irrational number – it may not be computed exactly, ever.
No perfect circle may be instantiated in a quantised reality.
QM – the best tool we have, is profoundly counter intuitive for most.
Even within 500 characters you manage to go off on 4 different irrelevant tangents (map vs. territory, pi, perfect circles, QM counterintuitiveness) in regards to what we are talking about right now which is about the best way to converse ideas back and forth with others (and for the free will topic we need to focus in one at a time here). Imagine how convoluted things get with an unlimited amount of characters and 20 other tangents per comment. Right now I’m just stressing why I have a limit and why that helps prevent (at least some) unwieldy tangents and stay focused. Your response furthers my point here. 🙂
But those ideas are not irrelevant – they are central.
They are all different sorts of indeterminism.
It seems beyond all reasonable doubt that our experiential reality is not the external reality, but a subconsciously created model of it. We all (each and every one of us) live in our own personal version of reality, and every one of them is a map (at some level of accuracy) of the thing being modeled.
Freedom (that which is other than hard causal predictability) does seem to exist.
1 – They are not central to the topic
2 – They are not different sorts of indeterminism without a complete semantic shifts of that term
3 – The fact that we model reality through perceptual input rather than magically know external reality itself is irrelevant to the topic
4 – “Freedom” and “unpredictability” differs from “freedom OF the will” and should not be conflated for this topic
Hi Trick
1/ They are precisely on topic.
2/ They are very different, systemically.
3/ We don’t model reality through perceptual input, we entrain our models to reality via perceptual input. That distinction is fundamental. Our perceptual reality is model – always.
4/ Freedom of the will can be “unpredictability” in respect of agent relationships. What else could it possibly be? My will is free to the degree that it has internal consistency and another cannot control it.
1 – They really are not.
2 – I’m saying they do not all fall under the umbrella of the term “indeterminism” how it is normally used regardless of their systemic differences.
3 – That distinction is also unimportant unless you are leaning toward epistemic solipsism about the external world.
4 – Unpredictability, internal consistency, and others not controlling it… can ALL happen in a completely deterministic universe scenario in which you couldn’t have done otherwise. No free will.
You are being tautological Trick.
I already agreed with you that if the universe is deterministic, then necessarily free will is illusion.
Never have argued about that!
Hold that thought.
What I am arguing is that the evidence we have does not seem (on balance of probabilities) to support that hypothesis.
In a universe which is a balance between order and chaos, then free will can exist as described above.
That does seem to be the sort of world we live in.
You are missing why I bring up the deterministic universe in which you could not have done otherwise. It is not to say such a universe is necessarily the case, it is to say that what you are saying qualifies as “free will” exists in just as much in that deterministic universe – which contradicts your position that free will does not exist in that deterministic universe. Chaos theory, for example…IS entirely deterministic. Probabilities exist in a deterministic universe. Epistemic uncertainty exists in a deterministic universe as does “consistency”…etc. This is why those are irrelevant qualifiers.
Sorry Trick,
You can be right and wrong at the same time.
I can see how what you write is true from your perspective, but it entirely ignores the point I have been consistently trying to make clear.
There is deterministic chaos, and there is non-deterministic chaos.
My statements apply only to the ontologically non-deterministic sort – as I have explicitly stated – many times.
You haven’t seen that yet.
Probability of that happening any time soon seems low.
If you are referring to an indeterministic event (e.g. quantum indeterminacy assuming an indeterministic interpretation), the words chaos, unpredictability, probability, etc….add nothing new to the free will discussion. They do not add any explanatory power in how that indeterministic event – an event that you have absolutely no say over the outcome – an event that you cannot “will” – an event that you have no say how it ultimately interacts with other existing events once it happens – helps at all with free will. It may cause an “otherwise”, but not one that is a willed otherwise.
If you start from a presumption of necessary causality, then there is only one conclusion possible.
We must all start from simple beginnings.
If one examines evidence, and goes where the evidence leads, then for me, the balance of evidence is clearly that order and chaos are both necessary components of reality, and both need be in balance for life such as ourselves to exist.
Such freedom as exists, exists in that boundary.
And what does this have to do with free will? ie the ability to do otherwise?
Sure I can deliberate and conceive alternative paths, pick and choose from them. But all this thought is also caused by classical or probabilistic events.
On top of this all, the concept of free will is totally unnecessary to go about one’s life.
The idea that one has choice, at some level, is fundamental to social organisation.
The idea that one can refrain from an impulse to cause harm, and can choose something else, is important in how we act in reality.
The idea that we can be creative, that choice (morality) matters – is real.
The experience of choice – is real.
Few people have explored the some 20 levels of complex systems present in an embodied human, from both evolutionary and systems perspectives.
We are complex!
So we are complex! So what? Does not mean we are free.
Refraining from impulses to cause harm? In what way is this free?
Morality I would think is a figment of our collective imaginations that has been spurred by evolution giving us emotions like shame and pride.
Because we are complex and the access to the underlying mechanisms to our choices etc is limited, results in the illusion for freedom.
Hi Rom,
It seems that we are free to the degree that we accept all the many levels of necessary boundaries and constraints that are required to maintain the existence of complex social apes such as ourselves, and no more than that.
The levels of uncertainty and complexity present deliver many levels of uncertainty, particularly in changing and novel contexts.
The classical notion of causality seems to be a simple heuristic approximation to something profoundly more complex.
We are going around in circles here Ted.
The many levels of necessary boundaries that we are free to accept – No we are caused by something profoundly more complex to imagine these boundaries. These same [necessary] boundaries are an anathema to the profoundly more complex you point to.
And to be clear when I refer to causality, I am not solely referring to the Newtonian approximation. But something similar to the Hawking and Mlodinow quote on 21st March
Please provide a link to the quote, and I will look closely at it.
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/atheist-believes-in-freewill/#comment-7482
Thank you.
Probabilities – yes – those I can work with.
Hard determinism – no – that doesn’t work.
The thing most people don’t get about probabilities is that small differences in the median can make big differences in the tails of distributions.
The longer the tail, the more pronounced the effect.
We cannot say precisely where the planets were even a few hundred years ago, though we can get close enough to compare to the historical accuracy of any historical documents we have.
I don’t disagree with what you say. What about hard indeterminism? How does indeterminism give us free will? Indeterminism (ie no such thing as cause) absolves form responsibility. We are not responsible for indeterminism. We might think we take on that responsibility, no matter how erroneously.
If you are saying the universe is at some level fundamentally unpredictable, I don’t think anyone would argue against this. But how does this unpredictability give us a will then in any philosophical sense free.
Thank you rom – that is the question.
The answer seems to be deeply recursive (about 20 levels in each individual).
It seems that reality is not simply unpredictable, but is at every level a balance between order and chaos (between predictability and unpredictability).
Within sets of constraints, order and pattern can exist.
What does free mean?
Free cannot be an absence of pattern.
That is chaos.
Free must mean pattern that has degrees of isolation.
It cannot be absolute.
This graph was really good!
I am a student philosophy and I have been struggling with certain philosophy terms but thanks to you now at least I clearly understand two of them.
I have a question, do you know if determinism agrees with “cogito ergo sum”?
I have been thinking that the whole belief of a “mind” is false. I am able to doubt EVERYTHING except my own mind? it sounds like BS to me.
Hi Julio – thanks.
Determinism itself doesn’t take a stance on which theory of consciousness one has. I think the mind is real and align with “cogito ergo sum” (in some sense), but it is not necessary for determinism. Free will is incompatible with any theory of mind. 😉
Free? Independent of cause.
Recursion does not give freedom … just blinds us to cause.
Chaos nor patterns are free. An example a Mandelbrot set.
No freedom does not have patterns with degrees of isolation.
Not only is freedom not absolute, but it is an llusion or an arbitrarily applied boundary.
No rom
This time you missed the point.
In a deterministic world we use pseudo random algorithms to approximate randomness – like the sequence of irrational numbers, or other such things. These are not really random, just useful approximations in some contexts.
Freedom does seem to be a mix of the truly random, with complex pattern, with that balance at the boundary delivering degrees of freedom.
Recursing that system, is what increases the degrees of freedom (isolation).
If I am missing your point it is because your semantics are strange. You seem to be confounding chaotic and random. They are not the same thing!
Your last post referred determinism … my post referred to cause irrespective of whether the cause is deterministic or indeterministic.
Regardless of the degree of recursion/iteration there is a mechanism. A mechanism for free will is an oxymoron.
OK
I was not using chaos in the mathematical sense, just in the ordinary sense of meaning “elements without order or connexion” (OED), so can understand the mis-interpretation.
In ordinary language, random and chaotic are synonyms.
A mechanism for free will is an oxymoron only if all aspects of the mechanism are deterministic – which is quite explicitly not the case in this instance.
So if the mechanism is indeterministic … in that I am not, in any sensible interpretation, responsible for cause; how is that relatable to free will?
Also in this long discussion Trick has made it clear that chaos is deterministic.
Random is a poorly understood term. A series of numbers might pass statistical tests for randomness and not actually be rando … eg a high end pRNG. Randomness essentially boils down to not being able to predict a next step in a sequence of events.
Chaos can be deterministic.
It has both forms – in normal human speech.
In the strictly mathematical sense, then yes, it is deterministic.
I can’t see this going anywhere.
From my perspective, you are both looping, inside a closed system.
I guess it feels safe in there.
And it is, really, very complex.
At 500 chars per message, 3 messages per day, could take years to get anywhere near alignment (seems like too many local attractors keeping you within boundaries).
The reality Ted, is that you are avoiding rom’s main question “So if the mechanism is indeterministic … in that I am not, in any sensible interpretation, responsible for cause; how is that relatable to free will?” Asserting something as “really, very complex” allows one to make any erroneous claim. How square-circle producing invisible undetectable self-contradictory fairies exist is “really very complex”. No, for the free will topic it is not that complex at all and many have debunked libertarian free will entirely.
As per Trick’s point we are not moving ahead, because you are not answering the question repeatedly.
The argument from complexity/recursion … does a family have more free will, than an individual? A community? A city. A nation? The Earth? At each level there are orders of magnitude increases in recursion. Does this provide more free will?
And yes I would be interested to know how indeterminism (a cosmic dice shaker) provides free will. Are you looping and not answering our questions?
1 We are complex, multi level, systemic entities – approximately 20 levels of complex adaptive systems in each of us;
2 At every boundary, between every system, both within and between levels, exist levels of uncertainty, of isolation (not in total, but in degree);
3 When you look at individual will, it must have many levels of systemic influence on its development (physical, biological, cultural, etc), and it will also have degrees of separation present (from boundary uncertainties);
——–
4 At the level of will, all influences will be present, as will degrees of separation;
5 To the degree that one is conscious of influences, and to the degree that one consciously develops and filters internal systemic novelty (creativity, randomness, creating from nothing, call it what you will), then one develops degrees of freedom from any predictable chain of cause and effect;
6 Real novelty (real randomness) must be part of the system for this systemic separation to occur.
——–
7 I have been very consistent in saying this.
8 I am very familiar with complex systems, I have written vary larger and complex computer systems, and have lead teams developing legal systems, I have worked in law enforcement and as judiciary. I undersstand something of both the power and the limits of stricty causal rule based systems.
9 If your conceptual system does not allow of the random, then none of this can possibly make sense.
Since you used 3 comments I will go over 500 characters to address each unnecessary term used:
1 – 4 and 6 (if we accepted those all as premises) do not follow to the free will of concern for anyone in the history of this topic. What you are calling “degrees of freedom” in 5 is an interaction of causal events that you have no ultimate say over (no matter how complex, multi level, or systemic) with indeterministic events (and “separation”) that you have no say over, in a way that the interaction is forced from both ends of “complex, multi level, systemic” processes with “separation” that you ultimately have no say over. 7 – 9 are not a part of your argument (and are irrelevant to the soundness of it which fails – perhaps trying to invoke an authority fallacy for 8, etc. 9 is irrelevant because both rom and I are willing to accept an indeterministic universe). The indeterministic interaction of “unbounded uncertainties” doesn’t grant the free will of concern any more than not having a single indeterministic interaction, it is just the addition of a “dice rolling” bombardment into the causal interaction that you had no control over….again, no matter a) how complex, b) how many levels, c) how systemic, d) how much uncertainty, e) how much indeterminism/real randomness/real novelty, f) how many degrees of separation, and g) how much influence. Every aspect will be dictated by 1) causal events that ultimately stem outside of you, 2) indeterministic events that you have no say over, and 3) the exact interaction between 1 and 2 that must come about based on how 1 and 2 come about.
In other words, your “terms” (no matter how many you throw in) do not logically lead to “free will”. Your conclusion is a non-sequitur. What you label “degrees of freedom” also are not freedom of the will.
rom – your turn. 😉
Why are you engaged in this conversation?
Because you both invoked my name in the convo. I would have let you two haggle over your positions but not when I’m invoked. You said “From my perspective, you are both looping, inside a closed system” but the reality is that we are both granting you a universe with indeterminism (for the sake of argument) and pointing out it is equally incompatible with free will as a deterministic universe. We are granting an “open system”. 😉
To respond to the challenges of existence in real time we have many levels of heuristics and oracles.
Heuristics are quick ways of solving complex problems that are near enough in practice most of the time to allow survival.
Oracles are essentially black boxes that deliver a random output within a range that is survivable.
Why use oracles rather than heuristics?
Because we often face halting problems while involved in tournaments at various levels, and predictability means losing.
—–
So we come to awareness as extremely complex entities, but with extremely simple models of ourselves.
We are (or ought to be) deeply mysterious to ourselves, but the needs of survival mean we usually adopt simple heuristics in our models of ourselves (of the sort you keep repeating).
To will is to show some disposition, some preference, at some level.
Will is a very complex thing.
It has many levels of components in each of us.
—–
Every level of that complexity has certain sets of boundary conditions, and certain sets of rules, that give it the form and functionality that it has.
There must exist some degree of predictability in those relationships, or else they have no survival value.
And sometimes, in some tournament situations, the survival value exists in some randomness.
So not simple.
So given this reality, what might freedom mean?
It cannot mean an absense of rules, for that is an end to pattern.
—–
It can mean a level of self determination that includes levels unpredictability from the perspective of external agents.
We may be able to have random generated sets of heuristics and oracles that we test (internally or externally) and accept or reject on the basis of those tests.
As we explore our own systemic depths, we can modify or replace many of complex componentry of “Will”.
We can choose.
—–
Thus our “Will” can develop a freedom from any causally predictable stream to any external agent, or conversly, may develop in ways that are at variance with externally imposed probability functions.
In both of these fashions, our will can be said to have degrees of freedom, even as aspects of it remain deeply mysterious even unto ourselves. The systems do in fact appear to be that complex.
In this fashion, freedom of will does in fact seem to be reality, and is essential to survival.
This type of unfocus is exactly why I have the character limit. Adding in terms such as “heuristics” and “oracles” adds in nothing new to the point about how those are freely willed, even though you make the non-sequitur to that. You do this with the term “predictability” as well, but the free will debate is not about whether something is predictable or not (or to whom it is not predictable for, etc.) – that seems to be your misunderstanding of the topic. Same with complexity, more complexity (with sets of boundary conditions) does not equate to free will.
So to focus down on where you make the non-sequitur leap:
None of this is freely willed “self-determination”. These “heuristics”, “oracles”, “predictability”, “unpredictability/randomness”, “complexity”, “boundary conditions”, “rules”, etc…ALWAYS stem to events that the person has no say over…whether that be a causal lines that ultimately stem outside of the person (and hence is not “self-determined” but driven by antecedent variables), or causal lines that stem to indeterministic/truly random events that the person has no say over (and hence is not “self-determined” but driven by non-willed truly-random variables)…and any interactions between the two can never lead to a system that has freely willed “self-determination” because the very interaction is dictated by the EXACT product of these lines.
The point is, that “will” could not have been, of the person’s own accord, otherwise (the free will of concern). Any otherwise that comes from indeterminism would be entirely out of the control of the willer. This is the same for ANY of those complex processes that you use to obfuscate this point.
Whether or not something is predictable to an external agent is entirely irrelevant to the topic of free will.
***********************
Instead of keep reiterating what you had in multiple comments, I’d like to focus down on a “yes/no” question if answerable to you:
Given the “complex” system you propose, could the “willer” (the person willing) have willed, thought, or done otherwise – of the willer’s own accord (meaning the otherwise output would have been ultimately “up to willer” and not due to some event out of the willer’s control)? Yes or No?
Have you stopped beating your grandmother yet Trick? A simple yes or no answer – please!
Implicit in your question is an acceptance of the very system I am questioning.
In my world, which is a world defined by probability functions, neither yes nor no are accurate.
The answer is always – to some degree, and the degree depends upon the context, and both the context and the degree are important, and uncertainty is always a big part of every context.
No, my question was NOT a loaded question. This is the 2nd time you’ve incorrectly used that “grandma” analogy which is used for a specific purpose – not just because you don’t like yes/no questions.
Some questions are indeed binary, for example: Do you have any type of brain in your head at any point in your existence? Yes or No? It’s not a loaded question. If you say “to some degree I do”…the answer is “yes”….PERIOD!
Same with my question which contains the FULL context (which is important). If you say “to some degree you could have done, of your own accord, otherwise”…the answer is “yes”. So I ask again?
The question is loaded Trick – but you cannot see that, which is a big part of why communication is not working.
All questions are loaded, in a very real sense.
Communication happens when the loadings are accepted on both sides, in our case they are not.
I am not operating on the same set of assumptions you are.
For me, their use in this context is outside of their domain of utility.
You will not allow discussion of the substantive issue as you have not distinguished it as such.
Then you don’t understand what a loaded question is. There is nothing presupposed in the question I asked.
You are basically suggesting that questioning your position cannot take place because “all questions are loaded”. This is a convenient way to suggest that your position cannot be questioned.
—————————————-
Reminder: Please don’t waste your time writing a 2nd and 3rd comment that will not be approved. One comment at a time. Once the person you are talking with has responded, it is your turn to respond to that. Also, I don't consider these necessary reminders or addressing rules (that fall outside of the discussion topic) as breaking my own rules, but I'll place them in this font type so you can understand the distinction. Also note that if these rules prolong the discussion, I'd rather have that and have certain points addressed (even basic ones like the correct use of a fallacy claim) than none at all.No Trick.
False on every count.
Good, that gives us focus. Let’s start here:
Q: Given the “complex” system you propose, could the “willer” (the person willing) have willed, thought, or done otherwise – of the willer’s own accord (meaning the otherwise output would have been ultimately “up to willer” and not due to some event out of the willer’s control)? Yes or No?
You claim this is a loaded question, which means no matter how you answer Q, it presupposes that you X.
Please fill in X.
The use of the term “ultimately” is what makes the question difficult.
Will in this sense isn’t ultimate, it is instantaneous.
A system complex enough to exhibit “will” must of course have many necessary components present that allow it to have the form that it does.
So if you are in search of an “ultimate”, then everything in existence ultimately traces back to big bang.
“Will” of the sort I contend, can only exist if the causal chain is soft (probabilistic) rather than hard.
Great, progress! I’m always happy to revise language for clarity (but it is a clarity issue – we should not jump to claims of fallacies). How about this:
Given the “complex” system you propose, could the “willer” (the person willing) have willed, thought, or done otherwise – of the willer’s own accord (meaning the otherwise output would have been not due to some event(s) out of the willer’s control)? Yes or No?
I cannot answer that question from my perspective, because the terms “control” and “own accord” are too hard.
In my understanding, none of us have strict control of anything, the best we have is degrees of influence, and in some cases those may closely approximate (but never equate to) strict control.
In my understanding the willer could have altered the likelihood of that particular outcome in that particular instant, and that was the outcome that occurred.
Let’s start with indeterministic events first: Do you have ANY degree of influence over the outcome of any indeterministic event (e.g. whether a particle in the system collapses or decoheres to a 30% chance area over a 15% chance area, etc.)? Y or N
Can you be a little (lot) more specific?
I can push a graphite control rod in or out of a nuclear pile and alter the output of the system, without knowing how or if it affects the probability of any specific atom decaying.
I cannot tell when any specific atom will decay, and I can predict within quite useful limits the response of the system as a whole.
It is analogous to that, but several levels more complex.
Let me be very Quantum specific (which also applies to atom decay start):
Regardless of what preceding events cause a specific superpositioned state – once a superpositioned state exists, does a “willer willing” EVER have ANY “degree of influence” over how the wave function of the superpositioned state will collapse – meaning which position it collapses to (which is where all of the indeterminism resides for an indeterministic interpretation of QM)?
I do not accept the assertion that all quantum indeterminism is in “over how the wave function of the superpositioned state will collapse”, though that is an important idea.
Heisenberg uncertainty (related) seems to be important also.
The very idea that mathematical models can capture what is going on accurately seems to be at issue.
Degrees of approximation seem to be allowed, nothing more.
The mathematical technique “sum over life histories” seems to point to deep influence.
The HUP (uncertainty principle) has nothing to do with indeterminism in ANY “true-randomness” sense. Not being able to mathematically measure both the momentum and position in a clear way simultaneously is a product of how the wave function itself works. It does not itself, for example, allow an “otherwise” occurrence. Only the “collapse” for an indeterministic interpretation does, which, for a deterministic interpretation there are hidden variables for (a causal variable) whereas for indeterministic interpretation there are none. The HUP is irrelevant and applies to both deterministic and indeterministic interpretations of QM.
Here is a 1 minute vid that can help you out: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vc-Uvp3vwg
That 1 minute video does not do the topic justice.
Heisenberg himself said “The law of causality is no longer applied in quantum theory and the law of conservation of matter is no longer true for the elementary particles” (Physics and Philosophy (1958)).
HUP has fundamental uncertainty within it.
Yes the video is sufficient for the point.
Heisenberg supported the Copenhagen interpretation and your quote-mine is absolutely true under that interpretation, but the quote is about wave-function collapse and no variable for it… NOT HUP!! For HUP it is entirely about what we can and cannot measure only, and Heisenberg understands this.
Do you agree that the “uncertainty” in HUP is NOT the same thing as true randomness / no cause? Y or N
Still not that simple.
At least two aspects present in HUP.
1/ HUP gives indeterminancy to all measurement – regardless of if underlying mechanism is deterministic or has random aspects. So from the perspective of the knowability of the universe – HUP introduces indeterminance.
2/ Is the conjecture that any mathematical model accurately models reality, rather than simply giving us the best heuristic approximation. Irrational numbers point to mathematical models being heuristic.
1)That type of “unknowability” or “unpredictability” is irrelevant to the topic and when we address “indeterminacy” for the free will debate we are referring to “true randomness” meaning not being ‘determined by causality’. Again, you even said that a CAUSALLY deterministic universe cannot grant free will – this is regardless of HUP. 2 is also irrelevant.
Are you going to answer the question?
Do you agree that the “uncertainty” in HUP is NOT the same thing as true randomness / no cause? Y or N
If consciousness is an information system, then indeterminancy of information is every bit as random, from the perspective of that information system.
So giving a simple yes or no answer to the question seems to be off topic, if the topic is the freedom of an information system rather than the freedom of any level of substrate upon which that information system is operating.
From an information perspective – HUP delivers indeterminant measurements – Random, within limits.
Let’s avoid the terms “determinism” and “indeterminism” from here on out as you have a different (and irrelevant) definition than the norm for the topic that is epistemic rather than ontic. Also let’s exclude “random” as you are using an epistemic version there too. Rather, answer this:
Imagine a universe where EVERY event (ontologically) has a cause (there is no event that is not the specific product of antecedent causes), HOWEVER there are aspects that make it so we cannot assess the specifics about certain causes or effects (there is uncertainty, meaning a lack of knowledge about a cause or potential effect). In that universe, could you have done otherwise? Y or N
That universe cannot logically exist.
As soon as uncertainty becomes translated to information then it delivers randomness to some degree.
That lack of predictability, then introduces a degree of freedom to the system.
If a system is of sufficient complexity that it can condition that (bias it in some way), then the internal state of that system can become separated from hard causal predictability of the whole.
Any level of “noise” in a system can do that.
This requires complex systems.
It certainly can “logically exist” (as in the case of any deterministic interpretations of QM). This idea that “uncertainty” translates to “randomness” in the non-causal (could have been otherwise) sense of that word is, frankly, nonsense for both logic and science. Seemingly, there is not a question you are willing to answer (and no, none of the questions are at all loaded), but the good thing with the 500 character count is that we can decipher that quickly and without all of the unnecessary bloat.
This is the point where the good ol’ “agree to disagree” mantra comes in. It causally happens. 😉
Can you prove your claim that a lawful computational system whose state is determined by its consistent rule set applied to inputs according to its program, can have outcomes that are predictable when one or more of the inputs are not predictable?
HUP gives fundamental limits to predictability.
No amount of repeated measurement can get past HUP.
Strawman – I never made that claim. Let me make this clear: Your position is epistemological, not ontological. The questions being asked are ontological questions. You invoking epistemological unpredictability is irrelevant to whether an event is determined by an antecedent cause or not. None of my questions asked about “predictability”. If every event has antecedent causes that derive the event, I can prove that the output could not have been otherwise – logically (regardless of unpredictability).
No Trick
My position is both epistemological and ontological (repeatedly stated as such).
I do not accept your assertion that the position of a photon is deterministic. The twin slit cannot work if it is. It must have a plank degree of indeterminism.
The math says it is probabilistic.
Can we prove absolutely ontological indeterminism?
No – no more so than we can prove determinism.
HUP is non deterministic on that issue.
Ted, I granted you your Indeterministic Interpretation of QM (IIQM) for the sake of argument multiple times and explained that it is (entirely) about wave function collapse in the ontological sense – which is what the double slit is about for this. My questions (that you refused to answer) were entirely about this aspect! HUP, however, should not be conflated with this! The “uncertainty” for HUP is not about the probability distribution of “collapse” (and applies to both IIQMs and DIQMs).
Also, you are simply incorrect about your assertion that the double slit cannot work without an IIQM as there are DIQM’s that work just as well (but that is irrelevant as, again, I’m granting you an IIQM for the sake of argument).
I agree with you in the sense that it is possible to construct a deterministic model of anything that works within the margins of error present in a system.
And having had both the physical and intellectual experiences I have, it seems probable to me that the universe within which we exist is at every level a balance between the lawful and the stochastic.
In that universe, free will can exist.
In yours it cannot.
And by definition, there is no reliable way to distinguish between them.
I’m agnostic on whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic. I’m trying to show you that free will, in any important sense of the term for this topic, cannot exist in either a causally deterministic model (meaning ontologically deterministic) OR an indeterministic model (meaning ontological indeterminism in the non-caused sense), regardless of epistemic limitations, uncertainty, unpredictability, and so on (that apply to both). I cannot do that if you refuse to answer legit questions. Also, the term “stochastic” is as ambiguous as the term “random”.
Are you familiar with the idea of an “Oracle” in computational systems?
A system that delivers a workable heuristic by having a random output within a set of constraints that have a reasonable probability of surviving in that context.
With the insertion of an unpredictable output from an oracle, a system can become decoupled to a degree from the necessary relationship to the external causal stream, in as much as such causality exists.
And this will need many sets of 500 characters.
Unless it is a quantum computer or uses QM (and we accept an IIQM), randomness on a computer is not ontologically random in the sense of not-caused. A random oracle is either an epistemic “black box” that uses (caused) “noise” or (caused) pseudorandomness, or it uses (uncaused – if we accept an IIQM) QM wavefunction collapse. But again, unpredictability is irrelevant to whether or not an event has a cause. You are mistaken on the “decoupling from causality” claim unless it is a quantum computer or uses QM and the probability distribution comes from wave-function collapse in an IIQM.
No Trick
You are making an assumption of ontological causation.
That is your bias, your belief.
It is not actually supported by evidence.
Evidence sets we have all contains uncertainty.
The best evidence we have indicates quantum mechanics gives the best approximation to reality, which is uncertainty within limits, that over large collections delivers a close approximation to a regular distribution.
And that distinction is important.
It seems to be as Heisenberg said.
Ted – stop. Everytime the word “causation” comes up you mention “uncertainty”. Why can you not understand that “uncertainty” (of knowledge about something) does not necessarily equate to “uncaused event”? This is your bias. I am not making an assumption of ontological causation, I’m saying that the only evidence of an uncaused event is in quantum wave function collapse IF we accept an IIQM. This is just a fact about physics – borne out by the fact that HUP (uncertainty) also applies to entirely causal interpretations of QM (DIQM). HUP is irrelevant here.
I can say something exactly equivalent Trick.
To me, the evidence is clear, that all knowledge is approximation, that the very idea of Truth – of absolute causation, is illusion.
Look at the evidence of recent centuries.
We started with the idea that absolute knowledge was possible.
Newton was certain of Truth.
He was wrong.
His mathematics was later proven to be nothing more than a useful approximation to reality in some contexts.
Why do you hold onto a disproved idea?
Ted – when you speak of “knowledge” you are specifically in the realm of epistemology, which should never be conflated with ontology. The fact that we lack knowledge about something does not imply that you can make a conclusion such as “no cause exists”…that is a complete argument from ignorance fallacy. If you want to invoke in quantum mechanics, which you do, then it is an IIQM that you are referring to which postulates that there is an actual lack of a causal variable for wave-function collapse. Period. There is no other quantum theory for an ontological lack of causation in QM.
I get that in your reality, your statement:
…”lack of a causal variable for wave-function collapse. Period. There is no other theory for an ontological lack of causation.”
does make sense.
I can see how that appears to be so, from within the paradigm set you seem to be using.
And yes – in a sense.
You do not yet seem to appreciate how my statements might be valid in a different paradigm set.
And that is the issue.
I can point to any number of ladders.
I cannot make you climb them.
My set is science and logic here, your set is an argument from ignorance fallacy and nonsequitur. If we are going to talk about how uncaused events cannot be willed events and why they cannot help free will, it makes no sense for you to bring up uncertainty in this context. Even if I accept there are other uncaused events besides wave-function collapse in an IIQM, the more important part is that “uncertainty” does NOT address those uncaused events – both logically and scientifically (it is not a replacement word). It just doesn’t and to keep saying “there is uncertainty” is to avoid context about ontology. Your “ladders” are (tangential) non-sequiturs, conflations of epistemology and ontology, and avoidance mechanisms. For that REASON I refuse to climb and we require thee “agree to disagree” mantra.
NO Trick
It really is far deeper than that.
It really does go deeply to the nature of interaction, the ability of systems to influence, rather than to be seen as hard cause.
Hard causality can only exist where there is hard time.
Relativity destroys the notion of hard time, and makes time local.
That blurs the distinction cause.
QM takes that blurring a step further.
Complexity does not require hard boundaries, it can work with sufficient regularity.
It does seem to do so.
Even here you don’t understand the philosophical implications of your assertion. You seem to just blurt out aspects of physics that you don’t fully understand when that misunderstanding suits you. For example, if you are suggesting there is no neo-lorentzian absolute frame (another argument from ignorance btw) in relativity/the universe (no real local frame), then a block conception of time logically follows and the future and everything you will ever (watch yourself) do already exists in the block. Absolutely no free will there either – and certainly no “otherwise” possibilities.
I was suggesting Trick only what I said – that time is local. That the sequencing of events depends upon the reference frame being considered – that there is no absolute sequencing of things – it is all relative.
That was not in any way intended to be any direct inference about a mechanism for free will.
It was an attempt to show that classical notions have changed.
It was an argument by analogy.
Rather than make the effort to look for the substantive argument you insult from error.
You are bringing up a time conception that is completely incompatible with your own position. This isn’t an insult Ted, you are DISPLAYING a lack of understanding. This doesn’t mean that you cannot educate yourself, or that you are not intelligent, it is just that you seem uneducated here due to the display of misunderstanding you continue to provide (even now). And it is the very sequencing of events and reference frames that I’m referring to – if there is no real ontological frame with absolute simultaneity (A-series) – the block universe (B-series) is the case and everything everyone “will do” is already in the block. Please understand this.
No Trick
That is not what I am pointing to.
What I am pointing to is the change of perspectives – Universal time, to frame relative time.
A sequence from fixed eternal heavenly perfection, to Newton’s eternal clockwork, to something probabilistic.
A shifting of paradigms.
A series of better approximations to something.
Hard truth, to probabilistic approximation to something.
In a systems sense, it is a journey from simple binary approximations to Bayesian approaches to infinities.
First, relativity theory is NOT probabilistic, there is a Lorentz transformation that happens between frames of reference. Second, you are missing the more important point that your invocation of relative frames, if each frame is considered ontic, leads to a B-series of block-time which actually is eternally fixed. You have this all exactly backward.
No Trick
Once again you misinterpret me.
The paradigm shift on time – was from universal to relative (though any particular measurement will have probabilistic margins of error on it, that wasn’t the point – the point was paradigm shift).
The spatial aspect really does come down to quantum probabilities – both in HUP and in “wave function”.
And the point was the nature of paradigm change.
It is not trivial, not easy, and you haven’t got it yet.
No Ted,
I know why you THINK you are invoking this in, but it is wrong on a number of fronts (and another attempt to muddy the waters). We have more accurate time measurements today than ever before DUE to relative assessments (not less…and that is not trivial)…AND you invoking in relative frames as ontic features still goes against your very position (and that is not trivial). You don’t even appreciate that we have huge issues aligning relativity with your version of QM. Since you feel you can just invoke in misunderstood ideas about time to muddy the waters about causality, let me ask you this: Is your preferred system an A-series of time or B-series of time?
It is another – yes and no.
Yes – we can make more accurate time measurements, and not exact – ever.
It seems very probable to me that you do not have much idea at all of how or what I think, if you did, then you would not be making false assertions with the frequency that you seem most likely to be doing.
This approach is clearly not a productive use of time.
Can I suggest exploring a couple of definitions:
Freedom; and
Knowledge.
Start with freedom.
You first.
Another question goes unanswered: I asked if your “system” had an A-series or B-series of time? You brought up time and I really want to know. If you don’t know, just say “I don’t know”. If you do know, please answer.
“Not exact” has nothing to do with relativity, as relativity allows for exact mathematical transitions between reference frames.
Perhaps I don’t know what you think because you refuse to answer a single relevant question. That is unproductive.
The term “freedom” is ambiguous and context dependent, but here is how I define “free will” and the reason why: CLICK HERE.
Please answer the question about time.
My understanding of time is a mix of relativity and QM.
Time seems to me a local phenomenon mediate by the exchange of photons (and the information they carry).
As such time also seems to be part of quantum mechanics, and subject to uncertainties at the Plank level.
Thus I am closer to Hericlitus, and significantly different in detail.
It seems to me every particle only has the eternal present, which is constantly evolving as conditioned by influences and uncertainties.
Please select one:
1) My view falls under an A-series of time…such as presentism (only the present exists and constantly changes) or evolving block (the present changes like in presentism but leaves an existing past – the future does not exist)
or
2) My view falls under a B-series of time, such as eternalism (the past – present – future all eternally exist)
*I need more clarity due to the “eternal” word you used – as eternalism is B-series…but you said only a present that is evolving which leads me to think A-series. Please specify if your view falls under 1 or 2 (it must be one or the other) for clarity sake (in other words answer the question I asked directly).
This is our problem in every dimension – our paradigms of understanding are so different, they do not easily map one to another.
I was explicit.
It seems clear to me that the notion of any sort of universal time is illusory, though a useful approximation in many common contexts.
It seems that time is a local phenomenon to each “particle” of matter, and it is given by the exchange of information embodied in “photons”.
This understanding seems to work for both relativity and QM.
I’m suggesting that if you cannot categorize your theory of time (e.g. A / B series), you don’t understand the topic (and how it relates to “particle” relativity). To get to the heart of the matter, in YOUR VIEW, is the relativity of simultaneity:
1) An ontological fact (two events can *exist* together in the same reference frame and for another reference frame the same two events can *exist* one after another)
or
2) NOT an ontological fact about event order but rather about a lack of knowledge over whether two events are ontologically simultaneous (*exist* at the same time absolutely or not)
or
3) Neither 1 nor 2
or
4) I don’t know
I will continue to ask questions to see if I can get an actual answer at some point, though it seems futile, almost comically so.Most closely approximates 1 in most contexts, and contains aspects of 2, and aspects of 3; and because it is explicitly heuristic knowledge (as all knowledge is in my paradigm of understanding), probably has aspects of 4 embedded and undistinguished.
If all one wants to do is build a house, and a road to the next village, then “flat earth works”.
Understanding the range of cosmology to intelligence, and all that seems to embody, seems to demand one accept evolutionary epistemology.
Then your view is actually agnostic on whether there is an absolute reference frame or not, correct? (Meaning you do not know if ontic simultaneity is absolute or if it is relative)
No.
The idea “agnostic” doesn’t apply well to me.
All my understandings have both contextual confidence and essential uncertainty.
I am very confident that the very idea of “Ontic simultaneity” seems to be a simplification of something profoundly more complex and fundamentally uncertain at the margin. It is a low resolution model of something very different at the next level. Different in ways that are fundamentally important to the nature of freedom.
If by “freedom” you mean the freedom to have been or done otherwise, do you agree that ontic simultaneity (if it did exist – and regardless of complexity) being ontologically relative (e.g. to a particle’s frame of reference) is incompatible with that freedom?
Note: You are the one that brought up relativity, so I want to make sure you know just how uncomfortable your claims about relativity are with your version of QM.
If by “ontic simultaneity” you mean that reality is a “hard” causal system, with no uncertainty at the margins, then yes.
But that does not seem to be the sort of reality we live in.
So – No.
It does seem to be the sort of thing people like to model – which is not at all the same thing.
The sort of reality we live in seems to have ontic uncertainty at the margins, always.
That marginal uncertainty allows for systems to operate in ways that are free from hard “causality” in degrees.
I’m referring to the relativity of simultaneity in special relativity where-as:
* From the POV of reference frame 1, event A happens first and event B afterward.
* From the POV of reference frame 2, event B happens first and event A happens afterward.
* From the POV of reference frame 3, events A and B happen at the same time (are simultaneous).
I’m asking, in your view, if it is ONTIC-LY the case for events A and B that the order is ontologically relative?
That is relativity. Space-Time is relative.
Basic stuff.
That is not the issue.
(And keep the idea that it seems probable that all models are useful approximations at some level.)
The issue is much deeper.
It is the quantum uncertainty at the margins (be it the “time like” or the “space like” margins) that seems to be real, and it is fundamental to the ideas that there may be uncertainty in outcomes, and systems may be conditioned over time as to how they employ such uncertainty.
It is an issue. If you think the relativity of simultaneity is ontologically the case, then the future ALREADY EXISTS in a block conception of time (both events A and B already exist in the block). This leaves you no room for your indeterministic interpretation of QM where an “otherwise possibility” is actually viable. I’m explaining to you that you are being inconsistent with the “physics” you expel in order to promote “uncertainty” (an irrelevant word for the onticity).
No Trick.
You do not allow of the possibility of ontic uncertainty.
You deny it, ignore it, repeatedly, at every level.
Of course, if you do that, then free will must, by definition, appear as illusion.
That is simple logic.
I am making the strong claim that the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that such a model is not how reality is.
I make the strong claim that ontic uncertainty seems very likely to exist, and is fundamental to freedom.
No Ted, it is your very position on time and relativity that does not allow it. I’m denying nothing, I’m showing your own inconsistency by using your own responses. You are promoting two incompatible theories… you just do not realize it. Your view of relativity (e.g.relativity of simultaneity) requires a block conception (of space-time) where the future already exists, but that is incompatible with your idea of ontic “uncertainty” in a sense that allows an otherwise possibility.
No Trick
You keep making assumptions about what I am saying, that are strictly at variance with my explicit statements – but fit with your model.
I see no indication of your having comprehended what I wrote.
You seem to deny the possibility of uncertainty.
You seem to deny the possibility of time as a local phenomenon, given by photon interaction, which always has quantum uncertainty.
I said: “I’m asking, in your view, if it is ONTIC-LY the case for events A and B that the order is ontologically relative?”
You said in response: “That is relativity. Space-Time is relative. Basic stuff.”
To me that is a “yes”. If it is not, then maybe try being clear with your communication and actually answer a question using appropriate words (like “yes” or “no”) rather than side-step it – so try again (and re-answer that question).
Also, I’m not denying anything – I’m pointing to your own inconsistencies.
What you do not seem to acknowledge Trick, is that we have fundamentally different ontic (and epistemic) paradigms.
I have tried many times to make mine available to you, but it remains hidden.
I understand the grief and frustration as I keep saying things that make no sense in your paradigm.
I get that.
I have explicitly stated many times, I am not using that paradigm.
I do not require you to adopt my paradigm ongoingly, but acknowledging it as a possibility is a start.
If you are invoking in physics such as QM and relativity, then you do not have different paradigms, but let’s start here: what methodologies do you use as “epistemic standards of evidence” regarding what is ontological or not?
For me it is the scientific method and analytic logic. You?
Scientific method for me means a recursive process of:
Examine evidence;
Generate hypotheses to explain evidence;
Design experiments to discriminate between hypotheses;
Perform experiments;
Use best available tools to examine results;
Repeat.
It has been an exploration of domains of enquiry and understanding.
It started with True and False;
Then came probabilistic tools for deciding True or False;
Then came non-binary Truth values, starting with T/F/Undetermined…
Good, so we BOTH incorporate the scientific method in our epistemological standard (and hence we will get back to the relativity of simultaneity later). Now you also happen to believe free will exists (a metaphysical topic). Is that based on the scientific method alone, or do you have other epistemological standards you use as well (e.g. like analytic logic)? What other method (if any) do you use to conclude “free will exists”?
Note: I’m not asking for your argument for free will, I’m asking what methodology other than science do you use to argue for its existence?
I have used the scientific method, recursively, across many domains.
That has lead me to an interpretive meta-schema where seems that all interpretive schema are very probably, at best, some sort of useful approximation to reality in some set of contexts.
It seems very probable that reality has ontic uncertainty at all levels.
It is logical that uncertainty at the boundaries of systems can lead to uncertainty in the relations between sets of systems that meets the definition “freedom”.
What epistemological method do you use for your “interpretive meta-schema”? Does it, for example, take a scientific finding (such as uncertainty), and other findings or axioms as other premises, and use those premises in order logically deduce a conclusion from them? If so then we are on the same page with the use of logic as well. If not, what method other than logic or the scientific method do you use here?
Here is where it starts to get uncertain again.
What do you mean by logic?
Do you mean using the tools of probability to determine which of the infinite sets of possible logics best meets Ockham’s Razor in that specific context, which can itself lead to a recursive process with higher order logics becoming involved if the context gets really complex (as biology often does)?
If you mean that – yes.
If you mean simple Boolean logic in all contexts, then no.
So (to be clear) you don’t use DEDUCTIVE logic (which differs from mathematical Boolean logic) to conclude that free will exists? Meaning premises follow to the conclusion that it exists. It is just a scientific fact that we can assess from an observed (empirical) probability distribution?
One can only reliably use deductive logic within defined domains. It is great within mathematical and logical domains.
Goedel is one of the few thinkers who’s work I have closely investigated in whom I found no significant errors, largely because he stayed in the domain of logic and made no claims about reality.
When it comes to reality, one can use deductive logic to refine conjectures (hypotheses), and one must always test those hypotheses in reality.
Reality has uncertainties.
Yes, there are different domains when induction is used, deduction, etc. Do you use any deductive logic for your conjecture (hypothesis) about free will existing?
Note: We may get into Gödel later, especially his conjecture on time in which real change is impossible… which contradicts your free will position as well (but I doubt we will get that far). The idea that he makes no claims about reality is misinformed.
Yes certainly.
And in doing so I use all the logics I have gathered from QM, relativity, biochemistry, evolution, games theory, systems, cybernetics, history, psychology, economics, politics, complexity theory, logic, computational theory, information theory, neuro-anatomy and physiology, artificial intelligence, probability, mediation, martial arts, religious and cultural evolution, etc; and all the abstractions I have made from my 50+ years of study and experience across these domains.
Great, so you use both the scientific method and logical deduction for your epistemological standard of evidence to conclude what ‘exists’. So rather than we have “fundamentally different ontic (and epistemic) paradigms” as you suggest…. there seems to be more of a communication problem, and I’d argue the problem has everything to do with a lack of clarity on your end. For example, it was like pulling teeth in over four comments to get you to just say that you used the “scientific method and deductive logic”. I didn’t ask about your (irrelevant) resume, just your epistemic standards.
So shall we go back to your ontic position on the relativity of simultaneity and what it means?
Everything depends on how each of those terms is interpreted.
I use simple binary logic forms when writing computer code.
I rarely use them in relation to anything in reality that isn’t trivially simple.
The differences in ontic and epistemic paradigms doesn’t relate to the use of logic and models, but to the forms of models and logic being used.
I’m still not confident that you have that distinction.
I only care about what forms you use for the free will conclusion you make, which (if I have it correct) is obtaining information from science, placing that info into premises, and having a deductive conclusion that follows logically from the premises (whether done formally or informally). I could care less about binary logic in computer code, we are addressing a philosophical topic in relation to an ontological claim you are making regarding something IN REALITY.
Before we move on, let me ask you this: If there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? If it is not, should you accept the conjecture?
What does the word logic mean to you?
Is it restricted to classical binary logic forms, containing on binary truth value (True and False), or does it allow for any of the infinite class of possible non-binary logics eg the simplest trinary form (True, False, Undecided).
If open, then you immediately have uncertainty deciding how to search the space of possible logics for appropriate hypotheses, and how to test competing claims, in respect of any particular physical system.
It contains both classical AND modal/multivalued logic, and whether you use one over the other depends on the information you have (or lack) and context. Modal and multi-valued logic are an EXTENSION of classical logic depending on the conditions, they are not a replacement as you seem to suggest. But no matter what you use here, one thing is the case in all of these – if ontological identity is contradicted – it is unsound and hence illogical. So I ask again:
According to your usage of logic (whatever that may be), if there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? If it is not, should you accept the conjecture?
Ontological contradictions, if supported by evidence, indicate that the logic in use is not appropriate to the task.
The meta schema seems logically sound.
It seems to be a useful approximation to reality, which is all any evolved entity has any right to expect.
Logic gives us the best models we have of reality.
There is no demand that reality follow any form of logic exactly, though whatever reality is must approximate the forms of logic at some level for them to work as they do.
If your epistemological standard of evidence allows in ontological contradictions (something that exists that does not need to be identical with itself) and, hence, the principle of explosion (which applies to all ontological contradictions), it is neither scientific evidence, nor empirical evidence, nor logical evidence about something ontic, (all which depend on identity) but something else (what I’m unsure of). So it seems you are right about one thing after-all, our epistemological paradigms are fundamentally different, and communication about what exists or does not becomes impossible. Knowing this makes things very easy, as convo on philosophical topics end full-stop. It also should be noted that without identity as a fundamental standard, you cannot know anything at all about what exists as it could, at the very same time, also not exist….so any free will claim becomes rather absurd (as free will need not be identical to itself per such a standard). All knowledge goes out the window.
Once again – you misinterpet what I wrote.
For me:
Evidence is king.
Systems of logic must fit the evidence.
If the evidence points to ontological contradiction, then it means the logic is not appropriate to the evidence.
So we are saying something very similar, in different ways.
The difference, is that you seem to attach primacy to the particular logical form that you happen to be using, rather than to the evidence sets available.
You said “Ontological contradictions, if supported by evidence, …” (and you repeat that idea again above).
To suggest that there could be evidence of an ontological contradiction is cart-before the horse and proves that your standard of evidence does not depend on identity / non-contradiction – which is a requirement of A) any deductive reasoning regarding an ontological claim, B) any inductive reasoning regarding an ontological claim, C) any abductive reasoning regarding an ontological claim, and D) falsification / any science regarding an ontological claim. They all depend on identity holding. You are basically saying no matter how many contradictions I show in your reasoning, you can just hand-wave them away by magical evidence that does not require identity.
I cannot use logic to convince you of the merits of logic, so we are at an impasse.
Not quite there.
You seem to subscribe to the notion that reality must fit the particular logic that you subscribe to.
The abstract space of all possible logics seems to be infinite.
I have gotten to the idea that all knowledge seems to be heuristic approximation to whatever reality is (in as much as reality may be approximated by any system). At all levels that seems to be what evolution does, as a system.
It seems clear that all evidence sets come with levels of uncertainty.
No Ted, I’m addressing epistemological standards that address ontology that there is currently no replacement for. If you have an epistemological standard (for ontological claims) that does not have identity at its very base, you have some standard of evidence that is not known to humans yet. Perhaps you are an alien with your own form of reasoning in regards to “reality”, I don’t know. If so, you should write a book on this new epistemological standard that does not require that A is identical to A and teach us humans a better system. Right now, all standards of rational evidence (from physics to syllogisms, etc.) for ontological claims rely on the tautology of identity and without it the principle of explosion kicks in and we can’t know anything.
But that is precisely the point.
A = A is simple tautology.
It says nothing, whatsoever, about the nature of reality.
A is a symbol, that in an abstract space equals itself.
Tautology.
So what!!!
If you make any logical inference between that and any aspect of reality, that is a category error of logic.
A tautology says everything about the nature of reality. It is true in every possible interpretation. It isn’t a category error in logic when it is the very basis of logic itself when addressing ontological claims. My point is that there is no evidence for any ontological claim that you can point to that breaks identity. If there is, it is no TYPE OF EVIDENCE any human knows of. To suggest there is “evidence” that is outside of this means you do not understand the term “evidence”.
Wrong Trick.
Tautology is a non entity.
It is valid only in its domain of logic.
Correspondence of any logic domain to reality requires evidence.
Evolutionary epistemology is different.
Evolutionary epistemology requires only that something has a greater than random probability of utility.
Evolution will select for that, and for any subsequent variant that delivers greater divergence from randomness in that specific set of contexts.
Thus systems successively approximate.
No Ted, what you are calling “evidence” requires the tautology that A is identical to A. You have this all backward. To have evidence for A, it cannot also be NOT A. If your evidence for A is X, X cannot also be NOT X.
Your fundamental error is in assuming that any percerpt or concept you have of reality is directly related to reality.
The evidence is overwhelming that our experiential reality is a low resolution subconsciously generated model of reality that is strongly conditioned by our many levels of highly evolved systems.
It is a fundamental error of logic to think that anything you experience as reality is actually the thing it represents.
Back to evolutionary epistemology.
Right, you are then an epistemological solipsist who should not be making the claim you have evidence for free will. There can be no knowledge about reality OR ANYTHING under your epistemological position. You cannot talk about evidence being overwhelming for anything when you have no standard of evidence. You cannot have your cake and eat it too here.
Wrong.
Saying that all information we have is some sort of probabilistic approximation is nothing at all like saying we have no confidence about anything.
Stop trying to make a binary out of an infinite spectrum.
Your claim is the exact opposite of the initial proposition.
You seem to have lost all contact with reality in your pursuit of being right.
You said, and I quote:
If you are suggesting that there is no precept or concept that is related to reality, that is epistemological solipsism. If, however, you just mean that all relations to reality are “indirect” (whatever that would mean), that is a meaningless distinction and any indirect relation / evidence still requires identity at base.
If you see a car you have the impression you do of car.
What you perceive, is what is presented by subconscious processes.
That perception is not identical to the car it represents.
The car is vastly more complex than any perception you may have of it.
Yes there is a relationship, but it is not one of identity, but one of degree.
Same appears to be true of all aspects of reality.
Bacon’s great contribution to science was the use of experiment over logic to resolve such claims.
Whatever conception of “car” you have, if being used as evidence of something, must be identical with itself. If the conception holds a contradiction, it is an illogical conception. For example, your conception of car X cannot be that which both has wheels and an engine and does not have wheels and an engine. Identity is primary. No one is suggesting that a concept or precept is identical to an object, only that each are identical to themselves – ALWAYS! No contradictions.
Sorry Trick – but that is simple tautology, and utterly irrelevant.
Of course a thing is the thing it is, when it is.
But that does not tell you anything.
The thing you do not acknowledge, is that nothing in reality has to be as we conceive it to be.
Our conceptions are pointers, models, not the thing itself.
One cannot make any necessary binding statements about reality.
One can only make probabilistic assessments based upon evidence.
That is science.
You said:
Now you are saying:
So which is it, because (2) contradicts (1) (which makes it very relevant).
*** Also the fact that we only ever model reality through precepts that come through senses and internal conceptualizations (which I never claimed otherwise – we could theoretically be a brain in a jar probed by scientists – the problem of hard solipsism) is entirely irrelevant to my original question: if there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? If it is not, should you accept the conjecture?
It is all definitional Trick – what does is mean? Give examples.
To me, saying A = A says nothing about reality.
Science is about examining the evidence.
If A is real we can never know what A is, we can only ever approximate what it was.
Sure, if there seems to be a logical contradiction in the evidence, then one will suspect a fault in the evidence, and examine it carefully.
If having done that, and the evidence remains strong, then one must look at the logic being used to model A.
The whole point is that you don’t seem to have a standard OF evidence if you allow in any ontological contradictions (which always is in opposition to identity), so for you to say “examining the evidence” and “[if] the evidence remains strong”, I have no idea what you mean by “evidence” here.
To suggest that the evidence can remain strong in light of a contradiction is completely cart before the horse. If there is a contradiction, the evidence fails….because ALL evidence requires consistency with identity. An ontological contradiction within the argument for A is always evidence that the argument fails and hence is not evidence for A.
No Trick.
Here is where you have the cart before the horse.
The only method we have to determine what reality is, is to test it with experiment and see what it does.
Saying something has identity implies that some list of attributes are present that one can test.
The only way we have of determining what that set of attributes might be, and what the values of any attribute was, is by experiment.
Evolution seems to have given us this ability by successive approximation.
You simply cannot “test X with experiment” (empiricism) if X (which can either be the internal model or the reality) need not be identical to itself. All empirical evidence relies on identity at base level. Saying X has identity does not say anything specific about the attributes other than they cannot be in contradiction whatever they happen to be (and regardless if we can know the specifics or not). When you say that evidence can remain strong in light of an ontological contradiction, your standard of evidence fails as the principle of explosion kicks in and all so called “evidence” is lost. This is why your position is cart before the horse, identity precedes evidence (any type).
No Trick,
1/ Recall how many times I have said that this is really complex – more than 16 levels of recursive process.
2/ Models or processes do not need to be identical or perfectly aligned with reality to survive, they only need be closer approximations than the alternatives.
3/ The idea of identity you champion is true only in the most trivial of senses. Evidence is clear – we don’t get to experience reality directly, ever. All we have is a historically near enough model.
1) Complexity is irrelevant as I said even more times. Recursive process (whether a million levels) grant no allowance of contradiction.
2) STOP saying that I’m suggesting that “our models need to be identical to reality” – you are just displaying your own intellectual dishonesty or incapacity to read when you do.
3) Again, us not experiencing reality directly is irrelevant to whether the reality (which we cannot perfectly know)can hold a contradiction OR (more importantly) our imperfect models OF reality (what we call evidence) can be in contradiction and still be evidence. Neither one can!
We are at a stand-still because your epistemological standard of evidence is decrepit and needs a complete overhaul that I cannot help you with. This is why for philosophy the “agree to disagree” mantra is sometimes required.
When you write “be in contradiction” what precisely do you mean?
Do not use a symbol “A”.
Give an example.
Symbols exist in an abstract realm of logic where the rules of identity are trivially true.
There is no necessity for reality to be constrained by any rule set in all instances.
We find out what rules (if any) apply in reality via evidence.
You appear to be mixing logical realms – something Rand did often.
You don’t know what a contradiction is? The always entirely furless bunny that never doesn’t have fur has eyes and has no eyes at the same time. Given that “fur” and “eye” is defined the same in both usages, that bunny is in contradiction (has properties that contradict each other).
Then something (whatever that thing may be, the symbol “A” just represents whatever you want to insert) in reality does not have to be identical to itself per you – correct?
And don’t compare my epistemology with Rand, that is an ad-hom and insult. The reality is that you do not understand logical realms and why identity / non-contradiction is a requirement for all logical realms that are addressing ontological assessments.
No Trick.
It is not that I don’t understand the concept of identity.
What I fail to see is any place that it has anything to do with the argument we are having.
You just keep raising it without explicit connection.
I have made no arguments about bunnies.
I have made the explicit claim that human freedom of choice, to the degree that it exists, exists in a system that is 16 or more levels of complex adaptive systems, each level with a necessary balance between order and disorder.
Ted, we have moved the discussion from free will to epistemological standards of evidence (e.g. for an ontological claim like “free will exists to some degree”) per your request (and I’m glad we did now). Whether or not you allow ontological contradictions into your framework has EVERYTHING to do with the topic. Once back addressing “free will” – I need to know that once I show a contradiction in your “meta-schema / position”, that you will no longer think that your position is “evidence” for anything (that identity needs to be fundamental to anything postulated in it). If not, your epistemological standard of evidence allows in any claim at all (via the principle of explosion), and any discussion we have is moot. I don’t care about your arbitrary and meaningless “16 level / complexity” assertion right now – just whether or not you allow in contradictions.
In any non trivial discussion one has to make assumptions.
Any argument in logic has to be free of contradictions if it is to be coherent. If one cannot assume that, one cannot do anything, so I was looking for much deeper meaning than the obvious in your questions. Unfortunately – it seems such meaning was absent.
And in a very real sense, that is almost irrelevant to the conversation, as the conversation is dealing with realty, with uncertainties at every level, with approximations.
I’m not going to let you spin doctor your way out here, you said:
and in a different comment:
…there is no way to spin your way out of that by suggesting some deeper meaning or that what I asked is trivial (it is anything but), but since you seem to be backtracking (which is fine but be honest about it)….I will ask you again: (1) if there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? (2) If it is not, should you accept the conjecture?
(what you should say here is (1) “no” and (2) “no”)
I am not trying to spin doctor my way out of anything.
I stated plainly – what I am trying to communicate is very complex.
I accepted that you are intelligent – I would not be attempting to communicate with you otherwise.
I expected that the basics would be given, and we would not need to start from grade school all over again.
I was, therefore, looking for depths of meaning, involving at least three levels of abstraction, in what you were writing.
Basic rules apply at meta level.
Ted, the problem is that there is no other way of interpreting what you wrote other than something that goes against the basics of any evidence, this is why the basics are our top priority right now. But I’m willing to let the past be past and to move on by saying this: YES!… let’s address the very basics of epistemological standards of evidence, and applying those basics, please answer my question:
(1) If there is an ontological contradiction anywhere in your “interpretive meta-schema / conjecture”, is it logically sound? Y or N or Maybe
(2) If it is not, should you accept the conjecture? Y or N or Maybe
I also now want this answered too:
(3) Can the basics of identity/non-contradiction be trumped via complexity? Y or N or Maybe
The the best of my ability to test and evaluate, there are no logical contradictions in the meta schema.
And many of the conjectures present will seem orders of magnitude more alien than those of general relativity do to someone living in a flat earth model of reality.
Einstein got to relativity by the conjecture:
We observe C as constant.
What happens to the equations if I make C constant?
Coherence must be preserved, and almost everything one once accepted might vanish in the process.
I recognize that you don’t see any contradictions, but there are. Right now we are not addressing whether your argument does or does not have a contradiction, but rather epistemological standards of evidence. So please answer my three questions or I will take it that you are not really interested in communication but rather proselytization. If we find out in the future that C is not a constant, then that contradicts it being a constant, and we should reject theory that is based on it being a constant.
So please, next comment place the numbers 1, 2, and 3 and answer each with either a “Yes”, “No”, Maybe”, “I don’t know”, or “Other”. Appreciated.
1N2N3N
Now take a simple case, the uncertainty principle.
s(x).s(p)>=h|/2
The standard deviation of position, multiplied by the standard deviation of momentum must exceed this version of Planck’s constant (hbar divided by 2).
h|/2 is a constant, so let us just call it k for now.
Now assume we can define p with absolute precision.
What happens.
The uncertainty of p is now zero.
s(x) >= k/0
Whatever we have so defined can no longer exist in observable space, so it must vanish.
Thank you! It seems we are back on track with epistemological standard of evidence agreement here for the basics. What a relief. 🙂
I think we would measure p, but otherwise, sure. If we are taking an IIQM the wave function would collapse to p (a collapse to a position we would have no say over). But let’s get back to relativity since we are now on the same page regarding no ontological contradictions.
Does the relativity of simultaneity exist at event source in your view? Y, N, Maybe, I don’t know, I don’t understand the Q, etc. Let’s try to be clear with our answers.
In my understanding, relativity means that space-time is relative to every “particle” of matter.
In this view, our experience of time as a universal is an illusion created because most of the time we are dealing with things that are going at about the same speed in about the same place, so it usually works within the errors of measurement.
So a simple yes no doesn’t clarify a lot, because either answer could be interpreted to reinforce the illusion of time as some sort of universal.
We are getting there, but I will rephrase the question in hopes for a clearer answer:
Under your view, can there be two space-like particles which have events that EXIST *ABSOLUTELY* simultaneous with each other – or is whether the events EXIST simultaneously always relative to a specific ontological worldline slice (frame) in which there are other ontological worldline slices that the events do not exist simultaneously for as well?
Note: I know this can be confusing, so let me know if this wasn’t clear to you and I can re-word.
You’re right, hard to resolve.
The term “worldline” has history and I acknowledge the heuristic utility of such a view in most normal contexts and I use it in those.
To me, it seems probable that at the most fundamental level we have yet explored (without making any claim of absolute), the most powerful interpretive schema is that space-time is relative to each and every “space like” entity.
The uncertainty principle seems to demand uncertainty in those relationships at this level.
Still getting there, but let’s put this in the context of two position measurements of two different space-like particles (at the expense of momentum measurements being uncertain). Let’s imagine that someone in location L1 measures particle P1 location causing collapse to a specific observable collapse location of C1X ….and another person in location L2 measures particle P2 location, causing collapse to a specific observable collapse location of C2Y.
P1 and P2 both collapse to their specific collapse locations simultaneously (e.g.C1X/C2Y) per one reference frame, but one before the other for all others (e.g. C1X first C2X next).
Is (per you) the “more powerful interpretive schema” for the collapse event order:
A) the idea that all reference frames are equally correct ontologically speaking about event order (relative order), or
B) that only one is ontologically correct about event order (absolute order) but there is a lack of knowledge over which one is the absolute frame
A is the more useful approximation of the two.
And in my schema, both A and B miss essential aspects. Both imply a sense of localisation that is a reasonable approximation at human scale, but doesn’t work at all well at the quantum scale. At this scale, rather than “things” being localised by some simple set of integers across some set of dimensions, it seems that the arrays that best describe identity are complex functions that deliver probability distributions over multiple dimensions.
I have a lot to say about your comment and I will get to why A is incompatible with your position on “otherwise” possibilities, but before I do, I want to inquire about what “dimensions” you are referring to if you don’t mind? What “dimensions” are you talking about here (I assume you are referring to dimensions within a sect of theoretical physics with the term but if not let me know that as well)?
The 4 dimensions of space-time are the prime set of interest.
It does seem likely that there are more present, last time I had a serious look, seemed like 7 more was most likely to be the next set.
I suspect that deeper exploration may find more. That has been the general trend over the last few centuries.
I suspected that by answering as I did you might ignore most of what I wrote, and we’ll see where this goes.
I just wanted to be clear, because to add in extra dimensions beyond the fourth dimension of time (e.g. 10 dimensions for superstring theory, or 11 for m-theory, etc. – speculative theories with no empirical evidence for them BTW), one must invoke in the fourth dimension being real (for all minkowski space-time) and A below applies fully. So back to A… before I explain why, are you aware that this position denotes an eternal block conception of time where the past, present, and future are all equally ontologically real? If not we will go over why, but let me know if you are aware of this aspect, because if so it would save a ton of time.
Hi Trick,
No.
It does not require that, and that is a possible explanatory framework.
Continue as to why you think it is the only possible one.
IF the relativity of simultaneity addresses ontic events (btw – that is not my position, but that is not relevant since it is yours), then what makes two events simultaneous for one frame, and in different orders (unsimultaneous) for other frames, is the fact that you can slice space-time into different “now slices” from “past” to “future” or vice versa (different angles slicing space-time).
(If you have 30 min) Watch this first and we will get into this deeper if you are still unclear:
Everything hinges on the definition of Ontic.
I was explicit – that time is relative to each entity.
Simultaneity is not a concept that has a lot of meaning in that context.
In that context, ontic is relative. Time itself, as a measure, is relative.
Not only does it seem to be relative, it seems to be fundamentally uncertain at the level of quanta.
And I get that is not a concept that seems to sit happily with you.
——————————————————————–
Watched the video – and fine with it up to about 23 minutes in, when both Brian and Max seem to drop back to a Newtonian conception, of slicing a loaf, rather than a relativistic conception where time is local to particles, and ontology only makes sense in respect of interaction.
So to me, they really haven’t accepted relativity, they are treating it as something universal, which does lead to that weird conception.
To me, it is what happens when one accepts invalid assumptions.
From my perspective you don’t seem to understand what “relative” means in the context of special and general relativity. Saying “time is local to particles” is meaningless in the context of relativity – it is about wordlines and “relative slicing” (frames). What you are not getting is the incompatibility between the (assumed ontic) relativity of Einstein and your conception of quantum mechanics. This is why there are so many problems trying to fuse the two. Are you familiar with Minkowski space-time diagrams? If so we can address actual special relativity and ontic relativity of simultaneity of source events (and why the block follows if we suggest that).
Hi Trick,
I am clear about Minkowski diagrams, and Lorentz transformations, and that those equations are useful approximations to reality, at least to the limits of our experimental methods to date.
I understand that “world lines” and “relative slicing” tend to give the impression that they do, and your using that framework explains why you have come to the conclusion that free will is illusion.
To me, coming to such a conclusion ignores too much data; alternative model required.
Then you need to change your position on relativity and suggest that the relativity of simultaneity is not ontic and that there is an absolute frame that we just do not know about. BTW, I don’t support a block conception, but A requires it (you need to switch to B if you want to avoid it). In other words, these cannot be ontic-ly relative:
Note: My (lack of) free will position is based on an A-series of time with an absolute frame, though a B-series also has no free will either and my point is it is incompatible with your position.
Communication is poor.
Many concepts are not being communicated. Only a few are getting through.
Consider a possibility:
Anything traveling at the speed of light, experiences no time. Interacting with such things gives time. The exchange of information about the state of the emitter is what we call time. And it is connected to space.
In this view, all space like entities exchange information via time like entities (eg photons).
The equations are the same, the picture different.
You are talking a language that seems to be far removed from the physics of relativity. For example, space-like / time-like almost always pertain to separation of events – not whether it is a photon or not. Space-like denotes two events that are not in the same light cone, and time-like are events within the same light-cone.
How relativity measures time is via light traveling to an event and back in a specific frame.
I get that is the schema you are using.
It was the one I was using 40 years ago.
It is not the schema I am using now.
It really is difficult communicating ideas for which no agreed terminology exist.
Yet you invoked relativity when addressing how time has changed, however, your very theory of time seems to have nothing to do with relativity. So let’s address schemas and start at the beginning, do (non-photon) events happen, in your view, at a spatial and temporal location (space and time)?
(Regarding terms, if using a physics term other than the way it is used in physics, we should specify that when using, otherwise it will be assumed the common usage)
Space and time are useful approximations to what seems to be present at our scale of being.
At the scale of the very small, the ideas of space and time seem to be much more related.
The equations of both relativity and quantum mechanics seem to work within the errors of measurement of our existing technologies.
The history of Flat Earth, to Newtonian Mechanics, to Relativity and QM supports a series (perhaps infinite) of successive approximations.
Ontic and epistemic uncertainty.
For our discussion, I want you to assume one thing AT ALL TIMES during it: Anything we address about external reality is never a discussion about epistemic certainty in some absolute sense, just the evidence we have today and what we infer from it. Neither of us believe in absolute knowledge about much if anything, it is always about what is “beyond any reasonable doubt” or “most likely” given the evidence we have.
So when you say “useful approximations of what seems to be present”, is there an example of science that is not this given we only ever model perceptions about external reality?
Great – epistemic alignment is close.
Consider:
Flat earth works at the scale of building houses. It is a useful approximation at that scale.
Similarly Newtonian.
Similarly GPS requires both relativity and QM.
In each case, the domain of utility is defined by the scale of interest.
Each contains uncertainty.
Evolution is heuristic.
You and I appear to embody 18+ levels of complex adaptive heuristic systems; all biased by evolved priors.
Science exists in this milieu.
Flat earth is (beyond any reasonable doubt) proven incorrect, are you also suggesting that space and time for the macro-scale addressed in relativity is similarly proven incorrect (but is still a useful approximation for some things like GPS)?
Let’s also keep in mind that flat-earth ideas have no real utility for building houses, rather it is benign to it. It is not useful.
Perhaps we need to overcome the heuristic level that made you believe in free will. 😉
I am suggesting that thinking our current best available knowledge is anything more than the best approximation available at present is probably unwarranted.
Is it the case that your position on “free will” is based on your assessment of your “current best available knowledge”?
If so, then if I show an inconsistency between two positions you hold regarding what you deem as “current best available knowledge”, isn’t it the case that you should re-think your position about one or both of them?
I reassess my “position” whenever I have evidence of sufficient quality, or imperatives of sufficient strength, to warrant it.
For me, over 50 years of enquiry, evidence, experience and contemplation indicate beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt that free will exists.
And the nature of that free will is not at all what most think.
Evolution seems to have selected a much more complex and constrained form, that is still capable of independent, creative, responsible action.
We will eventually get to how indeterminism (in the could have been otherwise sense) does not allow or assist with “independent, creative, responsible action”, but for now let’s keep to the time discussion: Do you agree that true indeterminism in the “could have been otherwise” sense requires an A-series of time for our known universe or those (indeterministic) events (that the B-series in the video you watched is incompatible)?
If you are unfamiliar with an A-series, it basically means there is a state of the universe that becomes or evolves to the next state that does not exist prior (which requires an absolute frame that changes or evolves).
I agree that the “B” series in the video is incompatible.
The requirement for an absolute frame is questionable. It is the simplest way of resolving, but not the only one.
It does seem possible that existence itself is distributed. But that is a very difficult notion to get to terms with, and for the sake of the free will debate is not required, so the “A” series is a sufficiently useful approximation for the purposes of this debate.
Whenever you say “useful approximation” you make me think it is not your actual current position given the evidence you have.
Is an A-series with an absolute frame your current position on time given the evidence? Y or N
* If it is not (only answer 1 and 2 below if you say “N” to the above):
(1) How can you have an A-series of time or lack a B-series of time without an absolute reference frame ontologically?
(2) What do you mean by “existence itself is distributed”? Do you mean distributed through time?
I have said all along this is deeply complex.
I have stated repeatedly that it seems very likely that all of our models are at best “useful approximations” at some scale to whatever reality actually is.
Our understanding of anything and everything seems to be deeply conditioned by evolution. Some ideas “come naturally”, and others are much more difficult.
What if the very ideas of time and space are heuristic interpretational biases?
What if existence is actually quite different?
You said:
…and then this:
Your very idea of free will is likely a heuristic interpretational bias. Regardless, you seem to have a framework you are using to make assertions about “beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt” assessments for some things in reality that are not even empirical (and rather illogical), yet when questioned about any part that ties to your positive claim your answer is always “reality is too complex”. Do you not see how convenient this is for you? If you are going to be an epistemological solipsist, you need to consistently do so for all beliefs (including free will).
No Trick.
As has been so often the case you have misinterpreted what I wrote. Understandably so in a real sense.
Yes, in a sense, of course I have looked at the possibility of bias in my schema, it is only by distinguishing them as such that one gains the opportunity to mitigate those effects.
And I do not deny the logic of your statement that on the surface an A series does seem to imply an absolute frame. Part of my brain brings that up every time I approach this question.
You are very misinterpretable…almost by design it appears. 😉
So you are saying that biases can be mitigated – great, we agree. Right now I’m trying to mitigate some potential biases you have by pointing out that an A-series of time does not align with an ontological relativity of simultaneity (and you should tentatively abandon the idea that both can exist together given the current evidence that they cannot). We should be able to assess this incompatibility “beyond any reasonable doubt”. If A happens before B within frame 1 …and A happens simultaneously with B within frame 2, then for frame 1 the future (B) already exists before it happens. This is incompatible with an A-series of time – beyond any reasonable doubt. Agreed?
No Trick.
I have been explicitly clear on many occasions, and I will repeat, I am using a different interpretive schema.
If you take relativity seriously, then time and space are local to the existence of each particle, and there is no universal frame.
Because we live in a place where everything is essentially in the same place, moving at the same speed (within the errors of measurement available), then we get the illusion of space and time as universals.
The illusion works.
We already went over that we have fairly close epistemological standards, we are just addressing communication issues where you are inconsistent. Regardless, this last response was more clear even though you don’t say if YOU take relativity sufficiently seriously and I need to assume that is what you are saying. I don’t agree with your “if” statement above but since you do:
I’m saying that the interpretation of relativity you have (of no universal frame) is incompatible with your other position that something “could have been otherwise”. Under your ontological position, the relativity of simultaneity kicks in for source events themself, and the future already exists in a block conception of time. This is logically unavoidable under that interpretation of relativity.
No Trick
That is true only if you demand a universal frame of time.
The alternative is really hard to even conceive of, being the total absence of any universal frame. Relativity meets QM.
It is the very ideas of space and time originating as the existence “fields” of the particles present, via the interaction with the existence of other particles, as mediated by the “fundmental” forces.
Think – little bundles of time and space potential – it may help initiate something.
———————————-
The thing to get it is – block conception of time is a universal frame.
———————————
The “block conception” of time is the meta equivalent of flat earth.
Yes it is how it seems, naively, from our default universal frame perspective, but we do not exist in a universal frame, our universe is not “flat” (at least such seems most likely to be the case – on balance of probabilities).
No Ted,
You do not seem to understand A) what a frame is, and B) what a universal frame is. The block universe has no universal/absolute frame. What you are saying makes absolutely no sense for relativity, quantum physics, any other physics, or the philosophy of space and time. If there is more than one particle, either those particles must be in the same frame (absolute/universal), or frames can be sliced differently where they are not in the same frame or are in the same frame depending (relativity). If the latter, the frames are relative rather than universal, and a block conception of time follows. The same can be said about “fields”, “interactions”, etc.
And no, from our common-sense perspective we have an A-series / absolute frame – NOT a block conception (which is a B-series). You are confusing the two.
But let’s clear up semantics: What do you think a “frame” is in relativity?
I think a frame in relativity is a mathematical tool that Einstein found that allowed him to hold on to the idea of time as some sort of universal relationship in some construct.
He wasn’t able to let go of that notion completely.
He got close, but didn’t quite make it.
I cannot make this jump for you Neo – you have to make it for yourself.
——————————————————-
This may help.
Consider mathematical induction.
Consider flat earth n=1
Consider Newtonian world n=2
Consider Einstein/QM n=3
Having now established a sequence of 3, and you are engaged with a guy saying take a look at n=4, why would anyone consider the sequence has an end?
I noticed you are avoiding answering the question (“mathematical tool” says nothing). What do you think a “frame” is in relativity?
After I get that response we will address the absurdity of you suggesting that frames themself are not a requirement of relativity or a requirement of all time notions for all of physics. And yes, relativity is about relationships.
And WOW on n=4, you need to write a scientific journal, get it peer reviewed, and win the nobel prize!
My workload just went ballistic – likely to be 3-4 weeks before I have significant time to put into this conversation.
Totally understand! Unfortunately starting July 3rd I’ll likely (it isn’t set in stone yet) be starting a new project that will take me outside of my home for a whopping four months and it is likely I won’t have time for these convos when you come back. I may even disable commenting for that 4 month period – haven’t decided yet. We would probably just have to do the “agree to disagree” thing ultimately anyway. Hope everything goes well with you and your work. Later good sir.
Ted here is my perspective I have asked repeatedly how indeterminism (a cosmic dice shaker) provides free will. You assume indeterminism exists. I might not as there are deterministic interpretations of quantum phenomena. eg Sabine’s Superdeterminism. Never heard of superdeterminism? How does complexity and recursion make it free?
Hi rom
I don’t assume anything, other than existence (whatever it is – cogito ergo sum).
Everything in my world is some function of evolution in the first instance, and some function of a balance of probabilities derived from the examination of sets of observations and conjectures.
Mathematics and logic seem to be the best modeling tools we have, and there does not seem to be any requirement for reality to exactly align with any model we may make of it.
This is false Ted. We might apply boundary conditions to simply the complexity. Boundary conditions are useful approximations nothing more.
Which of the four fundamental forces don’t extend to infinity? We ignore the contribution at some arbitrary distance to simply the calculation and get a reasonable prediction.
A gradient can be an effective boundary, if at some region of that gradient a threshold of action is effectively crossed.
And boundaries can be much more complex that simple gradients.
All that is necessary for evolution is for something to be sufficiently boundary like to alter survival probabilities with sufficient reliability to influence the frequency if variations present in the population. And the definition of population is also similarly probabilistic.
Seriously not simple.
Ted seems to have redefined freedom as indeterminism (should it exist). Possibly in conjunction with determined recursion at different levels. Ted does not seem to distinguish between unpredictability derived from chaotic behaviour [mathematical] and indeterminism.
He simply asserts that freedom is present at some arbitrary boundary.
Oh well.
Exactly rom….the “freedom” to be truly-random and entirely out of the control of the willer…interacting with causality that he recognizes does not grant free will – until some “free” truly-random event comes in to manipulate that causality in a way that the willer also has no control over. Oh…and it’s really very very complex…so there is that. 😉
Yep.
But to be fair reality is extremely complex. As Ted points out likely many levels of recursion. But where he goes wrong badly is with boundaries.
There is a lot of hullabaloo about nature versus nurture. In reality the separation between the two is in our minds. Every single bit of me is a product of my environment.
No doubt it’s extremely complex, but let’s keep in mind that while we are simpletons who cannot understand complexity fully, Ted is very familiar with complex systems and has written vary larger and complex computer systems, and has lead teams developing legal systems and has worked in law enforcement and as judiciary. He knows complex – and complexity + indeterminism allows for free will! We are just looping in a closed system – obviously. 😉
In that case Ted should be able to state his position clearly and coherently, that is he has the will to do so and it is free to do so.
I wonder what the judiciary make of witnesses that don’t answer direct questions?
============IMPORTANT NOTICE - PLEASE READ=============Sorry guys, I need to start buckling down on the one comment at a time rule. I was allowing multiples in but this last round there are 7 comments pending from Ted - and for the ones to me - each comment (even with the 500 character limit each) contained multiple pieces of misinformation that would need to be addressed separately. As examples, there is a false claim of a loaded question when there is none and an abuse of a wrongheaded analogy for this, there is a misuse and misunderstanding of when multivalent logic is used vs bivalent logic (what he calls "binary space") and a conflation of that with indeterminism and complexity, there is an appeal to consequences fallacy, there is a (dangerous) misunderstanding of those consequences for the topic, there is a false claim of "over-simplification", there is a straw man fallacy, etc. It is just loaded with too many fallacies and misinformation to approve all comments, each deserving of their own attention and debunking. I’d be more than happy to go through these one at a time (and one comment at a time) in a back and forth convo that does not allow more tangent fallacies in, but the reason I have a comment limitation is to prevent illogical and unreasoned bloat from being too much to address and misinformation sitting on my site unaddressed that can confuse laypersons who read it.
If you two would like to continue your own convo without the limited one comment rule, you should navigate to a post on Ted’s platform where this type of misinformation can run "free" to get as bulky as it wants and as convoluted as it wants. My comment section I reserve for back and forth focused discussions only....which means addressing one fallacy or misinformed claim at a time (think of it like a call in show where the host is going to stop you to clear up what you said before you move on and not let you just proselytize the whole show away). For the sake of fairness I'm only approving the first comment to each person (first comment to me and rom). If either of you want the other comments I can email them to you and you can copy/paste them on Ted's site or some unlimited forum. All responses on my site from here on out must abide by the one comment per addressing one person rule so focused conversations can actually happen and convolutions cannot. I won’t approve multiples. Thank you for your understanding.
rom, since your comments are unmoderated (I put you on the whitelist when we first met as I trust you not to spread misinformation and you seemed to limit responses), I ask that you only respond with one comment at a time (I'd prefer not to moderate your comments).
We’ll see how the universe unfolds Trick … 😉
All I ask from sections of the unfolding universe. 😉
You have more stamina than I Trick.
Part of me likes Dennett, another makes me think he talks down to us through his nose in a pedagogic manner. Linked below is a quote from Dennett from, From Bacteria to Bach and Back. Touches on free will.
http://www.agnosticsinternational.org/forum/viewtopic.php?p=34179#p34179
please delete if not allowed
I actually like Dennett on a variety of topics – for free will he’s terrible. This sentence says it all to me (from the link you provided): “This is not an illusion we should dismantle or erase; it’s where we live, and we couldn’t live the way we do without it.” In other words we should keep people in their illusions rather than disillusion them: Free Will Illusionism vs. Disillusionism
The interesting thing in the quote, Dennett recognizes the traditional (commonly) accepted definition of free will.
I am OK with say doing something of my own free will, in the sense there isn’t a gun at my head; but in any deeper or philosophical sense compatibilism is unnecessary.
Exactly, I think free will is an UMBRELLA TERM which hosts both coherent abilities (She was not coerced by a gun) as well as incoherent abilities (She could have done, of one’s own accord otherwise – and is therefore blameworthy for not). The problem with compatibilism is that it ignores the latter.
OK fair enough … what about illusions (not what it seems) … like love, colour, dollars, opportunities that Dennett cites?
I personally can be pragmatic about these as well … my kitchen chair is red …. despite every bit of physics says it isn’t. We can reduce dollars and opportunity in similar ways.
“Illusions” exist as illusions (specific brain states). The free will illusion exists, free will does not. “Love” refers to an emotional brain state (a type of emotion). “Colour” either refers to a wavelength of light reflected or a mental state / brain model (a type of qualia). “Dollars” is a useful concept for passing around fictitious value. I’m not sure in what sense “opportunity” is an illusion unless one does not take it (then the opportunity was a counterfactual rather than factual).
Your chair reflects the longest wavelength (red), and your brain models the photon/retina/brain interaction as what we label “red”.
Yes I understand (as much as I need, the science). But the dollar (loonie in our case) remains an illusion. Calling it a useful concept (and no doubt a brain state), while I think, is accurate; it is also missing the point.
I think the bigger point is that illusion exist “as illusions” (real states that are informationally confused), what they are referring to is what does not really exist. For the “dollar”, that is more of a fiction than an illusion, a fiction made for a specific purpose. Similar to unicorns, most don’t experience an illusion of unicorns, they are fictions that we can build an image of create imagery in pictures, statues, mentally, etc.
“(we would still need to stop Hitler and the Nazi party from harming others even though they don’t have free will – just as we would a rabid dog).” Why is viewing criminals as rabid dogs morally superior to viewing criminal behaviour as the result of a rational choice (which most criminal behaviour is)?
Because rabid dogs are not “blameworthy” for being rabid and we should not punish them retributively for trying to bite but rather try to cure them or quarantine them. Read here: On The Practical Importance of the Free Will Debate
Trick, Dennett asks would you rather be punished or “treated” (drugged up, locked in a cage and experimented on)? Since according to incompatibilism determinism means all criminals have a diseased Brain (“tumours all the way down” as Harris says).
Yeah – Dennett is kind of silly that way. Being good consequentialists means actually doing what is consequentially best for both the criminal and potential victims. This doesn’t usually entail “being drugged up and experimented on”. Incarceration should resemble the quarantine model. In places like Norway where they have less retributive models of justice we see the lowest recidivism rates in the world.
We would still need to stop Hitler? Surely that depends if we are in that particular bit of the unfolding universe that has that particular need?
This bit of discussion reminds me of Walden Two … I “should” read it one day.
Of course, that part of the universe concerned with such things as wellbeing of conscious creatures (colloquially “we”) would still have the need, those parts unconcerned with this would have no need. I’m only referring to the former and not the latter.
Dennetts justification for punishment is simple. 1) criminal acts are rational decisions made in the persons self interest 2) The purpose of the law is to constrain the self interest of individuals therefore punishment (taking away something that a person values) is a necessary part of criminal law and justice.
Nor do criminals need to be “rehabilitated” because criminal acts by definition are rational decisions not acts committed by a diseased (insane) mind.
“Simple” is the key word here. They are “rational” based on the very specific brain construct caused by circumstances out of their control. If you were born them atom for atom, environment for environment, you would have the same “self interests”, the same “rational capacities”, and think and do exactly as they do. “Constrain” should never be “in order to punish”, just as a quarantine “constrains” those infected, but is never meant as a punishment, even if the person values their freedom. A “rational act” does not mean they could have, of their own accord, thought or done otherwise.
“but is never meant as a punishment, even if the person values their freedom” Without punishment why is anyone going to respect the law or take it into account when making a cost-benefit evaluation? Those people who aren’t punishable are criminally insane or “wired wrong” as DD says and they are the people who are sent to secure mental hospitals for their own protection and the protection of society.
If you are referring to deterrent, sure, we can still do that without blame – however, it should be noted that harsh punishments as a deterrent is ineffective as many studies show. Even the death penalty shows no evidence of deterring homicide, and in some areas has a reverse deterrent effect. Deterrent works best with small fines such as speeding tickets. Also, harsher incarceration leads to re-enforcing of bad behaviors and repeat offense, as I mentioned before. It doesn’t work.
The more important point is that no person deserves punishment if they could not have done, of their own accord, otherwise (which they could not have). Free will skeptics such as Pereboom and Caruso look to change the justice system to a non-retributive quarantine model of justice, because it is shown to be more effective AND because ‘just desert’ notions of justice are illogical and unprogressive.
“The more important point is that no person deserves punishment” It doesn’t matter whether they “deserve” it or not punishment is a integral part of criminal law and justice.
“change the justice system to a non-retributive quarantine model of justice, “ Unless these people are arguing lack of CCFW means everyone is insane then punishment is going to stay an integral part of the criminal justice system.
Only someone like Dennett would produce a strawman that no CCFW means all criminals are “insane”. It does, however, mean that they are no more “to blame” than an insane person is, and they are no more “to blame” than a person with a brain tumor causing the behaviour. This is about blameworthiness, which differs from treatment – we don’t treat the brain tumor person like they are insane, we try to remove the tumor – different methods for different circumstances.
Faulty rationale does not need to “rehabilitated”? OK.
Agreed! I tend to think John is conflating “rational” with “rationale” too. Most criminal acts are not “rational” in the sense of being “reasonable” or “logical” – especially if the act harms others. Rather they have, as you say, a “faulty rationale” that a specific “pre-programmed” brain outputs.
Criminals are sane that means their brain is cognitively healthy and their behaviour was the result of a cost-benefit evaluation – not the result of a diseased (insane) mind.
“Sane” and “rational” are two very different things. Most “sane” people belief in some sort of creator deity. Most “sane” people allows billions of animals (annually) to exist in horrible conditions until slaughtered. Many “sane” people think 1% owning more wealth than 50% of the population is justified. Most “sane” people believe in incoherent notions of free will. Almost 50% of “sane” people in the US don’t believe in evolution.
Again, if you were the “sane” criminal since birth, you would process the same (usually irrational) “cost-benefit” analysis and do as they do.
Does not mean that criminals have adopted reasoned cost-benefit models for their analysis. Does not mean they have sound axioms either.
Trick
They are the same thing sane means your mind is in touch with reality.
A criminal who commits a crime in order to benefit himself is not insane.
Also people who lack empathy for others are not insane.
No, being “irrational” is not the same thing as being “clinically insane”. Also sociopathy/psychopathy (or ASPD) which entail a lack of empathy is a mental disorder that is often not diagnosed as being “insane”. Also the line between sanity and insanity has to do with psychological norms and degrees of abnormal behaviour, delusions, etc…it isn’t about a capacity to reason or not.
Rom
Well “career” criminals do exactly that. They make rational decisions that will increase the chances of profiting from their criminal activities (and decrease the risk of being caught). These people are not insane.
It is you John that is flitting between insane and rational.
Lets leave insane aside for the moment as I think we are all agree insanity is irrelevant to the people that are actually considered criminal. These career criminals may well be rational. But that does not mean the models and axioms for their rationality are coherent or even accurate.
Trick the Oxford dictionary agrees with me.
Sanity
11 The ability to think and behave in a normal and rational manner; sound mental health.
1.1 Reasonable and rational behaviour.
People who dispose of bombs and those who work in the special forces and law enforcement also have low fear and anxiety but they are not mentally disordered and certainly not insane
This is what the oxford dictionary says:
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sane
1.”(of a person) of sound mind; not mad or mentally ill.”
1.1″ Reasonable or sensible.”
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/insane
What you are doing is conflating ambiguous definitions (1 vs 1.1), one being a clinical diagnoses “clinical insanity”, and one being a colloquialism “it was an insane discussion”. If you want to call any irrationality “insanity” then everyone is insane to various degrees (as everyone is irrational to various degrees). You cannot have your cake and eat it too here, either use definition properly or be consistent on your misuse of terms.
Also “low fear” is not the same as “lacking empathy”.
Trick said
“different methods for different circumstances.” The method for treating someone with a cognitively healthy brain is punishment.
Rom
“But that does not mean the models and axioms for their rationality are coherent or even accurate” Nothing incoherent about profiting from prostition, security fraud, smuggling drugs and making and selling guns and bombs to be used in illegal wars.
No, studies show that punitive measures are inefficient to rehabilitate and only work in very specific conditions that almost never apply for inmates. In fact the harsher the sentence (such as in supermax), the more it reinforces negative behaviours. Non-punitive and comfortable environments that allow inmates to learn, not fear for their own existence, have various educational programs, etc. work best and this is borne out by a hundred years of evidence.
Super max is for the most dangerous criminals – those who are high risk for killing other inmates and guards.
The purpose of punishment is so you will make better future choices and live a normal life when you leave.
As I mentioned, it has the reverse effect, and places where punishment is reduced such as Norway have far fewer repeat offenses: “It looks nothing like most prisons in the US. That’s because Norway’s prison system is designed with three core values in mind: normality, humanity and rehabilitation.”
https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/08/us/prison-reform-north-dakota-norway/index.html
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-norways-prison-system-is-so-successful-2014-12
What kind of punishment are you talking about? The kind of punishment DD talks about is one which encourages offenders to make better choices in the future. If offenders choose to engage in educational programs and skills training etc then they are rewarded and get time knocked off their sentence you disagree with that?
If they get time knocked off their sentence because they are less of a danger to society earlier, then it has to do with that fact. More time should not be thought of as punishment, but just for the sake of others. People who are not a danger should not be in prison.
Similar to the quarantine, someone who participates in curing themself may be cured and able to leave quarantine earlier, but forcing those who do not and hence are not cured earlier to stay in quarantine, is just a matter about not harming others – not meant as a punishment to the individual.
“then everyone is insane to various degrees” Yes that’s probably my view. The delusions of religious people for instance are practically indistinguishable from what is classically called insanity.
“Also “low fear” is not the same as “lacking empathy”. Studies show psychopaths can choose to empathise or not – and this is true of normal people as well.
Then you should take no issue treating criminals as “insane” – hence the part about having your cake and eating it too.
The thing about psychopathy and a lack of empathy is that it is ACTUALLY linked to structural abnormalities in the brain, and “Most violent crimes are committed by a small group of persistent male offenders with ASPD.”:
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/ioppn/news/records/2012/May/The-antisocial-brain.aspx
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/09/130924174331.htm
https://academic.oup.com/scan/article/11/8/1326/2413915
“However, this study featured a fascinating twist: in a second condition, both criminals and control subjects were instructed to explicitly try to empathize with the people in the videos they watched. Under this condition, individuals with psychopathy engaged these regions more than they had without instructions, and almost as much as control subjects. These data, again, suggest that oftentimes deficits in empathy can be reduced through the right motivational “triggers.””
———-
Show that a criminal whose behaviour is the result of a rational decision and cost-benefit analysis is delusional.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/moral-universe/empathy-as-a-choice-part-2-autism-and-psychopathy/
Even if some empathy can be triggered given the right circumstances (e.g. being asked to explicitely focus on empathizing in a study), the fact that it is not triggered without these circumstances (when it is for non-psychopaths) is a brain abnormality. There is no magical “free will” that can produce the “empathy trigger” when we want it – and punishment certainly is not the way to trigger it! Psychopath’s do not “rationally” decide to be unempathetic given such a circumstance, and they certainly could not have done, of their own accord, otherwise given that specific circumstance (which is more important).
Good work, I intuit a solace in disbelief in free will that is a corollary of love & reality.
Exactly. Thanks for the visit anthony.
(1)
If you want to participate in a civilised society you have to obey the rules. Just like if you play a sport you have to obey the rules of that game. If you break a rule you are punished- if you don’t agree with that don’t play the game.
Likewise if you don’t want to participate in society then you get put in an institution and appointed a guardian by the state – since you can’t be relied upon to obey the rules and manage your own affairs.
But if you prefer that didn’t happen and want to continue having a politically free life then take your punishment.
————-
(2)
“the fact that it is not triggered without these circumstances (when it is for non-psychopaths) is a brain abnormality.”
The study shows empathy is not simply an automatic reflex but often requires a choice – to engage with others emotions – a choice which even “normals” often refuse – because it is challenging painful or costly to the individual.
“Psychopath’s do not “rationally” decide to be unempathetic given such a circumstance, “ They certainly do and even non psychopaths do.
(1) Except you miss the important facts:
First – if a person could not have done, of their own accord, otherwise (which they could not have) – they do not DESERVE punishment.
Second – punishment (even a death sentence) is INEPT as a deterrent. These “if you don’t want X don’t do Y” are not even practically relevant for the criminal cases of concern.
Third – people are forced into the game of life, their biology, and their environment.
(2)
No, the study does not show that empathy is not an automatic reflex (or that it is a rational decision to empathize by non-psychopathic people) – it shows that it IS an automatic reflex for non-psychopaths and not for psychopaths. All the study shows is that deficits in empathy that psychopaths HAVE can be reduced through the right motivational “triggers”. You are wrong about what the study shows:
https://academic.oup.com/brain/article/136/8/2550/432196
From the study: “Brain regions involved in experiencing these interactions were not SPONTANEOUSLY activated as strongly in the patient group while viewing the video clips. However, this group difference was markedly reduced when we specifically instructed participants to feel with the actors in the videos.”
(meaning it is a more automatic or instinctual response in non-psychopaths – hence the issue)
Also, you are missing the point that they could not have thought or acted, at that time, otherwise. This is the part you aren’t comprehending.
*Let's go back down to one comment at a time please. Please stay within the rules as these are getting bloated.John
If this were true, you would be advocating that we all should do this.
Trick … the Captcha question did not work just now 15 – 15 = 0 did not work …. tried three times!
Thanks rom, it seems even systems we expect to logically work are sometimes “insane”. Let me know if the insanity in the system continues.
Why on earth would a person need the ability to choose an option to act against all their desires in any given circumstance in order to be deserving of punishment?
Law and punishment is a necessity of any civilised society without punishment no one will have respect for the law.
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/moral-universe/empathy-as-a-choice/
———
Trick here is a little story which shows that the fact of inevitability is practically useless “It’s my fate to steal,” pleaded the man who had been caught red-handed by Diogenes.
“Then it is also your fate to be beaten,” said Diogenes, hitting him across the head with his staff.” (I will try to keep it to 1 comment from now on).
Those “desires” could not have been otherwise either. I’m saying that the notion of ‘just deserts’ (e.g. being deserving of punishment) is as incoherent as the ability to have done, of one’s own accord, otherwise (the free will of concern). Also – cute story that conflates fatalism with determinism…and has nothing at all to do with being “deserving of punishment” which “inevitability” certainly has something to say about even when someone is inevitably punished undeservingly.
Appreciated. 🙂
Trick
“Inevitability” is not an argument against punishment. If you say it was inevitable for a thief to steal from me then I can say it’s inevitable that I will beat him. You can’t claim he doesn’t deserve it – while at the same time claiming that the whole notion of “deserve” is incoherent.
Yes- it is. The fact that you inevitably beat the thief does not in any way, shape, or form, imply that the thief deserved the beating. Only that it was inevitable that you acted irrationally. He does not deserve it BECAUSE the whole notion of deserve is (rationally/logically) incoherent (due to a lack of coherency with free will). One cannot deserve X if deserve notions are incoherent. Saying they deserve it is like saying they possess the attribute of being a square-circle.
If the concept of deserve is incoherent then the justice system doesn’t even need to get into reasoning about “deserve” then when giving a criminal a punishment. For example somebody who commits a capital offence will simply (and “inevitably”) be handed a death sentence by the state.
That is what would happen if society “inevitably” doesn’t care about a rational justice system that mitigates “non-deserved” (meaning all) harms, but people like me “inevitably” do care and hopes that society “inevitably” does as well. What rationally justifies retributive punishment is the very notion of deserve. If that was ruled out, then the only thing to rationally fall back on is consequentialist assessments – such as preventing “non-deserved” harms. The death sentence does not do this, nor do a large majority of punishments….in fact they often make things worse. Also, being “incoherent” just means it is not logical to invoke “deservingness”, not that a lack of deserve cannot be addressed (just like a lack of free will).
Rom
This would be like saying to a vegetarian who points out farmers profit from slaughtering animals “if that was true you would be advocating that everyone should make money from slaughtering animals”. Completely ridiculous.
Yes it is not coherent … yet you claimed it was a coherent position, whether it be slaughtering animals or smuggling drugs.
Unless you are claiming the circular argument that it is completely coherent for criminals to carry out criminal acts.
Rom
Criminals act in their self interest. What’s incoherent about that? We also have laws for this reason and enforcement of those laws. Is having a state and laws incoherent in your opinion or can we just expect that everyone will have empathy for each other and just give out of the kindness of their hearts like anarchists believe?
It’s coherent to risk getting caught and going to jail? It is in their self interest?
Again I will restate … the axioms they have adopted and possibly the reasoning the find they have are probably a bit wonky.
“consequentialist assessments” The criminals have violated the social contract therefore society is justified in taking from them what it can to restore the harm they have caused. In the case of someone who commits a capital offence they have given up their right to live in a civilised society and they have a debt to society – a debt which they are never going to be able to pay back.
Your entire comment presupposes that they could have, of their own accord, not have violated the social contract. Punishment is not a restoration of harm, it just tacks on more harm. Again, if you were unlucky enough to be born in their shoes (their biology, environment, and causal variables), you would have done the exact same thing and “violated the social contract”. The sooner you get this the sooner you will have compassion over someone elses causal variables.
Trick
If you think all criminals have a diseased brain then why keep the most hardened criminals alive? There’s no cure for them, no magic pill, no therapy and these are not people that society needs.
That has more to do with my consequentialist assessment of the death penalty: 1) They don’t *deserve* to die or the threat of death and psychological harms of that threat, 2) the death penalty has no deterrent effect, 3) the death penalty causes harm to interconnected relations (e.g. family), 4) some are put to death when they would have been exonerated, 5) the death penalty costs 18 times more than life incarceration, 6) sometimes the procedure goes horribly wrong.
That beings said, there could be a very rare (consequentialist) exception, but this is the case for most things.
1) If they are in prison for life that means they will die in prison. Presumably that also causes psychological harm. 2) If it deters no one then no loss but if deters anyone that is has saved at least some lives. 3) See point 1 also this person destroyed someone else’s life. 4) The risk of killing an innocent is minuscule. 5) Where does 18 times come from? 5) Lethal injection is generally safe, quick and painless. (It’s what we use to euthanise our pets).
1) To die is not to be killed. Knowing you are being put to death is a huge existential harm. 2) It doesn’t deter anyone and in some places there are more homicides where there is the death penalty. 3) That doesn’t mean they deserve to die themself. 4) 4.1% is not miniscule here. 5) The california study for example. 6) There have been many cases where this is not the case. See the links in my last comment.
* To keep comment length on par let's focus on these one at a time starting with (1).“It’s coherent to risk getting caught and going to jail? It is in their self interest?” Certainly its a risk versus reward evaluation. A robbery can take place in literally seconds and the robber takes that risk because the probability of him being caught is low and if successful will make hundreds or thousands of dollars from a few seconds or minutes “work”.
Trick if we found a mass murderer committed his murders because of a tumour in his brain and we could not remove the tumour, its very easy to justify killing (euthanising) him. You think viewing criminals as (essential) wild animals instead of rational agents will make society treat them more humanely. That’s far from guaranteed and if anything is easier to justify experimenting on people and killing them. (like the Soviet Union and the nazis did).
I’m saying it would not be justified killing him (if he wants to live). The fact that you think it is is the very problem. Let me ask this:
X person, who is in quarantine, is a carrier of Y contagious disease. X, as just a carrier of Y, will not die from Y, however, others will die if we ever let X out of quarantine. We cannot cure Y and X will never be helpful for the cure. X does not want to die, but X also doesn’t want to live in quarantine for the rest of X’s life (though would rather that than be put to death). Should we put X to death (force death on to X)? Y or N?
If we Abandon free will in the justice system and instead base sentencing on that persons risk to society then yes. Not only would it much be easier and cheaper to kill the most hardened criminals under this system but the mentally ill and retarded as well.
I disagree (it’s also not even easier or cheaper as already mentioned), but please answer my question about the quarantine scenario of the person who has contracted a contagious disease. Should we put person X who is in quarantine (in my specific scenario) to death under your position? Y or N
Sam Harris’s moral theory is that the action which produces the most benefit is the morally good action. So from that viewpoint it seems we would be morally obligated to kill this person.
That is a very simplistic view of The Moral Landscape. I didn’t, however, ask about Harris (which you are incorrect about). Is it YOUR position that we should kill the quarantined person? Y or N?
Hi Trick,
I didn’t realise how bad Dennett is on this. I read the Harris response and then Dennett’s review. I wondered if Dennett had pinned his colours to the mast and wasn’t prepared to change his mind or if he’s just stupider than I thought. He misses the point of the “could have done otherwise” thought experiment, and defines free will as having the ability to do things differently when circumstance are different.
Exactly! 🙂
I don’t believe the mentally ill and retarded should receive a death sentence (and the justice system agrees with me). So the answer is no. Now you need to prove all criminals are sick and should be excused from the death penalty.
Why are you mentioning the “mentally ill and retarded” for this question (though I agree they should not get the death penalty even if a danger if let “free” to roam about on their own), the person in quarantine is neither mentally ill or retarded. They just had the unlucky circumstances of contracting and being a carrier of a dangerous disease but are of clinically sound mind (and not mentally deficient). Should the person in quarantine, who is NOT ill (but a carrier of a dangerous disease), get the death penalty according to YOU? Please answer the proper question.
“get the death penalty according to YOU? “ The person in your hypothetical case hasn’t committed a crime so obviously no. (Whether they should be euthanised for purely utilitarian reasons and not as a punishment is a different question.)
Great and (in the scenario) is the main reason for keeping person X in quarantine the negative consequences to others if we let the person out of quarantine? Y or N?
“Great and (in the scenario) is the main reason for keeping person X in quarantine the negative consequences to others if we let the person out of quarantine” Yes.
Great – last one: Should we treat person X in quarantine poorly, punishing them for accidentally contracting the dangerous disease? Y or N
“Should we treat person X in quarantine poorly, punishing them for accidentally contracting the dangerous disease?” No.
Great – most free will skeptic suggest that we should (most often) treat dangerous criminals similar to dangerous person X who is in the quarantine. As you denote – that would not necessitate: A) killing the person, or B) letting the person free (as doing so is harmful to others), or C) treating the person poorly / punishing (as they do not deserve it). It does not imply we need give them the same diagnoses as those with a mental disorder, or a brain tumor (just as we don’t need to for those in quarantine) –> they just are equally not as ‘just desert’ responsible for their conditions as those with a mental disorder or brain tumor (and that is what is being compared for the analogy, not cure methods). Hope this clarifies.
“‘just desert’ responsible” Nobody is *ultimately* responsibly but that doesn’t mean they are not pragmatically responsible.
As pragmatically responsible as person X who is in quarantine (we need to keep them in quarantine for pragmatic reasons). No more and no less.
“No more and no less.” No there are different degrees of responsibility. a child is not responsible while an adult with a cognitively healthy brain whose criminal behaviour was the result of a rational choice in an attempt to benefit themselves is held to be responsible for their choices and the behaviour which resulted from that choice.
Are you talking (as you say) “pragmatic responsibility”? If so, pragmatically, it is more of a danger to let the person in quarantine out (that would cause a death epidemic) than it is the psychopathic serial killer (that would kill many)….so sure, in that sense (and ONLY that sense) there are different degrees of “pragmatic responsibility” (if you can even call that responsibility) depending on consequences (it seems the quarantined person has MORE here – so sure – it seems I misspoke with the “no less” statement technically in this case). You are missing the point that if the person who committed the crime could not have, of their own accord, made a different “rational choice”, then it is ONLY about pragmatics (re: consequences). They are NO MORE blameworthy or responsible than person X (who is a bigger danger) in quarantine is. Correct?
No a person whose criminal behaviour was the result of a rational choice is responsible and blameworthy a person infected with a virus or whose behaviour was the result of an accident or illness etc is not.
Your position here displays the very reason free will skepticism is so important and why compatibilists contriving free will is a problem. Your position isn’t about “pragmatic responsibility” at all (the fall-back of compatibilists) but the more irrational type of responsibility. If it was about pragmatism you would have to say person X in quarantine is “more responsible”. Glad we cleared this up.
For the sake of argument, I will give you that a choice was “rational” (even though that isn’t the case for most criminals).
Could the “rational” criminal have, of their own accord, made a different choice at the time? Y or N
If a person was put back in the same circumstance they would always make the same choice. Now should we treat people differently based on their capacities? Should somebody who cheats on their tax return be treated the same as a person with Down syndrome? Should tax evaders be excused from paying a fine or serving a prison sentence? If no then you agree with DD and our justice system. If not then in your system all law breakers should be declared incompetent to manage their own affairs and put in an institution.
It means we should not treat people retributively. Should person X who is in quarantine be treated the same as a person with Down syndrome? Should person X be let out of quarantine? If no, then we are simply back to matters of being pragmatic.
Sidenote: I do think that for some acts fines may have useful deterrent effect (as I mentioned earlier)….but that is also entirely about pragmatics (and I don’t agree with ownership rights here anyway). Prison (a quarantine) should be only for those who are a danger to others – not used as punishment. It all comes down to what is pragmatic (the consequences).
“If no, then we are simply back to matters of being pragmatic.” The whole idea of responsibility and moral competency is ultimately pragmatic.
“ Prison (a quarantine) should be only for those who are a danger to others – not used as punishment.” Why? Like Dennett says if you don’t want to punished then don’t play the game. If you don’t want to honour a contract then don’t sign it.
Great, then I’ll ask again: Person X in quarantine (that would cause an epidemic if let out) is more pragmatically responsible than the criminal in jail. Correct?
Because prison is an ineffective deterrent.
It’s pragmatic to hold people with a cognitively healthy brain criminally responsible for their choices. It’s not pragmatic to do so for a person who contracted a virus through no fault of their own.
“Because prison is an ineffective deterrent.” People value their freedom so it makes sense that taking it away will deter them. That doesn’t mean prison should be used first maybe cheaper alternatives like fines and community service should be used first. (For more minor offences).
What is the distinction between “criminally responsible” and “pragmatically responsible” that you are making? If there is none (as you suggested before), then isn’t it the case that it is MORE pragmatic to keep person X in quarantine than the criminal in jail? Y or N
I understand why you intuitively think this, but this is not borne out by the evidence. The deterrent effect is very minimal, there are far better ways to deter. Also, (once imprisoned) harsher prison environments have far larger recidivism rates (which makes them anti-pragmatic).
Those who are criminally responsible are those who have the capacity for reason and whose criminal behaviour was intentional.
(link removed)So you think if a police car is visible to drivers it won’t deter people from speeding? CCTV, locks, alarms, vaults and security guards all a waste of money in your opinion?
Answer the question and stop avoiding: isn’t it the case that it is MORE pragmatic to keep person X in quarantine than the criminal in jail? Y or N – You should be able to answer this question – it’s easy.
Actually no, those are where deterrence actually DO have an effect – when there are visible features AT THE TIME of considering a crime. Don’t strawman.
No, I'm not going to debunk an entire (compatibilist) PDF file in comments - link removed.t’s just as pragmatic to punish people whose behaviour was the result of a rational choice as it is to quarantine a person with a deadly virus.
“DO have an effect” Deterrence and punishment does have an effect then?
“AT THE TIME” So all criminals commit their crime on the spur of the moment? They can only make a cost benefit decision just seconds before but not hours, days, weeks or months in advance?
You are question avoiding, so I will rephrase another way: If we HAD TO let A) a serial killer out of prison, or B) person X out of quarantine that will cause an epidemic, who would be the more pragmatic one to let out? A or B?
I said in the very beginning (click here) that there were some lesser punishments, such as fines, that did work as a deterrent for smaller infractions – and are pragmatic even if someone does not have free will. And no, I said that is when (statistically) deterrent works best – if there is something in their view at the time that leads to caution (e.g. a police, etc.). Harsher punishments (even death sentences) and incarceration are not good deterrents…for example, for homicide (as I mentioned many times now). This is a fact.
Actually, the death sentence is a great deterrent; recidivism goes way down. There’s not a lot it won’t pragmatically solve, come to think of it.
Hah…good one JF…it would also prevent future speeding, especially if it can be enacted right when someone is pulled over. 😉
A death penalty for speeding? Very extreme no? But if all criminals are dangerous wild animals on the other hand….
JN -The death penalty when pulled over for speeding is a joke (but if we are using it for recidivism? 😉 ). If we shouldn’t kill the quarantined person – we shouldn’t the criminal (as neither are deserving of it) – rather life sentence/quarantine is better as you denote yourself John re: quarantine person X (and not killing them). Also, over 4% of those put to death would have been exonerated (and it costs 18X more than life incarceration) – there is that.
Come to think of it JF – if we start killing people who have not committed any crime at all it would start to lower crime rates. Statistically the more dead, the less chance for them to commit a crime. 😉
“If we HAD TO” Is such a scenario realistic?
If criminals do not choose to commit a crime if they see a police officer etc then that means they are deterred and that they are punishable.
Does it matter if it is realistic or not – it points out that the quarantined person X is MORE pragmatically responsible….and to denote otherwise is to move away from pragmatics…which you so desperately want to do for the criminal. This shows your leaning toward retributivism – which is irrational.
It just means that they are deterred by the threat of being caught. If that threat seems less (no police or cameras around), the deterrent effect loses value statistically. Again there is no rate change of homicides in areas with the death penalty (some have higher homicides) – so it isn’t the punishment itself that deters, it is the visual cue of a higher chance of being caught.
I am talking of moral responsibility. It’s pragmatic to praise and blame the Actions of a moral agent don’t you agree? The only way that a offender with a sound mind can change their behaviour is by taking responsibility for their actions and by making better future choices.(since in reality we don’t have any magic pills), don’t you agree?
You are confusing pragmatic responsibility in the consequentialist sense with moral responsibility in the just desert sense. If what we do is for the sake of pragmatics only, then the REASON we do it has nothing to do with moral responsibility – it is just the pragmatic thing to do. We quarantine person X not because they are morally responsible, but because it is pragmatic. Likewise, the criminal. We should only do what we do because it is pragmatic, not because they are morally responsible for something they couldn’t have not done.
How else are we to influence the future behaviour of rational (and moral) agents if not by praising and blaming their good and bad choices? (Holding them responsible basically)? Do you have a superior alternative?
Doing so through ‘pretending someone is blameWORTHY’ is archaic and unprogressive. We can look to see if a method is pragmatically effective (like the quarantine) ONLY – if not and it causes harm to the person who does not deserve the harm (which they never deserve it any more than person X in quarantine) – don’t do it (such as harsh prison sentences and harsh punishments). We should treat people as well as we consequentially can, which also is more effective at rehabilitation than harsh punishments / prison sentences are. We should change behavior through education and changing causal conditions, and avoid doing it through hitting them with a stick whenever possible.
Pragmatic incentive is another topic but we should stick to the problem of ‘blame when someone is not actually blameWORTHY’ for now.
“blame when someone is not actually blameWORTHY’ for now.” The law blames people who fail to exercise their capacities. For example if a police car asks you to pull over and you choose not to do so you will be held responsible. That’s because you are an agent with the capacity to reason. Only if you lack that capacity will you be excused by the law.
What we do and what we should do are very different things. We can change behaviours without (irrational) backward blaming for things that could not have been otherwise (they did lack the CAPACITY to do otherwise at the time!). We can focus entirely on future output. The mental capacity to adjust behaviour can be a consideration for future adjustments that are pragmatic ONLY BUT should not be a consideration for blaming for the past event. This is important for the attitudes we have about criminals, etc….which plays into how they are treated.
Understanding one’s role in causing something is the basis for “taking on” responsibility. The Sun is responsible for much of today’s life that exists on Earth. Is the Sun morally responsible?
Personally I would drop the word moral; though it is a good way of manipulating people to do what we might want.
Understanding we are proximate or perhaps immediate causes is a more accurate way of looking at things.
John Nutt, you said, “if a police car asks you to pull over and you choose not to do so you will be held responsible”, but are you arguing from a position of accepting the premise that there’s no free will? I thought you were. If so, that person was caused not to pull over (even including their decision not to) by prior causes, hence the law is an ass. If not, maybe catch up with the argument. Cheers.
Trick
“We can change behaviours without (irrational) backward blaming” How can we influence a persons future choices if we don’t hold them responsible for past choices?
“(they did lack the CAPACITY to do otherwise at the time!). “ If they lacked that capacity they would have been unable to make a choice
We can influence their causal choices through education and assistance (influencing brain states) all without backward blame.
Aren’t you a compatibilist? If you are you should understand that a capacity to have done otherwise given the causal variables at the time is nonsensical.
* My request is that, if you insist on compatibilism, be a more consistent NSRC Compatibilist: click here
“understand that a capacity to have done otherwise given the causal variables at the time is nonsensical” If their behaviour was the result of a decision making process then at the start of that process they would have started with multiple options from which to choose from. So they did have the ability to choose any of those viable options. Saying I “could have done otherwise” is correct (even with determinism) but in the same circumstance I WOULD always choose the same option.
No, only one of the options was ever “viable” the others were part of the thought process that MUST causally play to the only one possible selection (given determinism that is). You would always choose the same option because the other options were not really possible in the sense that they could have been actualized, they were just unviable thoughts that were weighed the only way they could have been causally weighed.
If we rewind the tape till just before the person starts to deliberate then it’s true at that moment that they are faced with 2 or more viable options which they could have (at that time) chosen. But given who they was at that moment they will always choose the same option.
Who they are at the moment in time is a part of causality that ALSO could not have been otherwise…so no, only one option was causally viable (unless you are reverting to indeterminism and libertarian free will, not compatibilism….then we can address how those indeterministic events are also out of the control of the willer. Right now we are addressing compatibilism/determinism).
Rom
“Is the Sun morally responsible?” The sun is not a moral agent. The only way to change the behaviour of a Criminals with a sound mind (since we don’t have magic pills in reality) is to give him better options from which to choose.
“Understanding we are proximate or perhaps immediate causes is a more accurate way of looking at things.” Such as the persons choice being the immediate cause of their behaviour? And the only way for them to improve their behaviour is to deliberately choose a better way to live.
So you are saying people are moral agents? If so this begging the question! The question is how we change a criminal’s mind.
Yes the choice might be the proximate cause … is the choice free? Do judges intentionally tend to give stiffer sentences just before lunch?
Trick
When a person is faced with an issue they imagine multiple possibilities (can do’s) and then they implement one of those options (what the person “inevitably” WILL choose). So it’s correct to say they had the capacity to do otherwise.
Just because one THINKS that they can take a {counterfactual} action (due to epistemic uncertainty), does not mean they actually CAN take (“can do”) a {counterfactual) action. That is to conflate the epistemic with the ontic. Rather, that thought plays a part into the one and only option they can take/do. Also, once it is done, there is no more epistemic uncertainty about the factual. It is entirely incorrect to say they had a capacity to do otherwise (to do a counterfactual) – given determinism.
You have the capacity to select one option out of multiple options. At that moment in time you had a choice and then by exercising your will or “free will” you determined which option would be implemented in reality.
You had the capacity to select the one and ONLY option you could select at the time. You did not have a free choice or free will, but rather a constrained causal choice and will. You had zero capacity to select a different option at that time. You had no more capacity to select a different option than you had the capacity to flap your arms and fly to the moon at the time.
What is free will to choose the inevitable?
Trick
I did not not say we have the ability to select multiple options but the ability to imagine multiple (feasible) options. Obviously we can only choose or select one of those options and implement it.
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JF
“What is free will to choose the inevitable?” Because you actually have to deliberate over multiple options and exercise your free will to choose anything – because the universe or “inevitability” isn’t going to do it for you.
JN
Some have the ability to “imagine” they can jump off a cliff and fly (and think it “feasible”). It is whether or not they can “DO” that (it actually being “feasible”) that matters to whether we find them splatted on the ground below or not. We could not have DONE otherwise, and DOING so is not any more “feasible” than jumping off a cliff and flying just by flapping our arms (regardless of what one imagines they can do).
* Only one option was ever ontologically feasible – those other imagined options are just part of the causality (that could not have been otherwise) that will lead to the one and only option that could have been selected.
JN: ‘Because you actually have to deliberate over multiple options and exercise your free will to choose anything.’
Whether you deliberate or not and every detail of how you do are subject to the same causative law, also inevitable. Deciding to be conscientious or laisez faire, outside influences – everything is caused precisely, inevitably, just the way it happens. So you are defining the illusion of free will as “free will”.
Feasible means I can physically and realistically do it. For example I can (its physical possible for me) to walk to the supermarket but it’s not possible that I can fly there so that option is not feasible.
“Only one option was ever ontologically feasible” So tell me what it is then so I don’t have to bother making a choice? It doesn’t matter if determinism is true – since we still have to make choices to determine what the future is.
The fact that you don’t know the only feasible option does not make the others feasible. You could never have physically done otherwise. You could never have realistically done otherwise. Doing otherwise was physically impossible. Saying you could have done otherwise is unrealistic. You still have to choose the only way you can (physically) choose and the only option you can choose, based on the only brain configuration you could have had at the time.
JK
“So you are defining the illusion of free will as “free will” Free will definition (from the free will dictionary) “The ability or discretion to choose; free choice: chose to remain behind of my own free will” Where’s the illusion? Even with determinism the word choice has meaning and saying all our choices are “inevitable” adds nothing of value and therefore should be of no concern to anyone.
JN: ‘Where’s the illusion?’
1. You appear to be making a decision between several options.
2. There can only be one possible outcome.
3. Therefore your apparent freedom to choose is an illusion.
4. Dictionaries say many things that don’t always apply.
“does not make the others feasible.” It’s feasible that I can make a cup of coffee or a cup of tea this is a correct use of language.
“You still have to choose the only way you can (physically) choose“ So you agree we still have to go through a decision making process? And being faced with multiple feasible options (“can do’s”) is a necessary part of that process? And determinism does NOTHING to change that fact?
You are conflating epistemic for ontic. Saying something is epistemically feasible/possible just means you lack the knowledge over which is really ontically feasible/possible. After the fact that epistemic uncertainty is no more: and under determinism if you made coffee and not tea, you never could have made the tea (it was not feasible for you to have). We process decisions the only way we can, and only one of the options we factor in was actually (in reality) feasible/ possible. “Can do” suggests ontic, not simply epistemic. That is wrong under determinism, you could not have “done” otherwise.
“just means you lack the knowledge over which is really ontically feasible/possible.” I can make tea (I have the ability to do so) and IF I do choose the tea then that is what I WILL do.
““Can do” suggests ontic, not simply epistemic.” The “can do’s” only exist in our imagination.
“That is wrong under determinism, you could not have “done” otherwise.” With determinism we WOULD NOT have chosen otherwise.
You had no ability to make tea AT THAT TIME! To suggest you did goes against causality and the laws of physics (given a deterministic account). Your ability was constrained to processing the only decision you could – coffee.
If “can do’s” only exist in your imagination, they are no different that someone imagining you “can fly”. It does not mean you actually can fly but that you are just imagining it (indeed, you might even believe it).
You BOTH would not have done otherwise AND could not have done otherwise.
“You had no ability to make tea AT THAT TIME!” You have the ability to make tea and if you choose it you will make it.
“Your ability was constrained to processing the only decision you could – coffee.” In other words the only constraint was my own will – and why would a person want the ability to act against their own will?
No I can (feasible) walk to the supermarket but I cannot fly there.
You had no ability to choose tea at that time, hence no ability to make tea at that time.
You could not have chosen another will. Your will was not free to be otherwise.
You could not have feasibly A) had a different will, B) deliberated otherwise, or C) done otherwise, anymore than you could have feasibly flown to the supermarket.
JF
1. We actually do evaluate the multiple options and then we select the “best” option.
2. Yes that’s the option we end up choosing to implement.
3. Where’s the illusion?
JN: There’s no illusion at all. Trouble is, you just re-wrote the scenario without determinism.
1. You’ve no idea it’s the best option. It could be the worst. Never made a bad decision? What we know about it is that it is the inevitable decision.
2. It’s the only one we could have made.
3. The deluded prisoner decides to stay in today.
1. We actually do evaluate the multiple options and then we select the “best” option.
2. Yes that’s the option we end up choosing to implement.
3. Where’s the illusion?
JF
1. We select the “best” option based on the information available to us at the time. Obviously since we are not omniscient it could turn out terrible.
2. It’s the only one we would have chosen. Why would we want to choose something different to the option that we thought was best suited to our purposes (at that time.)?
3. The deluded prisoner is not responsive to reasons so it cannot be said he is exercising his free will.
Where is determinism missing?
JN: ‘ Why would we want to choose something different to the option that we thought was best suited to our purposes?’
The argument does not rest on whether we would want something other than what we choose. But to be postulating such a condition shows that you understand the difference. If you could choose a different option, you’d have free will. And if you deliberately choose a bad option to spite determinism, that was just as caused, so that’s no escape from determinism.
JF
“If you could choose a different option, you’d have free will.” No if I choose a less attractive option I would be acting against my own will. So such an “ability” even if it existed would have nothing to do with “free will”.
Without causality/determinism you wouldn’t have coherent thoughts and you wouldn’t have the ability to make rational choices and implement those choices. So “escaping” from determinism is just as nonsensical as being “free” from yourself.
JN: ‘No if I choose a less attractive option I would be acting against my own will.’
So you define free will as choosing what you cannot help but choose, and choosing something else “acting against” FW?
‘Without causality/determinism you wouldn’t have coherent thoughts and you wouldn’t have the ability to make rational choices and implement those choices.’
That may be true, but is irrelevant to whether your choices are freely made, whereas determinism itself precludes that.
So “escaping” from determinism is just as nonsensical as being “free” from yourself.’
True, but for the wrong reason. Are you saying determinism GIVES us free will?
Rom
“the option we chose has been determined” Yes it’s determined by us – we are the ones doing the choosing – not anything else and this is NOT an illusion.
“That we chose independently or freely” When you choose a meal at a restaurant the only thing (or being rather) in existence interested in what you want for dinner is you. It’s a free and independent choice made entirely by you.
JN
When you say determined by us you mean … chemical and physical processes chose a result? Or are you pointing to some magical property of the brain? Why is it the chemistry and physics of only humans and perhaps a few other animals that chose freely? In what way is the chemistry and physics free and independent?
Your menu example is an argument form ignorance … sorry. We are completely unaware of these processes and therefore free of them?
JF
We select the option that best suits our purposes. Why WOULD we choose something else (even if we “could”) if we was ever put back in the exact same circumstance?
“but is irrelevant to whether your choices are freely made, whereas determinism itself precludes that.” You’re making choices freely and independently of anyone else. Determinism doesn’t change this fact.
JN: ‘Why WOULD we choose something else (even if we “could”)’
So you now agree we could not? (Please have the courtesy to answer questions.)
Not being able to identify a motivation to do otherwise doesn’t make your action freely willed. Determinism doesn’t impose terrible hardship, just inevitability.
JF
“So you now agree we could not?” More precisely would not. You are putting the “could not” at the start of the decision making process – which is mistaken. As a choice always starts with what we “can” do and finishes with what we WILL do.
“Determinism doesn’t impose terrible hardship, just inevitability” Yes and the fact of *inevitability* has no practical value and therefore shouldn’t be a concern to anybody.
JN, you accept the fact of inevitability. This means that, at the start of the decision-making process, the outcome is already determined. It can only be one thing. This is what inevitability means. It applies to future conditions. So it is right to put “could not” at the beginning regarding all other outcomes. Saying you have free will, or avoiding “could not” implies that other outcomes are possible, which is not the case. You know it is not the case, because only one is inevitable. You are simply abusing English.
We select the option which is completely dictated by the specific deliberation that takes place which is completely dictated by the very specific brain configuration we have at the time that is ultimately dictated by events that stem outside of us, none of which could have been, of the our own accord, otherwise. We wouldn’t choose something else, because the very “programming” we have dictates the exact way we deliberate and assess at the time.
*** It is the will itself that is not free.***
If one is going to denote an unfree, entirely causally dictated choice as “free will”, they might as well say that a selection a computer chess program makes out of a database of options that it processes through via checks and balances was a “free choice”.
JF
“So it is right to put “could not” at the beginning regarding all other outcomes.” No it is not. A choice starts with what we “can do” and then ends with what we will do. If you put “could not” at the start of the choosing process then no choosing would have happened – and that is factually wrong.
Why was the chosen option inevitable? Because that option most fitted our purposes at the time- inevitability is not some mysterious external force which forces us to choose against our will.
JN
No, I agree, not a mysterious force, or all external. Inevitability is the fact that only one outcome is possible. That fact pertains at the start of the choosing process. It must pertain at all moments prior. Therefore, before we choose, we cannot choose anything other than the one inevitable outcome. These facts follow from determinism.
Trick
We act with “free will” when we are free from coercion and undue influence. It’s the “I am signing this of my own free will” variety – not the contra casual variety that most religious people believe in.
I do understand that you are a compatibilist who re-defines free will to be “lacking a disqualifier [of free will]“, that is common for compatibilists. When you, however, suggest that someone could have done otherwise or that they are responsible in the strong ‘just desert’ sense you are falling victim to libertarian notions or not being a “good compatibilist”. Believe it or not, I don’t insist on necessarily converting you to a full-blown free will skeptic (defining free will in the proper, important sense), I’d be okay if you redefined free will the way you want – but don’t inject in irrational metaphysical beliefs in. I’m asking that you, at the very least, become a NSRC Compatibilist that I denote in this article:
A Compatibilism / Incompatibilism Transformation
If that is doable, we’ve made progress.
Why are you so desperate not to be responsible for your actions?
Hi Andrew, thanks for stopping by.
It isn’t about me. Rather, I’d argue, that the notion of “just desert” responsibility (or “strong” responsibility denoted here: Moral Responsibility Infographic) is causing way too many problems in the world – from retributivism to justifying gross inequalities, and for humanity to progress we need to move away from these faulty, irrational, and ultimately harmful notions. 🙂
It’s more about the nature of that responsibility rather than whether or not we are responsible.
Trick
Okay let’s for now leave aside “free will” and talk about moral responsibility.
As defined on wiki “Moral agency is an individual’s ability to make moral judgments based on some notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions.A moral agent is “a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong.”
Is moral responsibility compatible with determinism in your opinion?
Why did you say “let’s talk about moral responsibility” and then give the wiki definition of “moral agency”? They are not the same thing. The wiki definition of moral responsibility is:
And no, moral responsibility in this sense is not compatible with determinism, as this denotes the STRONG ‘just desert’ sense that I show here: Moral Responsibility Infographic
The article on moral responsibility also says “Philosophers refer to people who have moral responsibility for an action as moral agents.”
It seems you are simply arguing against Retributive notions of justice and in favour of rehabilitation. While that might be fine humanism it is poor philosophy. ( To make the point what ethical system is NOT compatible with determinism – as determinism is a metaphysical claim and not a ethical system – anymore than indeterminsm is.)
The wiki article on “moral agents” is based off of one article and is missing a whole lot. One can be a causal moral agent and NOT have after-the-fact moral responsibility in the sense that wiki explains (being “deserving” of X).
No John, both physical and metaphysical facts play a huge part in any rational ethical system. To suggest otherwise is “poor philosophy”. If someone could not have done otherwise due to the metaphysical position of causal determinism being true, that fact ties to the notion of ethical responsibility (same with indeterminism that one would have no say over).
“being “deserving” of X” The concept of deserve doesn’t contradict determinism. It simply means a person has earned something or should be given something because of their actions or qualities (dictionary definition). How is this a metaphysical claim?
Causal determinism doesn’t tell us how to behave it doesn’t tell us to distribute wealth for example – anymore than the scientific method tells us we should not use it to build nuclear weapons.
Causal determinism (the metaphysical claim) tells us that one could not have done otherwise and what they do is based on causal variables they ultimately had no say over. It is that understanding that informs us that suggesting someone is more or less deserving over one’s lucky or unlucky (privileged or unprivileged) causal variables is an irrational, baseless position. Someone could not have had different actions, nor could they have had different qualities or privileges.
Causal determinism tells us that one is not more or less deserving of wealth than another, and that justifications of someone owning more of the world at the expense of others because they deserve more (or the other deserves less) are irrational justifications that have no basis in reality.
1) “suggesting someone is more or less deserving over one’s lucky or unlucky (privileged or unprivileged) causal variables is an irrational, baseless position.” Which is not what people are suggesting when the say x deserves y for doing z. Dictionary definition again “a person has earned something or be given something because of their actions or qualities”. This definition has nothing to do with metaphysics.
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2) Causal determinism doesn’t say anything about “deserve” because it is not a ethical theory .
There may be justification for someone receiving certain benefits that others don’t or them not receiving extra (or less) benefits than others but those reasons have nothing to do with causal determinism per se.
1) No, it is not just about “earning” but whether they deserve what they earned (earning itself does not suggest deserving what is earned). Also, if you are going to point to a dictionary definition, link it as well, because a quick google search shows many different definitions, for example “do something or have or show qualities worthy of (reward or punishment)”.
The point is that they have not “deserved” or “merited” a reward or punishment that should be granted to them due to the action or quality itself that could not have been otherwise (even if there may be other reasons for granting it that apply to future consequences that do not suggest “being deserving”). And yes, being “deserving of X” when others do not have X or at the expense of others who lack X means that they are deserving X OVER another – and this is a big part of the problem of faulty “deserve” notions. Metaphysics of determinism just explain that the notion of “deserve” itself is as silly as suggesting that anyone who wins the lotto “deserved winning” and anyone who gets cancer “deserved cancer”.
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2) Causal determinism doesn’t have to, itself, be an ethical theory …in order to play into an ethical theory (namely the parts about ethical responsibility), just as any other fact that plays into ANY theory do not by themself have to BE the theory (if you want to use that reasoning you cannot make any claims about anything). If there are justifications, those justifications cannot (rationally) be that the person is more deserving (or the other is less deserving), because that very idea of “deserve” is nonsense given causal determinism.
Let's go back to one comment at a time please.Trick
“but whether they deserve what they earned” That’s what it means to be deserving – that you earned the reward through you own actions or qualities.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/deserve
“And yes, being “deserving of X” when others do not have X or at the expense of others who lack X means that they are deserving X OVER another” Why should incompetent people receive the same benefits as competent and productive people?
That is a horrible (and uncommon/obsolete) dictionary definition of “deserve”. If one can say “Did person X deserve what they earned?”, and that sentence makes sense (which it does), then obviously they do not mean the same thing in normal usage. Some of the examples the dictionary gives are more suited than the way they define it. How that dictionary defines “EARN”:
“(1) to receive money as payment for work that you do, OR (2) to get something that you deserve because of your abilities or actions”
(1) is NOT the same as (2)!
Receiving money as payment for work does not imply one deserves it. It is (2) that is completely irrational (If one uses the term “earn” in that way – that uncommon definition of “earn” is just as irrational as “deserve”)
Because whether one is competent or not has to do with causal luck or causal unluckiness and having causal luckiness does not mean one deserves more of the earth than another.
Trick
“Receiving money as payment for work does not imply one deserves it.” Not necessarily no. We usually say criminals despite “earning” their money do not deserve to profit from their crimes.
If no one deserves anything then why should the fortunate spend their resources on the unfortunate?
Then a definition that equates “deserve” with “earning” (as the one you suggest does) is a poor definition. Glad you agree.
The fortunate don’t spend their resources on the unfortunate today (8 men own more wealth than 3.6 billion people). The bigger point is in regards to justifications for calling resources “their resources” to begin with when they are not more deserving of such a larger chunk of resources. Mindset shifts regarding “ownership rights” need to take place, as when one is not more or less deserving, that lends to less justification for the gross inequalities we see with today’s “deserving” psychologies.
“Ownership rights” also come with responsibilities to the community and wealth generated by private citizens and businesses is redistributed through taxation. But if the whole concept of moral responsibility is nonsense then nobody need worry about these concerns – if a billionaire decides to hoard his wealth instead of putting it back into society we should just regard that as the same as if the termites eat it.
We don’t sufficiently “redistribute” via taxation – at least not yet. No doubt that if people hoard money they were causally determined to do so and are not blameworthy – but that does not imply there is no need to worry about these concerns (anymore than we should not worry about the dangerous psychopath even though they are not blameworthy – or non-blameworthy termites that eat important resources for that matter). The question we are asking is if it is rationally justified in society … if there is a rational justification for society to accept that “the billionaire should have ownership rights to that degree of wealth and resources at the expense of others” given that the billionaire is not any more deserving of it and that people in poverty are not deserving of that, etc.
“given that the billionaire is not any more deserving of it and that people in poverty are not deserving of that, etc.” But if we dispense with the notion of deserve then how could we convince a billionaire to show compassion to the unfortunate?
If we are able to convince a billionaire, hopefully it would be by explaining to them that the unfortunate are not blameworthy in regards to their circumstances and hence not deserving of their negative circumstances, and that the billionaire is not more deserving than the unfortunate of what they do own. More importantly, regardless if we can convince billionaires or not, perhaps a mindset shift needs to happen in regards to what we (society) allow for unjustified extreme ownership rights at the expense of many.
Hiya Tom – first thanks for the visit. 😀
In short: The free will of importance is logically incoherent regardless of whether or not materialism applies. What I mean by “no good reason” is that there is insufficient evidence to conclude a god. Even if, however, a god did exist, a free will ability would be just as logically incoherent when applied to such a “being”.
https://breakingthefreewillillusion.com/debunking-dennettian-diatribe/